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ESSAYS. 



ESSAYS 



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FORMATION AND PUBLICATION 



OF 



OPINIONS, 



THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH, 



AND ON OTHER SUBJECTS. 



BY 

SAMUEL BAILEY. 



NEW EDITION, EE VISED AND ENLARGED. 



BOSTON: 
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MBCCCL1V. 



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48 65 55 

JUL l 7 1942 



THURSTON, TORRY, AND EMERSON, PR1NTEK3. 



PREFACE 

TO THE FIRST EDITION. 

It has been frequently objected to metaphysical specu- 
lations, that they subserve no useful purpose ; and it must 
be allowed, that there are many inquiries in this depart- 
ment of intellectual exertion, which lead, in appearance, 
and even in reality, to no practical result. This is, 
however, a defect inherent in every pursuit, and can be 
brought as no specific objection against the philosophy of 
mind. How many substances are analyzed by the chem- 
ist, which can never be rendered useful ; how many 
plants are minutely described by the naturalist, which 
might have remained in obscurity without the least pos- 
sible detriment to the world ; and how many events are 
narrated by the historian, from which no beneficial infer- 
ence can be drawn ! It seems to be a necessary condition 
of human science, that w T e should learn many useless 
things, in order to become acquainted with those which 
are of service ; and as it is impossible, antecedently to 
experience, to know the value of our acquisitions, the 
only way in which mankind can secure all the advantages 
of knowledge is to prosecute their inquiries in every 
possible direction. There can be no greater impediment 



VI PREFACE. 

to the progress of science than a perpetual and anxious 
reference at every step to palpable utility. Assured that 
the general result will be beneficial, it is not wise to be 
too solicitous as to the immediate value of every individual 
effort. Besides, there is a certain completeness to be 
attained in every science, for which we are obliged to 
acquire many particulars not otherwise of any worth. 
Nor is it to be forgotten, that trivial and apparently useless 
acquisitions are often the necessary preparatives to im- 
portant discoveries. The labors of the antiquary, the 
verbal critic, the collator of mouldering manuscripts, the 
describer of microscopic objects (labors which may appear 
to many out of all proportion to the value of the result), 
may be preparing the way for the achievements of some 
splendid genius, who may combine their minute details 
into a magnificent system, or evolve from a multitude of 
particulars, collected with painful toil, some general prin- 
ciple destined to illuminate the career of future ages. 
To no one, perhaps, are the labors of his predecessors, 
even when they are apparently trifling or unsuccessful, of 
more service than to the metaphysician ; and he who is 
well acquainted with the science can scarcely fail to 
perceive, that many of its inquiries are gradually con- 
verging to important results. Unallied as they may 
appear to present utility, it is not hazarding much to 
assert, that the world must hereafter be indebted to them 
for the extirpation of many mischievous errors, and the 
correction of a great part of those loose and illogical 
opinions by which society is now pervaded. 



PREFACE. ( Vll 

The principal Essays in the following work are attempts 
to throw the light of metaphysical investigation on sub- 
jects intimately connected w T ith the affairs and the happi- 
ness of mankind. The importance of the topics discussed 
in the two Essays to which the volume owes its title will 
be acknowledged by all, and it will be perceived by the 
attentive inquirer, that the principles which the author has 
there attempted to establish lead to the most momentous 
conclusions, many of which he has contented himself with 
leaving to the sagacity of his readers. If any one will 
take the trouble of rigidly pursuing the main principle of 
the first Essay to all its consequences, he will find them 
of a magnitude and importance of which he was originally 
perhaps little aware. 

In venturing upon these remarks, the author would not 
be conceived as making any undue claims to originality. 
Most of the principles, which he has advanced, have been 
repeatedly asserted, and have had an influence on man- 
kind of which they themselves were probably unconscious. 
It often happens, that an important principle is vaguely 
apprehended, and incidentally expressed, long before it is 
reduced to a definite form or fixed by regular proof: but 
while it floats in this state on the surface of men's un- 
derstandings it is only of casual and limited utility ; it is 
sometimes forgotten and sometimes abandoned, seldom 
pursued to its consequences, and frequently denied in its 
modifications. It is only after it has been clearly estab- 
lished by an indisputable process of reasoning, explored 
in its bearings, and exhibited in all its force, that it becomes 



Vlll PREFACE. 



of uniform and essential service ; it is only then that it 
can be decisively appealed to both in controversy and in 
practice, and that it exerts the whole extent of its influ- 
ence on private manners and public institutions. 






CONTENTS. 



ESSAY I. 

ON THE FORMATION OF OPINIONS. 

PAGE 

On the Terms, Belief, Assent, and Opinion . . 3 
On the Independence of Belief on the Will • . 7 
On the Opinions of Locke and some other "Writers on 
this subject 12 

4. On the Circumstances which have led men to regard 

Belief as voluntary 16 

5. On the Sources of Differences of Opinion • . 21 

6. The same Subject continued. Sources of Differences 

of Opinion in the Feelings and Passions of Mankind 29 

7. On Belief and Opinions, as objects of Moral Approba- 

tion and Disapprobation, Rewards and Punishments 37 

8. On the Evil Consequences of the Common Errors on 

this subject .43 

ESSAY II. 

ON THE PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS. 

Sect. 1. Introduction .57 

2. On the Mischiefs of Error and the Advantages of 

Truth 60 

3. Continuation of the same subject .... 67 



X CONTENTS. 

Sect. 4. On Freedom of Discussion as the Means of attaining 

Truth 72 

5. On the Assumptions involved in all Restraints on the 

Publication of Opinions 77 

6. On the Free Publication of Opinions as affecting the 

People at large 83 

7. On the ultimate Inefficacy of Restraints on the Publi- 

cation of Opinions, and their bad Effects in disturb- 
ing the natural Course of Improvement . . 90 



MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS. 

ESSAY III. 
On Facts and Inferences 99 

ESSAY IV. 

On the Influence of Reason on the Feelings . . .107 

ESSAY V. 

On Inattention to the Dependence of Causes and Effects in 
Moral Conduct. 

Part 1 117 

Part II 125 

ESSAY VI. 

On some of the Causes and Consequences of Individual 
Character 131 

ESSAY VII. 
On the Vicissitudes of Life 139 

ESSAY VIII. 
On the Variety, of Intellectual Pursuits .... 147 

/ 



CONTENTS. XI 

ESSAY IX. 

On Practical and Speculative Ability . . . .155 

ESSAY X. 

On the Mutability of Human Feelings . . . .169 
Notes and Illustrations 175 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

CHAPTER I. 

The Importance of Truth and of our Moral Sentiments in 
relation to the pursuit of it . ... 203 

CHAPTER II. 

The Duty of Entering upon Inquiry 216 

Sect. 1. In -what Circumstances Inquiry is a Duty . 217 

2. Objections and Prejudices inimical to the Duty of 

Inquiry , 231 

3. Continuation of the subject • . 238 

CHAPTER III. 

Duties in the Process of Inquiry 249 

Sect. 1. Duties of the' Inquirer in relation to the State of 

his own Mind 249 

2. Duties in relation to the Evidence . • .263 

CHAPTER IV. 

The Issue of Inquiry .271 

Sect. 1. The Issue of Inquiry, not a matter of Duty . 272 
2. The Issue of Inquiry attended by its natural Con- 
sequences 281 



xu 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER V. 

Duties towards others in relation to the Pursuit of 

Truth 285 

Sect. 1. Moral Influence 286 

2. Intellectual Assistance . 295 

3. Treatment of the Young 301 

4. Public Communications ..... 306 

5. Eeception of Public Communications . .310 

6. Duties of Non-Inquirers 319 

CHAPTER VI. 

Duties of Governments in relation to the Pursuit of 

Truth 326 

Sect. 1. Duties of Governments considered as Inquirers 

themselves 326 

2. Duties of Governments towards their Subjects 

considered as Inquirers. Encouragement of 
Inquiry ....... 328 

3. Continuation of the Subject. Methods of pro- 

moting the Attainment of Truth . . . 331 

Sub Sect. 1. Employing Public Instructors .... 332 

2. Employing Force . . . . . .345 



CHAPTER VII. 
Conclusion 352 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

Paet I .357 

II 369 

III - 385 



APPENDIX. 



Notes and Illustrations 



403 



ESSAY 



ON 



THE FORMATION OF OPINIONS. 



ESSAY I. 

ON THE FORMATION OP OPINIONS, 



SECTION I. 

ON THE TERMS BELIEF, ASSENT, AND OPINION. 

Every proposition presented to the mind, the terms of 
which are understood, necessarily occasions either belief, 
doubt, or disbelief. These are states or affections of the 
mind on which definition can throw no light, but which no 
one can be at a loss to understand ; resembling, in this 
respect, all the other simple operations and emotions of 
which we are conscious. Although we cannot define or 
illustrate them, we may, nevertheless, enlarge or limit the 
application of the terms by which they are distinguished. 

By some writers the term belief has been restricted to 
the state of the understanding in relation to propositions 
of a probable nature. Locke, for instance, makes a dis- 
tinction between the perception of truth, in propositions 
which are certain, and the entertainment, as he expresses 
it, given by the mind to those which are only probable ; 
styling the former knowledge, the latter belief, assent, or 



4 ON THE TERMS BELIEF, 

opinion.* This distinction, however, is not sanctioned by 
the practice of the generality of metaphysicians, who 
constantly employ the term belief in reference to facts 
and propositions of all kinds. They speak of the belief, 
not only of our own identity, of the existence of an exter- 
nal world, and of the being of a God, but of the axioms 
and theorems of geometry. Nor does there appear to be 
any ground for the distinction when we appeal to our own 
consciousness. The nature of the affection is the same, 
whatever be the nature of the subject which has occa- 
sioned it. It is a state, indeed, which admits of various 
modifications ; or, in other words, the belief of some 
things ma}' be more firm' and lively than of others. This 
strength and liveliness, however, do not at all depend on 
the logical nature of the propositions entertained. We 
believe as firmly, that there was a sanguinary contest be- 
tween the English and French on the field of Waterloo, 
as that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two 
right angles, although the one would be ranked by logi- 
cians amongst probable, and the other amongst certain 
propositions. 

There are two other terms sometimes employed as 
synonymous with belief, viz. assent and opinion, but all 
the three have their respective shades of meaning. Assent 
appears to denote the state of the understanding in re- 
lation only to propositions ; while belief has a more 
comprehensive acceptation, expressing the state of the 

* * Probability is likeness to be true, the very notation of the word 
signifying such a proposition, for which there be arguments or 
proofs, to make it pass or be received for true. The entertainment 
the mind gives this sort of propositions is called belief, assent, or 
opinion, which is the admitting or receiving any proposition for true, 
upon arguments, or proofs, that are found to persuade us to receive 
it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so.' — Essay on the 
Understanding, book iv., chapter 15. 



ASSENT, 

mind in relation to any fact or circumstance, although 
that fact or circumstance maj r never have occurred to it 
in the form of a proposition, or, what is the same thing, 
may never have been reduced by it into words. Every 
body believes in his own identity, and in the existence of 
an external world, although comparatively few have 
thought of these truths in express terms. It would, there- 
fore, be more proper to speak of a man's belief in his 
identity than of his assent to his identity ; of his belief in 
the existence of matter than of his assent to it : but we 
might with perfect propriety speak of his assent to the 
proposition that matter exists. 

The term opinion is used by Locke, in some passages 
of his Essay, as synonymous with belief and assent, but 
there is a wide difference in its general acceptation. It is 
seldom, if ever, used in reference to subjects which are 
certain or demonstrable. We talk of a person's opinion 
in religion or politics, but not in algebra or geometry, and 
so far the last named philosopher and common usage are 
in accordance ; but he appears to have sometimes forgot- 
ten that the term, in its ordinary sense, denotes not the 
state of the mind, but the subject of belief, the thing or 
the proposition believed. Thus we say to receive, to hold, 
and to renounce an opinion. 

The distinctions here pointed out are not, however, very 
closely observed. On the contrary, it is surprising that 
words of so much importance should be employed with so 
little precision. Belief is often indiscriminately used to 
express a state or affection of the understanding, a propo- 
sition believed, a doctrine, and a collection of doctrines. 
In the following pages it will simply denote the state or 
affection of the mind, while the term opinion will be em- 
ployed (in reference to propositions of a probable nature) 
to designate that which is believed. 



6 BELIEF, ASSENT, AND OPINION. 

It may be remarked, that whatever we believe may be 
thrown into the form of a proposition ; and when we say 
of such a proposition that we believe it, it is equivalent to 
saying that it appears to us to be true. The expressions 
are exactly synonymous, or convertible ; for it would be a 
manifest contradiction to assert that we believed a propo- 
sition which did not appear true to us, or that a proposition 
appeared true which we did not believe. 



INDEPENDENCE OF BELIEF ON THE WILL. 7 

SECTION II. 

ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF BELIEF ON THE WILL. 

It has been frequently asserted, and still more fre- 
quently assumed, that belief is, in many cases, a voluntary 
act of the mind. In what cases, however, it is dependent 
on the will, few writers have ventured to state in direct 
terms ; nor do I know that the subject has ever been 
examined with that closeness of attention which its impor- 
tance deserves. If it were a point of mere speculative 
curiosity, it would scarcely be worth while to rescue it 
from the vagueness in which it has hitherto remained ; 
but the fact is, that many of the actions, as well as many 
of the moral judgments of mankind, proceed on an 
assumption of the voluntary nature of belief, and it there- 
fore becomes of practical moment to ascertain how far that 
assumption is founded in truth. Of the justness of this 
remark we shall have occasion in the sequel to adduce 
ample proof. 

It may be observed, in the first place, that there are a 
great number of facts and propositions, in regard to our 
belief, of which it is universally allowed that the will can 
have no power, and motives no efficacy. A mathematical 
axiom, for instance, cannot be doubted by any man who 
comprehends the terms in which it is expressed, however 
ardent may be his desire to disbelieve it. Threats and 
torments would be in vain employed to compel a geome- 
trician to dissent from a proposition in Euclid. He might 
be compelled to assert the falsity of the proposition, but 
all the powers in the universe could not make him believe 
what he thus asserted. In the same way, no hopes nor 



8 ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF 

fears, no menaces, no allurements, could at all affect a 
man's belief in a matter of fact which happened under 
his own observation. The remark is also true of innu- 
merable facts which we have received on the testimony 
of others. That there have been such men as Csesar and 
Cicero, Pope and Newton, and that there are at present 
such cities as Paris and Vienna, it is impossible to disbe- 
lieve by any effort of the will. 

In those cases, therefore, where the evidence is of such 
a nature as to produce universal assent, it is acknowledged 
by all that the will can have no power over our convic- 
tions. If it exercises any control at all, we must look for 
it in those subjects which admit of diversity of opinion. 
But the belief, doubt, or disbelief which a man entertains 
of any proposition, which others regard with different 
sentiments, may be the same in strength and every other 
respect as the belief, doubt, or disbelief which he enter- 
tains of a proposition in regard to which there is entire 
unanimity ; and if in the latter case his opinion is involun- 
tary, there can be no reason to suppose it otherwise in the 
former. The mere circumstance of others taking a dif- 
ferent view of the subject (of which he may be altogether 
unaware) can have no tendency to render his belief more 
liable to be affected by motives, or, in other words, to 
bring it under the control of the will. 

It will, perhaps, be generally granted, that decided be- 
lief, or decided disbelief, when once engendered in the 
mind, cannot be affected by volition. This influence is 
usually placed in the middle region of suspense and 
doubt, and it is suppos'ed, that when the understanding is 
in a state of fluctuation between two opinions, it is in the 
power of the will to determine the decision. The state 
of doubt, however, will be found to be no more subject to 
the will than any other state of the intellect. All the 



BELIEF ON THE WILL. V 

various degrees of belief and disbelief, from the fullest 
conviction to doubt, and from doubt to absolute incredulity, 
correspond to the degree of evidence, or to the nature of 
the considerations present to the mind. To be in doubt 
is to want that degree or kind of evidence which produces 
belief; and while the evidence remains the same, without 
addition or diminution, the mind must continue in doubt.* 
The understanding, it is clear, cannot believe a proposi- 
tion on precisely the same evidence as that on which it 
previously doubted it, and yet to ascribe to mere volition 
a change from doubt to conviction is asserting that this 
may take place ; it is affirming that a man, without the 
slightest reason, may, if he please, believe to-day what he 
doubted yesterday. 

It may be alleged, perhaps, that it is not necessary to 
suppose the understanding to believe a proposition on the 
same evidence as that on which it previously doubted it, 
since the will may have the power of changing the charac- 
ter of the evidence. This implies that it may be capable 
either of raising additional ideas in the mind, or of de- 
taching some of the ideas already there from the rest with 
which they are associated, and dismissing them from 
view. But it is acknowledged by our best metaphysical 

* Belief appears to be the firmest when there are no hostile or 
contrary considerations for the mind to rest upon. In proportion to 
the number and importance of contrary considerations belief is im- 
paired, and if they are increased to a certain extent, it fades into 
doubt. The latter is often a state of oscillation, in which the. mind 
passes from one class of arguments to another, the predominant 
affection of the moment according with the arguments on which the 
contemplation happens to be fixed. The mind may also be said to 
be in doubt when it is acquainted with neither side of a question, 
and has therefore no grounds for a determinate opinion. The one 
may be called active or positive, the other passive or negative 
doubt. 



10 ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF 

writers,* that by mere volition we cannot call up any idea, 
nor, therefore, any number of ideas forming an argument; 
such an operation necessarily implying the actual pre- 
sence of the ideas before the will is exerted : it is also 
impossible for us to choose what ideas shall be introduced 
into the mind by any topic on which we bestow our atten- 
tion ; and it is manifest, that when ideas have been once 
joined together, we cannot prevent them from suggesting 
each other according to the regular laws of association. 
In the examination of any subject, therefore, certain ideas 
will arise in our minds independently of the will, and, as 
long as we fix our attention on that subject, we cannot 
avoid the consequent suggestions, nor single out any part 
and forget the rest. We may, it is true, by the help of 
external means, or even by an internal effort^ dismiss a 
subject entirely from our thoughts ; we may get rid of it 
by turning our attention to something else ; but while we 
continue to reflect upon it, we cannot prevent it from sug- 
gesting those ideas, which, from the habits, character, and 
constitution of our minds, it is calculated to excite. 

We come then to the conclusion, that since the same 
considerations present to the mind must invariably pro- 
duce the same belief, doubt, or disbelief, and since volition 
can neither introduce any additional considerations, nor 
dismiss what are already present, the will can have no 
influence on belief; or, in other words, belief, doubt, and 
disbelief, are involuntary states of the intellect. 

But the proof of the involuntary nature of belief de- 
pends not on the justness of any metaphysical argument. 
Every one may bring the question to the test of experi- 
ment ; he may appeal to his own consciousness, and try 

* See Lord Karnes's Elements of Criticism, and Dugald Stewart's 
Philosophy of the Human Mind. ^ 



BELIEF ON THE WILL. 11 

whether, in any conceivable case, he can at pleasure 
change his opinion, and he will soon become sensible of 
the inefficacy of the attempt.* Take any controverted 
fact in history ; let a man make himself perfectly ac- 
quainted with the statements and authorities on both sides, 
and, at the end of his investigation, he will either believe, 
doubt, or disbelieve the fact in question. Now apply any 
possible motive to his mind. Blame him, praise him, in- 
timidate him by threats, or allure him by promises, and 
after all your efforts, how far will you have succeeded in 
changing the state of his intellect in relation to the fact? 
How far will you have altered the connection which he 
discerns between certain premises and certain conclu- 
sions ? To affect his belief you must affect the subject 
of it by producing new arguments or considerations. The 
understanding being passive as to the impressions made 
upon it, if you wish to change those impressions you must 
change the cause which produces them. You can alter 
perceptions only by altering the thing perceived. Every 
man's consciousness will tell him, that the will can no 
more modify the effect of an argument on the understand- 
ing, than it can change the taste of sugar to the palate, or 
the fragrance of a rose to the smell ; and that nothing can 
weaken its force, as apprehended by the intellect, but 
another argument opposed to it. 

* See Note A. 



12 ON THE OPINIONS OF LOCKE AND 



SECTION III. 

ON THE OPINIONS OF LOCKE AND SOME OTHER WRITERS 
ON THIS SUBJECT. 

The view which we have just taken, of the involuntary 
nature of belief, coincides with that which Locke has pre- 
sented to us in the following passage, as well as in other 
parts of his Essay. 

c As knowledge,' says he, c is no more arbitrary than 
perception ; so I think assent is no more in our power 
than knowledge. When the agreement of any two ideas 
appears to our minds, whether immediately or by the 
assistance of reason, I can no more refuse to perceive, 
no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid seeing those 
objects which I turn my eyes to, and look on in daylight : 
and what upon full examination I find the most probable, 
I cannot deny my assent to. But though we cannot 
hinder our knowledge, where the agreement is once per- 
ceived, nor our assent, where the probability manifestly 
appears upon due consideration of all the measures of it ; 
yet we can hinder both knowledge and assent, by stopping 
our inquiry, and not employing our faculties in the search 
of any truth.'* 

It is not to be concealed, however, that this powerful 
reasoner frequently makes use of language implying be- 
lief to be an affair of the will, although there is only one 
case which he specifically points out as an exception to 
the general remark in the preceding extract. 

< I think,' says he, c we may conclude, that in proposi- 

* Essay on the UnderstandingJ^ook iv., chapter 20. 



m 
SOME OTHERS ON THIS SUBJECT. 13 

tions, where though the proofs in view are of most mo- 
ment, yet there are sufficient grounds to suspect that there 
is either fallacy in words, or certain proofs as considerable 
to be produced on the contrary side; there assent, sus- 
pense, or dissent, are often voluntary actions. ' * 

Here he has evidently mistaken the effect of an argu- 
ment on the understanding for an act of the will. To 
have ' sufficient grounds to suspect either fallacy in words, 
or certain proofs as considerable to be produced on the 
contrary side/ is to be already in doubt, or in the state 
called suspense ; and consequently our suspense cannot be 
occasioned by subsequent volition, much less can it be 
converted by the will into assent or dissent. 

Locke has in fact asserted, first, that the mind may be 
in doubt from a consideration presented to the understand- 
ing, and then, that in consequence of this doubt it may 
voluntarily suspend its opinion ; or, in other words, volun- 
tarily doubt what it before doubted involuntarily. 

The case adduced is analogous to that of a surveyor, 
who in taking the dimensions of a piece of timber should 
be led to suspect the correctness of the instrument which 
he employed. The suspicion would be manifestly invol- 
untary, and could be removed only by a proof of its being 
unfounded. That in the instance alleged by Locke, or in 
any instance, assent, suspense, and dissent are voluntary 
actions, is moreover inconsistent with his former admis- 
sion, that assent must follow or be determined by the 
greater manifest probability. For, if a greater apparent 
probability unavoidably produces assent, a smaller ap- 
parent probability opposed to it must produce dissent ; and 
two equal probabilities poised against each other (which is 
the only remaining case that can possibly occur) must 

* Essay on the Understending, book iv., chapter 20. 



14 ON THE OPINIONS OF LOCKE AND 

either produce uncertainty, or one of them must produce 
the same effect as a greater probability, and the other the 
same effect as a smaller probability. Thus two opposite 
and unequal effects would be made to result from two 
equal causes. And if to believe a proposition is the same 
thing as for that proposition to appear to the mind more 
probable than its opposite, then to say that a man may 
believe if he choose one of tw T o equally probable propo- 
sitions, and disbelieve the other, is to say, that by an act 
of the will two propositions may appear equally and 
unequally probable at the same time. 

In the writings of another celebrated philosopher. Dr. 
Reid, we find the doctrine, that belief is independent of 
the will, stated without any such exception as that which 
has been the subject of the preceding animadversions. 

c It is not in our power,' says this acute writer, ' to judge 
as we will. The judgment is carried along necessarily by 
the evidence, real or seeming, which appears to us at the 
time. But in propositions that are submitted to our judg- 
ment there is this great difference ; some are of such a 
nature that a man of ripe understanding may apprehend 
them distinctly, and perfectly understand their meaning 
without finding himself under any necessity of believing 
them to be true or false, probable or improbable. The 
judgment remains in suspense, until it is inclined on one 
side or another by reasons or arguments.' * 

That Dr. Reid did not ascribe this suspense of the 
judgment to any exertion of the will is sufficiently evident 
from the manner in which he expresses himself. It is 
scarcely necessary to adduce the following passage by 
way of corroboration, but it is too explicit and too much 
in point not to be presented to the reader. 

* Essays on the Intellectual Powers, page 545, 4to. edition. 



SOME OTHERS ON THIS SUBJECT. 15 

c Every degree of evidence, perceived by the mind, 
produces a proportioned degree of assent or belief. The 
judgment may be in perfect suspense between two con- 
tradictory opinions, when there is no evidence for either, 
or equal evidence for both. The least preponderancy on 
one side inclines the judgment in proportion. Belief is 
mixed with doubt, more or less, until we come to the 
highest degree of evidence, when all doubt vanishes, 
and the belief is firm and immovable. This degree of 
evidence, the highest the human faculties can attain, we 
call certainty.'' * 

Lord Bacon, in several parts of his writings, appears to 
have entertained similar views on this subject, although, 
as he never made it a matter of separate consideration, 
and only incidentally mentions it, his language cannot be 
expected to be uniformly consistent. In one remarkable 
passage he directly asserts the independence of belief on 
thewill, and distinctly points out the only way in which 
it can be controlled. 

c The commandment of knowledge,' says he 4 is yet 
higher than the commandment over the will ; for it is a 
commandment over the reason, belief, and understanding 
of man, which is the highest part of the mind, and giveth 
law to the will itself; for there is no power on earth, 
which setteth up a throne, or chair of state, in the spirits 
and souls of men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, 
opinions, and beliefs, but knowledge and learning.' t 

* Essays on the Intellectual Powers, p. 691, 4to. edition. 
f Of the Proficience and Advancement of Learning, book i. 



16 WHY BELIEF HAS BEEN 



SECTION IV. 

ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES WniCH HAVE LED MEN TO 
REGARD BELIEF AS VOLUNTARY. 

It is natural to inquire, why the affection or state of 
mind, which we term belief, should be considered as 
depending on the will any more than other affections 
or states of mind ; why the discernment of truth and 
error should be considered as voluntary, and the. discern- 
ment of other qualities as involuntary. We cannot alter 
at pleasure the appearances of objects, nor the sentiments 
which they occasion. If we open our eyes we must see 
things as they are, and receive the impressions which 
they are fitted to produce. Fields will appear barren or 
fertile, hills low or lofty, rivers wide or narrow, men and 
women handsome or ugly, pleasant or disagreeable. If 
we take up a book its language will appear to us refined 
or vulgar, its figures apt or inappropriate, its images 
beautiful or inelegant, its matter well or ill arranged, its 
narrative pathetic, or lively, or uninteresting ; and we 
think not of ascribing these impressions to the will ; why 
then, when we go a step farther, and find its arguments 
convincing, or doubtful, or inconclusive, should that be 
considered as a voluntary act ? 

The common error, of regarding belief as dependent on 
volition, may perhaps be mainly ascribed to the intimate 
connection subsisting between belief and the expression or 
declaration of it, the latter of which is at all times an act 
of the will. So close is this connection, and so frequently 
do they coincide, that this same language is often appli- 
cable to both. It is not, therefore, surprising that they 

■ 



REGARDED AS VOLUNTARY. 17 

have been confounded together, and even received one 
common appellation, for the term assent is used to express 
the intimation of our concurrence with an opinion as well 
as the concurrence itself, our ostensible as well as our 
real belief. By this intimate connection and frequent 
coincidence, men have been inadvertently led to attribute 
the properties belonging to an external sign to the state or 
affection of the mind, and have drawn their inferences as 
if the two things were exactly identical. As we can 
refuse to express our agreement with a proposition, so, it 
has been assumed, we can refuse to believe it; and as 
motives have power to induce a man to declare his assent, 
so it has been taken for granted they have the power of 
inducing him to yield his credence. 

Our best writers and acutest metaphysicians speak of 
yielding or withholding our belief, granting or refusing 
our assent, all which are evidently phrases transferred 
from the external profession to the internal act. They 
can be regarded with propriety only as figurative expres- 
sions ; and if they are defensible, on the ground of the 
necessity of explaining the phenomena of the mind by a 
reference to physical events, their figurative character 
should never be overlooked. 

It is trite to remark, that, in treating of the mental 
powers, it is but too common to found conclusions on the 
literal interpretation of metaphorical phrases, as if the 
operations of the mind corresponded exactly with those 
physical operations which supplied the language used in 
describing them. 

We cannot keep too steadily in view the distinction 
here pointed out, between the state of the understanding 
and the outward declaration, between internal and exter- 
nal assent. To the neglect of it may be traced almost 
all the vagueness, sophistry, and inconsistency on the sub- 
2 



18 WHY BELIEF HAS BEEN 

ject of belief, which abound, as well in the writings of 
moralists and metaphysicians, as in the opinions, practices, 
and institutions of society. We ought always to bear in 
mind, that what a man affirms may be totally at variance 
with what he believes : and that whatever power we may 
exert over his professions by allurements or intimidation, 
by the application of pleasure or of pain, his internal con- 
viction can be reached by nothing but considerations ad- 
dressed to his intellect. 

Another source of error on this subject has probably 
been the practice of confounding the consent of the under- 
standing with that of the will or the feelings. The term 
assent is often applied indiscriminately to both, and doubt- 
less this confusion has sometimes suggested wrong infer- 
ences. Dr. Johnson has furnished an instance .of the ease 
with which these two very different things may be. con- 
founded by their common right to the same term. He 
defines assent to be c the act of agreeing to any thing,' 
and supports his interpretation by the following exam- 
ples : — 

1 Without the King's assent or knowledge 
You wrought to be a legate. 9 

Shakspeare, Henry VIII. 

i All the arguments on both sides must be laid in balance, and 
upon the whole, the understanding determine its assent. 9 

Locke. 

In the first of these examples, the term is evidently 
used, not to express opinion or belief, but the consent or 
concurrence of the will ; in the second it implies the 
consent of the understanding. The expression, c act of 
agreeing,' may be employed indifferently for either ; but 
agreeing to a measure or a proposal is obviously a very 
different thing from agreeing with an argument or a propo- 
sition. 



REGARDED AS VOLUNTARY. 19 

In attempting to account for the error of regarding 
belief as voluntary, it is important to remark, that it may 
have arisen, in some degree, from the circumstance of 
many people having no real conception of the truth or 
falsehood of those opinions which they profess. They 
adopt an opinion according to their interest or their pas- 
sions ; or, in other words, they undertake to assert some 
particular doctrine, and regard as adversaries all who 
oppose it. Without any reference to its import, they look 
upon it as a thing to be maintained, a post to be defended. 
In this sense, and with such people, opinions may be said 
to be voluntary, and being mere professions, forming a 
sort of party badge, and having no dependence on the 
understanding, they may be assumed and discarded at 
pleasure. 

It may perhaps be asserted with truth, that in regard 
to some subjects or other, all mankind are in this pre- 
dicament; and opinions thus taken up are often main- 
tained with more violence than such as are founded on 
the most thorough conviction. They are maintained, not 
for the sake of truth, nor from the desire natural to man 
of impressing upon others what he sincerely believes, 
but for the support of that interest, or the gratification 
of that passion, on account of which they were originally 
adopted. By thus defending opinions of which they have 
no clear conviction, people often succeed in imposing on 
themselves as well as on others. Paradoxical as it may 
seem, it is nevertheless true, that they are not always 
aware of the exact state of their own minds : they fre- 
quently imagine themselves to believe more than they are 
actually convinced of. On many questions they are not 
able to form any definite decision, and yet, from the 
necessity of professing some opinion, or joining some 
party, and from the habit of making assertions, and 
even arguing in favor of what they are thus pledged 



20 BELIEF REGARDED AS VOLUNTARY. 

to support, they come to regard themselves as entertaining 
positive sentiments on points about which they are really 
in doubt. 

To solve this apparent paradox it is necessary to reflect, 
that as it is impossible for us to have all the considerations 
on which our opinions are founded at once and all subjects 
present to the mind, our opinions are on most occasions 
simply objects of memory, results at which we recollect to 
have arrived without at the moment recollecting the pro- 
cess. In this way we believe propositions on the strength 
of our recollection, and perhaps the considerations on 
which they are founded present themselves only on occa- 
sions when it is necessary, for our own satisfaction or for 
the conviction of others, to retrace or restate them. Hence 
it is obviously possible for even an acute logician to be 
mistaken as to the opinions about which he has attained a 
decisive conviction, and not to find out this mistake till he 
is reduced to the necessity of recollecting, or rather repeat- 
ing, the process through which he had originally gone. 
When he is thus driven back on the merits of the question, 
he finds and feels himself doubtful as to points on which 
he imagined his mind to have been previously satisfied. 
If men, who are capable of estimating evidence, of pursu- 
ing a train of argument, and of reflecting on the operations 
of their own minds, are sometimes liable to this kind of 
deception, we need not wonder to find it common amongst 
such as have scarcely any definite notions, or any power 
of self-introspection. 

To return to the remark which led to this digression, it 
may be observed, that the practice of adopting and main- 
raining opinions without any actual conviction, must neces- 
sarily give them the appearance of depending on the will, 
and what is true of mere professions is naturally and easily 
transferred to opinions which have really j ossession of the 
understanding. 



SOURCES OF DIFFERENCES OF OPINION. 21 



SECTION V. 

ON THE SOURCES OF DIFFERENCES OF OPINION. 

Although belief is an involuntary state of the mind, 
yet, like many other involuntary affections and events, it 
may, in some circumstances, be partialiy controlled by 
our voluntary actions. Sleep is involuntary, but it may, 
to a certain extent, be prevented or induced according to 
our pleasure ; and in a similar manner, although we have 
no power to believe or disbelieve as we choose, yet there 
are cases in which we may imperfectly modify our belief, 
by subjecting our minds to the operation of such evidence 
as promises to gratify our inclination in its result. We 
may, at any time, be unfair and partial in the examination 
of a question. We may turn our attention from the argu- 
ments on one side, and direct all its keenness to those on 
the other; and notwithstanding some latent suspicions of 
a contrary nature, springing from the consciousness of a 
want of candor, we may possibly by such means lessen 
our doubts about an opinion which we desire to think 
true. 

If we had already a clear and full conviction of the 
truth of any doctrine, perhaps no partiality of attention in 
favor of the opposite side could effect an alteration in our 
opinion; but in all cases where our views were vague, or 
our minds uniformed, an exclusive devotion to one side of 
the evidence might have a material influence on our con- 
clusions. In such cases, a man has in some degree the 
power of making his opinions follow in the track of his 
inclinations. 

Let us suppose the case of one, who perceived that it 



22 ON THE SOURCES OF 

would be greatly to his interest to hold a certain doctrine, 
on which he had hitherto bestowed only a vague consider- 
ation. Unless he had more than common magnanimity, 
he would naturally endeavor to free himself from any 
doubts which might be floating in his mind. He would, 
therefore, make himself acquainted with all the arguments 
which had been urged on that side of the question to 
which his inclinations were directed, and shun all of a 
contrary nature, and by such a system of exclusion he 
might be successful in his object. Even in this case, how- 
ever, considerations might present themselves to his mind 
which would counteract all his efforts, and force upon him 
the very conviction he was endeavoring to avoid. Though 
he might choose what written or oral arguments should 
operate on his understanding, he could have no power 
over the result ; he would have no control over the intel- 
lectual machinery which those arguments might set in 
motion in his own mind. 

This wilful partiality of attention or examination is the 
only way in which our opinions can be purposely affected 
by our actions, or in which we can exercise any control 
over the formation of our opinions ; and its effects are 
■ obviously very circumscribed and uncertain. By a cur- 
sory glance at those sources of diversity of opinion which 
have no dependence on the will, it will be seen that they 
are perfectly sufficient to account for most of the differ- 
ences which exist; and that an intentional partiality in 
our investigations can have but a slender influence amidst 
the operation of causes so much more powerful. 

The external circumstances in which men are placed, 
as they vary in the case of every individual, must neces- 
sarily occasion different ideas to be presented to each 
mind, different associations to be established even amongst 
the same ideas, and of course different opinions to be 



DIFFERENCES OF OPINION. 23 

formed. It may be truly said, indeed, that in no instance 
have the ideas presented to two individuals, throughout- 
the course of their lives, collectively agreed or corres- 
ponded precisely in their qrder and connection. Amongst 
the external circumstances here alluded to, perhaps the 
most striking are those which we see operating on whole 
nations. In general, the casualty of being brought into 
the world in a particular country inevitably determines the 
greater part of a man's opinions ; and of the rest, there 
are few which do not owe their origin to the rank and 
family in which he happens to be born, and to the char- , 
acters of the other human beings by whom he is sur- 
rounded. Even the extraordinary views, which open to 
the man of original genius, are often the result of various 
ideas suggested by his peculiar situation, and presented to 
his conception in a particular order and concomitance. 

A great portion of the opinions of mankind are notori- 
ously propagated by transmission from one generation to 
another, without any possible option on the part of those 
into whose minds they are instilled. A child regards as 
true whatever his teachers choose to inculcate, and what- 
ever he discovers to be believed by those around him. 
His creed is thus insensibly formed, and he will continue 
in after-life to believe the same things, without any proof, 
provided his knowledge and experience do not happen to 
impinge on their falsehood. Mere instillation is sufficient 
to make him believe any proposition, although he should 
be utterly ignorant of the foundation on which it rests, or 
the evidence by which it is supported. It may create in 
his mind a belief of the most palpable absurdities ; things, 
as it appears to others, not only contradicted by his rea- 
son, but at variance with the testimony of his senses ; 
and in the boundless field, which the senses do not reach, 
there is nothing too preposterous to be palmed on his 



24 ON THE SOURCES OF 

credulity. The religious opinions of the majority of man- 
kind are necessarily acquired in this way : from the 
nature of the case, they cannot be otherwise than deriva- 
tive, and they are as firmly believed, without the least 
particle of evidence, as the theorems of Euclid by those 
who understand the demonstrations. Men do not suspect 
their religious creed to be false, because the grounds of 
its truth or its falsity lie altogether without the pale of 
their knowledge, and remote from the path of their ex- 
perience, and because, when they have been accustomed 
to connect certain ideas together in their infancy, it grows 
beyond the power of their imagination to disjoin them. 
Nor is 1t merely definite opinions which are acquired in 
this manner, but a thousand associations are established 
in the mind, which influence their judgments in matters 
with which they subsequently become conversant. 

Thus the external circumstances in which men are 
placed unavoidably occasion, without any choice on their 
part, the chief diversities of opinion existing in the world. 
National circumstances occasion national, and individual 
circumstances individual peculiarities of thinking. On 
this point, indeed, there can be no dispute. The most 
strenuous advocates (if such there are) for the power of 
the will over belief, will not deny the influence of the 
causes adduced : they will readily acknowledge that it is 
impossible for all men to think alike, when their cir- 
cumstances are so essentially dissimilar. The principal 
question to consider, and that which bears more peculiarly 
on the design of the present essay, is not why so many 
various opinions are prevalent in the world, but how, if 
belief is perfectly independent of the will, shall we ac- 
count for the fact, that the same events or the same argu- 
ments produce different effects on different minds, or, in 
other words, give rise to different opinions. 



DIFFERENCES OF OPINION. 25 

This fact, which is a matter of common observation, 
may at first sight appear to be inconsistent with the po- 
sition maintained in a former chapter, that the same con- 
siderations present to the mind will invariably produce 
the same opinion. The inconsistency, however, will 
vanish when we reflect, that in the one case are meant 
only the external or ostensible arguments, the considera- 
tions expressed in language and submitted to the senses ; 
but, in the other case, the whole combination of ideas in 
view of the understanding. Were language so perfect, 
that the same words would convey precisely the same , 
ideas to every individual, and could the understanding be 
strictly limited to the ideas alone conveyed by the words 
employed, then the arguments submitted to our eyes or 
ears, and the considerations present to the mind, would 
exactly coincide, and there could be no difference of opin- 
ion respecting any proposition whatever. 

This remark indicates the sources whence different con- 
clusions from the same arguments must arise. They must 
originate either in that defect of language, in consequence 
of which the terms employed do not convey to every 
mind the same ideas, or in those circumstances which 
occasion other ideas, besides those actually expressed (and 
different ideas in the case of different individuals), to 
present themselves to the understanding : to which we 
may add such circumstances as, when the original argu- 
ments or consequent suggestions are numerous and com- 
plicated, have a tendency to fix the attention of different 
persons on different parts, and thereby occasion different 
considerations to remain ultimately in view. 

That the terms employed, in many subjects, do not con- 
vey the same ideas to every understanding, is a defect in 
language, as an instrument of communication, which has 
often been explained and lamented. Since language is 



26 ON THE SOURCES OF 

conventional, involving an arbitrary connection between 
ideas and sounds, all men have to learn as well as they 
can to affix the same notions to the same signs. In 
regard to complex ideas this cannot always be accom- 
plished, and hence a term may stand for one thing in the 
mind of one person, and for a different thing in the mind' 
of another. When such terms, therefore, are used in any 
proposition, it is not surprising that various opinions are 
entertained of its verisimilitude. This is so obvious a 
source of diversity of opinion, that it requires no farther 
exposition. We may, therefore, proceed to the considera- 
tion of the other circumstances which occasion different 
conclusions from the same arguments. 

If we examine the procedure of the understanding, 
when it is considering any train of argument offered to 
it, we shall find that almost every idea, at least every 
proposition in the train, awakens other ideas and propo- 
sitions ; and the ultimate impression left on the mind is 
the joint result of both. It is not only what a book ex- 
presses, but what it suggests, which determines its effect 
on the reader; and, consequently, whatever occasions 
the same arguments to suggest different considerations or 
combinations of thought to different minds may be ranked 
amongst those sources of discrepancies in opinion which 
we are investigating. 

One circumstance, which must have a powerful effect 
in determining the character of these suggestions, is the 
natural constitution of the mind. The endless variety of 
original talent, and degrees of intellectual power, to be 
found amongst men, implies as endless a variety in the 
modes in which their ideas are associated and suggested. 
Hence, a diversity of judgment will inevitably ensue. Or, 
if we choose to vary the phraseology, we may say that 
the powers of conception and discrimination in different 



DIFFERENCES OF OPINION. 27 

persons are unequal, and since their intellectual vision 
extends not to the same depth and distance, their views 
cannot be alike. Whatever language we employ on this 
subject, it is sufficiently manifest, that the natural dis- 
parity in the understandings of mankind must be a cause 
of diversity in the trains of thought which any occasion 
may suggest, and must thus beget contrarieties of judg- 
ment. 

A still more powerful circumstance tending to modify 
the combinations of thought, suggested by any set of 
arguments, is the nature of the ideas, associations, preju- 
dices, and opinions, already in the mind. The train of 
ideas and considerations, which rises at the contempla- 
tion of an object, may not, as a whole, resemble any 
antecedent train, but its various parts must evidently be 
composed of ideas preconceived and familiar. Hence 
the diversities of opinion which the external circumstances 
of mankind have created, the peculiarities of thinking in 
sects and nations, the intellectual habits of professions, 
and the local prejudices of individuals, may all become 
causes of various conclusions from the same arguments. 
To feel the full force of this remark we have only to 
consider, what different ideas would crowd upon the mind 
of a whig and a tory during the perusal of the same 
political essay ; or how totally dissimilar would be the 
train of thought, awakened by the same theological 
treatise, in the understanding of an Italian monk and an 
English dissenter. Of all the circumstances, which de- 
termine the various judgments of mankind on any par- 
ticular subject, perhaps that which we have just noticed 
is not only of the greatest force, but of the greatest 
importance, since it has the principal share in moulding 
their opinions in moral, theological, and political science. 
It is, however, so completely obvious as to supersede the 



28 ON THE SOURCES OF 

necessity of any farther endeavor to illustrate it ; and we 
shall, therefore, proceed in the next section to the con- 
sideration of a not less interesting source of diversity of 
judgment, to be found in the influence possessed by the 
sensitive over the intellectual part of our nature.* 

* It may probably appear, that in this section we are resolving 
all reasoning into association, which has been termed (with what 
justice we cannot stop to examine) a mere verbal generalization. 
In reality, however, we are only proceeding on the indisputable fact, 
that in the examination of any subject, certain ideas and proposi- 
tions do come into the mind. There must be some cause or causes 
why every one of these presents itself ; the will is evidently not one 
of these causes, for reasons before assigned ; and we are endeavor- 
ing to point out what they are, or at least such of them as vary in 
different individuals. 



DIFFERENCES OF OPINION. 29 



SECTION VI. 

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. SOURCES OF DIFFER- 
ENCES OF OPINION IN THE FEELINGS AND PASSIONS 
OF MANKIND. 

In entering upon the subject of the present section it 
may be well to repeat the remark, that the causes of the 
various conclusions which men draw from the same 
arguments, are to be sought for in the imperfections of 
language, in the circumstances which regulate our trains 
of thought, and in whatever tends to excite or fix the 
attention in a partial manner. It is in the power of 
producing the two latter effects, that the peculiar influence 
possessed by the sensitive over the intellectual part of our 
nature seems to consist. There is no remark more fre- 
quent, no maxim more current in the world, than that a 
man's opinions are influenced by his interest and pas- 
sions.* This is so manifest that we can often predict, 
from a knowledge of his situation and relations in society, 
what sentiments, on a given subject, he will profess and 
maintain. Much of the influence thus apparently exerted 
by passion on the opinions of mankind, extends however, 
in reality, only to their professions. Many doctrines, as 
we have already remarked, are adopted without any real 
conviction; they are merely ostensible assumptions, not 
indications of the actual state of the understanding ; and 
what a man thus professes may be expected, of course, to 

* • Intellectus human us/ says Lord Bacon, ' luminis sicci non 
est; sed recipit infusionem a voluntate et ;' affectibus.' — Novum 
O.rganum, lib. i. 



30 SOURCES OF DIFFERENCES OF 

accord with his interest or passions. But laying all these 
out of the question, there is indisputably an influence 
exerted by emotions and passions over the understanding 
itself. They have sometimes the effect of making that 
argument appear valid to one man, which is regarded as 
inconclusive by another; in a word, of begetting various 
opinions on the same subject. 

This effect is partly to be accounted for, as before 
stated, by their power of awakening peculiar trains of 
ideas. The same words, or the same objects, will rouse 
combinations of thought in the mind when it is laboring 
under melancholy, of a totally different character from 
those which they suggest during a state of cheerfulness; 
and, in a similar manner, all the various emotions and 
passions by which we are affected, occasionally operate 
as principles of suggestion. If, therefore, the effect of 
any arguments on the understanding depends both on the 
arguments themselves and the ideas and considerations 
which they suggest, the various effects of the same argu- 
ments, on such as attend to them, may be partly ascribed 
to the states of feeling in which such persons happen to 
be. 

The other way in which the passions and emotions of 
men influence their opinions, and cause them to receive 
different impressions from the same arguments, may de- 
serve a fuller elucidation. When those arguments form 
a train or series of considerable length and complexity, 
it is obviously impossible that they should all be present 
to the mind together, or at the same moment. The 
understanding must survey them in detail; and its ulti- 
mate decision will depend on those which have chiefly 
excited its attention, and remain in view at the close of 4 
the scrutiny. Whatever, therefore, occasions any of the 
arguments to come before the mind more frequently, 



OPINION AMONGST MANKIND. 31 

and remain in view more permanently, than the rest ; or, 
in other words, whatever fixes the attention on some more 
than others, will naturally affect its decision. The re- 
mark applies not only to the arguments actually sub- 
mitted to us, but also to all the ideas and considerations 
which they suggest. 

This attribute, of drawing and fixing the attention, 
belongs in a remarkable degree to all strong emotions. 
Every one must have felt, while he has been affected by 
any particular passion, that he could scarcely attend to 
any thing but what had some connection with it ; he must ' 
have experienced its power of presenting exclusive and 
strong views, its despotism in banishing all but its own 
ideas. Fear, for example, may so concentrate our 
thoughts on some particular features of our situation, 
may so absorb our attention, that we may overlook all 
other circumstances, and be led to conclusions which 
would be instantly rejected by a dispassionate under- 
standing. 

While the mind is in this state of excitement, it has a 
sort of elective attraction (if we may borrow an illustra- 
tion from chemical science) for some ideas to the neglect 
of all others. It singles out from the number presented to 
it those which are connected with the prevailing emotion, 
while the rest are overlooked and forgotten. In examin- 
ing any question, it may really comprehend all the 
arguments submitted to it ; but, at the conclusion of 
the review, those only are retained which have been 
illuminated by the predominant passion ; and since opin- 
ions, as we have seen, are the result of the considera- 
tions which have been attended to and are in sight, not 
of such as have been overlooked and have vanished, it is 
those by which the judgment will be determined. 

In this way self-interest, hope, fear, love, hatred, and the 



32 SOURCES OF DIFFERENCES OF 

other passions, may any of them draw the mind from a 
perfect survey of a subject, and fix its attention on a 
partial view, may exaggerate the importance of some 
objects and diminish that of others, and by this virtual 
distortion of appearances affect its perceptions of truth. 

The peculiar effects of passion, which we have been 
describing, are evidently involuntary, and perhaps few are 
conscious of them in their own case, but such as have 
been accustomed to examine the movements of their 
sensitive and intellectual powers. It deserves to be re- 
marked likewise, that our good as well as our bad pas- 
sions, our kind as well as our malevolent feelings, may 
equally operate as principles of suggestion; and being 
also equally conducive to that partiality of attention, that 
peculiar vividness of ideas, which we have attempted to 
explain, are of course equally liable to mislead the judg- 
ment. 

We are prepared by these observations to examine the 
justness of the common saying, 'quod volumus facile 
credimus,' 'We readily believe what is agreeable to our 
wishes,' a saying which may at first sight seem at vari- 
ance with our former conclusions. This, like many other 
maxims current in the world, points at a truth without 
much precision. Mere wishes have in fact no influence 
on the understanding; they are totally inoperative till 
there appears to be some reason for expecting what we 
wish, till, in short, they are transformed into hope, and 
then we are strongly disposed to believe what is consonant 
with our anticipations. If instead of having a ground for 
hope, we have a reason for fear, our apprehension disposes 
us, in the same way, to believe the reverse of what we 
wish. Thus, so far is it from being true, that mere wishes 
tend to beget readiness of belief, we here see that there 
are cases in which we have a readiness to believe what is 
repugnant to our wishes. 



OPINION AMONGST MANKIND. 33 

In the instances both of hope and of fear, there must 
be considerations presented to the understanding to pro- 
duce them ; and those passions subsequently react upon 
the intellect, by concentrating its attention upon the con- 
siderations to which they owe their birth, and upon others 
of a similar tendency. This effect is evidently not attrib- 
utable to the will, on which hope and fear are themselves 
perfectly independent. 

The manner, in which the emotions of any one operate 
on his belief, may receive illustration from what takes 
place when the peculiar circumstances, by which a man is 
surrounded, tend to keep some considerations appertaining 
to a disputable subject more steadily before his attention 
than others. If it be true, that our feelings affect our 
belief by the vividness which they impart to particular 
ideas, or, what is the same thing, by turning the attention 
more intensely on such ideas; then whatever has the 
tendency to create the same partiality of attention, must 
have a corresponding effect on our opinions. Such a 
cause may be found in the sentiments of those amongst 
whom a man happens to be thrown. In the majority 
of instances, however dissimilar the opinions of an indi- 
vidual may have originally been, they will gradually 
conform to those of the community at large, or at least of 
his immediate associates; an effect which takes place, not 
because the arguments for the latter are stronger than 
those of the opposite side, but because they are per- 
petually kept before his mind, to the exclusion of adverse 
considerations.* Thus we sometimes see instances of 

* ■ Our opinions of all kinds.' says Hume, ' are strongly affected 
by society and sympathy, and it is almost impossible for us to sup- 
port any principle or sentiment against the universal consent of 
every one, with whom we have any friendship or correspondence/ — 
A Dissertation on the Passions. 
3 



34 SOURCES OF DIFFERENCES OF 

men, who are led to entertain a peculiar opinion, but who, 
on finding all around them dissent from it, and discover- 
ing it to be the object of reproach and invective, begin to 
be staggered in their faith, and grow more and more 
doubtful, till the general voice has triumphed over their 
sentiments and reduced them to acquiescence. In this 
case, the circumstance of the general opinion being 
against them withdraws their attention from their own 
peculiar views, forcibly and continually fixing it on the 
considerations which influence others. The sentiments of 
their fellow creatures draw around them a circle of attrac- 
tion, from which they can rarely step to contemplate other 
objects; and they gradually lose their peculiarities of 
thinking, from the mere circumstance of the considera- 
tions on which they are founded being seldom presented 
to their understandings. It is on the same principle that 
some of the most striking effects of eloquence are to be 
accounted for. Who, that has listened to some masterly 
exhibition of opinions contrary to his own, but has felt 
his mind shaken from its confirmed principles, till the 
vividness of the impression has died away, and suffered 
other considerations to reappear ? 

In regard to a single and perfectly independent propo- 
sition, there is evidently no room for any difference of 
opinion, except that which may arise from affixing differ- 
ent ideas to the same terms. As few propositions, never- 
theless, are so independent as not to be connected in some 
way with others, when any one is singly presented to the 
mind we generally form our estimate of it by the applica- 
tion of arguments and considerations, which are naturally 
suggested in the various modes already described. But 
when a question involves a long train of propositions, each 
of which may depend on many others, there is infinitely 
more room for the operation of ambiguities of language, 



OPINION AMONGST MANKIND. 35 

preconceived notions, inequalities of intellect, and diver- 
sities of feeling. In considering such a question, more- 
over, it is impossible to have all the arguments which 
bear upon it present at once to the recollection ; a thou- 
sand considerations will pass before the mind, prompted by 
passion or prejudice, or other causes ; and those, to which 
the state of our feelings or any other circumstance has 
given an adventitious prominence, will naturally remain in 
view and determine our opinions. 

Emotions, it is obvious, have less room to operate in 
proportion to the perspicuity of our views. With regard 
to opinions of which we have a distinct and thorough 
conviction, the state of our feelings can make no dif- 
ference. 

The process of reasoning, by which we perceive them 
to be demonstrated, may be so clear and forcible, that the 
passions can have as little effect as in the consideration 
of a geometrical theorem. It is only in regard to vague 
opinions, arising from the complicated and doubtful nature 
of the subject, or from partial and indistinct views, that 
the feelings can have any great influence ; and they may 
accordingly be expected to have considerable power in 
the consideration of questions which furnish various con- 
flicting arguments, and in the case of men whose notions 
are loose and undefined, without the ties of logical de- 
pendence and consistent principle. 

It would be vain, perhaps, to attempt an estimate of the 
comparative efficiency of the causes producing diversity 
of opinion, since they doubtless affect different minds in 
different proportions. Some men are infinitely less affect- 
ed by hereditary prejudices than others; some are full of 
feeling ; some dispassionate ; some are of weak and con- 
fused, and some of clear and vigorous intellects. 

With regard to the major part of mankind, however, it 



36 DIFFERENCES OF OPINION. 

will not be disputed, that traditionary prejudices and early 
associations have a predominant influence, imparting a 
tincture to every subject, and leaving traces in every 
conclusion. 

Any of the causes, which have been enumerated, acting 
singly, might be expected to create considerable diversities 
of sentiment ; but when we reflect, that several are gene- 
rally in operation at the same time, we cannot hesitate to 
pronounce them perfectly adequate to account for all 
those varieties of opinion, in relation to the same subject, 
which are daily exposed to our observation. 



BELIEF AND OPINIONS. 37 



SECTION VII. 

ON BELIEF AND OPINIONS AS OBJECTS OF MORAL APPRO- 
BATION AND DISAPPROBATION, REWARDS AND PUNISH- 
MENTS. 

The remarks in the preceding part of this Essay, if 
they are correct, necessarily lead to some important con- - 
elusions. By the universal consent of the reason and 
feelings of mankind, what is involuntary cannot involve 
any merit or demerit on the part of the agent. Results 
which are not the consequences of volition cannot be the 
proper objects of moral praise and blame.* These are 
the dictates of nature, truths felt by all : even the child, 
who is reprehended by his parent for accidental mischief, 
instinctively prefers the plea, that he could not help it ; 
and if we inquire into the final cause of this part of our 
nature, the reason of our being so constituted as to feel 
moral approbation and disapprobation only at those ac- 
tions which are voluntary, we shall probably find it in the 

* Hume, indeed, has controverted this, but it would not, I think, 
be a difficult task to show the sources of his erroneous conclusions 
on the subject, were it necessary to combat a doctrine at variance 
with the whole of our moral feelings. See his Treatise on Morals. 
The common, or rather universal sentiment on this point, is thus 
expressed by Bishop Butler : ' We never, in the moral way, applaud 
or blame either ourselves or others for what we enjoy or what we 
suffer, or for having impressions made upon us which we consider as 
altogether out of our power ; but only for what we do, or would 
have done, had it been in our power ; or for what we leave undone 
which we might have done, or would have left undone, though we 
could have done it. 5 — Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue. 



38 ON BELIEF AND OPINIONS AS 

obvious circumstance, that it is such actions alone which 
praise and blame can promote and prevent. 

It follows, that those states of the understanding which 
we term belief, doubt, and disbelief, inasmuch as they are 
not voluntary, nor the result of any exertion of the will, 
imply neither merit nor demerit in him who is the subject 
of them. Whatever be the state of a man's understand- 
ing in relation to any possible proposition, it is a state or 
affection devoid equally of desert and culpability. The 
nature of an opinion cannot make it criminal. In rela- 
tion to the same subject, one may believe, another doubt, 
and a third disbelieve, and all with equal innocence. 

There may, it is true, be considerable merit or demerit 
attached to the manner in which an inquiry is prosecuted. 
The labor and research which a man bestows, in order to 
determine any important question, and the impartiality 
with which he conducts the examination, may be entitled 
to our warmest applause. On the other hand, it is repre- 
hensible for any one to be swayed in his conduct by in- 
terest or passion, to reject opportunities of information, to 
be designedly partial in examining evidence, to be deaf to 
whatever is urged on one side of a question, and lend all 
his attention to the other. These acts, although they may 
be totally ineffectual in accomplishing their aim, are all 
proper subjects of moral obloquy, and may be left to the 
indignation and contempt which they deserve ; but they 
relate to the conduct of men as to the selection of those 
circumstances or ideas which they allow to operate on 
their minds, and are not to be confounded with the states 
or affections of the understanding, on which it is possible, 
after all, that they may not produce the slightest effect.* 

* It deserves to be remarked, that all institutions annexing 
advantages to the belief, or rather to the profession, of any fixed 
doctrines, have a tendency to beget this partiality of investigation ) 



OBJECTS OF MORAL APPROBATION, ETC. 39 

No one, perhaps, will dispute, that when a man acts 
without intentional partiality in the examination of a ques- 
tion, he cannot be at all culpable for the effect which 
follows, whether the research terminate in faith or incre- 
dulity ; because it is the necessary and involuntary con- 
sequence of the views presented to his understanding, 
without the slightest interference of choice : but it will 
probably be alleged, that in so far as belief, doubt, and 
disbelief, have been the result of wilful partiality of atten- 
tion, they may be regarded with propriety as culpable, 
since it is common to blame a man for those things,' 
which, although involuntary in themselves, are the result 
of voluntary acts. To this it may be replied, that it is, to 
say the least, a want of precision to apply blame in such 
a manner : it is always more correct to regard men as 
culpable on account of their voluntary acts, than on ac- 
count of the results over which volition has no immediate 
control. There would, nevertheless, be little objection to 
considering opinions as reprehensible in so far as they 
were the result of unfair investigation, if it could be ren- 
dered a useful or practical principle. In all cases where 
we make involuntary effects the objects of moral repre- 
hension, it is because they are certain proofs or positive 
indications of the voluntary acts which have preceded 
them. Opinions, however, are not effects of this kind ; 
they are not positive indications of any voluntary acts ; 
they furnish no criterion of the fairness or unfairness of 
investigation, since the most opposite results, the most 
contrary opinions, may ensue from the same degree of 
impartiality and application. Voluntary partiality of at- 
tention, as we have already seen, can be at the utmost 
but of slight and casual efficiency in the formation of 

since every man, not totally destitute of integrity, will strive to 
make his opinions conformable to his professions. 



40 ON ±>t,LIEF AND OPINIONS AS 

opinions ; it has often no effect whatever, and its influence 
will always be mingled with that of more powerful causes. 
Hence the share which it has had in the production of 
belief, doubt, or disbelief, can never be ascertained by the 
nature of the result. Whether a man has been partial or 
impartial, in the process by which he has acquired his 
opinions, must be determined by extrinsic circumstances, 
and not by the character of the opinions themselves. 
Belief, doubt, and disbelief, therefore, can never, even in 
the character of indications of antecedent voluntary acts, 
be the proper objects of moral reprehension or commen- 
dation. Our approbation and disapprobation, if they fall 
anywhere, should be directed to the conduct of men in 
their researches, to the use which they make of their 
opportunities of information, and to the partiality and im- 
partiality visible in their actions. 

If belief, doubt, and disbelief, are involuntary states of 
the understanding, which cannot be affected by the appli- 
cation of motives, and which can involve no moral merit 
or demerit, it follows, as a necessary consequence, that 
they do not fall within the province of legislation ; that 
they are not proper subjects of rewards and punishments. 

The only rational aim of rewards and punishments is to 
encourage and repress those actions or events to which 
they are applied. • When they have no tendency to pro- 
duce these effects it is evidently absurd to apply them, 
since it is an employment of means which have no con- 
nection with the end to be produced. In this predicament 
is the application of rewards- and punishments to the state 
of the understanding, or, in other words, to opinions. The 
allurements and the menaces of power are alike incapable 
of establishing opinions in the mind, or eradicating those 
which are already there. They may draw hypocritical 
professions from avarice and ambition, or extort verbal 



OBJECTS OF MORAL APPROBATION, ETC. 41 

renunciations from fear and feebleness; but this is all 
they can accomplish. The way to alter belief is not to 
address motives to the will, but arguments to the intellect. 
To do otherwise, to apply rewards and punishments to 
opinions, is as absurd as to raise men to the peerage for 
their ruddy complexions, to whip them for the gout, and 
haig them for the scrofula. The fatal consequences of 
regirding opinions as proper objects of penal laws, will 
claim our notice in the ensuing section. It will suffice at 
present to draw the conclusion, that all pain, mental or 
physical, inflicted with a view to punish a man for his 
opinions, is nothing less than useless and wanton cruelty, 
violating the plain dictate of nature, which forbids the 
production of evil in all cases where it is not consecrated 
by superior beneficial effects. 

In contending that neither merit nor demerit can be im- 
puted to any one for his opinions, it is almost unnecessary 
to say, we are not contending that it is of no importance 
what opinions he entertains. We are advocating the in- 
nocence of the man, not the harmlessness of his views. 
Errors, as we shall have occasion to show in a subsequent 
essay, are by their nature injurious to society ; and while 
he who really believes them ought to be regarded as per- 
fectly free from culpability, every one who sees them in a 
different light is justified in endeavoring, by proper means, 
to lessen their influence ; which is to be effected, not by 
the application of obloquy and punishment, but by ad- 
dressing arguments to the understanding. 

A distinction is also to be made between the state of the 
understanding and the manifestation of that state ; or, in 
other words, between holding opinions and expressing 
them. While the former is independent of the will, and, 
therefore, free from moral culpability, the latter is always 
a voluntary act, and, being neutral in itself, may be com- 



42 BELIEF AND OPINIONS. 

mendable or reprehensible according to the circumstances 
in which it takes place. Whether it is a proper object of 
rewards and punishments will form hereafter a separate 
topic of consideration. 



COMMON ERRORS ON THIS SUBJECT. 43 



SECTION VIII. 

ON THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE COMMON ERRORS 
ON THIS SUBJECT. 

Few speculative errors appear to have produced evil 
consequences so many and so extensive, as the notion that 
belief, doubt, and disbelief, are voluntary acts involving 
moral merit and demerit. One of its most obvious effects 
has been to draw mankind from an attention to moral 
conduct and lead them to regard the belief of certain 
tenets as far more deserving of approbation than a course 
of the most consistent virtue. Where such a doctrine 
prevails, where opinions are considered of paramount 
importance to actions, it is no wonder if the ties of moral- 
ity are loosened. The error under consideration has also 
produced much secret misery, by loading the minds of the 
timid and conscientious with the imaginary guilt of holding 
opinions which they regarded with horror while they could 
not avoid .them. What is still worse, it has frequently 
alarmed the inquirer into an abandonment of the pursuit 
of truth. Under a confused supposition of criminality in 
the belief of particular doctrines, men have with reason 
been deterred from examining evidence, lest it should irre- 
sistibly lead them to views which it might be culpable to 
entertain. If it is really true, indeed, that the least devia- 
tion from a given line of opinion will be attended with 
guilt, the only safe course is to exclude all examination, to 
shun every research which might, by possibility, terminate 
in any such result. When it is already fixed and deter- 
mined that an investigation must end in a prescribed way, 
otherwise the inquirer will be involved in criminality, all 



44 ON THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 

inquiry becomes not only useless but foolish. This appre- 
hension of the consequences of research once extended 
even to natural philosophy ; and there is little doubt that 
it may be justly charged by moral science with much of 
the slowness of its progress. If the former has long since 
emancipated itself from this error, the latter still confess- 
edly labors under its oppression. The intellect is still 
intimidated into a desertion of every track which ap- 
pears to lead to conclusions at variance with the prescribed 
modes of thinking.* 

■ Men grow pale 
Lest their own judgments should become too bright, 
And their free thoughts be crimes, and Earth have too much light.' t 

If it be objected to this representation, that those who 
regard belief as a voluntary act cannot consistently fear 
the result of examination on their own minds, since, ac- 
cording to their fundamental position, it will always be in 
their power to think as they please ; it may be a sufficient 
reply to say, that it is not intended to accuse them of rea- 
soning consistently from the principles which they assume. 
The truth is, there has been the utmost confusion in this 
respect. Although men must, in all probability, have had 
a notion, however vague and obscure, that belief was de- 
pendent on the will, before they could have inferred it to 
be criminal, yet they have often retained the conclusion 

* See Note B. 

fSuch are evidently not to be ranked amongst the disciples of 
Bacon, who says, ' Let no man, upon a weak conceit of sobriety, or 
an ill-applied moderation, think or maintain, that a man can search 
too far, or be too well studied in the book of God's word, or in the 
book of God's works, divinity or philosophy; but, rather, let men 
endeavor an endless progress or proficience in both.' — Of the Profi- 
cience and Advancement of Learning, book i. 



COMMON ERRORS ON THIS SUBJECT. 45 

and dropped the premises. They have sometimes thought 
and acted as if opinions were voluntary and criminal, 
sometimes, as if they were at once criminal and involun- 
tary. If the mistaken principle, that belief is governed 
by volition, had been rigorously pursued through all its 
consequences, it would have been immediately exploded. 
It is to the want of precise and consistent thinking on the 
subject that so many evil consequences are to be traced. 

It is probable, that the same error with regard to the 
nature of belief has been one principal cause of requiring 
subscriptions, or other outward manifestations of assent, to 
a long list of abstruse, complex, and often unintelligible 
doctrines, in order to qualify the aspirant not only for 
ecclesiastical, but even for civil and military offices. On 
no other hypothesis, at least, could the practice be justi- 
fied of making the profession of certain opinions the indis- 
pensable preliminary to personal exaltation, the stepping- 
stone to fortune and to power. Had not those who first 
devised this mode of obtaining unanimity had strong, 
although perhaps undefined impressions of the voluntary 
character of belief, they would, in all likelihood, have 
fallen upon the far more rational expedient of requiring, 
instead of a positive profession of faith, a pledge not to 
avow nor to inculcate any doctrines contrary to what 
were prescribed. This, though not free from numerous 
objections, would at least have been requiring what it was 
in every man's power to perform, while it would have 
presented no temptation to sacrifice, at the entrance of his 
career, his candor, or at all events his veracity. 

Whether we acquiesce or not, however, in the suppo- 
sition, that an impression of the voluntary nature of be- 
lief had a considerable share in the first institution of 
articles and subscriptions, it is plain that the practice could 
not have been consistently enforced under the general 
prevalence of the contrary doctrine. 



46 ON THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 

There is one thing, indeed, which even then might 
have justified the enforcement of such a regulation, the 
improbability of any one subscribing a creed who could 
not conscientiously do it. On this point, let those decide 
who are aware of the causes which necessarily generate 
diversities of opinion, and who can, at the same time, esti- 
mate the chance which, in such an affair, the scruples of 
conscience have of maintaining their ground against the 
temptations of interest or the blandishments of power. 

But the most fatal consequences of the speculative 
error under consideration are to be found in the repeated 
attempts to regulate men's creeds by the application of 
intimidation and punishment ; in the intolerance and per- 
secution which have disgraced the history of the human 
race. The natural consequence of imputing guilt to opin- 
ions was an endeavor to prevent and to punish them ; and, 
as such a course coincided with the gratification of the 
malignant passions of our nature, nothing less could be 
expected than that it would be pursued with eagerness 
and marked by cruelty. 

It will probably be urged, that since a man's opinions 
are not .to be read in his .gestures or countenance, punish- 
ments cannot be applied till the opinions are expressed ; 
and that when they have been inflicted, it has been done, 
not to alter his creed nor to punish him for holding it, but 
to prevent its propagation. If we look, however, into the 
history of mankind, we shall discover, that to prevent the 
propagation of opinions has not been the sole object of 
such penal inflictions. We shall find, that the aim of the 
persecutor has been, not only to prevent obnoxious opin- 
ions from spreading, but to punish the presumed guilt of 
holding them, and sometimes to convert the sufferers. 
He has accordingly directed his fury against innocent 
actions, merely expressive or indicative of opinions, and 



COMMON ERRORS ON THIS SUBJECT. 47 

having no tendency to propagate them, and has relented 
when his victims have been brought to profess a renuncia- 
tion of their errors ; his conduct evidently proceeding on 
the two assumptions, that belief was voluntary, so that a 
man might be induced or compelled to relinquish it ; and, 
secondly, that if it differed from his own it was criminal, 
and therefore deserved to be punished. 

The universal treatment of the Jews, from whom no 
contamination of faith could possibly be apprehended, is a 
standing proof of the prevalence and effects of these per- 
nicious errors ; and we need not go farther than the pages 
of our own history for additional instances and ample cor- 
roboration. ' The persons condemned to these punish- 
ments,' says Hume, in reference to the persecutions in 
the reign of the bloody and bigotted Mary, i were not 
convicted of teaching or dogmatising, contrary to the 
established religion ; they were seized merely on sus- 
picion, and articles being offered them to subscribe, they 
were immediately upon their refusal condemned to the 
flames.' 

These persecutors, it is plain (unless they were actu- 
ated solely by the vilest motives), must either have thought 
it possible to eradicate opinions from the mind by violence, 
and force others upon it, or have labored under a strange 
infatuation of conceiving, that they could render God and 
man service by destroying the sincerity of their fellow 
creatures, and compelling them to make professions at 
variance with their real conviction. Perhaps, sometimes 
one and sometimes the other of these notions actuated the 
minds of the bigots. Sometimes they might think, that 
if a poor wretch could be forced by intimidation or tor- 
ture to acknowledge the truth of a creed, he would really 
believe it : and sometimes, that it was a valuable triumph 
to extort a few words from the weakness of nature, how 



48 ON THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 

contrary soever they might be to the real sentiments of 
their victims. It is probable, however, that their minds 
were never entirely free from confused notions of the 
voluntary nature of belief, of the consequent possibility 
of altering opinions by the application of motives, and of 
the criminality of holding any creed but their own. These 
principles seem to have actuated more or less all religious 
persecutors. Even the victims themselves appear, in 
many instances, not to have called in question the right 
of persecution, but only the propriety of its exercise on 
their own persons. Both the persecutors and the perse- 
cuted have united in maintaining that the holders of 
wrong opinions deserved the vengeance of the commu- 
nity, and differed only as to the objects on whom it ought 
to fall. In reading the history of intolerance, our pity 
for the sufferers is often neutralized by a detestation of 
their principles, by a knowledge that they would have 
inflicted equal tortures on their adversaries, had they had 
equal power ; and all that is left for us to do is to mourn 
over the degradation of our common nature. Thus we 
find many of the reformers in England, Switzerland, and 
Germany, as unsparing in their persecution of those who 
departed from their tenets as the most bigoted adherents 
to the ancient religion. Of this a striking and memora- 
ble instance is furnished by our own annals in the case 
of a Dr. Barnes. This man, who had himself renounced 
the established doctrine regarding transubstantiation, was 
exasperated that another person, of the name of Lam- 
bert, had taken a different ground in his dissent from it. 

4 By the present laws and practice,' says Hume, j Barnes 
was no less exposed to the stake than Lambert ; yet such 
was the persecuting rage which prevailed, that he was 
determined to bring this man to condign punishment ; be- 
cause, in their common departure from the ancient faith, 



COMMON ERRORS ON THIS SUBJECT. 49 

he had dared to go one step farther than himself.' It is 
almost needless to add, that this wretched bigot succeeded 
in his object ; and the reader of his history, in the first 
warmth of indignation, hardly regrets that he met with a 
persecutor in his turn, and perished at the stake. 

We find even Cranmer, the mild, the moderate, the 
amiable, the beneficent, (it is thus he is represented by 
historians,) we find even such a character consigning a 
poor female to the flames because her opinions were not 
quite orthodox. Nor is it to be forgotten, that the gentle 
and dispassionate Melancthon expressed his decided ap- 
probation of the burning of Servetus, and his w r onder that 
any body could be found to condemn it. Nothing can 
more strikingly show the pernicious influence of this 
single error. 

But although it is scarcely to be conceived, that intoler- 
ance and persecution would have been carried to such an 
excess, had it not been for the fundamental error here 
noticed, it is not to be denied that many other causes have 
mingled their influence : and it will not be altogether 
foreign to the tenor of this essay to bestow upon them a 
passing notice. There seems to be a principle inherent 
in the nature of man, that leads him to seek for the ap- 
probation of his fellow-creatures, not only in his actions, 
but in his modes of thinking. He covets the concurrence 
of others, and is uneasy under dissent and disagreement. 
Objections to his opinions seem to place a disagreeable 
impediment in the way of his imagination ; they disturb 
his self-complacency, and render him restless and uneasy. 
This, of itself, is sufficient to make him regard with dis- 
pleasure and resentment all those who are of a different 
opinion from his own. Men, even of the best regulated 
minds and mildest dispositions, find it difficult to argue 
with uniform coolness and temper. A. debate, from a 
4 



50 ON THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 

contest of arguments often becomes a contest of passions. 
We resent, not only the opposition to our doctrines but 
the presumption of the opponent, and grow eager to chas- 
tise it. Love of truth, if we originally had it, is soon lost 
in the desire of avenging our mortified vanity ; and the 
rancor of our feelings being exasperated by every detec- 
tion of the weakness of our arguments, recourse is had to 
violence to overwhelm those whom we cannot confute. 

As we partly seek for the concurrence of others on 
account of the corroboration which it affords of the truth 
of our own sentiments, it is observable, that those men in 
general are the least hurt at opposition, who, having a clear 
discernment of the foundation of their tenets, least require 
the support of other people's approbation ; and that the 
prejudiced and the ignorant, men of narrow views and 
confused notions, always display the most inveterate in- 
tolerance. c While men,' to borrow the words of the clas- 
sical historian already quoted, ' zealously maintain what 
they neither clearly comprehend, nor entirely believe, 
they are shaken in their imagined faith by the opposite 
persuasion, or even doubts of other men ; and vent on 
their antagonists that impatience, which is the natural 
result of so disagreeable a state of the understanding.' * 

* It is a curious fact, which, I think, may be observed in the his- 
tory of persecution, that men are generally more inclined to punish 
those who believe less than they themselves do, than those who 
believe more. We pity rather than condemn the extravagances of 
fanaticism, and the absurdities of superstition j but are apt to grow 
angry at the speculations of scepticism. If any one superadds some- 
thing to the established creed, his conduct is viewed with tolerable 
composure ; it is when he attempts to subtract from it, that he 
provokes indignation. Is it that we feel a sort of superiority at per- 
ceiving the absurdity of what others believe, and, on the other hand, 
are mortified when any body else appears to arrogate the same supe- 
riority over ourselves ? f 

f See Note C. 



COMMON ERRORS ON THIS SUBJECT. 51 

The state of doubt is, indeed, a state of trouble, to which 
every one will be averse in proportion as he is unaccus- 
tomed to intellectual exertion and candid inquiry. Hence, 
whoever takes his opinions on trust has a thorough repug- 
nance to be disturbed by contrary arguments. This, as 
Berkeley remarks, is observable even in the literary world. 
c Two sorts of learned men there are,' says he : 6 one, 
who candidly seek truth by rational means. These are 
never averse to have their principles looked into, and ex- 
amined by the test of reason. Another sort there is, who 
learn by rote a set of principles and a way of thinking 
which happen to be in vogue. These betray themselves 
by their anger and surprise, whenever their principles are 
freely canvassed.' * 

But the mortification arising from controversy, and the 
uneasiness of doubt, are comparatively transient and ir- 
regular motives of persecution. We may find more fixed 
and steady sources of intolerance in the connection often 
subsisting between men's permanent interests, or favorite 
objects, and the maintenance of certain doctrines. Those 
persons are peculiarly rancorous against dissent and op- 
position, who have assumed an opinion, probably without 
comprehending it, and without the least concern about 
its truth, from selfish and mercenary views. When the 
emolument, power, pride, personal consequence, or grati- 
fication of any one becomes identified with a doctrine 
or system, he is impatient and resentful at the slightest 
doubt ; because every doubt is of the nature of a personal 
attack, and threatens danger to the objects of his regard. 
It is this identification of personal interests with systems 
of opinions, which has in all ages been one of the greatest 
sources of intolerance on the part of the priesthood. It 

* A Defence of Free Thinking in Mathematics. 



52 ON THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 

is this, which has led them to represent, with so much 
zeal, a departure from their dogmas as one of the worst 
of crimes, and often caused them to pursue with remorse- 
less cruelty all aberrations from that creed on which their 
power and importance depended. 

It becomes an interesting inquiry, how far these causes 
of intolerance continue in action in the present day, and 
in our own country. In the first place, with regard to 
such as are discoverable in the passions of mankind, we 
can only look for a mitigation in so far as those passions 
are weakened, or placed under stricter control. Men are 
still inflamed with resentment and opposition, and are 
ready to defend, by other than intellectual means, the 
doctrines with w T hich their interest, power, and importance 
are indissolubly interwoven. But besides that the spirits 
of all such are probably softened by the improvement of 
the age (for it is the tendency of civilization to mitigate 
the irascible passions,) they are no longer permitted by 
the moral sympathies of mankind to manifest their resent- 
ment and mortification by the same violent methods. Re- 
proach and invective must now, in most cases, content 
that selfish bigotry, which, in a former age, would have 
had recourse to more formidable weapons. 

In the second place, if the practices of the world receive 
any amelioration from its advancement in knowledge, if 
the one keep pace with the other, we may rationally 
expect to see a diminution of intolerance, in so far as it 
is founded in ignorance and error. Society, accordingly, 
no longer presents us with the same outrageous scenes of 
persecution, and mad attempts on men's understandings. 
We no longer witness the same compulsory methods of 
obtaining subscriptions to creeds, nor do we even hear the 
same violent denunciations against heresy and dissent. 
The fundamental error, of imputing guilt to a man on 



COMMON ERRORS ON THIS SUBJECT. 53 

account of his opinions, has shrunk within narrower 
bounds ; but it is nevertheless far from being exterminated. 
Men have extended their sphere of liberality, they have 
expanded their system of toleration, but it is not yet with- 
out limits. There is still a boundary in speculation, 
beyond which no one is allowed to proceed ; at which 
innocence terminates and guilt commences; a boundary 
not fixed and determinate, but varying with the creed of 
every party. 

Although the advanced civilization of the age rejects 
the palpably absurd application of torture and death, it is 
not to be concealed, that, amongst a numerous class, there 
is an analogous, though less barbarous persecution, of all 
who depart from received doctrines — the persecution of 
private antipathy and public odium. They are looked 
upon as a species of criminals, and their deviations from 
established opinions, or, if any one prefers the phrase, 
their speculative errors, are regarded by many with as 
much horror as flagrant violations of morality. In the 
ordinary ranks of men, where exploded prejudices often 
linger for ages, this is scarcely to be wondered at; but it is 
painful, and on a first view unaccountable, to witness the 
prevalence of the same spirit in the republic of letters; to 
see mistakes in speculation pursued with all the warmth of 
moral indignation and reproach. He who believes an 
opinion on the authority of others, who has taken no 
pains to investigate its claims to credibility, nor weighed 
the objections to the evidence on which it rests, is lauded 
for his acquiescence, while obloquy from every side is too 
often heaped on the man, who has minutely searched into 
the subject, and been led to an opposite conclusion. There 
are few things more disgusting to an enlightened mind 
than to see a number of men, a mob, whether learned or 
illiterate, who have never scrutinized the foundation of 



54 EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF COMMON ERRORS, ETC. 

their opinions, assailing with contumely an individual, 
who, after the labor of research and reflection, has adopted 
different sentiments from theirs, and pluming themselves 
on the notion of superior virtue, because their understand- 
ings have been tenacious of prejudice.* 

This conduct is the more remarkable, as on every side 
we meet with the admission, that belief is not dependent 
on the will; and yet the same men, by whom this admis- 
sion is readily made, will argue and inveigh on the virtual 
assumption of the contrary. 

This is a striking proof, amongst a multitude of others, 
of what the thinking mind must have frequently observed, 
that a principle is often retained in its applications, long 
after it has been discarded as an abstract proposition. In 
a subject of so much importance, however, it behoves 
intelligent men to be rigidly consistent. If our opinions 
are not voluntary, but independent of the will, the contra- 
ry doctrine and all its consequences ought to be practically 
abandoned ; they ought to be weeded from the sentiments, 
habits, and institutions of society. We may venture to 
assert, that neither the virtue nor the happiness of man 
will ever be placed on a perfectly firm basis, till this fun- 
damental error has been extirpated from the human mind. 

* See Note D. 



ESSAY 



THE PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS. 



ESSAY II. 

ON THE PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS. 



SECTION I. 

INTRODUCTION. , 

It has been shown in the preceding essay, that belief is 
an involuntary act or state of the understanding, which 
cannot be affected by rewards and punishments ; and that, 
consequently, opinions are not the proper subjects of legis- 
lation. The publication of opinions, however, being a 
voluntary act, the propriety or impropriety of interfering 
with it must be determined by other principles. The 
advocates of restraints on the freedom of public discus- 
sion, renouncing the criminality of opinions as a ground 
of legislative enactments, may be conceived as urging the 
following arguments. 

c The formation of opinions may not depend on the 
will : but the communication of them being voluntary, it 
is surely wise to prevent the dissemination of such as 
have an injurious tendency, which can be effected only by 
attaching a punishment to it. In the same way that we 
are justified in restraining the liberty of a man who arrives 
from a country infected with the plague, by making him 
perform quarantine ; we are justified in restraining the 
liberty of every man who entertains opinions of an evil 



58 INTRODUCTION. 

tendency, by requiring him to keep them to himself. 
And as in the former case it is necessary to punish him 
who breaks through so salutary a restraint, so it is in the 
latter. This is all for which we contend. In either case 
there may be no criminality attaching to the individual, 
on account of his body or his mind being the seat of a 
noxious principle ; but the community has a right to im- 
pose upon him whatever regulations are necessary to 
prevent its diffusion, and to inflict a penalty on the trans- 
gression of regulations so imposed.' 

That the general principle involved in this reasoning is 
correct, there can be no doubt. A society has a perfect 
right to adopt such regulations for its own government, as 
have a preponderance of advantages. Utility, therefore, 
in the most comprehensive acceptation of the term, is the 
test by which every institution, every law, and every 
course of action must be tried. Restrictions of any kind 
must be acknowledged to be proper, if, taking in the whole 
of their consequences, they can be proved to be beneficial 
to the community, although they may be directed against 
actions involving no moral turpitude. The only point is 
to establish their beneficial tendency. The laws of quar- 
antine furnish a good illustration of the general principle, 
but do not form a case at all analogous to that of restric- 
tions on the publication of opinions. To render the cases 
parallel it would be necessary to suppose the phenomena 
of the human constitution to be different from what they 
are ; that health was of a communicable nature, and could 
be imported into a country as well as disease, and that no 
regulations could be devised to admit the one without the 
other. 

In this case, if the people were already afflicted with 
various disorders, and if it could be proved that the salu- 
brious would on the whole preponderate over the noxious 
contagion, it is evident, that any restraints imposed with a 



INTRODUCTION. 59 

view to prevent the importation of disease, would debar 
the nation from a positive accession to their stock of 
health. 

It is a similar effect to this, which, we shall endeavor to 
show, would ensue from restraints on the publication ot 
opinions. Truth and error, in the one case, are as much 
intermixed, and as inseparable by human regulations, as 
health and disease would be in the other ; they can only 
be admitted and excluded together ; and, of the two, there 
are the strongest grounds for believing that the former 
must greatly prevail and finally triumph. Restrictions, 
therefore, on the publication of any opinions, would retard 
the advancement and dissemination of truth as much as 
any precautionary laws, under the circumstances sup- 
posed, would impede the propagation of health. These 
views it will be the aim of the following pages to illus- 
trate. But as it may be questioned whether the happiness 
of mankind is promoted by truth and injured by error, a 
position on which the whole argument depends, it will be 
necessary to offer a few preliminary considerations in sup- 
port of that important doctrine. After endeavoring to 
establish the conclusion, that the attainment of truth ought 
to be the sole object of all regulations affecting the publi- 
cation of opinions, because error is injurious ; we shall 
proceed to show, that the extrication of mankind from 
error will be most readily and effectually accomplished by 
perfect freedom of discussion ; that to check inquiry and 
attempt to regulate the progress and direction of opinions, 
by proscriptions and penalties, is to disturb the order of 
nature, and is analogous, in its mischievous tendency, to 
the system of forcing the capital and industry of the com- 
munity into channels which they would never spontane- 
ously seek, instead of suffering private interest to direct 
them to their most profitable employment. 



60 ON THE MCISHIEFS OF ERROR, 



SECTION II. 

ON THE 3IISCHIEFS OF ERROR, AND THE ADVANTAGES OF 

TRUTH. 

Our inquiry into the mischiefs of error and the advan- 
tages of truth may be simplified by laying aside the 
sciences which have a reference to the material world, as 
no one will be found to doubt, that mistakes in physical 
knowledge must be injurious, and their overthrow bene- 
ficial. Or supposing that errors in these sciences may 
exist, without affecting the happiness of man, it is un- 
questionable, that the detection of such errors must also 
be harmless ; and it will scarcely be contested, that the 
utility of these departments of knowledge must consist in 
the truth* of their principles, and the justness of their 
application. 

We may, therefore, limit our inquiry to the effects of 
truth in those sciences which treat of the powers, conduct, 
character, and condition of intelligent beings. The ulti- 
mate problem to be solved in all these sciences is, what is 
most conducive to the real happiness of mankind ? Amidst 
the innumerable questions in theology, metaphysics, mor- 
als, and politics, it may not always be easy to discern, that 
to solve this problem is their final and their only rational 
aim : but it is, in reality, on the success with which they 
point out the true path of happiness, that their whole value 
depends, beyond what they possess as an exercise for the 
faculties, in common with a game at chess or a scholastic 
disputation, and what belongs to them as sources of 
sublime and pleasurable emotion, in common with the 
fictions of the poet and the painter. What is theology, 



AND ADVANTAGES OF TRUTH. 61 

but a comprehensive examination into the course of action 
and condition of mind, which will please the Being who 
has the fate of mankind in his hands ? What is meta- 
physics, but an inquiry into the nature of man, the extent 
of his faculties, his relations to the existences around him, 
and the bearing of all these on his condition ? What is 
the science of morals, but an endeavor to find out what 
conduct will ultimately tend to his felicity ? And what is 
that of politics, but a similar attempt to discover what 
public measures will promote the same end ? 

If the object of all these sciences is to inquire what is 
most conducive to the happiness of mankind, and if their 
value is proportioned to the success of that inquiry, error 
must of course be pernicious, or, on the most favorable 
supposition, useless. This proposition is, indeed, implied 
in the terms used. That we should be benefited by mis- 
takes relative to the means of obtaining happiness is as 
palpable an absurdity as can be conceived. 

In these moral inquiries, then, the nearer mankind 
approach to truth, the happier they will be, the better will 
they be able to avoid what is injurious, and adopt measures 
of positive utility. All errors must be deviations from the 
path of real good ; and whether they tend to give man 
too high or too low an opinion of his nature and destiny, 
to fill his mind with fancied relations which do not exist, 
or destroy his belief in those which are in being ; whether 
they give him mistaken ideas of moral obligation, or 
impose a wrong standard of moral conduct ; whether they 
mislead him in his social or in his political measures, 
they are alike detrimental, although they may differ in 
the degree of their mischievous tendency. In a word, 
whatever is the real condition, nature, and destination of 
man, it is important for him to know the truth, that his 
conduct may be regulated accordingly, that his efforts 



62 ON THE MISCHIEFS OF ERROR, 

after happiness may be properly directed, that he may 
be the sport of neither delusive hopes nor groundless 
fears, that he may not sink under remediable evils, nor 
lose attainable good. 

To argue that truth is not beneficial, is to contend that 
it is useless to know the direct road to the place which is 
the object of our journey ; to affirm that error is not 
injurious, is to advocate the harmlessness or the advan- 
tages of wandering in ignorance and being led astray by 
deception.* 

There are errors, it is true, which may be allowed to 
produce accidental benefit, and others, which, by supply- 
ing in some degree the place of truths, may be the source 
of partial good, and the subversion of which may be at- 
tended with temporary evil. The discovery of truth may 
occasionally resemble in its effects the invention of 
mechanical improvements, which, on their first introduc- 
tion, sometimes beget injury to individuals, and even 
transitory inconvenience to society. But partial and 
transitory evil can be no solid objection to the introduction 
of general and permanent good. There is not the sem- 
blance of a reason, why the welfare of the community at 
large should be sacrificed to the advantage of a few ; or 
why a small and transient injury should not be endured 
for the sake of a great and lasting benefit. If errors are 
ever useful they are less useful than truth, and are there- 
fore absolute evils.f c Utility and truth are not to be 

* See Note E. 

f En effet le caractere distinctif ne la verite est d'etre cgalement et 
constamnient advantaguese a tous les partis, tandis que le mensonge, 
utile pour quelques instaus seulement a quelques individus, est tou- 
jours nuisible a tous les autres.' — Du Marsais on Prejudice, as 
quoted in the Retrospective Review ; p. 75. 



AND ADVANTAGES OF TRUTH. 63 

divided,' says Bishop Berkeley, ' the general good of 
mankind being the rule or measure of moral truth. ' * 

With regard to the collateral advantages of the various 
branches of knowledge, consisting in the improvement of 
the faculties, and the pleasure which they immediately 
impart, irrespective of their ulterior usefulness, it will 
scarcely be necessary to prove, that truth cannot be in- 
imical to either. It will be admitted, at least, that the 
efficiency of any science in improving the powers of the 
mind can borrow nothing from its incorrectness ; and we 
may, therefore, pass on to the second collateral advantage, 
and inquire whether error can be superior to truth as a 
source of immediate gratification. 

Plausible and erroneous theories may be admitted, in 
some cases, to impart a pleasure to the mind, while they 
impose themselves upon it as true, equal to that which 
can be derived from the most accurate speculations ; but 
if they sometimes confer an equal, they cannot in general 
be supposed to confer a superior pleasure. If we allow 
that the hypothesis of Descartes imparted ideas and emo- 
tions to the astronomer of those days nowise inferior in 
point of interest and sublimity to those excited, at a later 
period, by the discoveries of Newton, it is the utmost 
limit of supposition, and we have not the shadow of a 
reason for giving the superiority to the former. On the 
contrary, unless we choose to suppose, that the chimeras 
of man's imagination are better calculated to excite pleas- 
ure and admiration than the real order and constitution of 
nature, we must admit, that every discovery of her laws, 
every detection of error, and every advance in true know- 
ledge, must have a tendency to exalt our sources of enjoy- 
ment. In the physical sciences, at least, we may take it 
for granted, that error cannot bring a real increase of 

* A Discourse addressed to Magistrates and Men in Authority. 



64 ON THE MISCHIEFS OF ERROR, 

pleasure ; but in religion, morals, metaphysics, and poli- 
tics, may not there be pleasant delusions; falsehoods, 
which delight while they do no harm ; dreams, the scene 
of which is placed beyond the reach of earthly changes, 
and which, as they are not assailable by time, may be 
cherished without the risk of being destroyed, and without 
any possible train of pernicious consequences ; and may 
not these delusions bestow consolation and happiness 
superior to the cold realities of truth? May not the 
benevolent mind derive more gratification from extrava- 
gant expectations of the extinction of vice and misery, 
and the perfectibility of man, than from juster views of 
the constitution of human nature ? And may not the 
enthusiast extract from his dreams of beatitude more real 
enjoyment, a greater sum of pleasurable emotion, than 
the rigid reasoner from more probable anticipations ? 
Since the human mind is so constituted as to be capable 
of connecting its happiness with almost any opinions, a 
man may certainly derive considerable pleasure from , 
such delusions as these, and suffer pain from their destruc- 
tion ; * yet it may be doubted whether, in general, juster 

* On this point every one will agree with Lord Bacon : c Doth 
any man doubt,' lie asks, e that if there were taken out of men's 
minds vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations 
as one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds of a num- 
ber of men poor, shrunken things, full of melancholy and indispo- 
sition, and unpleasing to themselves ? ' — Essay on Truth, His 
lordship, however, although he thus strongly portrays the disagree- 
able effects which would follow the destruction of these ' baseless 
fabrics,' is not to be considered as contending that they are a posi- 
tive good, for in another passage he expressly marks their evil ten- 
dency. ' How many things are there,' he exclaims, c which we 
imagine not ! How many things do we esteem and value otherwise 
than they are ! This ill-proportioned estimation, these vain imagi- 
nations, these be the clouds of error that turn into the storms of 
perturbation.' — In Praise of Knowledge. 



AND ADVANTAGES OF TRUTH. 65 

speculations would not have afforded equal, and even 
superior gratification, had he originally formed them. 
But granting the contrary, in its utmost extent, it could 
happen only in the case of a few individuals. Men are 
so engaged with the objects immediately around them, 
that mere visionary notions of this sort could never be a 
common and abundant source of enjoyment; or, at least, 
could never possess any superiority in that character over 
sober and rational views; and if they were formed on 
insufficient- grounds, as by the supposition they must be, 
that insufficiency would be liable occasionally to appear 
and throw the mind into doubt. So that, regarded even 
in this aspect, truth is the only sure and stable basis of 
happiness. But all the direct pleasure, which such delu- 
sions, how flattering soever to the imagination, could 
afford, would be no compensation for the ultimate evils 
attendant upon them. None of the dreams of enthusiasm 
are destitute of some bearing on practice. However 
remote they may appear from the present scene, and from 
the conduct of life, inferences will not fail to be drawn 
and applied from one to the other. These sanguine crea- 
tions, and celestial visions, will be linked to the business 
of the world in the same way that the motions of the 
heavenly bodies, which were at first matters of mere 
curiosity to a few shepherds, were soon connected by the 
imaginations of men with human affairs, and rendered 
subservient to gross and wretched superstitions. The 
influence of delusions will be always detrimental to hap- 
piness, inasmuch as they have a tendency to withdraw 
men's attention from those subjects in which their welfare 
is really implicated, and lead to eccentric modes of action, 
incompatible with the regular and beneficial course of 
duty and discretion. They are liable, too, to be exalted 
into sacred articles of faith, and to swell into an imaginary 
5 



66 

importance, which rouses all the energy of the passions 
in their support. It is thus that discord and dissension, 
intolerance and persecution, have sometimes been the 
bitter fruits of what was, at first, an apparently harmless 
and improbable dream. Nor is it to be forgotten, that 
delusions of this kind could never prevail without some 
weakness of understanding or imperfection of knowledge, 
incompatible with a thorough insight into the means of 
happiness, and therefore inconsistent with the highest state 
of felicity. A belief in them would necessarily involve 
logical errors, the consequences of which could not be 
confined to a single subject, but would extend themselves 
to others, where they might be highly injurious. The 
same fallacious principles, which deluded mankind on 
one occasion, with perhaps little detriment, would carry 
them from the direct path of their real interest, in affairs 
where such aberrations might be of vital importance. 



AND ADVANTAGES OF TRUTH. 67 



section in. 

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT. 

A doubt may, perhaps, be raised, whether the con- 
clusions, which we have attempted to establish, as to the 
advantages of truth, are corroborated by the actual state 
of facts and the experience of mankind : whether error 
has, in reality, been found replete with such evils as 
theoretical deductions lead us to suppose. 

Reasoning on the passions and principles of the human 
mind, perceiving its power of accommodation to circum- 
stances, and how much man's real felicity depends on his 
peculiar temper and conduct, as well as on other causes 
which spring up and expire with himself; comparing 
various ages and nations, under different laws, customs, 
and religious institutions, and seeing in all the same round 
of business and pleasure, the same passions, the same 
hilarity in youth and sobriety in manhood, the same ardor 
of love between the sexes, the same attachment among 
friends, the same pursuit of wealth, power, and reputa- 
tion, the same dissensions, the same crimes, and the same 
scenes of affliction, disease, and death; the philosopher 
may be induced to conclude, that, amidst the operation of 
so many principles, the state of opinions can have but a 
feeble influence on the happiness of private life. He 
may be ready to exclaim with the poet, 

* How small, of all that human hearts endure, 
That part which laws or kings can cause or cure 1 ' * 

# Goldsmith. 



68 ON THE MISCHIEFS OF ERROR, 

And, extending the remark to moral science, conclude, 
that beyond the circle of common knowledge, which is 
forced on every mind, truth and error can be of impor- 
tance only to speculative men ; that it is of little moment 
what opinions prevail, while the results, on a comprehen- 
sive estimate, are so nearly similar and equal. 

Bat, if he reason thus, he will overlook a thousand 
points, at which the state of moral, theological, and 
political opinions, touches on public welfare and private 
happiness. Knowledge of truth is essential to correctness 
of practice ; and this is true, not only of individuals, but 
of communities. The prevalence of error may, therefore, 
be expected to manifest itself in absurd and pernicious 
practices and institutions ; and we have only to look into 
the history of superstition and barbarism, to see its effects 
on the happiness of private life. Although that happi- 
3 may essentially depend on the qualities of individuals 
and their peculiar circumstances, is it of no importance 
that it should be secured from the violent interference of 
others ? that even the chances of evil should be lessened ? 
Is it no advantage to be free from the gloomy fears of 
superstition, to be absolved from the burden of fanatical 
rites, from absurd and mischievous institutions, from 
oppressive laws, and from a state of society in which 
unmeaning ceremonies are substituted for the duties of 
virtue ? Are unresirained liberty of innocent action, and 
security of property and existence, worthless r Is it 
nothing to be removed from the risk of the dungeon and the 
stake, for the conscientious profession of opinions ; to be 
rid of the alternative of the scaffold on the one hand, and, 
on the other, the sacrifice of conscience and honor ? 

These are all causes by which the train of events 

constituting a man's life is evidently liable to be modified. 

y have a material share in shaping the circumstances 



AND ADVANTAGES OF TRUTH. 69 

of the individual, and even enter largely into the forma- 
tion of his character ; so that even those features of his 
condition, which appear the most remote from such an 
influence, often derive their complexion from it. And 
what is it, that has extirpated these barbarities and pro- 
duced these benefits but the progress of truth, the discov- 
ery of the real nature and tendencies of such practices 
and institutions ? Let him that is sceptical as to the vast 
importance of truth, cast his eye down the long catalogue 
of crimes and cruelties which stain the annals of the past, 
and examine the melioration which has taken place in the 
practices of the world, and he will not again inquire into 
the nature of those advantages which follow the destruc- 
tion of error. All the liberality of thinking which now 
prevails, the spirit of resistance to tyranny, the contempt 
of priestcraft, the comparative rarity and mildness of 
religious persecution, the mitigation of national prejudices, 
the disappearance of a number of mischievous supersti- 
tions, the abolition of superfluous, absurd, and sanguinary 
laws, are so many exemplifications of the benefits result- 
ing from the progress of moral and political truth. They 
are triumphs, all of them, over established error, and 
imply, respectively, either the removal of a source of 
misery, or a positive addition to the sources of happiness. 
It is impossible for a moment to imagine, that if moral 
and political science had been thoroughly understood, the 
barbarities here noticed would have existed. A pernicious 
custom or an absurd law can never long prevail amidst a 
complete and universal appreciation of its character. 

The science of political economy, that noble creation 
of modern times, throws the strongest lights on the extent 
to which the welfare of mankind may be affected by 
fallacious prejudices and false conclusions in national 
policy. To pass over the evils of restrictions on the com- 



70 ON THE MISCHIEFS OF ERROR 

mercial intercourse of nations, from blind jealousy and 
absurd rivalsbip, the barriers everywhere opposed to the 
free exercise of industry, and the shackles by which 
enterprise has universally been crippled ; we have only to 
appeal to the principles on which governments have 
regulated the circulating medium of their respective 
countries (more especially our own) to show the vast 
influence, which an apparently slight mistake may pos- 
sess on the transactions and the condition of millions of 
the human race. 

In the science of morals, the operation of a wrong 
speculative principle on society cannot, perhaps, be more 
strongly exemplified, than in the consequences of the 
particular error which formed a principal topic of the 
preceding essay. The most cursory glance at the history 
of persecution is sufficient to discover, that intolerance 
never could have existed in such intensity, had it not been 
for the almost universal prevalence of the notion, that 
guilt might be incurred by opinions. In various ages and 
countries, deviations from the received faith have been 
looked upon, by the community at large, with more 
abhorrence than the most criminal actions ; and the con- 
sequence of this has been the perpetration of cruelties at 
which modern civilization shudders with horror. Let 
those who contend that speculative error can have but 
little influence on the happiness of private life, reflect a 
moment on the numbers of innocent and conscientious 
victims who have been destroyed by the Inquisition. It 
cannot surely be supposed, that these persecutions would 
ever have taken place, had the people at large been 
clearly convinced of the truth, that belief is an involuntary 
and therefore a guiltless state of the mind ; or, in other 
words, had they not labored under thg delusion* that 
opinions are the proper objects of punishment. Perse- 



AND ADVANTAGES OF TRUTH. 71 

cution would be necessarily exterminated in any nation 
which universally felt its injustice and absurdity. The 
moral sympathies of mankind, which had been perverted 
by false notions, would resume their natural direction, and 
would never suffer punishment to fall upon those, who, in 
the apprehension of all, had been guilty of no crime. What 
else but the general prevalence of the error already men- 
tioned, could have induced men, otherwise uninterested, 
to witness with tameness, nay even with satisfaction and 
delight, the most detestable barbarities inflicted by relig- 
ious zeal ? We are told, that in Spain and Portugal the 
spectators, who crowded to the executions for heresy, 
frequently testified extravagant joy. Even ladies would 
laugh and exult over the victims who were slowly con- 
suming at the stake. In reviewing such scenes, we are 
pained to think how awfully mankind may be deluded, 
how their sagacity may be blinded, their sense of justice 
extinguished, their best feelings subverted, by fallacies of 
judgment; and we become ready to question, whether 
even vice itself ever produced half the evils of false 
notions and mistaken views. 

6 The observer must be blind indeed,' says an elegant 
author and enlightened philosopher, * who does not per- 
ceive the vastness of the scale on which speculative 
principles, both right and wrong, have operated upon the 
present condition of mankind ; or who does not now feel 
and acknowledge how deeply the morals and the happiness 
of private life, as well as the order of political society, 
are involved in the final issue of the contest between true 
and false philosophy.' * 

# Dugald Stewart's Philosophical Essays, p. 67. . 



72 ON FREEDOM OF DISCUSSION AS 



SECTION If. 

ON FREEDOM OF DISCUSSION AS THE MEANS OF ATTAIN- 
ING TRUTH. 

The considerations offered in the preceding section 
are sufficient to show the extreme importance of just prin- 
ciples, and that mankind can never err in their speculative 
views without endangering their real welfare. It follows, 
as a necessary consequence, that the sole end of inquiry 
ought to be, not the support of any particular doctrines, 
but the attainment of truth, whatever may be the result to 
established systems. If, indeed, we admit the pernicious- 
ness of error, it is impossible to maintain any other object 
with even the appearance of reason. It is the sacred 
principle from which we ought never to swerve.* The 
inquiry, how truth is to be attained, becomes, therefore, in 
the highest degree interesting and important. 

Nothing more, it is manifest, would be required for the 
destruction of error than some fixed and invariable stand- 
ard of truth, which could be at once appealed to and be 
decisive of every controversy to the satisfaction of all 
mankind ; but that no such standard exists, the slightest 
consideration will be sufficient to evince. If it be assert- 
ed, that on points of religion the sacred writings are such 
a standard, it may be urged in reply, that this is only an 
apparent exception ; for, in the first place, we have no 
standard by which the authenticity of those writings can 
be determined beyond all liability to dispute; and, in the 

* The reader will find some excellent remarks on the subject of 
this section in Paley's Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. 
See the chapter on Toleration. 



THE MEANS OF ATTAINING TRUTH. 73 

second' place, supposing we had a test of this nature, or 
that the authenticity of the Scriptures was too evident 
to admit of the least doubt from the most perverse un- 
derstanding, yet we have no decisive standard of inter- 
pretation . 

Neuher can we discover a standard of truth in the 
opinions of the majority of mankind, otherwise we might 
ascertain all truth by the simple process of counting votes. 
The majority of mankind are seldom free from error; 
they have often held opinions the most absurd, and at 
differen: times have entertained contradictory propositions. 

It would be equally vain to look for a standard of truth 
in the jidgment of any particular class of human beings. 
No rank, no office, no privileges, no attainments in wis- 
dom or science, can be a security from error. Bodies of 
men, who have assumed infallibility, have, hitherto, always 
been misUken. 

Since, tien, we have no fixed standard by w T hich we 
can in all cases try the validity of opinions, as we can 
measure tine and space ; since we have no oracles of 
indisputable authenticity, or at least of incontrovertible 
meaning ; ance we cannot ascertain truth by putting 
opinions to he vote, nor by an appeal to any class or 
order of mei, how are we to attain it, or by what means 
escape from irror ? 

Although ve have no absolute test of truth, yet we 
have faculties to discern it, and it is only by the unre- 
strained exercise of those faculties that we can hope to 
attain correct Opinions. Our success in every subject will 
essentially depend on the completeness of the examina- 
tion. But no irdividual mind is so acute and comprehen- 
sive, so free frtm passion and prejudice, and placed in 
such favorable crcumstances, as in any complex question 
to see all the possible arguments on both sides in their 



74 ON FREEDOM OF DISCUSSION AS 

full force. Hence the co-operation of various minds be- 
comes indispensably requisite. The greater the number 
of inquirers, the greater the probability of a successful 
result. Some will come to the inquiry under circumstan- 
ces peculiarly favorable to success, some with faculties 
capable of penetrating where less acute ones fai 7 , and 
some disengaged from passions and prejudices with which 
others are encumbered. While one directs his scrutiny 
to a particular view of the subject, another will regard it 
in a different aspect, a third will see it from a position 
inaccessible to his predecessors ; and, by the comparison 
and collision of opinions, truth will be separated from 
error and emerge from obscurity. If attainible by 
human faculties, it must by such a process be utimately 
evolved. 

The way, then, to obtain this result is to pern it all to 
be said on a subject that can be said. All eror is the 
consequence of narrow and partial views, ani can be 
removed only by having a question presentee in all its 
possible bearings, or, in other words, by unlimited discus- 
sion. Where there is perfect freedom of examination, 
there is the greatest probability which it is possible to 
have that the truth will be ultimately attained. To im- 
pose the least restraint is to diminish this probability. It 
is to declare that we will not take into corsideration all 
the possible arguments which can be preseited, but that 
we will form our opinions on partial, views. It is, there- 
fore, to increase the probability of error. Nor need we, 
under the utmost freedom of discussion, ie in any fear 
of an inundation of crude and preposterous speculations. 
All such will meet with a proper and efectual check in 
the neglect or ridicule of the public : none will have much 
influence but those which possess the plusibility bestow- 
ed by a considerable admixture of trutl, and which it is 



THE MEANS OF ATTAINING TRUTH. 75 

of importance should appear, that, amidst the contention 
of controversy, what is true may be separated from what 
is false.* 

The objection, that the plan of unlimited discussion 
would introduce a multiplicity of erroneous speculations, 
is in reality directed against the very means of attaining 
the end. Though error is an absolute evil, it is frequent- 
ly necessary to go through it to arrive at truth ; as a man, 
to ascertain the nearest road from one place to another, 
may be obliged to make frequent deviations from the 
direct line. In the physical sciences, through how many 
errors has the path to truth frequently lain ! What would 
have been the present state of knowledge, if no step had 
been hazarded without a perfect assurance of being right ? 
Even the ideal theory of Berkeley and the scepticism of 
Hume have had their use in establishing human science 
on its just foundation. t We are midway in the stream 
of ignorance and error ; and it is a poor argument against 
an attempt to reach the shore, that every step will be a 
plunge into the very element from which w T e are anxious 
to escape. Mankind, it is obvious, are not endowed with 
faculties to possess themselves at once of correct opinions 
on all subjects. On many questions they must expend 
painful and persevering efforts ; they must often be mis- 
taken, and often be set right, before they completely 
succeed. To stop them at any point in their career, to 
erect a barrier, and say, thus far your inquiries have pro- 
ceeded, but here they must terminate, can scarcely fail 
to fix them in the midst of some error. It is prejudging 
all future efforts and all future opportunities of discovery, 
without a knowledge of their nature and extent. It is 
proclaiming, that whatever events may hereafter take 

* See Note F. t See Note G-. 



76 ON FREEDOM OF DISCUSSION, ETC. 

place, whatever new principles may be evolved, whatever 
established fallacies may be exploded, how much soever 
the methods of investigating truth may be enlarged and 
enhanced in efficacy, and how gigantic soever may be 
the progress of the human mind in other departments of 
knowledge ; yet no application of any of these improve- 
ments and discoveries shall be made to certain particular 
subjects, which shall be as fixed spots, immovable sta- 
tions, amidst all the vicissitudes and advancement of 
science. 



THE PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS. 77 



SECTION V. 

ON THE ASSUMPTIONS INVOLVED IN ALL RESTRAINTS ON 
THE PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS. 

The arguments adduced in the last section have brought 
us to the conclusion, that unrestrained freedom of inquiry 
is the only, or at least the best and readiest way, of arriving 
at correct opinions. It may deserve a little attention, in 
the next place, to investigate the grounds on which all 
restrictions, if they are honestly intended for the benefit of 
the community, must proceed. They must evidently be 
founded, either on the position that the prevalence of truth 
would be productive of pernicious consequences, or, ad- 
mitting its good consequences, on the positions, first, that 
truth has been attained, and secondly, that, having been 
attained, it stands in need of the protection and assistance 
of power in its contest with error. 

That the prevalence of truth would contribute to the 
happiness of man, has already been enforced at some 
length ; and in showing that there is no fixed standard or 
positive test of truth, we have, perhaps, sufficiently ex- 
posed the presumption of assuming, that truth has been 
infallibly attained. Nothing, in fact, could justify such an 
assumption but the possession of faculties not liable to 
mistake, or such palpable evidence on a subject as would 
render all restraints perfectly superfluous and absurd. 
The most thorough conviction of the truth of any opinions 
is far from being a proof of their correctness, or the 
slightest justification of any attempt at the forcible sup- 
pression of contrary sentiments. Had our predecessors, 
who were equally convinced of the truth of their tenets, 



78 ON RESTRAINTS ON THE 

succeeded in stifling investigation, the world would have 
been still immersed in the darkness of superstition, and 
bound as fast as ever by the fetters of prejudice. They 
felt themselves, nevertheless, as firmly in the right as the 
present age can possibly feel, and were equally justified in 
acts of intolerance and persecution. Amidst the over- 
whelming proof afforded by the annals of the past, that 
mankind are continually liable to be deceived in their 
strongest convictions, it is a preposterous and unpardonable 
presumption, in any man, to set up the firmness of his 
own belief as an absolute criterion of truth.* 

Every one must, of course, think his own opinions 
right ; for if he thought them wrong, they would no longer 
be his opinions : but there is a wide difference between 
regarding ourselves as infallible, and being firmly con- 
vinced of the truth of our creed. When a man reflects 
on any particular doctrine, he may be impressed with a 
thorough conviction of the improbability or even impossi- 
bility of its being false : and so he may feel with regard 
to all his other opinions, when he makes them objects of 
separate contemplation. And yet, when he views them in 
the aggregate, when he reflects, that not a single being on 
the earth holds collectively the same, when he looks at the 
past history and present state of mankind, and observes 
the various creeds of different ages and nations, the pecu- 
liar modes of thinking of sects, and bodies and individuals, 
the notions once firmly held, which have been exploded, 
the prejudices once universally prevalent, which have 
been removed, and the endless controversies, which have 
distracted those who have made it the business of their 
lives to arrive at the truth ; and when he further dwells on 
the consideration, that many of these his fellow-creatures 

* See Note H. 



PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS. 79 

have had a conviction of the justness of their respective 
sentiments equal to his own, he cannot help the obvious 
inference, that in his own opinions it is next to impossible 
that there is not an admixture of error; that there is an 
infinitely greater probability of his being wrong in some, 
than right in all. 

Every man of common sense and common candor, 
although he may have no suspicion where his mistakes lie, 
must have this general suspicion of his own fallibility ; 
and, if he act consistently, he will not seek to suppress 
opinions by force, because in so doing he might be at once 
lending support to error, and destroying the only means of 
its detection. In endeavoring to spread his opinions, and 
to suppress all others by the arm of power, the utmost 
success would have no tendency to lay open the least of 
those mistakes which had insinuated themselves into his 
creed ; but in propagating his opinions by arguments, by 
appeals to the discrimination of his fellow-men, he would 
be contributing alike to the detection of his own errors 
and to the overthrow of those of his antagonists. 

It remains to consider, in the next place, the assump- 
tion, implied in all restrictions on inquiry, that truth, in its 
contest with error, stands in need of ,the protection of 
human authority. 

Men have long since found out how ridiculous is the 
interference of authority in physical and mathematical 
science ; when will they learn to smile at its officious and 
impotent attempts at the protection of truth in moral and 
political inquiries ? The doctrine, that, under perfect 
freedom of discussion, falsehood would ultimately prevail, 
virtually implies the human faculties to be so constituted, 
as, all other things being the same, to cleave to error 
rather than to truth ; in which case the pursuit of know- 
ledge would be folly, since every step and every effort 



80 ON RESTRAINTS ON THE 

would carry us farther from our object. But the supposi- 
tion of the ultimate triumph of falsehood is a fallacy dis- 
proved by the experience of mankind. Error may subvert 
error, one false doctrine may supersede another, and truth 
may be long undiscovered, and make its way slowly 
against the tide of prejudice : but that it has not only the 
power of overcoming its antagonist in equal circumstances, 
but also of surmounting every intellectual obstacle, every 
impediment but mere brute force, is proved by the general 
advancement of knowledge. If we trace the history of 
any science, we shall find it a record of mistakes and 
misconceptions, a narrative of misdirected and often fruit- 
less efforts ; yet if amidst all these the science has made a 
progress, the struggles through which it has passed, far 
from evincing that the human mind is prone to error rather 
than to truth, furnish a decisive proof of the contrary, and 
an illustration of the fact, that, in the actual condition of 
humanity, mistakes are the necessary instruments by 
which truth is brought to light, or, at least, indispensable 
conditions of the process. 

No one, perhaps, in the present day, although he might 
be the advocate of restraints on the discussion of theo- 
logical and political topics, would be hardy enough to 
contest the justness of this remark, or contend for the 
utility of restrictions in mathematical and physical science : 
and yet, in this respect, all the various departments of 
knowledge stand on the same ground. Let those who 
think otherwise show us the distinctive characteristics 
which render it proper and expedient to shackle the dis- 
cussion of particular topics, while every other subject is 
abandoned, without fear or precaution, alike to the con- 
flicting play of the acutest intellects, and to the blunders 
of ignorance and imbecility. 

What, however, we have to prove on the present occa- 



PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS. 81 

sion, is not, that truth if left to its own energy will finally 
triumph over prevailing error, but the less questionable 
position, that novel errors are not capable of overturning 
truths already established. The exercise of authority is, 
of course, always in support of established opinions ; and 
since to be justifiable it must proceed on the assumption 
of their freedom from error, all that is necessaiy for our 
purpose is to show, that if they are as true as they are 
assumed to be, they cannot be subverted by the utmost 
latitude of discussion. 

If they are true, then is there the highest probability, 
that every fresh examination to which they may be sub- 
jected will terminate in placing them in clearer light ; 
because every argument levelled against them must in- 
volve some fallacy which is liable to detection, and the 
exposure of which will tend to propagate and confirm 
them. The only cause why any opinions need to appre- 
hend the touch of discussion is, that there is a certain 
process of reason by which they may be proved to be 
wrong, and the discovery of which may result from the 
conflict of arguments. The nature of this predicament, 
in which true opinions can never stand, and all objections 
to them must ever remain, constitutes of itself a sufficient 
, barrier against the' encroachments of falsehood, were there 
no other to be found in the fixed habits and dispositions of 
the community. It is a work of difficulty to overturn 
even established error, because the interests, passions, and 
prejudices of so many are engaged in its support, and 
long resist the strongest arguments and the clearest de- 
monstration : why then need we fear the overthrow of 
established truth by the utmost license of discussion, when 
not only prescription, interest, prejudice, and passion, are 
in its favor, but the powerful alliance of reason itself ? 
In stating the grounds on which all restrictions must 
6 



82 ON RESTRAINTS, ETC. 

proceed, we limited our remarks to restrictions honestly 
intended for the benefit of the community, because no 
others can be openly maintained ; and whatever may be 
the real motives of those who impose or advocate them, 
the good of the public must be their ostensible aim. It 
is obvious, however, that restraints of this kind much more 
frequently owe their origin to the selfish fears and pur- 
poses of part of the community, than to just and liberal 
intentions with regard to the whole. Established opinions 
are so interwoven with the interests of individuals, that 
the subversion of one often threatens the ruin of the other. 
Hence the energy which strains every nerve in their 
support, and hence much of the rancor with which the 
slightest deviation is pursued. 



FREE PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS. 83 



SECTION VI. 

ON THE FREE PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS AS AFFECTING 
THE PEOPLE AT LARGE. 

We now come to a question naturally springing out of 
the present subject, and of no mean importance. It may- 
be urged, that, granting the justness of the observations in 
the preceding chapter, there are other considerations of 
too momentous a nature to be overlooked. Free discus- 
sion may be the best means of promoting the progress of 
truth ; but is the unbounded license of disseminating all 
opinions the best way of propagating truth amongst those 
who may be presumed, from their situation in life, to be 
incompetent to judge for themselves? Would it not be 
w T ise to interpose some restraint to prevent the poor and 
the ignorant from being deluded by falsehood ? 

There are several strong reasons why any restrictions, 
imposed with a view to guard the lower classes from error, 
would prove abortive, and even injurious. All restraints 
of this kind would imply, on the part of those who im- 
posed them, that they themselves could infallibly determine 
what was true and what was false. But it is plain, as we 
have already remarked, that if such an assumption had 
always been acted upon, authority would have been fre- 
quently employed in suppressing truth and lending assist- 
ance to error ; nor can we have better grounds for acting 
upon it now than the same strong conviction which clung 
to our predecessors. To see the matter in its proper light, 
we have only for a moment to consider what would have 
been the state of society in Europe, if the principle of 



84 ON THE FREE 

guarding the poor from what the established authorities 
regarded as error, had been always successfully en- 
forced. 

The whole experience of mankind on this subject pro- 
claims, that regulations to keep the people from opinions 
which have been pronounced to be errors by fallible men, 
if they could accomplish their object, would prove the 
most" effectual engines that could be devised for per- 
petuating ignorance and falsehood. 

Were it possible, nevertheless, for any set of men to 
discriminate the true nature of opinions with unerring 
accuracy, yet, in an age of improvement and a land of 
liberty, they could not confine the minds of the people to 
those ideas which they chose to imparl to them. Unless 
the lower classes were kept in total darkness by the most 
intolerable despotism, it would be impossible to prevent 
them from participating in the discussions of their supe- 
riors in rank and knowledge. There are a thousand 
channels of communication which cannot be closed, and 
on every controvertible subject there is a certain train of 
doubts, difficulties, and objections, which nothing but utter 
ignorance can suppress. Truths, which have been the 
gradual result of inquiry and induction, of suppositions 
disproved and mistakes rectified, cannot always be intro- 
duced into the mind without a process somewhat similar 
to that by which they have been originally obtained. 

Since then the poorer classes cannot be brought to limit 
their inquiries to what their superiors choose to set before 
them ; since doubts and difficulties will necessarily start 
up in their minds, it becomes very questionable whether, 
even on the supposition of established opinions being true, 
more error would not prevail under a system of restriction 
than under perfect freedom of inquiry. All that authority 
could do in regard to contrary doctrines would be to pro- 



PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS. 85 

hibit their open expression or promulgation ; it would have 
no power to extirpate them from the mind. Under a system 
of restraint, therefore, it is probable, that a multiplicity of 
errors would secretly exist; and as they would not be 
allowed to find public vent, they could not be refuted. 
They would, consequently, bid fair to have a far" more 
durable and extensive prevalence than if they were open- 
ly expressed, and exposed to the rigorous test of general 
examination. It seems, indeed, an obvious if not an 
unavoidable policy, rather to encourage than repress the 
expression of dissent from established notions. A govern- 
ment, whose fundamental principle was the happiness of 
the community, would act, in this respect, like a wise 
teacher, who encourages his pupils to propose the doubts 
and objections to which the imperfection of their know- 
ledge may have given birth, and which can be removed 
from their minds only when they are known. The surest 
way of contracting the empire of error, is to increase the 
general power of discerning its character. In the present 
stage of civilization this is, in fact, all that can be done. 
The days of concealment and mystery are past. There 
is now no resource but in a system of fairness and open 
dealing; no feasible mode of preserving and propagating 
truth but by exalting ignorance into knowledge. 

The universal education of tba poor, which no earthly 
power can prevent, although it may retard it, is loudly de- 
manded by the united voices of the moralist and politician. 
But if the people are to be enlightened at all, it is unavail- 
ing and inconsistent to resort to half measures and timid 
expedients; to treat them at once as men and as children; 
to endow them with the power of thinking, and at the same 
time to fetter its exercise ; to make an appeal to their rea- 
son, and yet to distrust its result ; to give them the stomach 
of a lion, and feed them with the aliment of a lamb. The 



86 ON THE FREE 

promoters of the universal education of the poor ought 
to be aware, that they are setting in motion, or at least 
accelerating the action of an engine too powerful to be * 
controlled at their pleasure, and likely to prove fatal to 
all those of their own systems, which rest not on the solid 
foundation of reality. They ought to know, that they are 
necessarily giving birth to a great deal of doubt and 
investigation ; that they are undermining the power of 
prejudice, and the influence of mere authority and pre- 
scription ; that they are creating an immense number of 
keen inquirers and original thinkers, whose intellectual 
force will be turned, in the first instance, upon those sub- 
jects which are dearest to the heart and of most importance 
to society. 

In the further prosecution of this subject, it may be asked 
of the advocates of restrictive measures, by what con- 
ceivable regulations they could guard those from error, 
who were not able to judge for themselves, and at the 
same time secure the substantial advantages of unlimited 
discussion to the rest ? 

No human ingenuity could combine these two objects. 
No line of demarcation could be drawn between those 
who should be left to the operation of all arguments 
which could be adduced, and those whose weakness or 
ignorance required the paternal arm of authority to shield 
them from falsehood. There can be no distinction made 
between the rich and the poor in these cases. Not to 
insist upon the fact, that many in the inferior ranks are 
quite as competent to the examination of any question, 
which bears upon moral or political conduct, as many in 
the highest stations ; it is impracticable to devise a meas- 
ure which shall exclude any particular classes, and leave 
the right of free examination unimpaired to the rest ; so 
that, if we were under the necessity of allowing, that some 



PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS. 87 

evils might arise from admitting the poor to be a party 
in the examination of a subject, it might still be contended, 
that such evils would be wisely encountered for the sake 
of those inestimable advantages, which follow the progress 
of truth, and which can be purchased only by liberty of 
public discussion. It may be further urged, to show the 
importance of maintaining this liberty unshackled, that 
the intelligence of the lower classes, the diminution of 
ignorance and error amongst them must necessarily de- 
pend on the general progress of knowledge. While those 
who have the best opportunities of information, are in 
darkness, those, who are in inferior stations, cannot be 
expected to be otherwise than proportionably more so. 
Whatever therefore tends to keep the former from be- 
coming enlightened (as all restrictions inevitably do) must 
have a corresponding effect on the latter, or, in other 
words, tend to keep them in that state from which it is the 
professed object of restrictions to preserve them. 

It is necessary to recollect that the real question is, not 
whether it is desirable that the poorer classes, or all 
classes, should be preserved from error (about which 
there can be no dispute at this stage of our discussion), 
but whether it would be proper and expedient to attempt 
the accomplishment of that object by the interposition of 
authority. There are many acts which are highly in- 
jurious to society, but which we never attempt to 
suppress by legal enactments, because such a procedure 
would be either abortive or pregnant with greater evils 
than the evils against which it was directed. On this 
principle, ingratitude, cruelty, treachery, incontinence, 
and a number of other vices, are not touched by the laws, 
but left to the natural discouragements imposed by the 
moral sentiments of the community. On the same 
grounds, although erroneous opinions are injurious to 



88 ON THE FREE 

society, and it would be an important benefit if their 
dissemination could be prevented, yet it would be inex- 
pedient to endeavor to accomplish that object by legal 
restrictions. The attempt would be impolitic, because, 
as we have already shown, not only is it impossible to dis- 
criminate infallibly what is true from what is false, so as 
to avoid suppressing truth and propagating falsehood ; but 
all restraints would be likely to defeat their own ends, or 
at all events would never be effectual unless pushed to 
the extreme of tyranny, and could not be imposed so as 
accomplish their object without impeding the progress of 
knowledge. 

But the people are not left to the inundation of false- 
hood without a remedy or protection. Restraints on the 
promulgation of opinions, even if they were proper and 
expedient on the supposition of their efficacy, and of the 
infallibility of those who imposed them, seem peculiarly 
unnecessary, since there is always a powerful means of 
counteracting what we conceive to be errors. Fallacies 
may be exposed, misstatements detected, absurdities ridi- 
culed. These are the natural and appropriate modes of 
repression ; and while they must be ultimately successful 
amongst all classes of people, unless the human mind is 
better adapted to the reception of falsehood than of truth 
(in which case the pursuit of knowledge would be folly), 
they possess the additional recommendation of contribut- 
ing to the detection of those fallacies which have mingled 
themselves with the sentiments of the most accurate 
judges. Here we have a legitimate method of dis- 
seminating our tenets, in which we may indulge without 
restraint, assured that whether right or wrong we shall 
contribute to the ultimate triumph of truth. In detecting 
falsehood and exposing it to general observation, we are 
far more effectually guarding all ranks from its influence. 



PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS. 89 

than by mysterious reserve and timorous precautions, 
which are always suspected of being employed in the 
support of opinions not capable of standing by their own 
strength.* 

* See Note I. 



90 INEFFICACY OF RESTRAINTS ON 



SECTION VII. 

ON THE ULTIMATE INEFFICACY OF RESTRAINTS ON THE 
PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS, AND THEIR BAD EFFECTS IN 
DISTURBING THE NATURAL COURSE OF IMPROVEMENT. 

In the present state of the world, it is questionable, 
whether the progress of opinion can be much retarded by 
restraint and persecution ; and it is certain, that it cannot 
be stopped. Where the arts and sciences are cultivated, 
and the press is in operation, restrictions on particular 
subjects must be in a great measure inefficacious, except 
in producing irritation and violence. The various branches 
of knowledge are so intimately connected, that it is a vain 
attempt to shackle any of them while the rest are at 
liberty. The general improvement of science will inevi- 
tably throw light on any prohibited subjects, and suggest 
conclusions with regard to them which no authority can 
preclude from universal adoption. 

Even if restraints partially succeed in their object, they 
will only retard the consummation, which they cannot 
prevent ; they will only detain the community longer 
amidst that struggle of truth and falsehood, which must 
inevitably take place. Since there is a sort of regular 
process, which must be gone through, a course of doubts, 
and difficulties, and objections, before any disputable truth 
can be firmly settled in the minds of thinking men ; the 
sooner this is accomplished the better ; the sooner the 
objections and their answers, the difficulties and their solu- 
tions, are put on record, the greater the number of people 
who will be saved from uncertainty and from the trouble 
of winding through all the intricacies of the dispute. The 



THE PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS. 91 

interference of power cannot obviate this necessity, nor 
can it prevent the operation of those general causes, 
which are constantly at work on the understandings of 
men, and produce certain opinions in certain states of 
society and stages of civilization. The utmost, then, that 
authority can do, is to retard the action of these general 
causes, to prolong the period of hesitation and uncertainty, 
and to disturb the natural progress of human improve- 
ment. It even sometimes happens (as we have already 
had occasion to notice), that restrictive measures defeat 
their own object, and accelerate the event they are in- 
tended to arrest or counteract. The mere attempt to 
suppress a doctrine has often been found to disseminate it 
more widely. There is a charm in secrecy, which often 
attracts the public mind to proscribed opinions. The curi- 
osity roused by their being prohibited, a repugnance to op- 
pression, and undefined suspicion, or tacit inference, that 
what requires the arm of power to suppress it must have 
some strong claims to credence, and various other circum- 
stances, draw the attention of numbers, in whose eyes 
the matter in controversy, had it been freely discussed, 
would have been totally destitute of interest. Whatever 
is the severity of the law, some bold spirit every now and 
then sets it at defiance, and by so doing spreads the ob- 
noxious doctrine far more rapidly than it would have 
diffused itself had it been left unmolested. 

In proportion to the inefficacy of restraints on the pub- 
lication of opinions, the objections which we have brought 
against them, would, of course, be weakened or removed. 
If they did not succeed in their object, they would be no 
impediment to the progress of truth ; but although they 
should be ultimately ineffectual, they would still beget 
positive evils, by disturbing the natural course of improve- 
ment. In a country, or community, where no such re- 



92 INEFFICACY OF RESTRAINTS ON 

straints existed, it is obvious that no changes of opinion 
could well be sudden. Truth, at the best, makes but 
slow advances. Its light is at first confined to men of 
high station, learning, and abilities, and gradually spreads 
down to the other classes of society. The reluctance of 
the human mind to receive ideas contrary to its usual 
habits of thinking would be a sufficient security from vio- 
lent transitions, did we not already possess another in the 
slowness with which the understanding makes its discov- 
eries. Arguments, by which prescriptive error is over- 
turned, however plain and forcible they may be, are 
found out with difficulty, and in the first instance can be 
entered into only by enlarged and liberal minds, by whom 
they are subsequently familiarized and disseminated to 
others. 

Now all restraints on the free examination of any 
subject are an interference with the natural and regular 
process here described, and produce mischievous irregu- 
larities. The gradual progress of opinion cannot be 
stopped, but it is interrupted. We no longer find it so 
insensibly progressive, that we can hardly mark the change 
but by comparing two distant peridds. Under a system of 
restraint and coercion, we see apparently sudden revolu- 
tions in public sentiment. Opinions are cherished and 
spread, in the secrecy of fear, till the ardor with which 
they are entertained can no longer be repressed, and 
bursts forth into outrage and disorder. The passions be- 
come exasperated ; the natural sense of injustice, which 
men will deeply feel as long as the world lasts at the pro- 
scription or persecution of opinions, is roused into action, 
and a zeal is kindled for the propagation of doctrines, en- 
deared to the heart by obloquy and suffering. 

Such ebullitions are to be feared only where the natural 
operation of inquiry has been obstructed. As in the 



THE PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS. 93 

physical so in the moral world, it is repression which pro- 
duces violence. Public opinion resembles the vapor, 
which in the open air is as harmless as the breeze, but 
which may be compressed into an element of tremendous 
power. When novel doctrines are kept down by force, 
they naturally resort to force to free themselves from re- 
straints. Their advocates would seldom pursue violent 
measures, if such measures had not been first directed 
against them. What partly contributes to this violence is 
the effect produced by restraint on the moral qualities of 
men's minds. Compulsory silence, the necessity of con- 
fining to his own breast ardently cherished opinions, can 
never have a good influence on the character of any one. 
It has a tendency to make men morose and hypocritical, 
discontented and designing, and ready to risk much in 
order to rid themselves of their trammels ; while the lib- 
erty of uttering opinions, without obloquy and punish- 
ment, promotes satisfaction of mind and sincerity of 
conduct. 

If these representations are correct, they distinctly 
mark out the course of enlightened policy. Whether estab- 
lished opinions are false or true, it is alike the interest of 
the community, that investigation should be unrestrained ; 
in order that, if false, they may be discarded, and, if true, 
rendered conspicuous to all. The only way of fully 
attaining the benefits of truth is to suffer opinions to main- 
tain themselves against attack, or fall in the contest. The 
terrors of the law are wretched replies to argument, 
disgraceful to a good, and feeble auxiliaries to a bad 
cause. If there was any fixed and unquestionable stand- 
ard by which the validity of opinions could be tried, 
there might be some sense, and some utility in checking 
the extravagances of opinion by legal interference ; but 
since there is no other standard than the general reason 



94 INEFFICACY OF RESTRAINTS ON 

of mankind, discussion is the only method of trying the 
correctness of all doctrines whatever ; and it is the 
highest presumption in any man, or any body of men, to 
erect their own tenets into a criterion of truth, and over- 
whelm dissent and opposition by penal inflictions. Such 
conduct can proceed on no principle, which would not 
justify all the persecutions, that disgrace the page of 
ecclesiastical history. Let established opinions be de- 
fended with the utmost power of reason, let the learning 
of schools and colleges be brought to their support, let 
elegance and taste display them in their most enchanting 
colors, let no labor, no expense, no arguments, no fasci- 
nation be spared in upholding their authority; but. in 
the name of humanity resort not to the aid of the pillory 
and the dungeon. When they cannot be maintained 
by knowledge and reason, it will surely be time .to sus- 
pect that judicial severities will be but a feeble protec- 
tion. 

Whoever has attentively meditated on the progress of 
the human race cannot fail to discern, that there is now a 
spirit of inquiry amongst men, which nothing can stop, or 
even materially control. Reproach and obloquy, threats 
and persecution, will be vain. They may embitter oppo- 
sition, and engender violence, but they cannot abate the* 
keenness of research. There is a silent march of thought, 
which no power can arrest, and which it is not difficult to 
foresee will be marked by important events. Mankind 
were never before in the situation in which they now 
stand. The press has been operating upon them for 
several centuries, with an influence scarcely perceptible 
at its commencement, but daily becoming more palpa- 
ble, and acquiring accelerated force. It is rousing the 
intellect of nations, and happy will it be for them if there 
be no rash interference with the natural progress of 



THE PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS. 95 

knowledge ; and if, by a judicious and gradual adaptation 
of their institutions to the inevitable changes of opinion, 
they are saved from those convulsions, which the pride, 
prejudices, and obstinacy of a few may occasion to the 
whole.* 

* See Note K. 



MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS. 



ESSAY III. 

ON PACTS AND INFERENCES. 

Dr. Reid, in that part of his Essays on the Intellectual 
Powers where he treats of the supposed fallacy of the 
senses, points out an important distinction between what 
our senses actually testify, and the conclusions which we 
draw from their testimony. 

c Many things,' says he, ' called deceptions of the 
senses, are only conclusions rashly drawn from the 
testimony of the senses. In these cases the testimony 
of the senses is true, but we rashly draw a conclusion 
from it which does not necessarily follow. We are 
disposed to impute our errors rather to false informa- 
tion than to inconclusive reasoning, and to blame our 
senses for the wrong conclusions we draw from their 
testimony. 

8 Thus,' he continues, ' when a man has taken a coun- 
terfeit guinea for a true one, he says his senses deceived 
him ; but he lays the blame where it ought not to be laid ; 
for we must ask him, Did your senses give a false testi- 
mony of the color, or of the figure, or of the impression? 
No. But this is all that they testified, and this they 
testified truly ; from these premises you concluded that 
it was a true guinea, but this conclusion does not fol- 
low ; you erred, therefore, not by relying upon the 



100 ON FACTS 

testimony of sense, but by judging rashly from its testi- 
mony.* 

This confounding of facts and inferences, so acutely 
exposed by Dr. Reid, is not, however confined to cases 
in which we have the testimony of our own senses. The 
remark may be extended to every department of know- 
ledge, which depends on observation, for in all we are 
continually liable to the same mistake. If we attend to 
the understandings of the majority of mankind, we shall 
discover an utter confusion in this respect. Their opinions 
are a confused and indiscriminate mass, in which facts 
and inferences, realities and suppositions, are blended 
together, and conceived, not only as of equal authority, 
but as possessing the same character. In other words, 
inferences, or assumptions from facts, are regarded as 
forming part of the facts. This is particularly observable 
with regard to the relation of cause and effect. That 
one thing is the cause of another may be either actually 
witnessed, or merely inferred; the connection of two 
events may be, to us, either a fact, or a conclusion 
deduced from appearances ; a difference which may be 
easily illustrated. For this purpose, let us suppose -the 
case of a stone falling from a rock, and crushing a flower 
at its base. To an eye-witness, it would be a fact, and 
not an inference, that the falling of the stone was the 
cause of the injury sustained by the flower. But suppose 
a man passed by, after the rock had fallen, and, perceiv- 
ing a flower crushed and a stone near it which appeared 
to be a fragment recently disjoined from the cliffs above, 
pronounced that the flower had been crushed by the stone, 
he would not be stating a fact but making an inference. 
The man who saw the piece of rock fall upon the flower, 

* Essays on the Intellectual Powers, p. 291. 



AND INFERENCES. 101 

and crush it, could not be mistaken ; but he who inferred 
the same thing from the appearance of the cliffs and the 
proximity of the stone, might be wrong, because the 
flower might possibly have been" crushed in some other 
manner. There would evidently be an opening for error. 
It would be possible, for instance, although it might be 
highly improbable, that some person had purposely taken 
ofT a piece from the rock, and, after crushing the flower 
with his foot, had laid the stone by its side, in order to 
mislead smy body that came after him. If we analyze 
this case, and separate the facts from the inferences, we 
shall find the whole of the facts to be these : that a flower 
was crushed, that a stone lay by it, and that the cliffs 
above exhibited a certain peculiar appearance. The 
inferences from these facts are, that the stone fell from 
the cliffs and crushed the flower in its descent. By this 
separation of facts and inferences, we clearly see where 
there is perfect certainty, and where there is a possibility 
of error. 

There cannot be a better illustration of the mistakes 
into which a neglect of this distinction leads, than the 
general opinion of the ignorant part of mankind, that the 
sun revolves round the earth, which is manifestly an 
inference drawn from observing that the earth and the sun 
change their relative position. This is the Whole of the 
fact : that the sun makes a revolution round the earth is 
an inference to account for the phenomenon ; yet so im- 
mediately is this inference suggested, so closely does it 
follow on appearances, that it is almost universally received 
as a matter of fact ; and a man might as well attempt to 
dislodge the sun from his position as to displace the opin- 
ion from the mind of one who had grown up to maturity 
in the belief of it. He would probably ask, if you wished 
to persuade him that he could not see, or whether it was 



102 ON FACTS 

likely that he could acquiesce in your arguments rather 
than the evidence of his senses. 

It is this blending of facts and inferences, which is at 
the bottom of the objections of mere matter-of-fact men 
to the conclusions of political economy, and of the 
assumptions continually made with regard to that science, 
that theory and experience are at war. We may discern 
it in the common prejudices against machinery for super- 
seding manual labor. A matter-of-fact man, as soon as 
he sees a number of workmen destitute of employment, 
from the fluctuations incident to commerce, begins to 
lament, that, in modern times, so much machinery should 
be employed, when so many laborers are idle, and regards 
it as an indisputable fact, that the machinery has occa- 
sioned the mischief. c Do we not see/ exclaim persons 
of this class, ; that these machines perform operations that 
would require hundreds of human beings, and thereby de- 
prive them of employment? Is it not clear, that if no 
machines existed, these idle hands would be set to work ; 
and would you persuade us not to believe our own eyes ? ' 
The only facts in this case, however, are, that the machin- 
ery is in operation, and the men are destitute of employ- 
ment. That one is the cause of the other (which may or 
may not be true), is an inference to account for the state 
of affairs ; and an inference which, though it may some- 
times be just, on the first introduction of machinery, is in 
general at variance with the clearest principles of political 
science. 

The utility of the distinction here pointed out is very 
perceptible in all questions of national policy. In public 
affairs there is commonly such a multiplicity of principles 
in operation, so many concurring and counteracting cir- 
cumstances, such an intermixture of design and accident, 
that the utmost caution is necessary in referring events to 



AND INFERENCES. 103 

their origin ; while in no subject of human speculation, 
perhaps, is there a greater confusion of realities and 
assumptions. It is sufficient for the majority of political 
reasoners, that two events are coexistent or consecutive. 
To their conception it immediately becomes a fact, that 
one is the cause of the other. They see a minister in 
office, or an abuse in existence, or a factious demagogue 
at work, during the prevalence of national distress or dis- 
order ; and by a compendious logic they identify the 
minister, or the abuse, or the demagogue with the evil, 
and make it an article in their creed, that the removal of 
one would be the removal of both. The coexistence, how- 
ever, of these two things is not sufficient to establish their 
connection, and all beyond their coexistence is inferential, 
and requires to be supported by proof. 

We cannot more aptly elucidate this part of our subject, 
than by referring to the discussion of such questions as 
the policy of educating the poor. To prove the advanta- 
ges of this measure, an advocate for the diffusion of know- 
ledge generally brings an instance of some country where 
education has extensively prevailed through all ranks, and 
which has at the same time been distinguished for moral 
excellence. This is called an appeal to facts ; but it is 
obvious, that the only facts are the coexistence of a system 
of education with virtuous conduct, and that the main 
force of the arguments lies, not in a fact, but in an infer- 
ence, that one is the cause of the other. This inference 
may be highly probable, but it requires to be proved itself 
before it can be admitted as a positive proof of any thing 
else.* The same observation applies to the arguments of 
those speculators, who begin to doubt the advantages of 

# It may be added, that the proofs necessary to establish the 
inference are altogether different from the proofs of the facts 
themselves. 



104 ON PACTS 

the plan of education lately pursued with the poor in 
England, on the ground that immorality appears to in- 
crease. Assuming it to be true, that immorality has 
increased since the introduction of the plan, yet this by no 
means establishes it as a fact, that one has been the effect of 
the other. A careful induction of circumstances, or a clear 
process of reasoning from general principles, would be 
necessary to prove such a connection between them. 

The tendency to confound these two different things is 
not the least remarkable in the practice of medicine. It 
extensively pervades the pretended knowledge of ignorant 
practitioners, and the empiricism of people in all ranks of 
life. If any particular change ensues after taking a 
drug, the drug is at once assumed to be the cause of the 
change ; it is immediately set down as an indisputable 
fact, that such a medicine is a certain remedy for such a 
complaint. It is in reality, however, one of the most deli- 
cate tasks, and forms one of the greatest difficulties of 
medical practice, to discriminate, amidst a complication 
of circumstances preceding any effect, that particular cir- 
cumstance which has occasioned it. In no cases, perhaps, 
are men more liable to err than these ; in none is patient 
investigation less attended to, or more necessary, and pre- 
cipitancy of inference more carefully to be avoided. In 
none is it of more importance to make the distinction, 
which it has been the object of this essay to point out. 

These remarks serve to show, what may at first sight 
appear paradoxical, that those men, who are generally 
designated as practical and experienced, have often as 
much of the hypothetical interwoven in their opinions as 
the most speculative theorists. Half of their facts are 
mere inferences, rashly and erroneously drawn. They 
may have no systematic hypotheses in their minds, but 
they are full of assumptions without being aware of it. 



AND INFERENCES. 105 

It is impossible, that men should witness simultaneous or 
consecutive events without connecting them in their im- 
aginations as causes and effects. There is a continual 
propensity in the human mind to establish these relations 
amongst the phenomena subjected to its observation, and 
to consider them as possessing the character of facts. But 
in doing this there is great liability to error, and the opin- 
ions of a man, who has formed them from what Lord 
Bacon calls ' mera palpatio,' purely from what he has 
come in personal contact with, cannot but abound with 
rash and fallacious conclusions, for which he fancies him- 
self to have the authority of his own senses, or of indis- 
putable experience. 



ESSAY XY. 

ON THE INFLUENCE OF REASON ON THE FEELINGS. 

Some philosophers have proposed as a curious subject 
of investigation, the mutual influence of the mind and the 
body, and the laws which regulate their connection. It 
would not perhaps be less curious, though it would be far 
more difficult, to trace the influence of the sensitive and 
intellectual parts of our nature upon each other. The 
understanding is affected in various ways by the feelings 
and passions ; and on the other hand, the state of the pas- 
sions greatly depends on the combination of ideas before 
the mind, or, in other words, on the state of the intellect. 
To investigate all the laws of this reciprocal action would 
require powers of close observation and acute analysis, 
greater than we could hope to bring to the task. In a 
former essay we touched upon the subject, in attempting 
to explain the influence which the passions exert on the 
judgments of the understanding ; and we shall now offer 
a few remarks on the influence which the conclusions of 
our reason exert on the passions. 

Our speculative conclusions, it will be immediately ac- 
knowledged, have not always complete power over our 
feelings ; or, in other words, our feelings do not invaria- 
bly conform to the previous convictions of our judgment. 
The opinion, that we ought to feel in a certain manner on 
a certain occasion, is often ineffectual in producing the 



108 ON THE INFLUENCE OF 

proper emotion. Our view of the impropriety and absur- 
dity of a passion does not allay it. A man, for example, 
may feel painfully vexed at some trivial circumstance, 
and although he is sensible of the folly of suffering his 
tranquillity to be disturbed by a thing of no importance, 
yet this consideration fails to restore the tone of his mind, 
and it would probably be incapable of preventing the 
same emotion on a recurrence of the same circumstances. 
Even the philosopher, who from the heights of contempla- 
tion from the ' edita doctrina sapientum templa serena,' 
looks down on the vain pursuits of his fellow-creatures, 
and distinctly sees their worthlessness, and the folly of 
the passions which they engender, is unable to resist the 
domination of the same influences when he descends 
from his elevation and mingles with the crowd. 

This insubordination of the sensitive to the intellectual 
part of our nature, is more particularly remarkable in 
those associations of thought and feeling, which we have 
acquired in early life. Before we have well emerged 
from infancy, our moral and intellectual constitution has 
been so far formed, that certain ideas or circumstances 
awaken peculiar emotions in the breast, with almost as 
much precision as the touch of the finger elicits from the 
keys of a harpsichord their respective musical notes. In 
the progress of life, however, we discover that some of 
these feelings are improper and inappropriate to the occa- 
sions on which they arise ; and yet, even after this dis- 
covery, they still beset us whenever the same occasions j 
recur. Present objects awaken our dormant associations, 
and the cool conclusions of our reason sink forgotten from 
the mind. The prejudices of the nursery have been com- 
monly adduced in illustration of this principle of our 
mental constitution. Few persons (to take a trite exam- 
ple), who have been taught in their infancy to dread the 



REASON ON THE FEELINGS. 109 

appearance of ghosts in the dark, are enabled so entirely 
to shake off their early associations as, at all times and 
in all places, to feel perfectly free from apprehension in 
the dead of night, however strong their conviction may 
be of the absurdity of their fears. 

We may observe the like pertinacious adherence of 
feelings, at variance with our reason, in those who are 
subject to the passion of mauvaise IwntB. To this passion 
some are doubtless constitutionally more prone than others ; 
but the strength of it, and the occasions on which it is 
evinced, depend greatly on the associations of ideas and 
feelings formed in early life. If a child is brought up, 
for instance, in a family where receiving and paying visits 
are regarded as extraordinary events, and attended by 
formality and constraint of manner, company becomes 
formidable to his imagination ; and it will require frequent 
intercourse with society in after-life to overcome the 
effects of such an impression. Notwithstanding the 
clearest perception of the absurdity of feeling embar- 
rassed before his fellow-creatures, he will often find 
himself disconcerted in their presence, and thrown into 
confusion by trifles which his good sense thoroughly de- 
spises. In the same manner, an involuntary deference for 
rank may be observed amidst the strongest conviction of 
the emptiness of aristocratical distinctions, and the most 
decided republican principles. The lingering spirit of the 
feudal system, and the general forms and institutions of 
society in Europe, have a tendency to infuse into the 
minds of certain classes such feelings of respect for the 
greatness of high life, as, when they find themselves in 
its presence, sometimes overpower the opposite influence 
of mature opinions.* It is the force of such impressions 

* The powerful effect of such associations is forcibly depicted by 
Madame de Stael, in the following passage of her posthumous work, 



110 ON THE INFLUENCE OF 

that produces so much awkwardness in the manners 
of our peasantry, and it is freedom from them that 
often gives an air of dignity to the deportment of the 
savage. 

In religion, the strong power of associations in opposi- 
tion to the convictions of the understanding, is peculiarly 
worthy of notice, especially in the case of changes from 
a superstitious to a more rational and liberal creed. The 
force of a man's education has perhaps long held him in 
bondage, and his whole feelings have become interwoven 
with the tenets of his sect. By the enlargement of his 
knowledge, however, he discovers his early opinions to be 
erroneous; different conclusions force themselves on his 
understanding, and his faith undergoes a radical alteration. 
Yet his former feelings still cling to his mind. A long 
time must often elapse before he can cast off the authority 
of his old prepossessions. It is not always that the mind 
can keep itself at a proper elevation for viewing such sub- 
jects in a clear light ; and till it has acquired the power of 
retaining its vantage-ground, it may be reduced to its 
former state by the influence of vivid recollections, cus- 
tomary circumstances, general opinion, or any thing which 
may occasionally overpower its vigor, or dim its perspica- 

where she exhibits the sentiments of the lower classes towards the 
Aristocracy during the French Revolution : — 

1 One would have said that nobody in France could look at a man 
of consequence, that no member of the Tiers Etat could approach a 
person belonging to the court, without feeling himself in subjection. 
Such are the melancholy effects of arbitrary government, and of too 
exclusive distinctions of rank ! The animadversions of the lower 
orders on the aristocratic body have not the effect of destroying its 
ascendancy, even over those by whom it is hated; the inferior classes, 
in the sequel, inflicted death on their former masters, as the only 
method of ceasing to obey them.' — Considerations on the Principal 
Events of the French Revolution, vol. i, page 348 (English Trans- 
lation). 



REASON ON THE FEELINGS. Ill 

city. Thus men, who have rejected vulgar creeds in the 
days of health and prosperity, manfully opposing their 
clear and comprehensive views to prevailing superstitions, 
have sometimes exhibited the melancholy spectacle of 
again stooping to their shackles in the hour of sickness, 
and at the approach of death ; not because their under- 
standings were convinced of error by any fresh light, but 
because they were unable to keep their rational conclusions 
steadily in view ; because that intellectual strength, which 
repelled absurd dogmas, had sunk beneath the pressure of 
disease, or the fears of nature, and left the defenceless 
spirit to the predominance of early associations, and to the 
inroads of superstitious terror. Such men are replunged 
into their old prejudices, exactly in the same way as he, 
who has thrown off the superstitions of the nursery, is 
overpowered, as he passes through a churchyard at mid- 
night, by his infantile associations.* 

It has been somewhere remarked, that in the soaring of 
a bird, there is a contest between its muscular power and 
the force of gravitation ; and that, although the former 
always overcomes the latter, when the bird chooses to 
exert it, yet the force of gravity is sure to prevail in the 
end, and bring the wearied pinions to the ground. Thus 
it is with associations, which have laid firm hold of the 
mind in early youth, which have mixed themselves with 
every incident, and wound themselves round every object. 
The mind may frequently rise above them, discard them, 
despise them, and leave them at an infinite distance ; but 
it is still held by the fine and invisible attraction of its 
antiquated feelings and opinions, which, whenever its vigor 
relaxes, draws it back into the limits from which it had 
burst away in the plenitude of its powers. 

* See Note L. 



112 ON THE INFLUENCE OF 

It is worthy of remark, that there are moments when 
old associations are revived with peculiar vividness by 
very trivial circumstances. A noble author has described 
such moments with his usual felicity, in the two following 
stanzas. What he so happily says of sorrowful emotions 
may be extended, with little qualification, to almost every 
passion of the human breast. 

'But ever and anon of griefs subdued 
There comes a token like a scorpion's sting, 
Scarce seen, but with fresh bitterness imbued ; 
And slight withal may be the things which bring 
Back on the heart the weight which it would fling 
Aside for ever : it may be a sound — 
A tone of music — summer's eve — or spring, 
A flower — the wind — the ocean — which shall wound, 
Striking the electric chain wherewith we are darkly bound ; 

And how, and why we know not, nor can trace 
Home to its cloud this lightning of the mind, 
But feel the shock renewed, nor can efface 
The blight and blackening which it leaves behind, 
"Which out of things familiar, undesigned, 
"When least we deem of such, calls up to view 
The spectres whom no exorcism can bind, 
The cold — the changed — perchance the dead — anew, 
The mourned, the loved, the lost — too many ! — yet how few 1 ' * 

It is in general very difficult, and even impracticable, to 
recall at will the peculiar emotions which have affected us 
at some distant period of life ; because, though we may 
remember the circumstances wherein we were placed, 
they no longer operate on our sensibility in the same way. 
We may recollect our joy or our sorrow, but we cannot 
reproduce in ourselves the same affections. What, how- 

*Childe Harold, canto iv. 



REASON ON THE FEELINGS. 113 

ever, we are unable purposely to effect, is frequently ac- 
complished by a few touches on the harpsichord, by the 
fragrance of a flower, or the song of a bird. These sim- 
ple instruments have the power of awakening emotions 
which have been dormant for years, and calling up the 
images, the impressions, the associations of some almost 
forgotten moment of past life, with all the vividness which 
they originally possessed. Our recollection seizes from 
oblivion the very hue which every thing then wore around 
us. Our heart catches the very tone which then impress- 
ed it. A sudden gleam of renovated feeling rescues one 
spot from the surrounding darkness of the past. 

To return from this digression : the effect, which we 
before attempted to describe, seems to spring from the 
power of the passion to engross and concentrate our atten- 
tion to its objects, and by necessary consequence to with- 
draw it from all others. The passion is strongly associ- 
ated with certain ideas or circumstances ; when those ideas 
or circumstances are presented to the mind the passion is 
roused, and when roused absorbs the attention, to the inev- 
itable exclusion of sober and rational views.* 

Has reason then no power whatever in these and simi- 

* The effect of prevailing passion (however excited) is not ill de- 
scribed by the pen of a celebrated female writer of the present 
day :-w 

' Under the influence of any passion, the perception of pain and 
pleasure alters as much as the perceptions of a person in a fever vary 
from those of the same man in sound health. The whole scale of 
individual happiness, as well as of general good and evil, virtue and 
vice, is often disturbed at the very rising of the passion, and totally 
overthrown in the hurricane of the soul. Then, in the most perilous 
and critical moments, the conviction of the understanding is, if not 
reversed, suspended. Those, who have lived long in the world, and 
who have seen examples of these truths, feel that these are not mere 
words.' — Memoirs of Richard Lovell Edgeworth } vol. ii. p. 403. 
8 



114 ON THE INFLUENCE OF 

lar cases ? Is it of no use to attain clear and rational 
.convictions, since they thus desert us in the hour when we 
' most require their assistance ? These questions are im- 
portant, and we will venture a few remarks by way of 
reply to them. 

It is evident, in the first place, that we are only occa- 
sionally liable to those relapses in which the feelings over- 
power the judgment ; it is only when our understanding 
is enfeebled and its views beclouded, or when we are 
placed within the sphere of some strong exciting cause. 
During the greatest part of our time, our deliberate con- 
victions will necessarily regulate our feelings and our ac- 
tions. A man convinced of the absurdity of a belief in 
spectral appearances will feel and act throughout the day, 
and commonly in the night, agreeably to that conviction ; 
it can only be under some striking circumstances that his 
old associations will predominate. In the same way, an 
individual, who feels more deference perhaps in the per- 
sonal presence of a great man than he chooses to acknow- 
ledge, may at other periods be perfectly independent of 
him, and altogether uninfluenced by any such emotion. 
The utility, therefore, of acquiring just views, will not be 
materially impaired by the difficulty of conforming our 
emotions to them on particular occasions. And it may be 
further remarked, that the value of such views lies, not so 
much in the efficacy of their counteraction during the 
access of any passion, as in enabling us to avoid the occa- 
sions on which it will be improperly excited ; and in ren- 
dering the mind less liable to be thrown into that state, or 
to have its sensibilities improperly awakened. The fear 
of nocturnal apparitions, it is obvious, would not be so 
easily roused in one who had freed himself from the pre- 
judices of the nursery, although not altogether from the 



REASON ON THE FEELINGS. 115 

power of the associations there formed, as in one whose 
belief and associations on that subject were in harmony. 

But the conclusions of our reason have not only the 
power of rendering the mind less susceptible of emotions 
when brought within the sphere of the exciting* cause, less 
liable to have opposite associations roused, they have 
sometimes a still farther effect. A conviction may be so 
strongly wrought into the understanding, so powerfully 
impressed on the imagination, as entirely to subvert former 
associations. Clear and comprehensive views, habitually 
entertained, may completely subdue the insubordination 
of the sensitive part of our nature ; and so effectually dis- 
solve the combinations of feeling formed in early life, as 
to reduce them to mere objects of cool reminiscence. The 
conclusions of our reason may, in time, be so strongly 
associated with the objects as to be suggested by them 
more readily than the feelings with which those objects 
were so intimately blended. This, however, must be the 
work of time, the gradual effect of habitual thought. In 
the endeavor so to discipline his mind, a man may expect 
to be repeatedly baffled, but he must still return to his pur- 
pose ; he must keep his dispassionate conclusions steadily 
before him, till they come to form part of the familiar 
views of his understanding, and are interwoven with his 
habitual feelings. Success may follow such an attempt 
on the part of the philosopher, and indeed some degree of 
the effect will necessarily attend every acquisition of sound 
knowledge ; but in general the erroneous associations of 
mankind will be found of too inveterate a nature to be 
thoroughly eradicated, and will maintain an occasional 
ascendency amidst all the advances of truth and the tri- 
umphs of reason. 



ESSAY V. 

ON INATTENTION TO THE DEPENDENCE OF CAUSES AND 
EFFECTS IN MORAL CONDUCT. 



PART I. 



In the physical world, to whatever part we turn our 
eyes, we are presented with a regular succession of causes 
and effects. By gradual, and almost imperceptible ex- 
perience, man learns to accommodate his actions to the 
fixed laws and ascertainable properties of matter ; and by 
observing the conjunction and succession of phenomena, 
he acquires the power of foreseeing events in their causes. 
Nor is he a mere spectator of the operations of nature, 
but in many cases he interferes with her processes, and 
after gathering her laws from observation, he employs 
their agency in the production of novel results for the 
accomplishment of his purposes. By observing the train 
of physical events, which lie beyond his control, he can 
frequently regulate his actions in such a manner as to 
avoid hurtful, and derive advantage from beneficial effects, 
which he cannot prevent or produce : and where he is 
enabled actively to interfere with her processes he can 
do more, he can arrest or avert evils, and create positive 
benefits. 

What a man can do in the material, he may also 
accomplish in a similar manner in the moral world. The 



1 18 DEPENDENCE OF CAUSES AND 

moral and intellectual qualities of the human race present 
an equal field for observation and sagacity. Certain 
actions lead to certain results, or are means connected 
with certain ends; and by observing the faculties and 
conduct of himself and others, he may trace the connec- 
tions thus subsisting between them. If he desires a good, 
depending on the state of his own mind, or of the minds 
of his fellow-creatures, he must find out and employ the 
means with which it is conjoined ; if he wishes to shun an 
evil of the same nature, he must ascertain and avoid the 
actions of which it is the effect. The happiness of his 
life will thus essentially depend on a strict attention to the 
tendencies and consequences of human actions. Many of 
the practical errors of mankind seem to spring from a 
heedlessness of these tendencies; from an ignorance or 
misconception of the course of events, or, in other words, 
from a wrong or inadequate apprehension of the depen- 
dence of causes and effects. In their plans, pursuits, and 
general conduct they too often betray a negligence of 
consequences, a hope against experience, a defiance of 
probabilities, a vagueness of anticipation, which looks for 
results where no proper means have been employed to 
produce them ; their actions frequently seem to indicate a 
blind expectation that the order of nature will be violated 
in their favor, and that, amidst the apparently irregular 
incidents and fortuitous vicissitudes of the world, they as 
individuals will escape the common lot, and prove excep- 
tions to general rules. All this principally arises from the 
want of a little vigorous attention, and close reasoning. 
Nothing, perhaps, gives its possessor such a decided 
superiority over the multitude as the power of clearly 
tracing the consequences of actions, the concatenation of 
mental causes and effects, and the adaptation of moral 
means to ends. It is a sagacity of the utmost importance 
in the conduct of life. 



EFFECTS IN MORAL CONDUCT. 119 

The errors, which have been adverted to, manifest them- 
selves in various ways. The vague expectation of gaining 
advantages without employing proper means, may be seen 
in those who are perpetually in search of short and easy 
roads to knowledge ; flattering themselves, that by the in- 
dolent perusal of abridgments and compendiums, or the 
sacrifice of an occasional hour at a popular lecture, they 
will, without much application, imbibe that learning, which 
they see confers so much distinction on others. They 
forget, that, from the very nature of the case, science 
cannot be obtained without labor; that ideas must be ' 
frequently presented to the mind before they become 
familiar to it; that the faculties must be vigorously exerted 
to possess much efficiency ; that skill is the effect of habit ; 
and that habit is acquired by the frequent repetition of the 
same act. Application is the only means of securing the 
end at which they aim ; and they may rest assured, that 
all schemes to put them into possession of intellectual 
treasures, without any regular or strenuous efforts on their 
part, all promises to insinuate learning into their minds at 
so small an expense of time and labor that they shall 
scarcely be sensible of the process, are mere delusions, 
which can terminate in nothing but disappointment and 
mortification. It cannot be too deeply impressed on the 
mind, that application is the price to be paid for mental 
acquisitions, and that it is as absurd to expect them without 
it, as to hope for a harvest where we have not sown the 
seed. 

As men often deceive themselves with the hope of 
acquiring knowledge without application, so they calculate 
on acquiring wealth without industry and economy, and 
repine that another should bear away the prize which they 
have made no effort to secure. Or, perhaps, impatient of 
this slow though certain process, they attempt to seize the 



120 DEPENDENCE OF CAUSES AND 

end by some extraordinary means, and carry by a single 
stroke what humbler individuals are content to win by 
regular and tedious approaches. They see the schemes 
of other adventurers continually failing, yet they press 
forward in the same course, in defiance of probability, 
and in the hope of proving singular exceptions to the 
general doom. Their bold speculations, it is true, may 
sometimes succeed, but they usually terminate in ruin. 
Disaster is the highly probable issue, and their certain 
consequence is a state of anxiety and suspense for which 
no success can atone. 

But the most important mistakes of the class under 
consideration are those into which men fall in their moral 
conduct. Misery in one shape or other is the inevitable 
consequence of all vice ; and a man can scarcely be un- 
der a greater delusion than to suppose, that he can in any 
instance add to his happiness by a sacrifice of principle. 
Yet, from the want of a clear perception of the tendencies 
of actions, it is too often assumed, that vice would be 
pleasant enough were it not forbidden ; and many a one 
indulges his guilty passions because he knows the pleasure 
to be certain, while the punishment, he flatters himself, is 
only contingent. Every departure from virtue, however, 
draws after it a train of evils, which no art can escape. 
The ruin of health is the consequence of intemperance 
and debauchery, the contempt and mistrust of mankind 
follow upon deceit and dishonesty, and all other deviations 
from moral rectitude are attended by their respective evil 
effects. Some of these consequences are certain and 
uniform, and if others do not invariably follow, they ought 
to be considered in practice as inevitable from the rarity 
of the anomalous instances. Between acting against pos- 
sibility, and against a high degree of probability, there is 
little difference in point of wisdom. General rules will 



EFFECTS IN MORAL CONDUCT. 121 

fail, or appear unnecessary, in particular instances; but as 
these instances cannot be foreseen, and are few in num- 
ber, he who wishes to secure the end which the general 
rule has in view must observe it, and would be guilty of 
folly to speculate on its exceptions. If a man wishes to 
be a long liver, he must adopt habits of sobriety and tem- 
perance, as the most likely way of obtaining his purpose, 
notwithstanding the instances of a few individuals who 
have reached a good old age in direct violation of this 
precept. Men should recollect, too, before cheating them- 
selves into the hope of impunity in vice, that however 
they may escape some of the peculiar effects, they can 
have no security against its general consequences. All 
vices are accompanied by self-degradation, as the sub- 
stance by the shadow; by a deterioration of character 
fraught with incalculable mischief to our future peace ; 
by the contempt, suspicion, or indignation of our fellow- 
creatures on their discovery ; and whether discovered or 
undiscovered, they are pursued by that secret uneasiness, 
which, by the constitution of our nature, is the doom of 
guilt, however successful, or however concealed. A man 
may, indeed, proceed for a time in the career of iniquity, 
with a seeming carelessness, and enjoyment, and obduracy 
of conscience ; but as long as the human mind retains its 
present structure, he can never be sure that the next 
moment will not plunge him into the acutest agonies of 
remorse. 

Virtuous actions, and virtuous qualities, on the contrary, 
may be regarded as the necessary, or most likely means 
to secure certain good ends ; as roads terminating in 
pleasant places. Thus honesty is the means of inspiring 
confidence, veracity of obtaining credit for what we say, 
and temperance of preserving health. If we would be 
esteemed, loved, and confided in, we must evince quali- 



122 DEPENDENCE OF CAUSES AND 

ties which are estimable, amiable, and calculated to 
attract confidence. The error of many consists in ex- 
pecting to arrive at the place without travelling the road. 
They imagine that they can retain health of body and 
peace of mind amidst sensuality, cruelty, and injustice, 
and calculate on the respect of their neighbors in the face 
of actions almost beneath contempt. It would be as 
rational to form expectations of reaching London by 
pursuing a northerly route from Edinburgh, or of pro- 
longing life by poisoned nutriment. 

Nor let any man suppose that he can reap the advantages 
of virtue by hypocritical pretension. There is a consis- 
tency of conduct which a hypocrite can scarcely main- 
tain ; and even if he could secure some of the particular 
ends which virtuous qualities are the means of gaining, 
there is a general result in serenity of mind, purity of 
taste, and elevation of character, which lies infinitely 
beyond his reach. 

' These errors, this disregard of consequences, and 
irrational expectation of advantages, without adopting ap- 
propriate measures to obtain them, may be particularly 
observed to prevail in domestic life. Of the miscalcula- 
tion, that we shall be loved and respected without evinc- 
ing amiable and estimable qualities, we may there see 
abundant instances. Parents and children, husbands and 
wives, brothers and sisters, reciprocally complain of each 
other's deficiency of affection, and think it hard, that the 
tie of relationship should not secure invariable kindness 
and indestructible love. They expect some secret influ- 
ence of blood, some physical sympathy, some natural 
attraction, to retain the affection of their relatives, without 
any solicitude on their part to cherish or confirm it. 
They forget, that man is so constituted as to love only 
what in some way or other, directly or indirectly, imme- 



EFFECTS IN MORAL CONDUCT. 123 

diately or remotely, gives him pleasure ; that even natural 
affection is the result of pleasurable associations in his 
mind, or at least may be overcome by associations of an 
opposite character, and that the sure way to make them- 
selves beloved is to display amiable qualities to those 
whose regard they wish to obtain. If our friends appear 
to look upon us with little interest, if our arrival is seen 
without pleasure, and our departure without regret, in- 
stead of charging them with a deficiency of feeling, we 
should turn our scrutiny upon ourselves. The well- 
directed eye of self-examination might probably find out, 
that their indifference arises from a want on our part of 
those qualities which are requisite to inspire affection ; 
that it is the natural and necessary consequence of our 
own character and deportment. It is a folly to flatter 
ourselves, that our estimation, either in the circle of our 
friends or in the world at large, will not take its color 
from the nature of our conduct. There is scarcely one 
of our actions, our habits, or our expressions, which may 
not have its share in that complex feeling with which we 
are regarded by others. 

It is true that all the pleasurable associations, formed 
with regard to each other in the minds of those who are 
connected by blood, do not depend on the personal char- 
acter of their object, and that some of them can scarcely 
be eradicated by any possible errors of conduct. A 
mother's love is the result of an extensive combination of 
ideas and feelings, in which, for a long time, the moral 
and mental qualities of her child can have little share ; 
but even her affection, supported as it is by all the 
strength of such associations, may be weakened, if not 
destroyed, by the ill-temper, ingratitude, or worthlessness 
of her offspring. The affection subsisting between other 
relatives must of course be far more liable to be impaired 



124 DEPENDENCE OF CAUSES AND 

by similar causes, and must chiefly depend for its con- 
tinuance on personal character. As vicious qualities may 
prove too strong for natural affection, so, on the other 
hand, amiable qualities are frequently found to inspire 
love, even under circumstances of a very contrary ten- 
dency ; as may be seen in the attachment sometimes 
evinced by beautiful women to men of ugly features or 
deformed persons. To see the same countenance, how- 
ever defective in form, constantly preserving an expres- 
sion of tenderness amidst all the cares and disappoint- 
ments of life, to hear language of uniform kindness, and 
be the object of nameless acts of regard, can hardly fail, 
whatever other circumstances may operate, to beget feel- 
ings of reciprocal affection. 



EFFECTS IN MORAL CONDUCT. 125 



PART n. 

While it will be found that many circumstances, in 
every man's condition, are exactly such as might be ex- 
pected to result from the qualities of his mind, and the 
tenor of his conduct, it must not be overlooked, that there 
are many others over which he has no control. Human 
life is a voyage, in which he can choose neither the vessel 
nor the weather, although much may be done in the 
management of the sails and the guidance of the helm. 
There are a thousand unavoidable accidents which cir- 
cumscribe the command he possesses over his own for- 
tune. With the greatest industry he may be suddenly 
plunged into poverty ; amidst the strictest observance of 
temperance he may be afflicted with disease ; and in the 
practice of every virtue that adorns human life he may be 
the victim of misfortune, from the ingratitude and base- 
ness of his fellow-men, the untimely dissolution of cher- 
ished connections, or the wreck of schemes prudently 
formed, and of hopes wisely cherished. 

Miseries and misfortunes like these, not depending on 
the conduct or character, it would be unreasonable to 
expect that conduct to be able to avert ; but amidst them 
all he will not cease to feel, in various ways, the beneficial 
consequences and consolatory influence of his good ac- 
tions. In the estimation of some people, a virtuous man 
ought never to be subject to accidental calamity ; but it 
would probably be difficult to assign a reason why he 
should be more exempt than a man of contrary character, 
from the misery arising out of occurrences beyond human 
control. Why, it may be asked, should the vicious man 
suffer any thing but the consequences of his vices, includ- 



126 DEPENDENCE OF CAUSES AND 

ing of course the reproaches of his own conscience, and 
the actions as well as sentiments which his conduct occa- 
sions in others ? These bad consequences, and the loss 
of that happiness which virtue would have brought in her 
train, constitute, it may be said, the proper difference 
between his fate and the fate of the virtuous man, and 
form a natural and sufficient reason, both to himself and 
others, for acting differently in future. Other evils which 
may happen to him can never operate to deter him from 
his guilty career, because he can see no connection that 
they have with it. 

Whatever opinion we may entertain, however, as to the 
reasonableness of all men being on a level with regard to 
accidental and uncontrollable evils, the fact is certain, 
that in the actual condition of mankind we do not see the 
virtuous enjoying an exemption from any evils but such 
as are the peculiar consequences of those vices from 
which they refrain ; nor, on the other hand, do we see 
the vicious deprived of any benefits but such as are to 
be attained exclusively by virtuous conduct. We should 
expect, therefore, from virtuous actions and qualities only 
their peculiar consequences ; and in recommending them 
to others, we should be careful to do it on just and proper 
grounds. It is injurious to the cause of good morals to 
invest virtue with false powers, because every day's expe- 
rience may detect the fallacy, and he who has proved the 
unsoundness of part of our recommendation, may reason- 
ably grow suspicious of the whole. Many of our writers 
of fiction, with the best intentions, injure the cause which 
they support by rewarding virtuous conduct with acci- 
dental good fortune. After involving a good man, for 
example, in a combination of calamitous circumstances, in 
which he conducts himself with scrupulous honor and 
integrity, they extricate him from his difficulties, as a re- 



EFFECTS IN MORAL CONDUCT. 127 

ward for his virtue, by the unexpected discovery of a rich 
uncle, who was supposed to have died in poverty ; or* by 
a large legacy from a distant relation, who happened most 
opportunely to quit the world at the required crisis. All 
such representations, leading as they do to the expecta- 
tion of fortuitous advantages in recompense of good ac- 
tions, cannot be otherwise than pernicious. If writers wish 
to represent a good man contending with misfortune (by 
which they may certainly convey a most excellent lesson) 
their aim ought to be, to exhibit the sources of consola- 
tion which he finds, as well in his own consciousness, as 
in the impression which his conduct has made on those 
around him ; in the esteem, gratitude, and affection of 
those amongst whom he has lived, and in the actions on 
their part to which these sentiments give birth. 

The true moral of fictitious writings lies in the clear 
exhibition of the tendencies of actions ; and if any thing 
is conceded to the production of effect, it ought to be, not 
a change in the character of these tendencies, but a more 
lucid development of them than life actually presents. 
Although the painter is allowed to unite beauties on his 
canvas which are rarely presented by nature in actual 
combination, and to sink all those attendant circumstances, 
which, however commonly occurring, would impair the 
effect to be produced, still he must faithfully adhere to 
the qualities of natural objects; and, in the same way, 
although the dramatist may give us a selection of actions 
and incidents disentangled from superfluous details and 
accompaniments, he must exhibit them according to their 
true tendencies and relations. 

There is another consideration relative to the present 
subject which is deserving of notice. What appears the 
inevitable consequence of circumstances not in our power, 
is frequently the natural effect of some subordinate part 



128 DEPENDENCE OF CAUSES AND 

of our character. The industrious man, who appears at 
first sight to have been ruined by the misconduct of others, 
or by some unexpected revolution in the business of so- 
ciety, may in reality owe his ruin to a want of circum- 
spection, prudence or foresight. The natural consequence 
of his industry was prosperity, but the natural consequence 
of his imprudence was loss and misfortune. We must 
not expect that the exercise of one virtue will be followed 
by the beneficial consequences of all, neither must we 
conclude that the indulgence of any vice will be pursued 
by unmixed evil, and destroy the good effects of better 
qualities. All the virtues and the vices have their respec- 
tive good and evil consequences, which will be felt in pro- 
portion as each vice and virtue is exercised. Industry, 
economy, shrewdness, and caution, for instance, without 
any great admixture of moral worth, or even in conjunc- 
tion with meanness and fraudulence, may often be suc- 
cessful in the attainment of wealth ; while these qualities, 
so attended, can never yield the fruits of integrity, ease 
of conscience, elevation of character, and the esteem of 
the good. 

From all that has been said it sufficiently appears, that 
although our fortune, our rank in life, our bodily organi- 
zation, and many other circumstances of our condition, 
may not be materially subject to our control, yet that our 
health, our peace of mind, our estimation in the world, 
our place in the affections of our friends, and our happi- 
ness in general, will inevitably be more or less regulated 
by the part which we act and the properties of our char- 
acter. It is a serious consideration, and one which ought 
to have more weight in the world than it appears to pos- 
sess, that all our actions and all our qualities have some 
certain tendency, and may greatly affect our well-being ; 
that in every thing we do, we may be possibly laying a 



EFFECTS IN MORAL CONDUCT. 129 

train of consequences, the operation of which may termi- 
nate only with our existence ; and that a steady adherence 
to the rules of virtue and a conformity to the dictates of 
discretion, are the only securities we can provide for the 
happiness of our future destiny. 



ESSAY VI: 

ON SOME OF THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OP 
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTER. 

Whatever subsequent circumstances may effect, it can 
scarcely be questioned, that all human beings come into the 
world with the germs of peculiar mental as well as physi- 
cal qualities. Attempts, indeed, have been made to re- 
solve all mental varieties into the effects of dissimilar 
external circumstances, but with too little success to re- 
quire any formal refutation. We are, then, naturally 
led to inquire, how are these original peculiarities occa- 
sioned ? Whence arise those qualities of mind which con- 
stitute the individuality of men ? There must be causes 
why the mind as well as the body of one man differs con- 
stitutionally from that of another ; what are they ? Per- 
haps all that can be said in reply to these inquiries is, that 
the mental, like the bodily constitution of every individual, 
depends, in some inexplicable way, on the conjoint quali- 
ties of his parents. It depends, evidently, not on the 
qualities of one of the parents only, but on those of both. 
A moment's reflection will teach us, that the individuality 
of any human being, that ever existed, was absolutely de- 
pendent on the union of one particular man with one par- 
ticular woman. If either the husband or the wife had 
been different, a different being would have come into the 



132 CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 

world. For the production of the individual called Shaks- 
peare, it was necessary that his father should marry the 
identical woman whom he did marry. Had he selected 
any other wife, the world would have had no Shakspeare. 
He might have had a son, but that son would have been 
an essentially different individual ; he would have been 
the same neither in mental nor physical qualities ; he 
would have been placed in a different position amongst 
mankind, and subject to the operation of different circum- 
stances. It seems highly probable also, that if a marriage 
had taken place between the same male and female either 
at an earlier or a later period of their lives, the age at 
which they came together would have affected the identity 
of the progeny. If they had been married, for instance, 
in the year 1810, their eldest son would not be the same 
being as if they had been married ten years sooner. It 
may be remarked, too, that not only the time at which 
persons are married, but their mode of living, and their 
habits generally, as they have the power to affect the phy- 
sical constitution of their progeny, may also affect the 
constitution of their minds, and occasion beings to be 
brought into the world absolutely different from those who 
would have seen the light under other circumstances. 

With regard to physical conformation, every one knows 
that the face and figure are frequently transmitted from 
parents to their offspring. Sometimes the father's form 
and lineaments seem to predominate, sometimes the mo- 
ther's, and sometimes there is a variety produced, unlike 
either of the parents ; but by what principles these propor- 
tions and modifications are regulated, it is impossible to 
ascertain. The transmission of mental qualities is not, 
perhaps, equally apparent, but it is equally capricious. 
In some cases we see the characteristics of the parents 
perpetuated in their offspring, and in other cases no re- 



OF INDIVIDUAL CHARACTER. 133 

semblance is to be discovered. The passions and temper 
appear to be frequently inherited ; and although the prone- 
ness of children to imitation may partly account for the 
appearance, it cannot be admitted as a complete expla- 
nation, since the same spirit will manifest itself where 
parents and children have never lived together. The re- 
semblance between their intellectual properties is seldom 
equally striking. In these, though there is no reason to 
suppose that they are not equally transmissible, there is at 
least less room for imitation. It is a common remark, 
that the sons of eminent men are themselves rarely con- ' 
spicuous for talents ; and yet, on the other hand, intellec- 
tual characteristics are sometimes known to run through 
whole families. 

We have already intimated, that both the mental and 
physical constitution seem to depend on the united qual- 
ities of both the parents ; not solely, however, for we every 
day see phenomena both of mind and body, which we can 
refer only to inexplicable accidents. Such are idiotism 
and mal-organization. The instances which may be cited 
of dull children being the offspring of parents, both of 
whom have been remarkable for quickness of intellect, 
present no greater difficulty than analogous instances with 
regard to corporeal qualities. It is as easily conceivable 
that two peculiar constitutions, which separately occa- 
sioned or were attended by intellectual quickness, may 
produce the reverse in the offspring, as that a fair child 
may be born of parents both of whom have dark com- 
plexions. 

These cursory observations naturally lead us to reflect 
on the long chain of consequences of which the marriage 
of two persons may be the first link ; and what an impor- 
tant influence such an union may have on human affairs. 
If two men and two women founded a colony, by remov- 



134 CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 

ing to some uninhabited district or island, where they 
were cut off from all intercourse with the rest of their 
species ; the whole train of subsequent events in that 
colony to the end of time would depend on the manner in 
which they paired. If the older man married the older 
woman a different train of affairs, it is manifest, would 
ensue, from that which would take place if the older man 
married the younger woman. In the first case, the off- 
spring of the marriage would be totally different individ- 
uals from those which would have been brought into the 
world in the second case. They would think, feel, and 
act, in a widely different manner, and not a single event 
depending on human action would be precisely the same 
as any event in the other case. 

As a farther illustration, it may not be devoid of amuse- 
ment to trace the consequences which would have ensued, 
or rather which would have been prevented, had the father 
of some eminent character formed a different matrimonial 
connection. Suppose the father of Bonaparte had married 
any other lady than the one who was actually destined to 
become his mother. Agreeably to the tenor of the pre- 
ceding observations, it is obvious that Bonaparte himself 
would not have appeared in the world. The affairs of 
France would have fallen into different hands, and have 
been conducted in another manner. The measures of the 
British cabinet, the debates in Parliament, the subsidies to 
foreign powers, the battles by sea and land, the marches 
and countermarches, the wounds, deaths, and promotions, 
the fears, and hopes, and anxieties of a thousand indi- 
viduals, would all have been different. The speculations 
of those writers and speakers who employed themselves in 
discussing these various subjects, and canvassing the con- 
duct of this celebrated man, would not have been called 
forth. The train of ideas in every mind interested in 



OF INDIVIDUAL CHARACTER. 135 

public affairs would not have been the same. Pitt would 
not have made the same speeches, nor Fox the same 
replies. Lord Byron's poetry would have wanted some 
splendid passages. The Duke of Wellington might have 
still been plain Arthur Wellesley. Mr. Warden would 
not have written his book, nor the Edinburgh critic his 
review of it ; nor could the author of this essay have avail- 
ed himself of his present illustration. The imagination 
of the reader will easily carry him through all the various 
consequences to soldiers and sailors, tradesmen and arti- 
sans, printers and booksellers, downward through every 
gradation of society. In a word, when we take into ac- 
count these various consequences, and the thousand ways 
in which the mere intelligence of Bonaparte's proceedings, 
and of the measures pursued to counteract them, influ- 
enced the feelings, the speech, and the actions of man- 
kind, it is scarcely too much to say, that the single 
circumstance of Bonaparte's father marrying as he did, 
has more or less affected almost every individual in 
Europe, as well as a numerous multitude in the other 
quarters of the globe. 

We see, from the preceding glance, what an important 
share an individual may have in modifying the course of 
events, and how his influence may extend, in some way 
or other, through the minutest ramifications of society. 
Yet amidst all this influence, we may also perceive the 
operation of general causes ; of those principles of the 
mind common to all individuals, and of the physical cir- 
cumstances by which they are surrounded. The individ- 
ual character itself, indeed, partly receives its tone and 
properties from general causes, and much of the reaction 
which it exerts may be, in an indirect sense, ascribed to 
them. Thus, although the marriage of Bonaparte's father 
and mother, the connection of those particular persons, 



136 CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 

was the cause of his existence, and of many of the pecu- 
liarities by which he was distinguished, yet his character 
and conduct were in no small degree moulded by the 
spirit of the age. There are many g'eneral causes, it is 
obvious, which would have operated although any given 
person had never come into the world. There is a certain 
progress or course of affairs, that holds on, amidst all the 
various impressions, the checks, and the impulses, which 
it receives from individual character. If Bonaparte had 
never existed, the nations of the earth would, in all likeli- 
hood, have been in much the same relative situation as 
they are, and, at all events, they would have made similar 
advances in political knowledge. The violence of the 
French Kevolution would probably have been directed by 
some other ambitious leader against the states of Europe ; 
it might have lasted nearly the same time, and subsided in 
a similar way. But although the general result might 
have been in many respects similar, the train of political 
events would have been altogether different ; there would 
have been quite a different mass of materials for the future 
historian. 

The remark may be extended, with still more certainty? 
to almost all the arts and sciences. Composed as their 
history necessarily is of the achievements of individuals, 
their advancement is the result of general causes, and in- 
dependent in a certain sense on individual character. The 
inventions of printing and gunpowder, the discovery of the 
virtues of the loadstone, and even the inductive logic of 
Bacon, were sure to mark the progress of human affairs, 
and were not owing to the mere personal qualities, nor 
necessarily bound to the destiny of those who promulgated 
them to the world. The discoveries of modern astronomy 
would doubtless have been ultimately attained, although 
such a^person as Sir Isaac Newton had never seen the 



OF INDIVIDUAL CHARACTER. 137 

light ; but they would not have been attained in the same 
way, nor perhaps at the same period. The science, it is 
probable, would have been extremely dissimilar in the de- 
tail, in the rapidity of its progress, and the order of its 
discoveries, while there is every reason to think it would 
have been much the same in its final result. 



ESSAY VII. 

ON THE VICISSITUDES OP LIFE. 

Although the events of our lives appear in the re- 
trospect naturally enough connected with each other, yet 
if we compare two widely distant periods of the past, we 
shall often find them so discordant as to excite our surprise 
that the same being should have been placed in circum- 
stances so essentially dissimilar. And if we could foresee 
some of the circumstances of our future lives, it would 
frequently appear quite out : of the limits of possibility 
that we should be brought into them. Our present state 
would seem so full of insurmountable obstacles to such a 
charge, that we could not form a conjecture by what in- 
strumentality it was to be effected ; we could not conceive 
how the current of our destiny was to be so strangely 
diverted from its original course, nor how the barriers, 
which circumscribe our condition, were to be so entirely 
overthrown. But time gradually elaborates apparent im- 
possibilities into very natural and consistent events. A 
friend is lost by death ; a rival is removed from the sphere 
of competition ; a superior falls and leaves a vacancy in 
society to be filled up ; a series of events renders a 
measure advisable, of which a few years before we never 
dreamed ; new circumstances bring around us new per- 
sons ; novel connections open fresh prospects ; objects 



140 ON THE VICISSITUDES 

before unknown excite passions before dormant, and rouse 
talents of which we were scarcely conscious ; and our 
whole ideas and feelings varying and keeping pace with 
these revolutions, we are at length brought quite natu- 
rally into the very condition, which a few years ago 
seemed utterly irreconcilable with our position in the 
world and our relations to society. Many circumstances 
of our lives would appear like dreams, if we were abrupt- 
ly thrown into them, without perceiving the succession of 
events by which we came there. We should feel like the 
poor man in the Arabian Tales, who, while under the in- 
fluence of a sleeping draught, was divested of his clothes, 
and attired like a prince, and on awaking was strangely 
perplexed to find himself surrounded by all the outward 
appendages of royalty, and by a crowd of attendants who 
treated him as their monarch. It is the gradual develop- 
ment of events, their connection and dependence on each 
other, and the corresponding changes in our views, which 
give the character of reality to actual life, as they confer 
it on the fictions of imagination. A succession of trivial 
changes carries the mind without abruptness to a wide 
distance from its former station, as a staircase conducts 
us to a lofty eminence by a series of minute elevations. 
Hence it is that men seldom suffer those extreme sensa- 
tions from a change of circumstances which we are some- 
times led to expect. Persons in low life are apt to think 
that the splendor, to which a man of their own class has 
raised himself by industry and talents, must teem with 
uninterrupted enjoyment ; that the contrast of his former 
lowliness with his present elevation must be a perennial 
spring of pleasurable emotion. It may indeed occasion- 
ally yield him gratifying reflections, but it is seldom in his 
power to feel the full force of the difference. It is not in 
nature that at one and the same time he should feel ardent 



OF LIFE. 141 

admiration of splendor and familiarity with it ; the pant- 
mo- desire for an object and the satisfied sense of enjoy- 
ment. He cannot combine at the same moment the 
possession of the feelings of two remote periods of his 
life, so as alternately to pass from one to the other, and 
revel in the full rapture of the contrast. No power of 
imagination can present him at once with two vivid land- 
scapes of his mental condition at two different junctures, 
so as to enable him to bring into distinct comparison all 
their lights, and shades, and colors. The hand of time 
has been constantly at work to wear out the impressions 
of his past existence. While he has been led from one 
vicissitude to another, from one state of mind to a differ- 
ent state, almost all the peculiarities of his original views 
and feelings have been successively dropped in his pro- 
gress, till it has become an effort, if not an impossibility, 
to recollect them with any sort of clearness and precision. 
The same revolution of feeling takes place when a man 
sinks into adversity, although memory perhaps is then 
more active and tenacious. A wonder is sometimes ex- 
pressed, that one who has been unfortunate in the world 
should be able to retain so much cheerfulness amidst the 
recollection of former times, which must press on his 
mind ; times when friends thronged around him, when 
every eye seemed to greet him with pleasure, and every 
object to share his satisfaction. Now destitute, forsaken, 
obscure, how is it that he is not overpowered by the con- 
trast ? There are moments, it cannot be doubted, when 
he acutely feels the transition, but this cannot be the ordi- 
nary state of his mind. Many of his views having been 
displaced by others, his feelings having gradually con- 
formed to his circumstances, and his attention being occu- 
pied with present objects, he has not that oppressive, 
habitual sense of the change, which a mere looker-on is 



142 ON THE VICISSITUDES 

apt to suppose. An indifferent observer, indeed, is often 
more powerfully struck with the contrast than the subject 
of it, not having to look at the former state through all 
the intermediate ideas and emotions, and being occupied 
only with the difference in external appearances. He 
contrasts (if we may have recourse to our former figure) 
only the base and the summit of the tower, while the stair- 
case which connects them is concealed from his view. 

It is certain that men frequently bear calamities much 
better than they themselves would have previously ex- 
pected. In misfortunes which are of gradual growth, 
every change contracts and reduces their views, and pre- 
pares them for another ; and they at length find them- 
selves involved in the gloom of adversity without any 
violent transition. How many have there been, who, 
while basking in the smiles of fortune, and revelling in 
the luxuries of opulence, would have been completely 
overpowered by a revelation of their future doom ; yet 
when the vicissitudes of life have brought them into those 
circumstances, they have met their misfortunes w T ith calm- 
ness and resignation. The records of the French Revo- 
lution abound with instances of extraordinary fortitude in 
those from whom it could have been least expected, and 
who, a few years before, would probably have shrunk 
with horror from the bare imagination of their own fate. 
Women, as well as men, were seen to perish on the scaf- 
fold without betraying the least symptom of fear. 

Even when calamity suddenly assails us, it is remark- 
able how soon we become familiarized with our novel 
situation. After the agony of the first shock has sub- 
sided, the mind seems to relinquish its hold on its former 
pleasures, to call in its affections from the various objects 
on which they had fixed themselves, and to endeavor to 
concentrate them on the few solaces remaining. By the 



OF LIFE. 143 

force of perpetual and intense rumination, the rugged and 
broken path, by which the imagination passes from its 
present to its former state, is worn smooth and rendered 
continuous : and the aspect of surrounding objects becom- 
ing familiar, loses half the horror lent to it by the first 
agitated survey. 

If it be thus true, that men in general bear calamities 
much better than they themselves would have expected, 
and that affliction brings along with it a portion of its own 
antidote, it is a fact which may serve to cheer us in the 
hour of gloomy anticipation. To reflect that what would 
be agony to us in our present state of mind, with our 
present views, feelings, and associations, may at a future 
time prove a very tolerable evil, because the state of our 
mind will be different ; that in the greatest misfortunes 
which may befall us, we shall probably possess sufficient 
strength and equanimity to bear the burden of our calam- 
ity, may be of some use in dispelling those melancholy 
forebodings which are too apt to disturb the short period 
of life. It may lead us to more cheerful views of human 
existence. 

There are few men of reflection to whose minds the 
fragility of human happiness has not been forcibly sug- 
gested by the very instances in which that happiness 
appears in its brightest colors. They have hung over it 
as over the early flowret of spring, which the next blast 
may destroy. As the lovely bride, blooming with health 
and animated with love and hope, has passed by in the 
day of her triumph, they have contrasted the transitory 
happiness of the hour with the long train of disappoint- 
ments and calamities, diseases and deaths, with which the 
most fortunate life is familiar, and many of which inevi- 
tably spring from the event which the beautiful creature 
before them, unconscious of all but the immediate pros- 



144 ON THE VICISSITUDES 

pect, is welcoming with a heart full of happiness and a 
countenance radiant with smiles. She seems a victim, on 
whom a momentary illumination has fallen only to be fol- 
lowed by deeper gloom. ' Ah ! ■ said a poor emaciated 
but still youthful woman, as she was standing at the door 
of her cottage while a gay bridal party were returning 
from church, c they little think what they are about. I 
was left a widow with two children at the age of twenty- 
one.' 

It was in the same spirit that Gray wrote his Ode on the 
Prospect of Eton College. After describing the sports of 
the schoolboys in strains familiar to every reader, he 
makes a natural and beautiful transition to their future 
destiny. 

■ Alas ! regardless of their doom, 

The little victims play! 
No sense have they of ills to come, 

No care beyond to-day; 
Yet see how all around them wait 
The ministers of human fate, 

And black misfortune's baleful train! 
Ah! show them where in ambush stand, 
To seize their prey, the murd'rous band ! 

Ah! tell them they are men.' 

In the indulgence of such reflections, however, it is to be 
remembered that we are contrasting distant events of life, 
bringing together extreme situations, of which to pas3 
suddenly from one to the other might be intolerable 
anguish, and that we are suppressing all the circumstances 
which lie between, and prepare a comparatively easy and 
gradual transition. 

It is evident from the tenor of the preceding observa- 
tions, that most of the intense pleasures and poignant 
sorrows of mankind must be experienced in passing from 



OF LIFE. 145 

one condition to another, not in any permanent state ; and 
that the intensity of the feeling will materially depend on 
the suddenness of the change. 

On comparing the condition of a peasant and a peer, 
we cannot perhaps perceive much superiority of happiness 
in either. The ideas and feelings of the peasant are ad- 
justed to the circumstances by which he is surrounded, 
and the coarseness of his fare and the homeliness of his 
dwelling excite no emotions of uneasiness. The notions 
of the peer are equally well adjusted to the pomp and 
refinements of rank and affluence. Luxurious dainties 
and splendid decorations, courteous deference and vulgar 
homage, are too familiar to raise any peculiar emotions of 
pleasure. But if a poor man rises to affluence, or a rich 
man sinks into poverty, such circumstances are no longer 
neutral. The former feels delight in his new acquisitions, 
and the latter is pained by the want of his habitual luxu- 
ries and accustomed splendor. In the same manner that a 
substance may feel cold to one hand and warm to another, 
according to the different temperatures to which they have 
been antecedently exposed, so any rank or situation in life 
may yield pleasure or pain according to the previous con- 
dition of the person who is placed in it. 

Hence we may perceive the error of such moralists as 
contend, that fame, wealth, power, or any other acquisi- 
tion, is not worth pursuit, because those who are in posses- 
sion of it are not happier than their fellow-creatures. 
They may not indeed be happier, but this by no means 
proves, that the object is not worth pursuing, since there 
may be much pleasure, not only in the chase, but in the 
novelty of the acquisition. The fortune which a man 
acquires by some successful effort, may not after a while 
afford him more gratification than his former moderate 
competence ; bat in order to estimate its value, we must 
10 



146 ON THE VICISSITUDES OF LIFE. 

take into account all the pleasurable emotions which would 
flow in upon him until a perfect familiarity with his new 
circumstances had established itself in his mind. 

Such moralists seem to forget, that man, by the neces- 
sity of his nature, must have some end, which he can 
pursue with ardor ; that to be without aim and object is to 
be miserable ; that the necessary business of life requires, 
on the part of many, an ardent aspiration after wealth, 
power, and reputation ; and that it is not the pursuits 
themselves, but the vices with which they may be con- 
nected, that are proper objects of reprobation. It is, in 
fact, by yielding to the passions and principles of his con- 
stitution, within proper limits, and under proper restric- 
tions, not by the vain attempt to suppress them, that man 
promotes the happiness of himself and society. 



ESSAY ¥111. 

ON THE VARIETY OP INTELLECTUAL PURSUITS. 

The various arts and sciences may be compared to the 
pictures in a large gallery. Every one who has passed 
through one of these magnificent repositories, knows how 
vain is the attempt to understand the subject, and estimate 
the merits, of all the specimens of art exposed to his 
view, in the short space of time usually allotted to the 
survey. As he throws his glances around, his eye is daz- 
zled and his mind confused by the diversity of represen- 
tations, and he at length finds it expedient to limit his 
attention to a few, which may have been pointed out by 
particular circumstances or general celebrity. In the same 
manner, the subjects of knowledge are too numerous and 
complicated, and human life far too short, to allow even 
the highest intellect to embrace the whole. As we look 
through the vast accumulation of science, our minds 
would be oppressed by the various objects which present 
themselves, did we not take them in detail, and concen- 
trate our observation on a part. Those, therefore, who 
wish to excel in intellectual pursuits, find it necessary to 
direct their principal efforts to some particular science or 
branch of literature. They thus escape the perplexity 
and superficialness of such as dissipate their attention on 
a multitude of subjects, and are far more likely to enlarge 



148 ON THE VARIETY OF 

the boundaries of knowledge than by a more indiscrim- 
inate application. This division of labor in the intellec- 
tual world, however, is not without its disadvantages. As 
the artisan, who is chained down to the drudgery of one me- 
chanical operation, is a much inferior being to the savage, 
who is continually thrown upon the resources of his own 
mind in novel circumstances ; who has to devise and exe- 
cute plans of aggression and defence, to extricate himself 
from difficulties and encounter dangers, and who thus 
acquires a wonderful versatility of talent ; so the man, 
who has devoted himself to one science, often loses by a 
comparison with him who has suffered his mind to wander 
over all the various and beautiful regions of knowledge. 
What the former gains in accuracy and nicety of tact, he 
loses in copiousness of ideas and comprehensiveness of 
views ; and thus it sometimes appears in the intellectual 
as well as in the civil world, as if the perfection of indi- 
vidual character must be sacrificed to the general progress 
of society. Although there is this tendency in the rapid 
advance of knowledge, and although a concentrated atten- 
tion is requisite to success, yet it is by no means necessary 
that men should devote themselves exclusively to their 
favorite subjects. The sciences are so connected, if by 
nothing else, at least by the general logical principles per- 
vading the whole, that they throw light on each other ; 
and he has the fairest chance of success in any one 
career, who starts well furnished with general information, 
while he possesses the only means of saving himself from 
becoming an intellectual artisan. 

Another disadvantage attending the multiplicity of know- 
ledge, and the consequent division of intellectual labor, 
lies in forming classes of men having little fellow-feeling, 
inasmuch as they cannot readily enter with interest into 
each others darling pursuits. The mathematician hears of 



INTELLECTUAL PURSUITS. 149 

a new species of plants with all possible apathy, and the 
antiquarian scarcely gives himself the trouble of inquiring 
after the most brilliant discoveries of the chemist. In 
proportion, too, as a science becomes complex and ex- 
tensive, requiring minute application, it is removed from 
general participation and sympathy. It cannot be ex- 
pected that the various acquirements of scientific men 
should be duly estimated and relished by that numerous 
body of people not destitute of mental culture, who come 
under the denomination of general readers. Almost all 
the sciences are defended by a host of peculiar ideas and 
technicalities in language, which effectually bar the ap- 
proach of such as have not gone through a regular process 
of initiation. The acutest mind might expend its efforts 
in vain on subjects of which it did not comprehend the 
terms. Pope has well described the effect which would 
ensue from a sudden plunge into mathematical science. 

' Full in the midst of Euclid dip at once, 
And petrify a genius to a dunce.' 

There is, however, a large class of subjects, in which 
almost all men of cultivated minds can take an equal in- 
terest ; subjects which relate to man himself, and chiefly 
to those phenomena of his nature which lie exposed to 
common observation. The elementary knowledge requir- 
ed in topics relating to morals, manners, and taste, is pos- 
sessed by all, the terms in which they are treated of form 
the common language of daily intercourse, and every 
mind feels itself confident to pronounce on the positions in 
the expression of which they are employed. That the 
sum of the squares of the two sides of a right-angled trian- 
gle is equal to the square of the hypothenuse, can be fully 
comprehended by such only as have gone through a pre- 
vious course of instruction ; but every one can understand 



150 ON THE VARIETY OF 

on the first enunciation, that it is ridiculous in a country 
girl to affect the fine lady, and base in a man to fawn on 
the minions of power. There are also other and stronger 
reasons why, while the subjects alluded to attract so much, 
many of the sciences attract so small a portion of general 
interest. The latter address themselves to the intellect 
alone. They are fraught with none of those interesting 
associations of hope, and joy, and sympathy, which cling 
to the productions of the poet, the moralist, and the histo- 
rian. They teem not with passion and feeling ; they call 
not into play the sensibilities of our nature ; they make no 
appeal to the experience of our hearts. They cannot 
therefore appear otherwise than dry and devoid of attrac- 
tion to those whose views are circumscribed by the ordi- 
nary affairs of life, who have never leapt the boundaries 
which encircle the regions of abstract truth and recondite 
knowledge, nor learned to invest them with those pleasur- 
able associations, which a vigorous effort to master their 
difficulties has created in others. 

It may be remarked, however, that this want of the 
power of awakening the feelings, this defect of vital 
warmth in the abstruser sciences, is not without its advan- 
tages. Some of the finest pleasures of our nature are 
those of pure intellect, without any mixture of human 
passion. When the mind has been agitated by the cares 
of the world, irritated by folly or disgusted by vice, it is 
an attainment of no despicable importance to be able, for 
a while, to divest itself of its connection with mankind, 
by taking refuge in the abstractions of science, where 
there is no object to drag it back to the events of the 
past, or revive the fever of its sensibility. It is such a 
welcome transition as we experience in passing from the 
burning rays of a vertical sun to the delicious coolness of 
a grotto. 



INTELLECTUAL PURSUITS. 151 

We may gather from the preceding observations, that in 
works of polite literature, more especially works of imagi- 
nation, too much care cannot be employed in avoiding the 
peculiar characteristics of science. To be generally inter- 
esting, their subjects and phraseology should carry along 
with them their own light; and their success, will also 
greatly depend on the frequency and effect with which 
they appeal to the feelings possessed in common by all 
well-informed readers. One of the most noted instances 
of the neglect of both these points is Dr. Darwin's poem 
of the Botanic Garden, which, though it contains passages 
of dazzling splendor, fails to interest, because it is loaded 
with the obscurities of scientific nomenclature and allu- 
sion ; and full of topics, vast and magnificent, but not 
within the range of ordinary feeling ; bright and imposing, 
but without warmth and vitality. 

The same principles will also serve to explain why 
poems, founded on the superstitions and manners of other 
nations, excite a comparatively weak and transient inter- 
est. In the first place, a poem of this class must neces- 
sarily be a learned poem, and it requires an effort on the 
part of the reader to enter into its allusions, and compre- 
hend the learning which it exhibits ; secondly, the asso- 
ciations and feelings ascribed to the characters can never 
lay hold of his mind with the same power as those which 
spring from indigenous customs and superstitions. No 
part of the mythology of the Curse of Kehama could ever 
excite, in the soul of an Englishman, so profound an 
interest as the appearance of Banquo's ghost, in the tragedy 
of Macbeth. In the one case we may admire the skill of 
the poet, and even imagine the emotions of his characters ; 
in the other, the emotions are our own. The Lalla Rookh 
of Moore is another example in point. The poet has skil- 
fully availed himself of a variety of oriental illustrations, 



152 ON THE VARIETY OF 

calculated to delight the fancy, but they do not fasten on 
the mind like allusions to familiar objects ; and it may be 
questioned whether his pretty eastern princesses, sur- 
rounded with a profusion of birds, and butterflies, and 
flowers, have enabled him to charm his readers as he 
would have done by the description of a lovely English- 
woman, with English manners, and amidst English scen- 
ery. The passions of human nature are no doubt much 
the same all over the world, and a vivid representation of 
them will be attractive under all the modifications of dif- 
ferent habits and manners"; but it will be more vivid and 
more attractive when it appeals to our sympathy through 
the medium of our usual associations. 

The differences already pointed out between works of 
science and those of morality and imagination, necessarily 
give rise to different kinds of reputation. The fame of a 
scientific author is in some measure confined to the circle 
of those who understand the subject ; or, if it overstep this 
limit, it becomes known only as a bare fact on the testi- 
mony of others. The fame of a poet, or a moralist, on 
the contrary, pervades all society, not as a matter of fact, 
but a matter of feeling. It is not merely the echo of his 
merits that reaches us, but it is his own voice to which we 
listen. His noble sentiments, his beautiful images, his 
brilliant wit, his felicitous expressions, mingle themselves 
with our intellectual being, and constitute a part of the 
public mind. 

Newton and Shakspeare are perhaps equally illustrious, 
but certainly possess different kinds of reputation. New- 
ton can be deservedly appreciated only by those few, who 
can track his gigantic advances in science ; to the world 
at large he is a man who has made discoveries, wonderful 
enough, but of which they can form no adequate concept 
tion. Shakspeare, on the other hand, is read and admired 



INTELLECTUAL PURSUITS. 153 

by all ; they speak in his words, and think in his thoughts. 
Not only the fame, but the manifestations of his genius 
live in their recollection, and his sentiments and expres- 
sions rise spontaneously as their own. Newton shines to 
the world like a remote though brilliant star. Shakspeare 
like the sun, which warms mankind as well as enlightens 
hem. 



ESSAY IX. 

ON PRACTICAL AND SPECULATIVE ABILITY. 



In the intercourse of the world, every one must have 
observed two kinds of talent, so distinct from each other 
as to admit of different appellations, although frequently 
united in the same person. One has reference exclusively 
to the operations of the mind, and may be called specula- 
tive ability ; the other has reference to the application of 
knowledge, or to action, and may be called practical 
ability. Speculative ability may be seen in the composi- 
tion of a poem, the solution of a problem, th,e formation of 
a chain of reasoning, or the invention of a story. In these 
performances nothing is required but an exertion of the 
mental powers : they are purely internal operations, and 
although they may be assisted by the employment of ex- 
ternal means, it would be possible to carry them on with- 
out it. • 

Practical ability may be seen in every department of 
active life. It consists in the dexterous application of 
means for the attainment of ends. The term may be ex- 
tended to every sort of skill, whether exerted in important 
or trivial matters ; but it is here meant to designate, not 
so much any technical dexterity, or that which a man 
evinces in the employment of his physical powers on inan- 
imate objects, as that higher skill by which he directs the 



156 ON PRACTICAL AND 

talents and passions of his fellow-creatures to the accom- 
plishment of his purposes, and seizes the opportunities of 
action presented by successive events ; and which enables 
him to conduct himself with propriety and success, in any 
circumstances into which he may be thrown. 

The two kinds of ability here pointed out must exist 
more or less in every individual. But they are often 
combined in very unequal proportions. A high degree of 
speculative is frequently found in conjunction with a low 
degree of practical ability, and conversely, the practical 
talents are sometimes superior to the speculative. Men, 
who have exhibited the greatest powers of mind in their 
writings, have been found altogether inefficient in active 
life, and incapable of availing themselves of their own 
wisdom. With comprehensive views and a capacity for 
profound reasoning on human affairs, they have felt bewil- 
dered in actual emergencies : keen and close observers of 
the characters, the failings, and the accomplishments of 
others, they have not had the power of conforming their 
own conduct to their theoretical standard of excellence. 
Giants in the closet, they have proved but children in the 
world. This destitution of practical talent in men of fine 
intellect often excites the wonder of the crowd. They 
seem to expect that he, who has shown powers of mind 
bespeaking an almost all-comprehensive intelligence, and 
who has perhaps poured a flood of light on the path of 
action to be pursued by others, should, as a matter of 
course, be able to achieve any enterprise and master any 
difficulties himself. Such expectations, however, are un- 
reasonable and ill-founded. Excellence in one thing does 
not necessarily confer excellence in all, or even in things 
requiring the exercise of the same faculties. Both practi- 
cal and speculative ability are no doubt modifications of 
mental power : but one, on that account, by no means 



SPECULATIVE ABILITY. 157 

implies the other, any more than dexterity in reefing a 
sail involves the art of leaping a five-barred gate, though 
they are both instances of physical skill. 

It would be just as reasonable, indeed, to expect that a 
good sailor should be necessarily a clever horseman, as 
that a man of fine speculative powers should in conse- 
quence be also a man of practical talent. The want of 
practical ability then, in such a man, may arise simply 
from an exclusive attention to processes purely mental. 
Where the mind is entirely absorbed by the relations of 
science, or where its powers are habitually concentrated 
on its own creations, it is perfectly natural that the arts of 
active life should not be acquired. To a man so occupied 
common objects and occurrences have little interest, and it 
is with effort that he commands his attention sufficiently 
to avoid egregious mistakes, and to gain a passable dex- 
terity in things which all the world are expected to know 
and to perform. The understanding, moreover, that is 
accustomed to pursue a regular and connected train of 
ideas, becomes in some measure incapacitated for those 
quick and versatile movements which are learned in the 
commerce of the world, and are indispensable to those 
who act a part in it. Deep thinking and practical talents 
require indeed habits of mind so essentially dissimilar, that 
while a man is striving after the one he will be unavoida- 
bly in danger of losing the other. The justness of these 
observations might be supported, if necessary, by a refer- 
ence to the characters of a number of men distinguished 
by their literary and scientific accomplishments. It will 
be sufficient to adduce- the instance of the celebrated au- 
thor of the Wealth of Nations. Few writers have carried 
profound and systematic thinking farther, or attained more 
comprehensive views of human policy ; and the effects on 
his character, as might have been anticipated, were seen 



158 ON PRACTICAL AND 

in a want of the proper qualifications for bustle and busi- 
ness. ' He was certainly,' says his biographer, c not fitted 
for the general commerce of the world, or for the business 
of active life. The comprehensive speculations with 
which he had been occupied from his youth, and the vari- 
ety of materials which his own invention continually sup- 
plied to his thoughts, rendered him habitually inattentive 
to familiar objects, and to common occurrences ; and he 
frequently exhibited instances of absence, which have 
scarcely been surpassed by the fancy of La Bruyere. 
Even in company he was apt to be engrossed with his 
studies ; and appeared, at times, by the motion of his lips, 
as well as by his looks and gestures, to be in the fervor of 
composition.' * 

The want of practical talent, in other cases, may be 
accounted for by a certain gentleness, reservedness, or 
timidity of disposition, which causes its possessor to shrink 
from the encounter of his fellow-creatures. Whatever it 
proceeds from, whether it is the effect of natural con- 
stitution, weakness of nerves, delicacy of organization, 
or the faulty associations of early life, it is certain that 
this disposition is frequently the accompaniment of su- 
perior genius. We are told that Virgil possessed it in a 
remarkable degree ; Addison seems to have had a similar 
temperament ; and it was the prominent weakness of 
Cowper. In the latter indeed it assumed a decidedly 
morbid character, and appears to have been either the 
cause of his insanity or a strong symptom of its approach. 
To such an extreme did it oppress him, that, according to 
his own declaration, a public exhibition of himself was 
mortal poison to his feelings. 



* An Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. Adam Smith, by 
Dugald Stewart. 



SPECULATIVE ABILITY. 159 

Where this imperfection of character exists, it must be 
an insuperable obstacle to success in active life. That 
power of intellect, nevertheless, which is thus circum- 
scribed, is not destroyed. Power, whether of body or 
mind, has always an unconquerable tendency to exert 
itself; and he, who is not endowed with the energy of 
temperament necessary to bring his intellect into play 
amidst the conflict of worldly interests, will turn its whole 
force to those pursuits in which his timidity will be no 
incumbrance. Thus both Addison and Cowper, although 
they were ill calculated to make a figure when the mani- 
festation of their talents depended on personal action, 
could accomplish more than most of their species, when 
they entered the free field of composition, unimpeded by 
the restraints of external circumstances. The character 
of Addison, indeed, may be selected as a striking instance 
of admirable speculative powers, combined with a defi- 
ciency of practical talent, in circumstances favorable to 
its cultivation. By the force of his genius, without the 
aid of hereditary fortune or family connections, he rose 
to an important office in the state, and had every oppor- 
tunity of qualifying himself to discharge its duties with 
credit and effect. The course of his education, and the 
career through which he subsequently passed, seemed to 
combine whatever was necessary to form and direct the 
powers of a practical statesman : yet, notwithstanding all 
his advantages, and all his accomplishments, he was 
found incompetent to fill the situation to which his general 
abilities, rather than any obvious fitness in the eyes of 
others, may be presumed to have raised him. c In the 
year 1717 he rose,' says Dr. Johnson, 'to his highest 
elevation, being made secretary of state. For this em- 
ployment he might be justly supposed qualified by long 
practice of business, and by his regular ascent through 



160 ON PRACTICAL AND 

other offices; but expectation is often disappointed; it is 
universally confessed that he was unequal to the duties of 
his place. In the House of Commons he could not speak, 
and therefore was useless to the defence of the govern- 
ment. In the office, says Pope, he could not issue an 
order without losing his time in quest of fine expressions. 
What he gained in rank, he lost in credit ; and finding 
by experience his own inability, was forced to solicit his 
dismission with a pension of fifteen hundred pounds a 
year/ * 

It is perhaps quite as common to meet with the reverse 
of the phenomenon which we have been considering ; to 
find considerable practical talents combined with com- 
paratively feeble powers of speculation. The language 
and conduct of men of business, both in private life and 
in the administration of public affairs, frequently involve 
principles decidedly erroneous, and when brought to the 
test of scientific investigation, even palpably absurd ; and 
yet it is almost as difficult to convince them of their error, 
and to place their minds in a position for viewing the sub- 
ject aright, as to give an idea of colors to the blind. 
Hence it is years, and almost ages, before the discoveries 
of science and philosophy are adopted in practice. The 
habit of looking at present expedients, and forming hasty 
conclusions from superficial appearances, seems to inca- 
pacitate such men for raising their views to remote con- 
sequences, and tracing the operation of general principles. 
Their incapacity for mere intellectual processes, except 
of the simplest sort, is in truth as remarkable as the awk- 
wardness of the philosopher in the active pursuits of life. 

This superiority of their practical talents to their specu- 
lative powers may be explained on much the same grounds 

* Live3 of the Poets. 



SPECULATIVE ABILITY. 161 

as the contrary case : it is occasioned by the exclusive 
application of their talents to business, and the intellectual 
habits thus created. We see in it another exemplification 
of the general principle, that a man will excel in that to 
which he lends the greatest attention. But there are some 
dispositions more qualified by nature for the business of 
the world than others. It has been already remarked, 
that the mind is frequently turned to speculative pursuits 
by constitutional timidity ; and it is frequently determined 
to active pursuits by energy of temperament. Energy 
itself, without superiority of intellect, suffices to make a 
man of practical talent. It puts all his faculties to their 
utmost stretch, and gives him a decided control over all 
who are less bold and resolute than himself. Intellectual 
ability is, in fact, only an inert instrument : it is passion 
which is the moving power, and which brings it into opera- 
tion ; and a small measure of understanding may often do 
more when urged on by strong passion, or a determined 
will, than an infinitely larger portion with no vigor to set 
it in motion. 

There is another quality of mind, not exactly the same 
as energy but often combined with it, which has usually a 
large share in the composition of practical talent, and that 
is, the presence of mind, or self-possession, which enables 
a man at all times to employ his powers to advantage. 
Madame de Stael, in her delineation of Bonaparte, remarks 
with her usual sagacity, that it was rather because other 
men did not act upon him than because he acted upon 
them, that he became their master. This power of not 
being acted upon by others gives a man a wonderful com- 
mand over such as have less coolness than himself ; and 
the susceptibility of being acted upon unfits him who is 
extremely subject to it for success in active life. 

To the qualities already mentioned, as entering into 
11 



162 ON PRACTICAL AND 

the composition of practical ability, we may add what is 
perhaps rather a habit than a natural property ; a certain 
versatility of feeling as well as of intellect. A man of 
business, accustomed to pass rapidly from one thing to 
another, can enter with a proper degree of interest into 
any affair in which he finds himself engaged. He pos^ 
sesses a facility of transferring his attention and the 
exercise of his powers to successive objects, not only 
wthout distraction, but with proper confidence in himself; 
and from this property of his mind, together with the 
others already enumerated, he derives such a perfect 
command over his faculties as to bring them to bear with 
effect on every occasion. 

Some of the highest functions which a man can be 
called to discharge, obviously require a considerable 
degree of both practical and speculative ability. This 
remark applies to the art of public speaking, which is 
materially indebted in its greatest excellence to grace of 
action, agreeable enunciation, skilful pliancy of tone, 
readiness of mind, acuteness and nicety of tact, boldness 
and self-possession ; while all the beauty and logical force 
of an oration are the result of speculative power. But a 
man of only moderate speculative talents will often 
make a popular orator by an imposing manner, a perfect 
command over his ideas and feelings, and a graceful use 
of his personal advantages ; and on the other hand, a man 
devoid of all these, a man of no practical ability, without 
making his way through our senses by the charms of 
voice or gesture, and even without the aid of perfect 
expression, will astonish and delight us by the mere 
potency of his thoughts. It is the soul of the speaker 
that seizes upon his auditors without the intervention of 
external artifice. 

There is a subordinate kind of practical ability, which 



SPECULATIVE ABILITY. 163 

consists in the easy and perfect management of ourselves 
in social intercourse. It may be termed ability of manner, 
and seems to depend in a great measure on the same 
qualities as other kinds of practical ability. It is occa- 
sionally found in a very high degree without much power 
of understanding. The man who has attained it, can 
conduct himself with propriety, and without embarrass- 
ment, in any company into which he happens to be 
thrown, and go through all the ceremonies of life with 
facility and grace. He has not only an instantaneous 
perception of what is proper to be said and done, on 
every occasion, but he has at command his language, his 
gestures, and even the expression of his countenance ; so 
that he can always act up to his own sense of propriety, 
and exhibit to advantage whatever share he possesses of 
intellect and acquirements. 

As one ingredient or accompaniment, or embellishment 
of 'ability of manner, we may mention that ready talent 
for conversation with which some are endowed, either by 
nature or education. Their ideas flow without effort, and 
clothe themselves in easy and appropriate language. 
Every thing around them, all that they see and hear, 
seems to awaken their memory or imagination. They 
are always fertile in topics, and expression never deserts 
them. 

It is not uncommon for men of eminent talents to want 
this ability of manner, and to evince a considerable 
degree of awkwardness and embarrassment in the inter- 
change of civilities. Though they may have a delicate 
perception of what is proper, yet having neither the 
facility, which is acquired by practice, nor the self- 
possession of less susceptible minds, they fail to exemplify 
their own ideas of propriety. The presence of a number 
of their fellow-creatures appears to oppress them with a 



164 ON PRACTICAL AND 

constraint, which fetters all their powers, particularly their 
powers of conversation. In vain do they task their minds 
for suitable topics of discourse. Their ideas seem to have 
vanished from their recollection, and their language is 
marked by hesitation and infelicity. 

The character of Addison furnishes an illustration also 
of this part of our subject. It appears that all his com- 
merce with society, and his intercourse with high life, had 
failed to give him the easy and unembarrassed carriage 
of a man of the world. According to Lord Chesterfield, 
he was the most timorous and awkward man that he ever 
saw. Dr. Johnson, who thinks this representation hyper- 
bolical, nevertheless admits that he was deficient in readi- 
ness of conversation, and that every testimony concurs to 
prove his having been oppressed by an improper and 
ungraceful timidity. That his taciturnity arose from 
constraint, and not from want of power, is decided by the 
testimony of those who best knew him, to the attractive 
qualities of his conversation, when amongst his intimate 
friends. ' Addison's conversation,' says Pope, * had some- 
thing in it more charming than I have found in any other 
man. But this was only when familiar ; before strangers, 
or perhaps a single stranger, he preserved his dignity by 
a stiff silence.' 

Gray may be cited as another instance of the want of 
ability of manner, if reliance is to be placed on the repre- 
sentation of Horace Walpole, who thus speaks of him in 
one of his letters : ' I agree with you most absolutely in 
your opinion about Gray ; he is the worst company in 
the world. From a melancholy turn, from living re- 
clusely, and from a little too much dignity, he never 
converses easily. All his words are measured and 
chosen. His writings are admirable. He himself is not 
agreeable.' In this representation, some ill-nature and 



SPECULATIVE ABILITY. 165 

exaggeration may be reasonably suspected, but the writer 
would scarcely have hazarded a portrait devoid of all 
resemblance to the original. 

To these instances we may add the account given us 
of the manners of Adam Smith, by his biographer, Mr. 
Stewart : 6 In the company of strangers, his tendency to 
absence, and perhaps still more his consciousness of that 
tendency, rendered his manner somewhat embarrassed; 
an effect which was probably not a little heightened by 
those speculative ideas of propriety, which his recluse 
habits tended at once to perfect in his conception, and to 
diminish his power of realizing.* 

Although constraint or embarrassment, in the presence 
of others, must of itself impair a man's powers of conver- 
sation, other causes conspire to produce a deficiency of 
conversational talent in men of profound genius. It seems 
partly to arise from a want of versatility of mind, and 
from the nature of those relations by which their ideas are 
connected. Men of profundity are not versatile, because, 
from pursuing logical deductions and regular inventions, 
they grow accustomed to proceed with order and method. 
Their associations are of too strict a character to admit of 
rapid transitions from one subject to another ; whereas the 
ideas of a man of the world, being connected by a thou- 
sand accidental ties, and superficial relations, are liable 
to be roused by any object or event which may present 
itself. What knowledge he possesses he has always at 
command ; it may be of small amount, but his prompt- 
ness at producing it frequently enables him to triumph 
over the philosopher, whose slow habits and abstract 
associations form a sort of ponderous machinery, requir- 
ing to be methodically worked to raise his ideas from the 
depths of his mind. But on this particular subject it 
would be idle to expatiate, since the world is already in 



166 ON PRACTICAL AND 

possession of the eloquent and philosophical explanation 
of Stewart. After illustrating 4 the advantages which the 
philosopher derives, in the pursuit of science, from that 
sort of systematic memory, which his habits of arrange- 
ment give him,' he proceeds as follows : 

6 It may however be doubted, whether such habits be 
equally favorable to a talent for agreeable conversation ; 
at least for that lively, varied, and unstudied conversation, 
which forms the principal charm of a promiscuous society. 
The conversation which pleases generally, must unite the 
recommendations of quickness, of ease, and of variety : 
and in all these three respects, that of the philosopher is 
apt to be deficient. It is deficient in quickness, because 
his ideas are connected by relations which occur only to 
an attentive and collected mind. It is deficient in ease, 
because these relations are not the casual and obvious 
ones by which ideas are associated in ordinary memories ; 
but the slow discoveries of patient and often painful 
exertion. As the ideas, too, which he associates together, 
are commonly of the same class, or at least are referred 
to the same general principles, he is in danger of becom- 
ing tedious by indulging himself in long and systematical 
discourses ; while another, possessed of the most inferior 
accomplishments, by laying his mind completely open 
to impressions from without, and by accommodating 
continually the course of his own ideas, not only to the 
ideas which are started by his companions, but to every 
trifling and unexpected accident that may occur to give 
them a new direction, is the life and soul of every society 
into which he enters.* 

To this may be added, that the philosopher can feel 



* Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. i., p. 
422, &c. 



SPECULATIVE ABILITY. 167 

little interest in many of those events which occasion 
fervent emotion in the minds of ordinary people ; and 
since to feel an interest in any thing is to have the ideas 
excited, and the imagination awakened, his conversation 
will frequently fail in vivacity, because his feelings are 
not roused by a number of inconsiderable circumstances, 
about which others are vividly affected, 



ESSAY X. 

ON THE MUTABILITY OP HUMAN FEELINGS. 

Man is a mutable being. Objects are in continual fluc- 
tuation around him, and his views, feelings, and faculties 
are subject to the same law. Let any one compare the 
state of his mind at two distant periods of his life, and he 
will perceive a revolution, not only in his external rela- 
tions, but in his moral and mental being : he is no longer 
the same man ; his purposes, motives, affections, and 
views of life have been the subjects of a change, gradual 
perhaps in its progress, but great in its consummation. 
The object which he once regarded with all the enthusi- 
asm of feeling, which seemed to be the very sun of his 
existence, and the bare mention of which thrilled through 
his heart, has totally vanished from his thoughts. The 
prospect which formerly looked so enchanting, is now cold 
and cheerless to his eye. He looks back, and cannot 
refrain from wondering, that, on circumstances of so tri- 
fling a nature his heart should have wasted such excess 
of passion. As a plain mansion meets his mature eye in 
the building, which to his infant gaze wore the appear- 
ance of a stately palace, so he discerns nothing but insig- 
nificance in those pursuits, which once filled and inflamed 
his imagination with their importance. A livelier descrip- 
tion of such a change of feeling cannot perhaps be found, 



170 ON THE MUTABILITY OF 

than that which Lord Chesterfield has left us in a letter 
written a short time before his death : c I have run,' says 
his Lordship, c the silly round of business and pleasure 
and have done with them all. I have enjoyed all pleas- 
ures of the world, and consequently know their futility, 
and do not regret their loss. I appraise them at their 
real value, which is, in truth, very low : whereas those, 
that have not experienced, always overrate them. They 
only see their gay outside, and are dazzled with the glare; 
but I have seen behind the scenes : I have seen all the 
coarse pulleys and dirty ropes, which exhibit and move the 
gaudy machine ; I have seen and smelt the tallow candles, 
which illuminate the whole decoration, to the astonishment 
and admiration of an ignorant audience. When I reflect 
back upon what I have seen, what I have heard, and what 
I have done, I can hardly persuade myself that all that 
frivolous hurry, and bustle, and pleasure of this world, 
had any reality ; but I look upon all that has passed as 
one of the romantic dreams, which opium commonly 
occasions, and I do by no means desire to repeat the 
nauseous dose, for the sake of the fugitive dream.' 

But besides these more important mental revolutions, 
there are others of a subordinate character, less remarked 
and less remembered. What a variety of desires, and 
passions, and tones of feeling, the same individual passes 
through in the course of a week ! What alternations of 
hope and fear, humility and exultation, gladness and mel- 
ancholy ! What a change in our views of life, as we 
look upon it through the transient media, which successive 
passions rapidly interpose between the mind and its ob- 
jects ! Even the most uniform state is diversified by a 
train of little passions and desires, followed by disappoint- 
ment or gratification ; and, with many, the very days of 
the week and hours of the day have each their different 
sets of feelings and associations. 



HUMAN FEELINGS. 



171 



No stage or condition of life is free from that copious 
source of mental changes, the attainment of our desires. 
This principle of mutation runs through life, through 
every hour and every day, although it may attract our 
notice only on important occasions. The revolution of 
feeling will of course be proportioned to the intensity of 
desire with which we have pursued our object ; and youth, 
as it is more liable to be inflamed and deluded by hope, 
will be peculiarly the season of such vicissitudes. In re- 
gard to almost every object of pursuit, we may say what 
the poet says of woman, 

6 The lovely toy so fiercely sought 
Hath lost its charm by being caught.' * 

Many of the changes of feeling already noticed are 
manifestly experienced without appearing in our actions : 
they are bubbles on the stream, which rise and disappear 
without any kind of consequences. Others prompt our 
actions without making any permanent difference in our 
habitual conduct. It is indeed astonishing what a number 
of various emotions may pass through a man's mind and 
sway his actions without affecting the permanent tone of 
his character, on which they seem to leave as little trace 
behind them as an arrow of its flight through the air. 
There are others of a third class, however, which produce 
a considerable effect on the tenor of his character and 
conduct. Perhaps the principal of these are the revolu- 
tions of mind in which its affections are transferred from 
one set of objects, or one pursuit, to another. In the 
lapse of time they must occur to every one ; but although 
all are subject to them, it is by no means in an equal 
degree. While some preserve a steadiness of taste and 
purpose, not to be suddenly altered by any of the vicissi- 

# Lord Byron's Giaour. 



172 ON THE MUTABILITY OF 

tildes of life, others bend to every impulse, and fluctuate 
with every variation ; a mutability which, if not under the 
control of strong sense, will inevitably lead to inconsisten- 
cy of character. Such men seem to possess a constant 
susceptibility of being inflamed with ardor towards any 
object which happens to strike the imagination. For a 
short time the chase is kept up with a vigor and enthu- 
siasm, which amaze the ordinary class of mortals, and 
leave competition at a distance ; but their preternatural 
energy soon relaxes, and ultimately dies away, till it is 
revived by some other caprice, and starts off in a new 
direction. 

This fickleness of character is doubtless in many cases 
constitutional, but it is often promoted, if not engendered, 
by an imperfect education, which has suffered the youth- 
ful mind to form its most important associations by chance. 
Hence the man not only becomes variable in his moods, 
but suffers from the vacillation arising out of the simul- 
taneous importunities of desires which are incompatible. 
Thrown in childhood amidst multiform characters and 
circumstances, his mind has been made up of impressions 
without any regulating principle to keep them in just 
subordination, or modify their effects. Happiness must 
be held on a precarious tenure by a man, who is thus 
subject to the opposite influence of inconsistent attractions, 
and who is continually liable to have his tranquillity ruf- 
fled and his purposes disturbed by some novel event or 
contact with some new character. With a mind full of 
associations which can be acted upon by impulses the 
most contrary, he is the slave of circumstances, which 
seem to snatch the guidance of his conduct out of his own 
hands, and impel him forward, till other events overpower 
their influence, and having usurped the same ascendancy 
exercise the same despotism. Such fickleness of charac- 



HUMAN FEELINGS. 173 

ter can be avoided only by acting on fixed principles and 
determinate aims, not to be abandoned in the transient 
humors which every day brings and every day sees ex- 
pire. Man, amidst the fluctuations of his own feelings 
and of passing events, ought to resemble the ship, which 
currents may carry and winds may impel from her course, 
but which amidst every deviation still presses onward to 
her port with unremitted perseverance. In the coolness 
of reflection, he ought to survey his affairs with a dispas- 
sionate and comprehensive eye, and having fixed on his 
plan, take the necessary steps to accomplish it, regardless 
of the temporary mutations of his mind, the monotony of 
the same track, the apathy of exhausted attention, or the 
blandishments of new projects. 

The folly of sacrificing settled purposes to transient 
humors cannot be kept too steadily in view. In a man 
of susceptible mind these moods of feeling often chase 
each other in rapid succession ; and if he is also a wise 
man, it will powerfully restrain their influence on his ac- 
tions, to reflect, that next month, or next week, or even 
to-morrow, he will experience nothing of the melancholy, 
or vexation, or ardor, or desire, which predominates 
to-day. He should therefore make his considerate deter- 
mination the fixed point round which his passions, and 
feelings, and humors might play, with as little power 
to move it as the clouds possess on the steadfastness of 
Skiddaw. 

The place of such a consistent perseverance, as here 
described, is in many individuals supplied by a devoted 
attachment to some particular pursuit ; and although this 
strong determination of the taste may cause absurdities 
in the character, it is perhaps on the whole conducive to 
happiness. A man with such a bias is surely happier 
than he who is perpetually subject to fickleness of taste 



174 MUTABILITY OF HUMAN FEELINGS. 

and passion ; or he who spends life in the vacuity arising 
from the want of a definite purpose. As instincts supply 
the place of knowledge, so does such a decided partiality 
produce many of the good effects of a perseverance in 
designs formed on mature and comprehensive reflec- 
tion. 



NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 



Note A. Page 11. 

This argument is so ingeniously put in the following passage, 
which I met with after the publication of the first edition of the 
present work, that I am happy in the opportunity to present it to my 
readers, especially as it also coincides with the practical application 
of the doctrine in the sequel of this esay : 

1 One thing there is which, verily, I could never understand but to 
be altogether void of reason. That he who is thought to have 
taught something false and impious should be forced to recant, 
which if he do, he shall not be punished. To what purpose, I pray 
you, serves this practice ? What good is there gotten, if for the 
avoiding of punishment, against his conscience, an heretic should 
recant his opinion ? There is only one thing that may be alleged for 
it; viz. that such as are possessed of the same error, and unknown 
perhaps, will do the like in their own hearts, yea, will counsel others 
to do the same. That opinion must needs have a very light impres- 
eion, which can so easily be plucked out of men's minds. Have we 
no reason to suspect that such a recantation is rather for fear of 
punishment than from the heart ? Will there not rather much 
heart-burning by this means arise, if the magistrates shall seem not 
only to kill the body, but to plot the ruin of the soul ? Are we, 
indeed, so ill furnished with weapons to vanquish error, as to be 
forced to defend ourselves with a lie, to put our trust in recantations 
made through fear ? But some may say, this is not what we desire, 
to force men to any kind of recantation, but that an heretic may 
acknowledge his error, not so much with his mouth as with his heart. 
This were excellent, indeed, if these could bring him to it. But 
what work is there for threats or blandishments in this case ? These 



176 NOTES. 

have some power, indeed, to prevail with the will, but thy business 
is with the understanding; it is changed neither by threats, nor flat- 
teries, nor allurements. These cannot cause that what formerly 
seemed true should now seem false, though the party may very 
much desire to change his judgment, which, if it seem a new and 
wonderful thing to thee, I shall not need many arguments to convince 
thee of the truth thereof. You suppose that a man may change his 
judgment when he will, without any new reason to persuade him to 
think otherwise. I deny that he can do so. Make you, therefore, an 
experiment upon yourself, and see if you can for the least space of 
time draw yourself to think otherwise than you do in the question 
between us, so as to make yourself believe as I do, c that a man 
cannot change his judgment when he pleases, 5 without question you 
shall find that you cannot do it. But take heed you mistake not an 
imagination for a persuasion, for nothing hinders but that thou 
mayest imagine that thou wilt. I pray thee likewise to consider 
again, that in case thou fear any thing, as for example, lest any 
business may not have a good issue, lest something should come to 
pass much against thy mind, so that thou canst not sleep for the 
trouble thereof, thou need but change thy opinion concerning such a 
thing, so as to hope that all will be well, and thy trouble shall be at 
an end. O most easie and ready medicine to take away the greatest 
part of that trouble of mind which men sustain in this life! short 
philosophy ! if whatsoever evil a man shall fear may betide him, he 
may believe (if he will) that it will not come to pass; whatsoever 
molests a man, because he takes it to be an evil, (when as oft times 
there is no evil in such a thing,) he may persuade himself when he 
pleases that it is not an evil. But experience show that none 
of these things can be.' — Safari's Stratagems, by Acontius or 
Aconzio, translated by John Goodwin, 1648. 

I am indebted for the above extract to the Monthly Repository, 
No. 188, page 458. 

Note B. Page 44. 

There are people in the world, and people even of intelligence, who 
are afraid of associating with others of opposite opinions to their 
own, or of reading books in which such opinions are maintained ; 
and they justify their fears by alleging, that they wish to avoid the 
contamination of their minds ; that no one can associate with free- 
thinkers without having his faith shaken, or with republicans with- 



NOTES. 177 

out some inroads on his veneration for monarchy. It is true enough, 
as we have had occasion to observe in the text, that our opinions are 
greatly influenced by our associates; but it is those opinions only 
which have been instilled into our minds without any examination on 
our part, or which have never assumed a distinct and definite form; 
which we have never analyzed, and which we cannot trace from any 
rational premises. Whatever therefore may be said in justification of 
. such fears on the part of the illiterate, no man who professes to 
think for himself, or to be an inquirer after truth, can consistently 
be afraid of any arguments, any opinions. To him they are subjects 
of examination, and he rejoices if he finds in them a new principle. 
They can come to form part of his own opinions only by their clear-' 
ness and cogency. Before any proposition can be received into his 
mind as true, it must appear to him logically deduced from undenia- 
ble premises. What is there, therefore, in any opinion, which can 
cause him a moment's alarm ? If it comes before him without 
proper evidence it makes no impression ; if it is supported by irresis- 
tible proof he has gained a new truth. What possible evil then can 
arise from subjecting his mind to the operation of any arguments' 
whatever ? 

It is different in the case of the imagination, or, in other words, 
with ideas connected by other than logical relations, with those mere 
conceptions which are continually rising in the mind. The evil of a 
false argument is not in its being perceived by the understanding, 
but in its being regarded as true : hence the perception of its fallacy 
annihilates its influence, and, however often it may occur to the 
recollection, it is perfectly harmless ; but in the case of horrid or 
disgusting images, it is the mere conception of them which consti- 
tutes the evil, and the most thorough insight into their character 
cannot remedy the mischief. 

Hence, while he who has formed his conclusions for himself, and 
clearly sees their dependance on indubitable evidence, is unaffected in 
his opinions amidst the thickest warfare of sophistry, and comes un- 
harmed out of the contest, a man of the most virtuous disposition 
and the purest intentions is at the mercy, as it regards his imagina- 
tion, of the ideas oftenest presented to him, and can hardly escape 
contamination from a frequent exhibition of such as are unseemly 
and improper. 

For these reasons, a man of thought, although he would forfeit the 
character of a philosopher, and deserve the pity if not the contempt 
N 12 



178 NOTES. 

of every inquirer after truth, by evincing the slightest fear of any 
arguments, by avoiding any book, lest it should produce a change in 
his opinions, would be perfectly justified in shunning such company or 
such writings as have a tendency to pervert the imagination. In the 
one case he can receive no impression which he can have any proper 
reason for avoiding; in the other he is exposed to disgusting or 
degrading images, which, when they have once become familiar, may 
intrude amidst the purest and most serious meditations. 

Note C. Page 50. 

I have left the foot-note to the text in this page exactly as it 
appeared in the first edition ; but it by no means solves the whole of 
the question, why we are apt to take greater offence at an endeavor 
to subvert part of our creed, than at an attempt to enlarge it by 
further additions. It must be partly accounted for by the fact, that 
our affections attach themselves to a doctrine as well as to any 
external object. If early and deeply fixed, a multitude of interest- 
ing associations naturally gather round it; it becomes endeared to U9 
by being connected with pleasurable circumstances, the rallying 
point of pleasant thoughts. We are alarmed and indignant, there- 
fore, at any design to shake its validity: the removal of it from our 
minds would be the destruction of a whole system of associations, 
and perhaps active habits, of which it is the nucleus or centre; the 
bare suggestion of its being erroneous infuses all the inquietude of 
doubt, and obstructs the course of our habitual thoughts and feelings, 
and our first impulse is to resent the attack. But it is obvious that 
a new article of faith, which suffers our old opinions to remain, and 
merely offers something additional to our thoughts, produces none of 
these effects. It overturns no superstructure of association ; it in- 
terposes no chasm in the regular track of our imagination, no sudden 
hiatus in the circle of our feelings, no doubts to impede our intellec- 
tual movements. It occasions therefore no alarm, and no resent- 
ment, no laceration of mind (to borrow an expression of Dr. John- 
son's), while it inspires that self-complacency attendant on a percep- 
tion of the superiority of our own views. 

In the Essay on the Influence of Reason on the Feelings, we have 
shown how liable the mind is, in certain circumstances, to the re- 
currence of these feelings, even in opposition to the convictions of the 
understanding. It seems to have been a similar view of the subject, 
arising probably from his own consciousness and experience (for we 



NOTES. 179 

all know how tenaciously his early prejudices clung to his mind), 
which led Dr. Johnson to maintain, in the passage which supplied 
the expression just quoted, that no reliance could be placed on a 
conversion from the Roman Catholic to the Protestant faith. 

'A man,' he observes, 'who is converted from Protestantism to 
Popery, may be sincere : he parts with nothing : he is only superad- 
ding to what he already had. But a convert from Popery to Pro- 
testantism gives up so much of what he has held as sacred as any 
thing that he retains, there is so much laceration of mind in such a 
conversion, that it can hardly be sincere and lasting.' 

We may trace to the same source, namely, to the pleasurable ideas 
and emotions which gather round a doctrine, those frequent decla- 
mations which we hear against cold reasoning and hard-hearted 
logic, and pathetic appeals to one part of our nature against the 
other. An original thinker, a reformer in moral science, will thus 
often appear a hard and insensible character. He goes beyond the 
feelings and associations of the age ; he leaves them behind him ; 
he shocks our old prejudices : it is reserved for a subsequent genera- 
tion, to whom his views have been unfolded from their infancy, and 
in whose minds all the interesting associations have collected round 
them, which formerly encircled the exploded opinions, to regard his 
discoveries with unmingled pleasure. Hence an author, who aspires 
after popularity, must not project his powers in advance of the age ; 
but throw them back amongst the recollections and associations of 
past times. 

Note D. Page 54. 

Many good men, who have wished to be liberal to such as differed 
from them in opinion, have perplexed themselves as to the extent to 
which their liberality should be carried. Some, with the inconclu- 
siveness of conscientious feeling, combined with feeble powers of 
logical deduction, have sagely inferred that it ought not to be car- 
ried too far, while others, in the true spirit of persecution, have 
denounced any indulgence to important differences as spurious libe- 
rality. 

The principles unfolded in the present work relieve us from all 
difficulty on this point. True liberality consists in not imputing to 
others any moral turpitude, because their opinions differ from our 
own. It does not consist in ostensibly yielding to the opinions of 
others ; in refraining from a rigorous examination of their soundness, 
or from detecting and exposing the fallacies which they involve ; but 



180 NOTES. 

in regarding those who hold them as free from consequent culpa- 
bility, and abstaining from casting upon them that moral odium, with 
which men have been ready in all ages to overwhelm such as devi- 
ated in the least from the miserable compound of truth and error, 
which they hugged to their own bosoms. 

NoteE. Page 62. 

It is not often that we can meet with any direct arguments against 
the utility of truth — at least in a quarter which entitles them to 
attention. The foMowing passage, therefore, from the Edinburgh 
Review may be considered of some value, as a specimen of what can 
be alleged against the doctrine. It shows the feebleness of acknow- 
ledged talent when engaged on the side of sophistry. 

The extract is from a Review of Belsham's Elements of the Phi- 
losophy of the Mind. 

1 Mr. Belsham has one short argument, that whatever is true 
cannot be hurtful. It is the motto of his title-page, and is after- 
wards repeated with equal emphasis, at every time of need. * If 
the doctrine be true,' he contends, * the diffusion of it can do no 
harm. It is an established and undeniable principle, that truth 
must be favorable to virtue.' To us, however, this principle, instead 
of being undeniable, has always appeared the most questionable of 
postulates. In the declamation of Cato, or the poetry of Akenside, 
we admit it with little scruple, because we do not read Plato or 
Akenside for the truths they may chance to contain ; but we always 
feel more than scepticism, when we are assailed by it in a treatise of 
pure philosophy : nor can we account for an almost universal assent 
it has received, from any other circumstance than the profession and 
habits of the first teachers of morals in our schools, and of the 
greater number of their successors. It was a maxim of religion, 
before it became a maxim of philosophy ; though, even as a religious 
maxim, it formed a very inconsistent part of the optimism in which 
it was combined. The Deity wills happiness j he loves truth : truth 
therefore must be productive of good. Such is the reasoning of 
the optimist. But he forgets, that, in his system, error too must 
have been beneficial, because error has been ; and that the employ- 
ment of falsehood for the production of good cannot be more un- 
worthy of the Divine Being, than the acknowledged employment of 
rapine and murder for the same purpose. There is, therefore, 
nothing in the abstract consideration of truth and Deity, which jus- 



NOTES. 181 

tifies the adoption of such a maxim ; and as little is it justified by 
our practical experience. In the small events of that familiar and 
hourly intercourse, which forms almost the whole of human life, 
how much is happiness increased by the general adoption of a system 
of concerted and limited deceit ; for it is either in that actual false- 
hood, which must, as falsehood, be productive of evil, or in the sup- 
pression of that truth, which, as truth, must have been productive 
of good, that the chief happiness of civilized manners consists ; and 
he from whose doctrine it flows, that we are to be in no case hypo- 
crites, would, in mere manners, reduce us to a degree of barbarism 
beyond that of the rudest savage, who, in the simple hospitalities of 
his hut, or the ceremonial of the public assemblies of his tribe, has 
still some courtesies, which he fulfils with all the exactness of polite 
dissimulation. In the greater events of life, how often might the 
advantage of erroneous belief be felt ! If, for example, it were a 
superstition of every mind, that the murderer, immediately on the 
perpetration of his guilt, must himself expire by sympathy, a new 
motive would be added to the side of virtue ; and the only circum- 
stance to be regretted would be, not that the falsehood would produce 
effect, since that effect would be only serviceable, but that perhaps 
the good effect would not be of long duration, as it would be de- 
stroyed for ever by the rashness of the first daring experimenter. 
The visitation of the murderer by the nightly ghost, which exists in 
the superstition of so many countries, and which forms a great part 
of that complex and unanalyzed horror with which the crime con- 
tinues to be considered after the belief of the superstition itself has 
ceased, has probably been of more service to mankind than the 
1 truths of all the sermons, that have been preached on the corres- 
ponding prohibition in the Decalogue. It is unfortunate, that with 
this beneficial awe unnecessary horrors have been connected ; for the 
place continues to be haunted, as well as the person ; and the dread 
of our infancy is thus directed, rather to the supernatural appear- 
ance than to the crime. But if superstition could exist, and be 
modified, at the will of an enlightened legislator, so as to be deprived 
of its terrors to the innocent, and turned wholly against the guilty, 
we know no principle of our nature on which it would be so much 
for the interest of mankind to operate. It would be a species of 
prohibitive religion, more impressive, at the moment of beginning 
crime, than religion itself ; because its penalties would be more con- 
ceivable and immediate. Innumerable cases may be imagined, in 



182 NOTES. 

which other errors of belief would be of moral advantage ; and we 
may therefore assume, as established and undeniable, that there is 
nothing in the nature of truth which makes it necessarily good ; 
that in the greater number of instances, truth is beneficial ; but 
that, of the whole number of truths and falsehoods, a certain num- 
ber are productive of good, and others of evil. To which number 
any particular truth or falsehood belongs, must be shown, in the 
usual way, by reasonings of direct experience or analogy ; and 
hence, in a question of utility, the demonstration of mere logical 
truth cannot justly be adduced as superseding the necessity of other 
inquiries. Even though the contrary of that postulate, which Mr. 
Belsham has assumed, could not have been shown from other cases, 
it would not therefore have been applicable, without proof, to the 
great questions which he discusses ; for these questions comprehend 
all the truths* that are of most importance in human life, which are 
thus the very truths from which the justness af the assumed prin- 
ciple is most fully to be demonstrated or denied.' 

It may be remarked in the first place, that this argument begins 
by confounding two essentially different things, the veracity of men 
and the knowledge of truth. The advantages of a system of con- 
ventional simulation and dissimulation we may pass over with the 
remark, that if it is really beneficial to society, it is so exactly in 
proportion as its character is accurately appreciated by those en- 
gaged in it. Where it is perfectly well understood, as it generally 
is, it does the least harm, and produces the most benefit. If any 
individual is deceived by it, if he misconstrues the current profes- 
sions of social intercourse in their literal sense, he usually suffers for 
his error, which proves, that, even in this case, a knowledge of the 
truth is a necessary protection against evil. 

Dismissing, however, the consideration of veracity, let us proceed 
to the real question, whether truth is beneficial, and examine the 
arguments adduced in support of the negative. 

The writer of the passage appears from first to last to proceed on 
the principle, that the true consequences of evil actions are not the 
most efficacious motives to deter men from committing those actions, 
but that it is useful for them to apprehend other and more alarming 
results, consequences of greater magnitude, capable of producing 
more vivid impressions on the imagination : that since mankind do 
not always act from a conviction of what is best, but from the pre- 
dominant appetite or passion of the moment, it is expedient to call 



NOTES. 183 

in the aid of some counter passion, founded on false views, whose 
influence shall operate in the direction which the most enlightened 
judgment would point out. The first thing which strikes the mind 
in this view of the matter, is the needlessness of any extraneous 
motives in cases which have an abundant supply within themselves. 
If human actions are morally bad only in proportion as they are 
pernicious to society, and to the agent himself, a perfect knowledge 
of their consequences seems to be all that is requisite to deter him 
from them; and to excite a dread of something more terrible would 
be a superfluous and wanton pressure on the feelings. We may 
admit, nevertheless, for our present purpose, that any groundless 
fears, which served to corroborate the effect of just apprehensions 
would be so far useful ; but whether they were absolutely beneficial 
would obviously depend on their not being necessarily accompanied 
by circumstances of an opposite character, and of greater moment. 
That they would be inevitably attended by circumstances of this 
latter description, both in the instances supposed by the writer 
before us and in every consistently imaginable instance, I shall en- 
deavor to show as succinctly as the subject permits. 

An apprehension of false consequences must evidently be founded 
on an incorrect knowledge of facts, or on wrong inferences from 
facts accurately ascertained. In either case the existence of the 
error implies a state of ignorance, and, if it regards actions impor- 
tant to mankind, ignorance of a deep and dangerous character. 

Let us take, for instance, the first case imagined by the critic ; 
let us suppose the universal prevalence of the belief, that a murderer 
would expire by sympathy immediately on the commission of the 
crime. The mass of moral and physical ignorance and misconcep- 
tion which must exist to support a belief of this nature in any 
society, cannot fail to rise before the understanding of every one 
who reflects a moment on the subject. It is not to be supposed that 
mankind could be involved in so gross an error, while they were in 
other respects at all enlightened. On the contrary, its prevalence 
would imply a total ignorance of the laws of animal life, of the phe- 
nomena of the human mind, of the rules of evidence, and the prin- 
ciples of reasoning, a blindness in the human race to every thing 
within and without them. These would be necessary conditions for 
the bare existence of so absurd a doctrine j they would be essential to 
its support, and would give birth to a multitude of evils infinitely 
greater than any which it would prevent. Although no clandestine 



184 NOTES. 

assassinations might be committed, a thousand public butcheries 
would probably take place, executions for witchcraft, human sacri- 
fices, self-immolations, legal murders for heresy and dissent. The 
mischief would be without assignable limits. Laws restrictive of 
innocent or beneficial actions, gloomy superstitions, absurd cus- 
toms, fanatical rites, wars of vengeance, slavery scarcely conscious 
of its own baseness, some or all of these would be the inevitable ac- 
companiments, sooner or later, of such an erroneous belief. Even 
supposing the delusion to exist amongst a gentle and harmless race, 
who were free from the grossest of the evils here enumerated, such a 
state of society could never be secure from them. There is no bar- 
rier against the irruption of the evils of ignorance but true knowl- 
edge. Hence the peaceable, the almost happy condition in which 
uncivilized nations may occasionally be found, is a state of fragile 
tranquillity, liable to be crushed from without or shattered from 
within by those spontaneous ebullitions of caprice and enthusiasm, 
against which the human mind has no security but in the full light 
of science and reason. What principles, amidst such ignorance, 
could prove a defence against any absurdity which a man of cunning 
and audacity might find his advantage in maintaining ? At the 
mercy of impostors and fanatics, or of that mongrel race which 
partakes of the complexion of both,* such a society would be in 
continual danger of an intestine ferment, which (if I may borrow an 
image from an exploded doctrine) might at any time burst out into 
the equivocal generation of vice and misery. 

This writer must have had strange views of the nature of the 
human mind, and have made little use of the lessons to be gathered 
from the history of the race, to suppose, what is necessarily implied 
in his arguments, that a gross error could exist independent and 
insulated, deprived of all its pernicious relations and accompani- 
ments, stripped of its power in every way, except in that particular 
direction which he has chosen to imagine. 

He seems to have fallen into the common practice of looking only 
at a single direct and immediate consequence of the error, uncon- 
scious of the necessity of expanding his view over the whole circle 
of its influence and connections. A single appeal to our own consci- 
ousness, a single glance at our fellow-men, suffices to show that one 
doctrine is necessarily connected with other doctrines ; that when 
one truth is established, other dependent truths, spring up around 

* l Fingunt, simul creduntque.' — Tacitus. 



NOTES. 185 

it ; that for any given error to prevail, a number of other errors 
must prevail at the same time. This is the reason universally ap- 
plicable why error, taking in the whole of its concomitants and 
consequences, never can be beneficial. It never can have a prepon- 
derance of good effects, because its existence implies related, collate- 
ral, co-ordinate errors, and is incompatible with that completeness 
of knowledge and perfection of reason, which are indispensable to 
the highest degree of human happiness. 

The other hypothetical case adduced is exposed to the same argu- 
ments. Assuming that a belief in apparitions really operates to 
prevent murders, we have on the one hand a good attained, and on 
the other we have, as in the former case, all the error and igno- 
rance which such a belief implies, with their incalculable train of 
pernicious consequences, which it is unnecessary to recapitulate. 
The argument is already abundantly conclusive. If a false appre- 
hension of consequences in these important cases would be accom- 
panied by the evils which we have endeavored to show would be 
inseparable from it, the assistance which it might furnish in deter- 
ring from crime would be a subordinate consideration. But it is by 
no means evident that it would lend any assistance worth regarding. 
The whole good accomplished is not to be placed to the account of 
the error ; it is only the superiority of its efficacy in deterring from 
the crime, over the salutary influence of those other circumstances 
which would operate in the same direction, if such a belief did not 
exist. The natural horror at taking the life of a fellow-creature, 
the infamy of detection, the vengeance of society, and the other 
necessary or probable consequences of the deed, would still be left 
to produce their effect ; and it would be difficult to show, that the 
addition of an absurd belief would materially enhance the motives 
to abstain from this consummation of wickedness. It may be even 
questioned whether the power of the motives would not be impaired, 
when it is considered that such a belief would be incompatible with 
that clear view of all the real consequences of the crime which an 
enlightened mind can alone fully possess, and which, except under 
the despotism of some passion that puts all consequences out of 
sight, would be sufficient to save any individual from a deed so ir- 
reparably destructive of his own happiness. We must recollect, too, 
that it is one of the beneficial effects of a clear and correct view of 
the consequences of actions to dispossess passion of this power, and 
that the tempest which obscures the intellectual vision is most likely 



186 NOTES. 

to arise, and produce its melancholy results, in a mind already 
clouded by error and ignorance. 

To all these considerations it may be added, that a morality found- 
ed on the exhibition of false consequences to the imagination is 
insecure and unstable. The delusion is constantly open to suspicion 
and exposure. The imputed consequences are often obscurely felt, 
if not clearly seen, to be fictitious, and a degree of practical scep- 
ticism is induced, which destroys their influence on the conduct 
without replacing it by motives of a higher, because of a more 
rational character. 

On the whole, the philosophy of the critic reminds one strongly 
of the profound policy of those mothers, who raise up dark and dis- 
mal images of dustmen, beggars, chimney-sweeps, and other nursery 
bugbears, to enforce their authority over unmanageable children; 
nor is the one entitled to less credit and clemency than the other. 
To the principles of the philosopher and the conduct of the parent 
an equal tribute of admiration is due, and the errors which the 
former commends in theory are just as well adapted to raise man- 
kind to the dignity and happiness of rational beings, as those which 
the latter reduces into practice. 

After this general view of the subject, which is sufficient to ex- 
pose the futility of these and all similar objections to the doctrine 
which teaches the necessary perniciousness of error, it is scarcely 
perhaps worth while to descend to a minuter scrutiny of the logical 
blunder committed by the critic in his elaborate eulogium on the 
hypothetical utility of spectres. I have regarded rather the general 
scope of his reasoning, than the form into which he has put it. Yet, 
it is too curious an instance of the slips of sophistry to be entirely 
passed over. 'If, 5 says he, ( superstition could exist, and be modi- 
fied, at the will of an enlightened legislator, so as to be deprived of 
its terrors to the innocent, and turned wholly against the guilty, we 
know no principle of our nature, on which it would be so much for 
the interest of mankind to operate.' He then proceeds to draw the 
conclusion, that therefore error is not necessarily injurious, * that 
there is nothing in the nature of truth which makes it necessarily 
good.' This is surely one of the strangest pieces of reasoning ever 
hazarded. Had the critic alleged, that superstition could be modi- 
fied at the will of an enlightened legislator, and rendered service- 
able to mankind, then, however the proposition might be disputed, 
there would have been some coherence of argument in proceeding to 



NOTES. 187 

Bay, that therefore it is not necessarily hurtful, but to say that if it 
could be so modified it would be highly beneficial, and that therefore 
it is not necessarily injurious, is a perfect instance of inconsequen- 
tial reasoning. From merely conditional or hypothetical premises, 
he has drawn a positive and absolute conclusion. It is as if any 
one should contend, that arsenic is not necessarily poisonous j be- 
cause, if it could be received into the stomach without injury it 
would not be destructive of life. In a word, the writer does not 
say, that if A were equal to B and B equal to C, then A and C 
would be equal ; but in utter defiance of rules of logic and forms of 
reasoning, if A were equal to B and B to C, therefore A and C are 
equal. 

He has, it is true, interposed another sentence between the prem- 
ises and the conclusion, which we have here brought together, and 
it may perhaps be imagined, that the inference deduced was meant 
to be drawn from this intermediate proposition. To suppose this, 
however, would be to presume that the author had taken the trou- 
ble of inventing instances, and had then dismissed them without 
applying them to the purpose for which he had tasked his invention. 
If this indeed were true, if the sentence in question, namely c innu- 
merable cases may be imagined in which other errors of belief may 
be of moral advantage,' were to be considered as the proposition on 
which the conclusion depends, the formal logical absurdity would 
certainly be got quit of, but only to be replaced by a substantial 
error equally glaring. The argument would then amount to this, 
that if we can imagine a thing to exist without its essential proper- 
ties, it is a proof that they are not essential ; a principle which car- 
ries its own refutation along with it. We have already seen what, 
in the case of error, these essential properties are. It was the prov- 
ince of the critic to show, either by reasoning from admitted prin- 
ciples or by the induction of facts, that properties of this kind are 
not necessarily connected with it, and not to content himself with 
asserting that they might be separated in imagination. Error may 
certainly be imagined in one sense to prevail without attendant evil, 
just as lead may be conceived to float in water ; but what should we 
say to the natural philosopher, who contended that the metal is not 
necessarily the heavier substance, because we may imagine it to pos- 
sess buoyancy when placed in the liquid ? 

Perhaps more than enough has been said in reply to this vindica 
tion of error, but the principle involved so well deserves a complete 



188 NOTES. 

elucidation, that the prolixity of the present note "will be excused. 
From the internal evidence afforded by the style and matter of the 
article in the Edinburgh Review, from which the passage here com- 
mented on is extracted, one would suspect it to have proceeded from 
the pen of the late Dr. Thomas Brown. If so, he lived to outgrow 
such philosophy, 'for passages of an opposite tendency might easily 
be quoted from his subsequent writings. Here, it is evident he was 
only- trying his wings, and he seems to have been more ambitious to 
display the brilliancy of the plumage than to prove the strength of 
the pinions ; more intent on showing the grace and agility of his 
evolutions than the boldness and precision of his flight. 

Note F. Fage 75. 

It is an interesting inquiry, what are those circumstances which 
form the best external criterion of the truth of a doctrine, or under 
which there is the greatest probability of its being true ? 

In answer to this question, I think it may be said, that we have 
the best test of the truth of any doctrine, the greatest possible 
assurance which external circumstances can give, when it is univer- 
sally believed amidst the fullest liberty of scrutinizing its pretensions. 
If both these circumstances do not concur, the doctrine may be pro- 
nounced doubtful. The universal belief of a doctrine is no argu- 
ment for its truth, if dissent and controversy are prohibited. And 
on the other hand, if a doctrine is believed by only a part of those 
Who have examined it, although the fullest freedom of inquiry pre- 
vails, it may be considered as not grounded on satisfactor}^ evidence ; 
or at least that the evidence in favor of it has not been hitherto 
exhibited in all its force. If this is true, it necessarily follows, that 
to protect a doctrine from examination, is to exclude that combina- 
tion of circumstances which constitutes the best external evidence, 
and gives us the greatest possible assurance of its validity. 

Note G. Fage 75. 
A very opposite confirmation of this remark may be found in the 
following letter from Dr. Reid to Dr. Gregory : ' It would be want 
of candor not to own, that I think there is some merit in what you 
are pleased to call my philosophy ; but I think it lies chiefly in hav- 
ing called in question the common theory of ideas or images of things 
in the mind, being the only objects of thought; a theory founded on 
natural prejudices, and so universally received as to be interwoven 



NOTES. 189 

with the structure of language. Yet were I to give you a detail of 
what led me to call in question this theory, after I had long held it 
as self-evident and unquestionable, you would think, as I do, that 
there was much of chance in the matter. The discovery was the 
birth of time, not of genius ; and Berkeley and Hume did more to 
bring it to light than the man that hit upon it. I think there is 
hardly any thing that can be called mine in the philosophy of the 
mind, which does not follow with ease from the detection of this pre- 
judice. 

8 1 must, therefore, beg of you most earnestly to make no contrast 
in my favor to the disparagement of my predecessors in the same 
pursuit. I can truly say of them, and shall always avow, what you, 
are pleased to say of me, that but for the assistance 1 have received 
from their writings I never could have wrote or thought what I have 
done.' — Life of Dr. Reid> by Dugald Stewart, page 122. 

Note H. Page 78. 

It may perhaps be argued, that although a man might be pre- 
sumptuous in maintaining that he himself was infallible in his opin- 
ions, or in setting up his own belief as a criterion of truth, yet he 
may without such presumption, nay even with great modesty and 
diffidence in his own faculties, repose implicit confidence in the infal- 
libility of another, and act upon it accordingly. ' But on strict ex- 
amination it will be found, that he who acts on the infallibility of 
another, proceeds also on the assumption of his own infallibility ; for 
the conclusion that the other party is infallible is necessarily the 
judgment of his own understanding, and it is therefore, at the bot- 
tom, on the judgment of his own understanding that he acts. 

Whether we assert a doctrine to be true from our own views of it, 
or whether we assert the opinions of others concerning it to be cor- 
rect, we are equally laying down a judgment of our own ; a judg- 
ment, in the one case directly on a doctrine, in the other case on the 
correctness of other people's views, but in both cases equally a con- 
clusion of our own minds : and if we at any time act on the assump- 
tion, that such a conclusion cannot possibly be wrong, we take for 
granted our own infallibility. 

A similar position, namely, that whoever maintains the infallibili- 
ty of another person, does in reality maintain the same of himself, 
is thus illustrated in a letter from the eccentric author of Sandford 
and Merton. 



190 NOTES. 

« I cannot help/ says he, * digressing here to propose a curious 
argument, derived from this principle, against the church of Rome ; 
"which I do not remember to have seen. He that asserts the infalli- 
bility of another, must also assert his own ; otherwise he may be de- 
ceived in the judgment he makes of that infallibility, as well as in 
any other judgment. But if he allow that all his own judgments 
are fallible, and may be erroneous, then his particular opinion of 
the infallibility may be erroneous too, unless he can show a particu- 
lar reason for the exception. In this manner it may be shown, that 
the real confidence every man has in his own judgment is much the 
same, since it must always precede his having a confidence in any 
one else.' * 

Thus no one can escape from the necessity of ultimately relying 
and acting on his own judgment. Even in the case of that appar- 
ently utter prostration of mind, in which a man regards a fellow- 
creature, or a number of fellow-creatures, as above the reach of 
error, it is still the same. Such a state of mind implies a greater 
degree of rashness and presumption than is generally imagined ; for 
what an extensive comprehension of human nature, and the affairs 
of the world, and the relations of man to all around him, would be 
necessary before even the grounds of such an opinion could be 
brought together ! 

Note I. Page 89. 

It must be observed, that we are treating the matter as a question 
of policy, not of morality, that is, we are inquiring whether it is 
expedient to allow an unlimited freedom of publication, not under 
what circumstances men are justified in availing themselves of that 
liberty. On the latter point, however, we may be here permitted to 
offer two remarks. 

1. It is a consequence of the principles in the text, that he who 
publishes his opinions, however erroneous they may ultimately prove 
to be, is conferring, as far as it is in his power, a benefit on society, 
provided he communicates them in a proper manner. There is as 
much merit in the publication of an opinion which is false, as in that 
of an opinion which is true, other circumstances being the same, 
and the publisher in each instance having the same conviction that 
he is promulgating truth. 

* Letter from Mr. Day, in Memoirs of R. L. Edgeworth, vol. ii. p. 89. 



NOTES, 191. 

2. It is also a remark of some importance, that in the expression 
and publication of opinions, the opinions themselves are not the only 
things manifested. Various moral as well as intellectual qualities 
are displayed. Truth itself may be urged in rude and indecorous 
language, with base and malevolent feelings. Such manifestations 
of bad passions are of course worthy of moral reprehension, in what- 
ever cause they are employed. Whether they appear in connection 
with true or false doctrines, is a circumstance perfectly immaterial, 
and which can^ neither extenuate nor aggravate their culpability. 
The morality of the press is a subject worthy of some able pen. The 
public sentiment wants rousing and directing against a variety of 
acts, which although viewed with apathy when committed through < 
the medium of the press, would not be a moment tolerated in private 
society. 

Note K. Page 95. 

The principles developed and established in the two preceding 
essays form the proper basis of that liberty, which has passed under 
the several names of toleration, religious liberty, and liberty of con- 
science ) the liberty of worshipping God in the way which approves 
itself to the judgment of each individual, without incurring any 
pain, loss, or disability. 

The grounds for interfering with this liberty may be supposed of 
several kinds : first, to protect the honor of God ; secondly, to punish 
erroneous opinions ) thirdly, to prevent those opinions from spread- 
ing. 

The first object is evidently not proper for human interference. 
The very supposition of our ability to accomplish it, involves a 
similar error to that of the anthropomorphites, a reduction of the 
Deity to the nature and constitution of man. But if it were a 
proper object, who shall judge between two individuals, or two sects, 
which has adopted the form of worship, and the doctrines most 
agreeable to the dignity of the Eternal Being ? Or again, if one 
body of men could infallibly know that they were in the right, how 
could they possibly do honor to God, or protect him from dishonor, 
by forcing upon their fellow-creatures a form and manner of worship 
which they could not conscientiously adopt, or even by suppressing 
creeds and observances of an erroneous nature ? To attempt the 
former would be proceeding on one of the most monstrous supposi- 
tions, which ever entered into the human imagination, that the 
Supreme Being could be pleased with hypocrisy and insincerity; nor 



192 NOTES. 

would it be much more rational to endeavor to effect the latter. If 
a man entertains any doctrine derogatory to the character of the 
Deity, the only way to remove it from his creed is to address our- 
selves to his understanding. To forbid the expression of that doc- 
trine, as it cannot extirpate it from the mind, is doing God no 
honor, for in what possible way can the expression of a thought 
derogatory to his character dishonor him more than the thought 
itself? In every view, then, the object of protecting the honor of 
the Deity should have no place in human regulations. It is far 
beyond their reach, and ought to be sacred from their presumption. 

With regard to the second object, the punishment of erroneous 
opinions, its absurdity has been sufficiently exposed. It would be 
the punishment of innocence for no possible good. The only object 
of restrictions on the liberty of worship, that can be maintained with 
a show of reason, is the third. This liberty can come under .the 
cognizance of the legislator only as a mode of propagating opinions. 
The manner in which a man worships God, provided it involves no 
breach of moral duty, cannot affect the community in any other 
way; and all the arguments which have been adduced, in favor of 
perfect freedom of public discussion, are of equal force in favor of 
perfect freedom of worship. But there are some peculiar evils 
attending restrictions on the latter. A person may entertain an 
opinion, and yet not feel under any conscientious obligation to 
express it; but he who thinks a certain form of worship right, feels 
an obligation to adopt it. Restraint, therefore, even were it sub- 
mitted to, would produce much secret misery. But in general it 
would not be submitted to. In the mind of such a one, there would 
be what he considered as his duty to God opposed to his duty to men, 
and he must of course prefer the former, or be degraded in his 
moral feelings. Either way the community must suffer : it must 
be either disturbed by the resistance of some of its members to the 
authority of the state, and the consequent excitation of a thousand 
malignant passions, or injured by destroying their moral integrity, 
by hardening the conscience and debasing the character. 

And what, after all, would be attained by these imbecile restric- 
tions ? The only thing which they could accomplish, if they 
were attended by perfect success, would be uniformity of worship 
and profession. But this might be either a good or an evil. A 
uniformity in religious observances, forms and doctrines, which wer^ 
in all respects true and proper, and in the adoption and profession. 



NOTES. 193 

of which every individual was sincere, would be a good ; but a 
uniformity in those which were not in all respects true and proper, 
and in the adoption and profession of which many of the community 
would be acting a feigned part, is the only uniformity which re- 
straints, could secure, and that would be an evil. It would be far 
better to have a variety than a sameness of error, because there 
would be a better prospect of attaining truth by the collision of 
opinions ; and that it would be infinitely preferable to have a va- 
riety of professions according to actual belief, than a uniformity of 
professions not sincere, it would be an insult to any mind of common 
moral feeling to attempt to prove. 

The true grounds, the grand principles of toleration, or (to avoid > 
a term which men ought never to have been under the necessity of 
employing) of religious liberty and liberty of conscience, are thus 
the principles which it was the object of the two preceding essays to 
establish — that opinions are involuntary, and involve no merit or 
demerit, and that the free publication of opinions is beneficial to 
society, because it is the means of arriving at truth. They are 
both founded on the unalterable nature of the human mind, and 
are sure, sooner or later, to be universally recognised and applied. 

Under the general prevalence of these truths, society would soon 
present a different aspect. Every species of intolerance would 
vanish ; because, how much soever it might be the interest of men 
to suppress opinions contrary to their own, there would be no 
longer any pretext for compulsion or oppression. Difference of 
sentiment would no longer engender the same degree of passion and 
ill-will. The irritation, virulence, and invective of controversy 
would be in a great measure sobered down into cool argumentation. 
The intercourse of private life would cease to be embittered by the 
odium of heterodoxy, and all the benevolent affections would have 
more room for expansion. Men would discover, that although their 
neighbors differed in opinion from themselves, they might possess 
equal moral worth, and equal claims to affection and esteem. 

A difference in civil privileges, that eternal source of discontent 
and disorder, that canker in the happiness of society, which can be 
cured only by being exterminated, would be swept away, and in a 
few years a wonder would arise that rational beings could have been 
inveigled into its support. 

Another important consequence would be, a more general union 
of mankind in the pursuit of truth. Since errors would no longer 
13 



194 NOTES. 

be regarded as involving moral turpitude, every effort to obtain the 
grand object in view, however unsuccessful, would be received with 
indulgence, if not applause. There would be more exertion, because 
there would be more encouragement. If moral science has already 
gradually advanced, shackled as it has been by inveterate prejudices, 
what would be the rapidity of its march under a system, which, far 
from opposing obstacles, presented facilities to its progress. 

Note L. Page 111. 

The following is a singularly apposite illustration of the remarks 
in the text. 

* The Emperors of China, her statesmen, her merchants, her peo- 
ple, and her Philosophers also, are all idolaters. For though many 
of the learned affect to despise the popular superstitions, and to 
deride all worship, except that paid to the great and visible objects 
of nature, heaven and the earth ; yet their own system is incapable of 
raising them above that which they affect to contemn ; and at the 
hour of death, finding that some god is necessary, and not knowing 
the true God, they send for the priests of false gods, to pray for their 
restoration to health, and for the rest of their spirits after disso- 
lution, and a happy return to the world again. It is remarkable, 
that the Yu-Keaou 9 or sect of the learned, though in health they 
laugh at the fooleries of the more idolatrous sects ; yet generally 
in sickness, in the prospect of death, and at funerals, employ the 
Ho-Chang and Tau-sze, to offer masses ; recite the king (standard 
books, of a religious and moral kind, thus denominated ;) write 
charms ; ring bells j chaunt prayers ; and entreat the gods. Ad- 
mitting the influence which universal custom has over them in these 
things, we may, perhaps, also conclude, that they feel their own 
system uncomfortable to die with. In that awful hour, when ■ heart 
and flesh fail, 5 human beings generally feel the necessity of resort- 
ing to some system, either true or false, which professes to afford any 
hope of escaping or mitigating those evils, which a consciousness of 
sin compels them to fear, and of attaining that happiness, the desire 
of which is identified with our nature.' — A Retrospect of the First 
Ten Years of the Protestant Mission to China } by William Milne, 
p. 29-31. 



ESSAY 



ON 



THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH, 



IN REFERENCE CHIEFLY TO 



THE DUTIES CONNECTED WITH IT. 



PREFACE 



TO THE SECOND EDITION. 



The volume in which the two following Essays first 
appeared, in the year 1829, was on the whole favorably 
received ; so much so, at least, as to be out of print in 
two or three years. The author has since been repeat- 
edly urged, in various quarters, by strangers as well as 
friends, to publish another edition ; a step which he has 
hitherto declined, partly on account of the tardy and 
limited encouragement extended to such works, but 
chiefly because he was dissatisfied with his principal 
Essay, as a less adequate view of the subject than he was 
capable of presenting, and he did not wish it to re-appear 
without such a complete revision as other studies pre- 
vented him for a season from bestowing upon it. 

Within the last year, however, he has had an opportu- 
nity of performing this task. He has enlarged the Essay 
by additional considerations and arguments, and thrown 
the whole into a more systematic form, so as to be less 
unworthy, he trusts, of the great questions which it ven- 
tures to discuss. 

In the second Essay, which is of inferior importance, 
he has not found it requisite to make any other alteration 
or addition worth notice than appending to it a few Notes. 



198 PREFACE. 

Besides these two Essays, the original volume con- 
tained another, i On the Fundamental Principle of all 
Evidence and Expectation,' not here reprinted. The 
reasons for the omission are, that it is a Treatise calcula- 
ted for a different class of readers ; and, more especially, 
that the author has not at present either the leisure or the 
inclination to give it that deliberate revisal which he 
conceives it to require. He may probably publish it 
hereafter, in an improved and expanded form, either alone 
or in company with other treatises more congruous with it 
in character than the two Essays which this brief expla- 
nation is intended to introduce. 

January 29, 1814. 



PREFACE 

TO THE FIRST EDITION. 

Few words will be necessary in introducing the present 
Volume to the Public. 

Some of those who did the Author the honor of pro- 
nouncing a favorable judgment upon a former Essay of 
his on the Formation of Opinions, expressed at the same 
time a regret that he had passed too lightly over one very 
important part of the subject; namely, the conduct of 
men in the application of their means and faculties to the 
investigation of truth. While he had explained more or 
less to their satisfaction in what manner the mind is 
affected by the circustances in which it is placed, and 
the inevitable determination of its views by the evidence 
presented to it, they thought that he had indicated in too 
cursory a way the duties of mankind in the collection and 
examination of that evidence, the effect of which, when 
once brought before the understanding, is so completely 
uncontrollable by the will. 

In consequence of these suggestions, he applied himself 
to the subject, and produced the treatise on the Pursuit of 
Truth, which stands first in the volume, and which he 
presents to those who took an interest in his former 
Essay, in the hope that it may prove a not unacceptable 
companion to it. 



200 PREFACE. 

Ill respect to the second Essay, he has only to offer a 
remark on its external appearance. It is, as the reader 
will observe, in Dialogue, a form not very frequently used 
by modern writers in the exposition of philosophical 
views, and adopted on the present occasion rather by way 
of experiment than from any opinion of its preferable- 
ness. After considering what has been said by Hurd and 
others on the employment of real or rictictious, ancient 
or modern names, he has preferred designating his speak- 
ers by simple letters, as being less repulsive to the taste 
than any other expedient, except that of using the names 
of eminent characters of past days, which he was pre- 
cluded from adopting, because the opinions expressed in 
these conversations have reference to the actual times in 
which we live. This is a point after all of little impor- 
tance in philosophical discussions, since the parts of the 
dialogue assigned to the different speakers are intended to 
exhibit opinions rather than character, and may be con- 
sidered as only embodying in language the various views 
which successively present themselves to the same mind 
in reflecting on the subject selected. 

The third Essay* embraces topics which the Author 
can scarcely hope will attract attention, except from that 
small number of intellectual men who have turned their 
thoughts to the consideration of the foundations of human 
knowledge, a subject included along with many others of 
vital, although unapprecciated importance to Society, 
under the repulsive appellation of metaphysics. By these 
few, however, he ventures to hope that the treatise will be 
found of some interest, if not from the absolute originali- 

* This Essay is omitted in the present edition as already stated in 
the new Preface, but the author did not conceive it needful to sup- 
press this short notice of it. 



PREFACE. 201 

ty of its views (on which it is not for him to pronounce), 
yet from the novelty and regularity of the order in which 
they are exhibited. 

With regard to the whole of the Essays, he may ven- 
ture to offer them to the Public, and particularly to the 
friends who have expressed so indulgent an opinion of his 
former volumes, as the result of long continued, if not 
always successful reflection. The greater part of the 
volume indeed was written out for the press four or five 
years ago, since which it has had the benefit of repeated t 
scrunity and revision. He mentions these circumstances, 
not to disarm criticism or to preclude animadversion, but , 
as establishing a title to a careful and candid examination 
from his readers, especially from those who may see 
reason to differ from the conclusions at which he has 
arrived. 

March, 1829. 



ESSAY 

ON 

THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH, 



IN REFERENCE CHIEFLY TO 



THE DUTIES CONNECTED WITH IT. 



CHAPTER I. 



IMPORTANCE OF TRUTH, AND OF OUR MORAL SENTIMENTS 
IN RELATION TO THE PURSUIT OF IT. 

Truth, by which term is implied accuracy of know- 
ledge and of inference, is necessarily conducive to the 
happiness of the human race. This is an assertion scarce- 
ly requiring in the present day to be either enforced or 
illustrated. That mankind are deeply concerned, not only 
in clearly understanding the properties of the material 
world, and of their own physical constitution, but in an 
accurate acquaintance with the operations of the human 
mind, the consequences of human actions, the results of 
social regulations, the effects of political institutions, the 
relations in which they themselves stand to other beings, 
and their real position in the universe, is a proposition so 
undeniable, when clearly expressed, as barely to escape 
the character of a truism. 

The transcendent importance of this fulness and accu- 
racy of knowledge is attested by the sad tale of error and 



204 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

suffering presented to the eye in every page of history. 
What possible problem can mankind have to solve in their 
mutual intercourse but one ? What is it, but to make them- 
selves conjointly as happy, and, for that purpose, as noble- 
minded and virtuous as they can, during the short term of 
their mortal existence ? And how have they hitherto solved 
this problem ? In what numerous ways have they not 
proved themselves totally blind to their real interests, per- 
verted their capabilities, wasted their resources, exaspe- 
rated the unavoidable evils of their condition, and inflicted 
gratuitous wretchedness on each other and on themselves ? 
It is clear that men can have no interest in suffering, no 
taste for misery, no preference for unhappiness in itself; 
and wherever they are found in a regular and systematic 
career after it, they must be laboring under an impression 
that they are in pursuit of a different object. It is error, 
therefore, it is ignorance, it is illusion, it is an incapacity 
on their part to see the real consequences of actions, the 
real issues of events, that gives rise to all those evils 
which desolate the world, except such as can be traced to 
irresistible impulse or to the physical circumstances of 
man's nature and condition.* c Error is the universal 
cause of the misery of mankind,' are the first words of a 
distinguished philosopher,! in his treatise on the Search 
after Truth ; and they are scarcely too unmeasured. 

The various modes in which this consummation is 
effected meet us every where. In the rapid glance we 
are now taking we can hardly pause for particular illus- 
trations ; but perhaps a few instances may indicate the 

* For a more extended discussion of the utility of truth and the 
mischievousness of error, the author would beg to refer to a former 
•work of his, viz. ( Essays on the Formation and Publication of 
Opinions.' 

f Malebranche. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 205 

nature of the evil in less compass, and with far greater 
suggestive power, than any general description. We are 
-told by a high authority that amongst the superstitions of 
the Shetlanders, one is, or was, that he who saves a 
drowning man will receive at his hands some deep wrong 
or injury,* — a prejudice manifestly fatal to one of the 
noblest and most universal impulses of the human heart, 
and inevitably leading to acts of cowardly selfishness and 
cruelty. 

A still more deadly prepossession exists among the 
Bechuanas in South Africa and all the Caffer tribes. 
They have no idea of the possibility of death except from 
hunger, or violence, or witchcraft. If a man die, even at 
the extreme age of ninety, without any appearance of 
perishing from hunger or violence, his death is imputed 
to sorcery ; and blood is required to expiate or avenge it. 
*This circumstance,' says the narrator, ; gives rise to in- 
describable scenes of slaughter and misery.' t It is re- 
ported by travellers that the superstition of the evil-eye 
prevails to a great extent in the present day, even amongst 
the highest classes, in Naples, where it occasions perpetu- 
al discord, insults, revenge, and even murder.t 

These instances are undoubtedly extreme cases, and, 
being alien from our own prejudices and habits, strike us 
all as palpable proofs of the connection between error and 
suffering ; but if we look around us in our own commu- 
nity we shall find the connection as strongly illustrated 
by circumstances in which familiarity alone has prevented 
us from observing it. 

* Memoirs of Sir Walter Scott, vol. iii. p. 155. 

f Researches in South Africa, by R,ev. John Philip, D.D., vol. ii. 
p. 120. 

% See, among other testimonies, that of Sir David Wilkie, in the 
Memoirs of his Life, by A. Cunningham, vol. ii. p. 250. 



206 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

The prevalence of misery, as the consequence of error 
and ignorance, proclaims the paramount importance of 
accurate knowledge. To discover truth is in reality to 
do good on a grand scale. The detection of an error, the 
dissipation of a doubt, the extirpation of a prejudice, the 
establishment of a fact, the deduction of a new inference, 
the development of a latent principle, may diffuse its bene- 
ficial consequences over every region of the world, and 
may be the means of lessening the misery or increasing 
the happiness of myriads of unborn generations.* The 
great interests of the human race, then, demand, that the 
way of discovery should be open, that there should be no 
obstructions to inquiry, that every possible facility and 
encouragement should be afforded to efforts addressed to 
the detection of error and to the attainment of truth, — 
nay, that every human being, as far as he is capable, 
should actively assist in the pursuit ; and yet one of the 
greatest discouragements to such efforts at present exist- 
ing amongst mankind is the state of their own moral sen- 
timents. Although he who has achieved the discovery 
of a truth in a matter of importance, or rescued an admit- 
ted truth from insignificance and neglect,t may justly 
indulge the reflection that he has conferred a benefit on 
his fellow-men, to which even time itself can prescribe 
no limits, he will do well to prepare for the odium and 
persecution with which the benefit will be resisted, and 

* * Revolutions of ages,' says Milton, ' do not recover the loss of 
a rejected truth, for the want of which whole nations fare the 
worse.' — Areopagitica. 

f ' In philosophy, equally as in poetry, genius produces the 
strongest impressions of novelty, while it rescues the stalest and 
most admitted truths from the impotence caused by the very cir- 
cumstance of their universal admission.' — Coleridge's Friend, vol. 
i. p. 184. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 207 

console himself with a prospective reliance on the grati- 
tude and sympathy of a future age. 

It is impossible to deny the fact, that in some of the 
most important departments of knowledge the bulk of 
mankind regard novelties of doctrine — a description un- 
der which all detections of error and acquisitions of truth 
must come — as acts of moral turpitude or reprehensible 
arrogance, which they are ready to resent on the head of 
the promulgator. 

A state of things, in which the real interests and the 
moral sentiments of the human race are thus placed in 
strong opposition, cannot fail to be fruitful of evil ; and 
whoever should be fortunate enough to hasten its termi- 
nation would perform no slight service to his species. 
On this point the past history of the world, although it 
affords little ground for vehement exultation, teaches no 
lesson of despair. In the progress of society men's moral 
sentiments inevitably change, both from those alterations in 
circumstances which enhance or depress the value of cer- 
tain qualities of conduct, and from that acuter insight or 
correcter appreciation of the tendencies of action which 
accompanies an advance of civilization. From one or 
other of these causes, modes of conduct formerly regarded 
as of trivial moment grow into importance, qualities at 
one time extolled sink into dubious virtues, or even posi- 
tive vices, acts once shunned are zealously performed and 
warmly approved, new duties are evolved from the novel 
situations in which men are placed, and the code of mo- 
rality is amplified with rules which w r ould have been unin- 
telligible or undervalued at a previous period, because the 
circumstances to which they are applicable either had not 
then arisen or w T ere wholly unregarded. Such changes 
may be seen by comparing either past times with present, 
or savage with civilized communities. The dexterous 



208 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

horse-stealer, an ignominious felon in England, is the 
consummate hero of the Crow Indians.* How large the 
stride in moral sentiment from the blind and selfish super- 
stition of the Shetlander, who runs away from the drown- 
ing seaman, to the enlightened benevolence which plants 
the life-boat on the sea-beach to succor the stranded ship, 
and stimulates such men as the noble-minded Pellew to 
plunge into the very midst of peril in order to rescue 
their fellow-creatures from destruction ! t 

In reference to that class of actions which are con- 
nected with the pursuit of truth, both these causes of 
change in moral sentiment have been in operation. 

In the first place, circumstances have occurred which 
have greatly raised in importance the consequences of 
inquiry, and of course the consequences of the conduct 
exhibited in prosecuting it. So long as science and civil- 
ization had no existence, as mankind were solely occupied 
with providing for their physical wants, or were contin- 
ually engaged in the rougher work of mutual depredation 
and hostility, the cultivation of knowledge as a separate 
sphere of exertion, and indeed any semblance of regular 
investigation even in practical concerns, would be almost 
unknown, and consequently the virtues and vices con- 
nected with the pursuit of truth would not be called forth. 
Gradually, however, as civilization advanced, as the in- 
terests of society growing more complicated required 
more careful discrimination, as wealth and the exemption 

* Astoria, by Washington Irving, vol. ii. p. 79. — ' Horse-stealing 
is their glory and delight.' 

t This is an allusion to the magnanimous conduct of the late 
Lord Exmouth, on repeated occasions, and more especially in. the 
case of the Dutton. There is something so ennobling in even the 
mere reading of such instances, which cannot be too widely known, 
that I have quoted the account in the Appendix, Note A. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 209 

from occupation accompanying wealth became diffused, 
and curiosity was at leisure to speculate on the nature and 
destiny of man and other beings, to investigate surround- 
ing objects, and to scrutinize passing events, it became 
manifest that the results of this mental activity would 
have important bearings on the fortunes of mankind. 
What we term inquiry must always have place and pos- 
sess importance in a certain degree, inasmuch as it is 
mixed up with ordinary conduct; but it is not so imme- 
diately apparent that, when pushed beyond the point of 
direct applicability, it has an extensive influence on hu- 
man affairs. 

The speculations of thoughtful men might naturally be 
regarded for a while as vain dreams or visionary theories, 
having little connection with the hard and pressing realities 
of life ; but they were found in process of time to pene- 
trate every where, to permeate morals, manners, education, 
government, religion : and when investigation was suc- 
cessfully turned into the paths of physical science, the 
relation of systematic knowledge to human welfare was 
brought home to mankind in its most irresistible form. 

The happiness of the world has thus proved itself to be 
in various ways deeply implicated in the establishment of 
truth and the rectification of error even in subjects appar- 
ently remote from ordinary life ; and in consequence 
the conduct both of communities and individuals in every 
thing relating to inquiry has risen to an importance of 
which earlier ages never dreamed, and has become more 
extensively the object of our moral sentiments. 

In the second place, concurrently with this change pro- 
duced by the growing importance of the pursuit of truth, 
and of all conduct connected with it, the moral sentiments 
of mankind on the subject have also undergone progres- 
sive alteration from a more and more accurate appre- 
14 



210 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

ciation of the tendencies of human actions, and a nicer 
discrimination of complicated moral phenomena. On this 
point, nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that we have 
greater reason to look forward with hope than around us 
with complacency, or backward with exultation. 

In a matter so greatly enhanced in importance it was 
hardly to be expected that the good and evil qualities of 
conduct should be all at once appreciated with distinctness 
and precision ; and, accordingly, a very cursory examina- 
tion is sufficient to show that mankind have hitherto 
lamentably erred, and still continue to err, in apportioning 
their approbation and disapprobation to the qualities dis- 
played in reference to the prosecution of inquiry. Their 
moral sentiments have been roused indeed, but have at the 
same time been grossly misdirected. They have too fre- 
quently bestowed their smiles on conduct destitute of 
merit or even fundamentally vicious, and poured their 
indignation on acts most truly deserving their admiration 
and applause. Nor as to this misdirection of their feelings 
can the major part of the human race, even in what are 
termed by courtesy civilized communities, be truly said to 
have radically improved. Such mistakes as these are by no 
means easily rectified. The morality of the subject, besides 
having been hitherto neglected and still remaining beset 
with prejudices, involves some nice distinctions, which 
cannot fail to be generally overlooked or confounded till 
they have been clearly exhibited and rendered plain and 
familiar by repeated expositions. 

We must expect that here, as well as in other matters, 
the moral sentiments of mankind will prove tenacious of 
their accustomed course — reluctant to take a new direc- 
tion. When men have once been habituated to look upon 
any quality or any system of action with approbation or 
the reverse, they can scarcely divest themselves of tha 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 211 

feeling, even though they discover the object no longer to 
deserve it ; and they are slow in bestowing the same 
sentiment on conduct by which it has not been familiarly 
excited. Thus (to take an obvious illustration) the barba- 
rian glare anciently flung over warlike qualities and 
military achievements still continues to dazzle the world 
into an admiration of actions manifestly destructive to 
human happiness. On this subject mankind have yet 
attained to no sound feeling ; their moral sentiments lag 
behind existing knowledge and established conclusions : 
and it will require the reiterated efforts of moralists and 
philosophers to work into their minds the only sentiments 
to be entertained by rational beings towards the vulgar 
heroes and pageants of history. 

The same process of distinctly pointing out and repeat- 
edly exhibiting the clear tendencies of action, is required 
to rectify the moral feelings of the world in all that re- 
gards the pursuit of truth ; and we may venture to hope it 
will be applied with eventual, although not immediate 
success. Tardy as mankind evince themselves in all 
changes of moral sentiment, they cannot permanently 
continue to bestow their approbation on qualities clearly 
proved to be pernicious, nor withhold it from actions 
shown to be undeniably calculated for their welfare. 

A retrospect of the three last centuries alone leads us 
to anticipate that any improvement in the discrimination 
of good and evil in the various paths of human life must 
eventually find its way from the meditative few to the less 
reflecting many. Amongst these few, in the present day, 
the fundamental principles, without which a code of mo- 
rality in reference to the pursuit of truth cannot exist, are 
universally held. Philosophers unite in regarding truth as 
inseparably allied with human happiness, and error as 
essentially hostile to it. It was otherwise with the sages 



212 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

of antiquity, amongst whom there was a prevalent disso- 
ciation of the utility from the truth of a doctrine. It was 
supposed that a dogma might be advantageous and even 
necessary to society, to morality, and to political institu- 
tions, although it were false, and that it ought in this case 
to be strenuously supported and shielded from scrutiny 
even by those who were aware of its character. With 
such a notion there could not co-exist any conscious obli- 
gation, or any inducement but sheer curiosity, to enter 
upon the search after truth, and faithfully pursue it. On 
the contrary, it unavoidably led to the employment of 
fallacious arguments, hollow pretexts, disingenuous con- 
nivance, and violent oppression, in order to maintain the 
authority of established doctrines. It could not fail to be 
fruitful in falsehood, hypocrisy, fraud, and despotic intol- 
erance.* The same policy of a double doctrine was 
inculcated by Machiavel, and was, indeed, long acted 
upon in Europe prior to the reformation ; it has been well 
characterized by Mr. Stewart as the policy of ' enlighten- 
ing the few and hoodwinking the many.' 

If similar views are yet occasionally entertained amongst 
the ignorant or half-informed, they are seldom avowed. 
Even the hardly less revolting, but certainly less consist- 
ent, principle of more recent times, and maintained even 

* l It seems,' says Dr. Whately, in an instructive dissertation on 
this subject, ' to have been the settled conviction of most of those who 
had the sincerest desire of attaining truth themselves, that to the 
mass of mankind truth was in many points inexpedient, and unfit to 
be communicated ; that, however desirable it might be for the lead- 
ing personages in the world to be instructed in the true nature of 
things, there were many popular delusions which were essential to 
the well-being of society. 5 — Essays on the Writings of St. Paul, 
p. 3. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 213 

by many of the early teachers of the Christian Church,* 
that a true doctrine may be rightly supported by false rep- 
resentations, and by what are called pious frauds, is dis- 
carded professedly, if not always really, by every party, 
every sect, and every individual with the slightest preten- 
sions to a name in philosophy or literature, or even to a 
reputable standing in society. 4 Nothing,' it has been 
well remarked, c can be more irrational in the pretended 
children of light than to enlist themselves under the ban- 
ners of Truth, and yet rest their hopes on an alliance with , 
Delusion.' f 

There is, happily, a growing disposition in the world, 
amongst the intelligent part of it at least, to prize truth of 
doctrine and veracity of statement ; to look with disdain 
on all artifice, disingenuity, and disguise, both in specula- 
tion and practice ; to regard the business of life no longer 
as an affair which demands unremitted intrigue and per- 
petual deceit ; to consider the great interests of humanity 
as not. requiring to be supported by ignorance, hypocrisy, 
and superstition ; to believe that the suppression and con- 
cealment of facts and arguments can be of no service ex- 
cept to the few at the expense of the many ; and that it is 
for the benefit of mankind, as well as essential to their 
progress in all which is virtuous and high-minded, that 
every important question should be freely and boldly ex- 
amined.! This state of feeling, on the part of men of 



* Ibid. Also Middleton's Free Inquiry, passim. 

t Coleridge's Friend, vol. i. p. 53. 

t « From the whole deduction which has now been made,' says an 
able writer, t it appears that superstition is useless ; that truth and 
reason are alone to be depended on in giving a regular and safe 
determination to human actions ; and that the idea of managing 
mankind by means of prejudices and by arts of deception is false 
philosophy, as unwise as it is immoral.' — Dr. Hardy on the Pro- 



214 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

cultivated minds, seems highly favorable to an impartial 
discussion of the conduct which we ought to observe, or, 
in other words, the moral sentiments we ought to cherish, 
in relation to the pursuit of truth ; and even if the present 
endeavor to trace the duties connected with it shall fail of 
yielding that entire satisfaction which it is seldom the 
destiny of any thing human to give, it may animate the 
conscientious inquirer, and serve as a groundwork for more 
successful efforts. 

Little has yet been effected in this part of ethical phi- 
losophy ; at all events, the subject has never, as far as the 
author knows, been systematically treated in the point of 
view here described : it is a department of moral exposi- 
tion yet to be created. Locke, indeed, in his Conduct of 
the Understanding, and in his Letters on Toleration, has 
thrown out excellent remarks on some of the topics which 
it embraces ; and these treatises, which cannot be too 
warmly recommended, breathe an admirable spirit of 
right feeling and sound judgment in relation to the pursuit 
of truth.* 

Malebranche, too, in his celebrated work, ' De la Re- 
cherche de la Verite,' abounds with instructive observa- 
tions, encumbered nevertheless with antiquated matter and 



gress of the Christian Religion, quoted in MilVs Translation of 
Villers on the Reformation, p. 58. 

* Since the first edition of the present Essay was published, 
many works have appeared, in which correct and ennobling senti- 
ments concerning the morality of investigation are incidentally ex- 
pressed, some of which the author has had the satisfaction of tracing, 
or fancying he traced, to the influence of his own inadequate exposi- 
tion of the subject. The Essays and Discourses of the late Dr.Tlian- 
ning may be particularly cited, as abounding in fervent and forcible 
lessons on this great theme. Occasional use of them is made in the 
following pages. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 215 

exploded doctrines, through which few in the present day 
will venture to toil. 

Neither of these distinguished writers, however, looked 
at the subject in the particular light in which it is the ob- 
ject of the following pages to place it ; and even if they 
had, the lapse of a century and a half may be presumed 
to have brought us into a more favorable position for view- 
ing it in its most important relations. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE DUTY OF ENTERING UPON INQUIRY. 

To inquire is simply to endeavor to obtain a knowledge 
of something we are ignorant of. Inquiries are therefore 
of all kinds, trivial and important, easy and difficult; they 
may be directed to the properties of matter or of mind, 
to the concerns of individuals, or of communities, or of 
mankind at large, to w T hat at present exists, or to what has 
formerly happened ; they vary, from the casual question 
regarding events of the day, to the laborious researches 
of the historian, and to the long series of observations 
and experiments by which the philosopher interrogates 
nature. g 

What people usually have in their minds, however, 
when speaking in general terms of the pursuit of truth and 
duty of inquiry, seems to be that sort of investigation 
which has no direct reference to ordinary exigencies, but 
goes beyond what the immediate necessities and unim- 
portant occurrences of life require. Few would probably 
think it needful to discuss the advantages or the obligation 
of seeking to know whatever is directly requisite for guid- 
ing their individual conduct on common occasions. 

Systematic, or scientific, or speculative investigation is 
generally implied when the interesting topics just men- 
tioned are in question, and perhaps there is usually a 
further implication that the inquiry, whatever it may be, 
is one that concerns society or mankind. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 217 

On coming, nevertheless, to consider the subject close- 
ly, it does not appear that any strict line can be drawn 
between the different kinds of investigation referred to. 
They pass into each other by insensible degrees, are 
frequently intermingled, and sometimes interchange char- 
acters ; nor even, if they could be clearly discriminated, 
would it be found that the moral obligation to enter upon 
any researches depends on such distinctions. It is the 
circumstances in which a man is placed that must deter- 
mine (chiefly at least) how far it is incumbent on him to 
engage in any investigation. 

That there are duties to be performed in reference to 
this matter, no one will be hardy enough to deny. If 
truth is so important to mankind, as we have shown it to 
be, there can scarcely fail to be circumstances which 
render it imperative on human beings to strive to attain it, 
or which in other words bring the pursuit of it under the 
cognizance of morality. The problem before us is to 
determine what those circumstances are. 



SECTION I. 

EST WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES INQUIRY IS A DUTT. 

Although it may be universally admitted that there are 
cases in which it is incumbent on mankind to engage in 
the pursuit of truth, those cases may appear on a first 
view too various and complicated to be definitively classi- 
fied. On further reflection, nevertheless, it will be found 
that the most important, if not the whole of them, may be 
comprehended in a few general propositions. 

The duty of inquiiy will be generally acknowledged 
to be obligatory upon every one in proportion to his 
capacity and opportunities in the following circumstances : 



218 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

1. When any direct means are within his reach of ob- 
taining additional or more accurate knowledge of the 
relation in which he stands, and the duty which he owes 
to God. 

2. When the extent and accuracy of his knowledge on 
any subject must have an important and direct effect on 
his conduct in life, public or private, professional or un- 
official, and consequently on the happiness of his fellow- 
creatures. 

3. When he takes upon himself the office of instructing 
others; a case included, indeed, in the preceding, but of 
such peculiar distinction from any other, as to deserve a 
separate consideration. 

4. When he possesses opportunities and abilities for 
prosecuting historical, scientific, or philosophical investi- 
gations, so as to enlarge the bounds of human knowledge. 

These four cases appear to comprise all the great 
circumstances which can be considered by any class of 
moralists, as rendering it the duty of mankind to enter 
upon any regular and express inquiry ; and they are all 
fruitful of important suggestions, deserving the deep con- 
sideration, not only of the moralist and philosopher, but 
of every human being. 

1. Let us advert, in the first place, to the duty of avail- 
ing ourselves of any direct means within our reach to 
increase and correct our knowledge of the relations in 
which we stand, and the duty we owe to the Great Author 
of the universe. In this are obviously included both the 
study of his attributes as displayed in the works of nature, 
and an investigation of the authenticity and import of any 
alleged communication from him to human beings. 

If we admit that there are any moral relations at all 
between us and the Supreme Being, we cannot but con- 
clude that our ideas of his attributes must be pleasing to 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 219 

him and beneficial to ourselves, in proportion as they are 
worthy of their object, or, in other words, in proportion as 
they are accurate ; whence it evidently becomes a general 
duty to exalt our conceptions of the Deity, by making 
ourselves acquainted with the real constitution of nature, 
as well as by correcting and enlarging our views of moral 
and intellectual excellence. If it were not incumbent 
upon us on other accounts to neglect no accessible means 
of acquiring a knowledge of the universe around us, and 
of our own sensitive and rational nature, this considera- - 
tion alone would render it obligatory to seize every op- 
portunity of escaping from ignorance and error. The 
conceptions of an uninstructed, although a virtuous man, 
or of an individual, however conversant with physical 
science, who has never investigated his own mental con- 
stitution and the true nature of morality, must inevitably 
be far less worthy of the Great Author of the universe 
than the human mind is capable of forming; and such 
unworthy conceptions cannot possibly be raised or recti- 
fied in the slightest degree by any other means than the 
removal of that ignorance to which they owe their imper- 
fections. 

The effect, too, of wrong ideas of God on man himself 
must not be overlooked : it is, in truth, a consideration of 
the highest moment. ■ The Deity/ says an able writer, 
* is proposed as the object, not merely of our belief, but 
of our practical adoration and love — in the imitation, 
limited and imperfect as it must be, of His moral perfec- 
tions. Hence the vital practical importance of the most 
unimpeachable conception of those attributes, and of re- 
moving any thing like a limitation on their infinite moral 
excellence.' * 

* The Connection of Natural and Divine Truth, by the Rev. 
Baden Powell, p. 212. 



220 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

The pernicious consequences of erroneous and degrad- 
ing conceptions of the Deity on the moral conduct of 
mankind, have seldom been sufficiently considered. To 
every man, the ideas which he forms of God must con- 
stitute a model to which he will naturally tend to conform 
himself, and according to which he will consider himself 
obliged in many cases to shape his own actions. If, 
therefore, he represents in his own imagination this Al- 
mighty Being as of an arbitrary, malevolent, selfish, and 
revengeful character (which are too often the actual no- 
tions lurking in the minds of the unenlightened, while the 
attributes of good and just and merciful are on their lips,) 
he will insensibly and without any compunction become 
cruel, capricious, and tyrannical in his own social sphere. 
Or, perhaps, in many cases, it would be more correct to 
say that he would remain so. For barbarous and igno- 
rant man first forms his notions of the Deity from his 
own low standard of what an All-powerful Being would 
do (beyond which, in fact, it is impossible for him to go) ; 
and then having consecrated his crude ideas by fixing 
upon them the imaginary stamp of divinity, he fears to 
depart from them, and it is with difficulty that he ad- 
vances to more accurate and enlightened views of moral 
excellence than are warranted by the model of his own 
creation. 

The slow progress of the race in true morality is to be 
ascribed in a great measure to these consecrated crudities 
of former ages. The ideas of mankind, naturally pro- 
gressive on this as on all other subjects, are continually 
called back to the venerated model while they have an 
irresistible tendency to depart from it. To borrow an 
expressive phrase from a modern writer, ' they are tether- 
ed to the stump of old superstitions.' Thus the morality 
of a nation may long remain rude, vacillating, and incon- 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 221 

sistent amidst the wonders of mechanical art, the achieve- 
ments of physical science, and the refinements of taste. 

Looking then both at the relation in which mankind 
stand to God, and at their own social claims and personal 
interests, it is unquestionably a general duty on their part, 
according to their means and opportunities, to enlarge 
and purify their conceptions of the Great Author of Na- 
ture, by making themselves acquainted, as accurately and 
extensively as possible, with his works, and investigating 
the truths of morality. To observe, to inquire, to exam- 
ine, to reason, to meditate, — these are the only means 
which they can employ to elevate their minds on this 
great subject — the noblest homage which they can render 
at the throne of the universe. 

1 Much earnest, patient, laborious thought,' says an emi- 
nent writer, c is required to see this Infinite Being as he is, 
to rise above the low gross notions of the Divinity, which 
rush in upon us from our passions, from our selfish par- 
tialities, and from the low-minded world around us.' 
8 Every man's elevation,' observes the same writer, ' is to 
be measured first, and chiefly by his conception of this 
Great Being.' # 

Not less imperative reasons exist why we should dili- 
gently apply ourselves to the examination of the authen- 
ticity and import of any alleged communication from God 
to mankind, that wears the least semblance of credibility. 
To neglect inquiry under these circumstances, would not 
only be a breach of the manifest duty arising out of the 
relation of a creature to his Creator, but it would be to 
plunge ourselves into those evils which an unacquaintance 
with accessible knowledge, and, much more, any positive 

* Lecture on the Elevation of the Laboring Classes, by Dr. Chan- 
ging. 



222 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

errors on so momentous a subject, would be sure to bring, 
as well as to sacrifice all those benefits which would neces- 
sarily flow from the possession of the truth. The disas- 
trous consequences which have arisen to mankind from 
mistakes on this great question, are alone sufficient to 
teach us the imperative obligation of entering upon the 
inquiry — an obligation under which every human being 
lies according to his means and opportunities, not (let it 
be borne in mind) to his fellow-creatures, but to that Om- 
niscient Being who is alone competent to judge how far it 
has in any instance been fulfilled. 

Surely, if there is any one course of conduct more than 
another which common sense and conscience unite in 
pointing out as imperative upon us, it is to devote our- 
selves to an investigation of the genuineness and the 
meaning of a communication, asserting itself with any 
shadow of plausibility to be a message from the great 
Author of Nature.* In what way such an investigation, 
in common with all others, ought to be prosecuted, will be 
shown in a subsequent part of this Essay. 

2. It will be readily admitted that it is likewise impera- 
tive on every one to undergo the labor of inquiry accord- 
ing to his means and opportunities in regard to all subjects 
which have an important and direct bearing on his social 
conduct ; which, in other words, furnish grounds for de- 
termining what that conduct shall be. Not to inquire in 
these cases, would be to take steps involving the happiness 
of our fellow-creatures, as well as of ourselves, without 

* For a more adequate exposition of this part of the subject, on 
which it would be here out of place to do more than briefly touch, 
the reader may consult * Letters of an Egyptian Kafir in search of 
a Religion,' to which the present revised Essay must acknowledge 
considerable obligations ; and which will be quoted on several occa- 
sions in the sequel. 



223 

knowing or doing all in our power to learn the conse- 
quences of those steps : it would be staking, in fact, the 
welfare of others and our own on the mere chance of 
being ignorantly in the right. How extensive and momen- 
tous this branch of duty is, will appear to any one who 
reflects that reputation, fortune, morals, health, life, are 
daily committed to the statesman, the judge, the lawyer, 
the physician, and the navigator, and must be placed in 
jeopardy, not only by their neglecting to investigate eacht 
particular case as it arises, but by professional error or 
ignorance, which proper inquiry would have removed. 
Nor is it a less powerful consideration that the destiny 
of a family, as well as of a community, is dependent on 
the due prosecution of inquiries connected with its welfare, 
and especially that the physical and moral being of a 
child may be irremediably depraved for want of know- 
ledge accessible but neglected by the parent. 

But there is a more general duty than any of these, 
which comes under this head — the important duty too 
little adverted to, if not wholly overlooked, of investigating 
the accuracy of our moral sentiments and the justness of 
our application of them. Obliged every day to mingle in 
the conflicting pursuits and interests of mankind, where 
there is constant opportunity for the exercise of every vir- 
tue and vice incident to human nature — called also to 
pronounce sentence upon others, to shape our behavior to 
them accordingly, and thus to affect their happiness by our 
words and deeds, it behoves us to make ourselves well 
acquainted with the real tendencies of human actions, to 
ascertain with the utmost accuracy what is really worthy 
of approval or censure, as well as to satisfy ourselves 
that the action which we praise or condemn comes under 
the class to which we refer it. 

It is painful to see how grossly this maxim is contra- 



224 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

vened — to witness the negligence of the greater part of 
mankind in regard to a just appreciation of social duties 
— to mark the arrogant spirit in which moral verdicts are 
flung about at random, when it is manifest that the self- 
constituted judges have never investigated the grounds on 
which such verdicts are pronounced, never taken the trou- 
ble to inquire whether the actions which they applaud or 
stigmatise are really beneficial or injurious to the happi- 
ness of mankind, or even whether there is evidence that 
they have been actually committed. 

We shall have, hereafter, to bring into view the bitter 
consequences of such negligence of inquiry, and especially 
of such rash and ignorant judgments in relation to human 
conduct in the very subject of our present speculations, 
namely, the pursuit of truth. 

Meanwhile it is sufficiently evident from what has been 
said, how extensive must be the influence of the accu- 
rate or inaccurate direction of moral sentiment both on a 
man's own conduct, and on his application of the power- 
ful instruments of approbation and censure to the conduct 
of his neighbors ; and how strong, therefore, is the obli- 
gation resting upon every individual, in proportion to his 
opportunities, to acquire the knowledge necessary for the 
correct discrimination of moral good and evil. 

In reference to the general duty of entering upon the 
task of investigation, as here inculcated, a modern writer 
makes the following judicious remarks : 

4 It is much to be feared,' he says, ; that the opinions of 
men in general on subjects of the greatest importance, 
and on which it most depends whether their influence 
shall be beneficial or injurious to mankind, are formed 
without inquiry or consideration, and are the mere preju- 
dices of education ; or the effects of caprice ; or adopted 
because they will promote their interest ; or because they 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 225 

are in fashion, and propagated by those who have a direct 
interest in deceiving the world. Very few even think of 
examining into the truth of the opinions which they find to 
prevail in the more respectable classes of society ; but 
most men adopt them as sound maxims, and regulate by 
them their judgment and actions, even in cases in which 
they must necessarily incur a very heavy responsibility. 
Yet while they thus take no pains to avoid error, they 
are always ready, when it turns out that they are in the 
wrong, to plead their ignorance or error in excuse for 
their misconduct ; though it be manifest that neither igno- 
rance nor error is a valid excuse, where it might have 
been prevented or remedied by such an attention to the 
subject, as its importance, honestly considered, would 
have appeared to require, and by the use of the means 
which were in their power.' * 

4 The improvement of our judgment,' says another wri- 
ter, 8 and the increase of our knowledge, on all subjects 
included within our sphere of action, are not merely 
advantages recommended by prudence, but absolute duties 
imposed on us by conscience.' t 

Of the lamentable effects of neglecting almost all the 
duties specified under this head, a striking illustration is 
furnished by an incident which occurred within the memo- 
ry of many now living. A young woman, Eliza Fenning, 
was capitally condemned for the alleged crime of attempt- 
ing to poison part of her master's family, on evidence of 
the most inconclusive character, and after a hasty and 
insufficient trial. Subsequently to her conviction, fresh 
evidence in her favor, calculated to make any wise and 

* Introduction to the Study of Moral Evidence, by the Rev. J. E. 
Gambier, 3d ed. p. 132. 

t Coleridge's Friend, vol ii. p. 171. 
15 



226 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

good man pause and review his conclusions, even on a 
less awful occasion, was tendered to the judge ; the dis- 
crepancies in the testimony of the witnesses on the trial 
were pointed out by the poor girl herself, not only to that 
functionary, but to the Lord Chancellor and to the Secre- 
tary of State ; and other efforts were used to avert the 
terrible calamity of putting the innocent to death : but all 
without avail. She perished on the scaffold. 

Here the judge had, in the first place, manifestly ne- 
glected the duty imperative on all judges, of making them- 
selves acquainted with the obligations imposed upon them 
by their office and with the principles of evidence, and was 
therefore professionally unfit for his situation ; he showed 
himself ignorant of the simple principle, that it was his 
duty to protect the accused from a capital conviction, ex- 
cept on the most unquestionable proof; he seems not even 
to have attained to the conception of what constitutes a 
fair trial. During the proceedings he was deaf to the re- 
peated entreaties of the poor victim in his power that a 
particular witness should be examined ; and after this 
mockery of justice was over, he pertinaciously refused to 
hear further material evidence which the diligence of some 
benevolent individuals had collected and offered to his 
notice.* Thus his professional ignorance, and his obsti- 
nacy in rejecting information, were the means of bringing 
to an ignominious end a young woman, innocent (as far 
as human sagacity can discovert) of the crime laid to her 
charge, and notwithstanding her lowly condition, of fine 

* Sir Samuel Romilly, in speaking of this unhappy case, stigma- 
tises the conduct of the Recorder as savage. — Memoirs, vol. iii. p. 
235. 

t It has been stated in the public papers, that a death-bed con- 
fession by the actual perpetrator of the crime has completely vindi- 
cated the innocence of this noble but unfortunate girl. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 227 

moral and intellectual qualities. Her youth, her interest- 
ing personal appearance, her reliance on her own inno- 
cence, and on the force of truth for an acquittal, the .noble 
spirit with which she supported the unexpected verdict, 
and struggled in the dreary desolation of a convict's cell 
against the unjust sentence, and, finally, the feminine pro- 
priety and more than feminine firmness of her demeanor 
throughout the closing scene, altogether form a picture 
deeply affecting. The story of Eliza Fenning makes the 
heart bleed. It is not often that the consequences of ne- , 
glecting the duty of inquiry, both special and general, are 
condensed into such intense evil, and can be so plainly 
exhibited. 

3. Many words will not be required to prove that he 
who takes upon himself the office of instructing others, 
should previously investigate the subjects he has to ex- 
plain. Inquiry is the only means in his power of satis- 
fying himself that he is disseminating truth and not 
falsehood. Nothing can be conceived more absolutely 
imperative. No obligation can be stronger than that of a 
teacher to render himself competent to the function of 
teaching, so that he shall not delude or mislead his 
disciples. Instruction can have no legitimate object but to 
teach what is true ; and it is a sort of practical contradic- 
tion to engage in the office without having bestowed the 
trouble of ascertaining what the truth is. To mention the 
schoolmaster, the clergyman, the lecturer, the public 
speaker, the author, the critic, is sufficient to show how 
numerous and influential are the classes bound by this 
obligation, and the important character of the duty resting 
upon them. The morality of this portion of the subject is 
so plain, that it would almost seem a waste of words to 
elucidate or enforce it, and yet, if we look into actual life, 
we shall discover few symptoms of an adequate concep- 
tion of the duty in question. 



228 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

Subjects requiring disciplined minds, years of study, 
careful weighing of evidence and nice discrimination, are 
taught with unhesitating confidence, and not seldom with 
dogmatical arrogance by men without any qualification 
for the office, and without even the pretext of a due course 
of inquiry, as if they labored under an utter insensibility 
to the obligations incurred by assuming so important a 
function. It is, indeed, a lamentable proof of the low- 
state of moral intelligence amongst us, that human beings 
should rashly engage without preparation in the office of 
instructing their fellow-creatures upon matters of the high- 
est concern, and not only be perfectly unconscious that 
they are trespassing against any moral rule, but have an 
impression that they are performing a valuable service. 

It is needless to dwell on the perpetuation of ignorance 
and error, which must ensue from the neglect of full and 
sedulous inquiry on the part of a teacher into whatever 
subject he engages to explain. If every one who takes 
upon himself this function would faithfully examine his 
own deficiencies, and exert himself to supply them, or 
abandon it to others more adequately qualified, it would 
be impossible that the enlightened views of the preeminent 
of the race should make their way in the world with so 
much difficulty as they do, and diffuse their benefits in so 
small a circle as that to which we see them confined. 

The duty of every one in the circumstances described 
under the three preceding heads, is not only to enter upon 
investigation, but to pursue his inquiries as far as his 
capacity and opportunities permit, till he has come to 
satisfactory conclusions, or feels thoroughly convinced that 
he has obtained all the light which investigation can 
supply. It is especially incumbent on men of cultivated 
minds who understand the process of reasoning and the 
force of evidence, not to be contented with their opinion 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 229 

on any question of importance till they can trace its con- 
nection with indisputable facts or with self-evident prin- 
ciples. The same considerations which render it a duty 
to commence inquiry, render it a duty to persevere till 
this satisfactory end has been achieved. 

4. We are next to consider the duty of entering upon 
scientific or philosophical or other systematic investigation 
with the simple view of enlarging human knowledge, and 
when investigation is not incumbent upon us from the 
considerations already specified. 

A great majority of mankind struggling for existence, 
and worn down with labor and anxiety, may obviously in 
this question be at once set aside : they are exonerated by 
their position from devoting attention to the investigation 
of any problems but such as directly relate to their actual 
condition, or are forced upon their notice. Doomed to 
incessant toil or unremitting care, they are rather to be 
commended when they evince any eagerness for extra- 
neous knowledge, than blamed for indifference to every 
subject not immediately bearing on their moral and physi- 
cal well-being. 

Upon those who are elevated above this constant atten- 
tion to the exigencies of ordinary life, the duty of inquiry 
for the single purpose of adding to the stock of human 
knowledge presses with varying force according to their 
station and abilities. Perhaps we can attain to no more 
precise rule on the subject, than that every one who has 
powers and opportunities to extend the boundaries of 
knowledge by systematic research is under a proportionate 
moral obligation to do so. 

There is another consideration which still further abates 
the precision of the rule. It is obvious that no man, even 
the ablest and most accomplished, can be expected to 
pursue every inquiry which his powers may be calcula- 



230 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH, 

ted to solve, or his position may enable him to enter 
upon. 

We are in the present day surrounded on all sides by 
phenomena pressing on our curiosity. Nature, to the 
awakened minds of men of the nineteenth century, pre- 
sents herself as a very different object of investigation 
from what she appeared a few hundred years ago, and 
science and history offer their accumulated instruments 
and volumes to assist us in the interpretation of her laws. 
Facts and principles, problems for solution, and fields of 
inquiry have multiplied on our hands. A single mind is 
no longer capable of grasping all extant knowledge ; and 
the ablest of us must be content with comprehending a 
part, and casting a longing look at the rest. 

The inquiries of every human being are thus necessarily 
limited by the multiplicity of objects presenting themselves 
for investigation. Different individuals, from peculiar in- 
clinations or capacities, will range over different parts of 
the field of knowledge. Whether they devote their abili- 
ties to this or that subject must be frequently a matter of 
mere personal taste ; and it can be only under some pecu- 
liar circumstances that the direction of their scientific in- 
quiries will be a matter of duty.* 

That such gifted individuals as have been described are 
nevertheless bound to enter upon some investigations or 
other for the extension of science, seems manifest. If we 
suppose a human being to be blessed with the combined 
opportunities, attainments, and -original genius of a New- 

# If it doth not appear,' says a learned writer, 'precisely into 
what kind of studies this respect to truth will carry a man preferably 
to all others, how far it will oblige him to continue his pursuit after 
knowledge, and when the discontinuance begins to be no offence 
against truth, he must consult his own opportunities and genius, 
and judge for himself as well as he can.' — Wollaston on the Reli- 
gion of Nature j p. 24. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 231 

ton, we feel at once that the pursuit of truth is his appro- 
priate career. In such a man indolence and inertness 
would be a crime. 

Here is an individual endowed with pre-eminent capa- 
city, trained in all human learning, gifted with leisure, 
animated by companions engaged in similar pursuits, 
stimulated by novel ideas beaming on his intellectual 
vision, capable of opening to his fellow-creatures new 
views of nature and vistas of thought, and yet he refuses 
to bestow any labor in following out these happy glimpses 
and brilliant conceptions ; he is content with the passive 
enjoyment of seeing them ; come and depart,' without 
making any effort to follow out and perpetuate his discov- 
eries for the good of mankind. He has great objects with- 
in his reach, yet refuses to stretch out his hand. 

No one requires to be told that such a being so acting 
would deserve the condemnation of the wise and the good, 
while he would be casting away some of the highest en- 
joyments of which human nature is capable. From such 
inertness, fortunately, the world is in a great measure 
secured by the irresistible propensity of genius to exert its 
powers. The issue is not left to the mere influence of a 
sense of duty, although the moral obligation does not the 
less exist, and if clearly apprehended, must constitute a 
valuable incitement in those moments when the ardor of 
enterprise is chilled by the cold reception which awaits 
discovery, or relaxes at the sight of the boundless field 
that remains to be explored. 

SECTION II. 

OBJECTIONS AND PREJUDICES INIMICAL TO THE DUTY OF INQUIRY. 

It is not easy to imagine how the plain statement of 
duty presented in the last section can be denied or contro- 



232 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

verted ; yet it frequently happens in actual life, that from 
indolence, ignorance, misapprehension, prejudice, or fear- 
fulness, the business of inquiry, if not positively repudia- 
ted, is really evaded. 

One of the first expedients that naturally suggest them- 
selves to stave off so troublesome a task, is to plead the 
undefined nature of the duty as rendering it impossible for 
any one to determine either for himself or for others, how 
far in any circumstances it is obligatory. 

In this plea there is doubtless some force. The circum- 
stances described in the preceding section as imposing the 
duty of investigation, are various in their character and 
weight, and it is frequently too much to expect from the 
parties on whom it is incumbent, that they should be fully 
conscious of their own want of knowledge, and be able to 
form clear views of what they ought to do, or of the best 
manner of doing it. There are in fact two classes of 
cases which may be readily distinguished. With one 
class there can be little difficulty. Men must be frequently 
well aware of their deficiency in such information as their 
position in the world demands ; and in those cases where 
the knowledge is estential to action, not only must their 
culpability in not having prosecuted the necessary investi- 
gations be clear to their own discernment, but it will often 
be unequivocally manifest to others. On the other hand, 
when we quit the sphere of action for that of speculation, 
when we turn for instance to such subjects as the charac- 
ter and proceedings of the Deity, the truth of historical 
records, or the correctness of our moral sentiments, or to 
any branch of science which we may be capable of ex- 
ploring, the task of satisfying ourselves as to what investi- 
gations it is requisite to undertake, is by no means so 
determinate. In such cases every individual must be 
necessarily left to his own conscience : the decision, 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 233 

whether he has acted up to the demands of the occasion, 
does not belong to his fellow-creatures, nor can they in 
general be competent to pronounce sentence. The ex- 
planation of the duty insisted upon in the preceding sec- 
tion, has constantly implied that to enter upon inquiry can 
be considered as obligatory only in proportion to the 
means which are actually within reach, including the 
degree of intelligence possessed regarding the duty itself, 
and can be perfectly so only to such individuals as are 
fully able to comprehend the position in which they stand 
to God and their own species. How far any one ap- 
proaches to this distinct apprehension, and acts according 
to the light of his knowledge in availing himself of the 
means within his power, are evidently points not within 
the province of humanity to decide. All that can be 
done is to delineate the course which ought to be followed, 
the line of conduct which is right in itself, and which 
would be pursued by any one who clearly saw the obliga- 
tion imposed by the circumstances described, and was 
resolved conscientious! v to discharge it. 

It may be quite practicable to point out a proper line 
of action in given circumstances, and at the same time 
exceedingly difficult to determine how far particular indi- 
viduals come under those circumstances, and are culpable 
for not observing the prescribed track. 

Nevertheless, it will still remain true (and the consider- 
ation is a most important one,) that if we neglect or omit, 
whether culpably or innocently, to enter upon the proper 
investigation demanded by any combination of circum- 
stances, we shall miss all the direct advantages of the 
right course, and incur the unhappy consequences of 
error ; we shall have no part in the conscious satisfaction, 
the clearness of view and solidity of principle, the worth 
of character, the power of beneficial action, the ability to 



234 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

avert or avoid evil arising from diligent and well directed 
inquiry. These are advantages not to be attained without 
making the efforts on which they depend. No purity or 
uprightness of intention can secure us against the bad 
consequences of not having taken pains to possess our- 
selves of the truth. 

Besides this objection, there are other phantoms con- 
jured up in the path of investigation by the prejudices of 
some and the fearfulness of others, which the aid of reason 
may be required to dissipate, as they are frequently made 
pretexts to justify inaction. 

These pretexts for declining the duty of inquiry are 
generally masked under vague or metaphorical phrases : 
— ' Inquiry implies the weighing of evidence, and might 
lead to doubt and perplexity ; ' Mo search into a subject 
might shake the settled convictions of the understanding;' 
c to examine opposite arguments and contradictory opin- 
ions might contaminate the mind with false views.' 

Every one who alleges such pretexts as these for de- 
clining inquiry, must obviously begin by assuming that his 
own opinions are unerringly in the right. Nothing could 
justify any man for declining the investigation of a subject 
which it is his duty to teach, or on which his opinions 
necessarily determine his religious or his social conduct, 
but the possession of an understanding free from liability 
to error. Not gifted with infallibility, in what way except 
by diligent inquiry can he obtain any assurance that he is 
not in the one case disseminating erroneous opinions, or 
in the other pursuing a course of injurious action ? If he 
holds any opinion, he must have acquired it, either by 
examination, or by instillation, rote, or some process 
which he cannot recollect. On the supposition that he 
has acquired it by proper examination, the duty on which 
we are now insisting has been discharged, and the matter 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 235 

is at an end. If he has acquired it in the other manner, 
if it is fast fixed in his understanding without any consci- 
ousness on his own part how it came there, the mere plea 
that his mind might become unsettled, can be no argu- 
ment against the duty of investigation. For any thing he 
can allege to the contrary, his present opinions are wrong; 
and in that case the disturbance of his blind conviction, 
instead of being an evil, is an essential step towards arriv- 
ing at the truth. 

There is no foreseeing how far the subtlety of interest 
and indolence may go ; and it may be possibly assigned 
as a further reason for his declining inquiry, that he may 
come to some fallacy which he cannot surmount, although 
convinced of its character. If he is convinced of its 
character, he must either have grounds for that conviction 
or not. If he has grounds, let him examine them, draw 
them out, try if they are valid, and then the fallacy will 
stand exposed. If he has no grounds for suspecting a 
fallacy, what an irrational conclusion he confesses himself 
to have arrived at ! But perhaps he will reply — he may 
be unable to solve the difficulty, his mind may become 
perplexed, and the issue may prove, after all, that it would 
have been much better had he remained in his former 
strong, though unenlightened conviction. Why better ? 
If he is in perplexity, let him read, think, consult the 
learned and the wise, and in the result he will probably 
reach a definite opinion on one side or the other. But if 
he should still remain in doubt, where is the harm, or 
rather why is it not to be considered a good ? The sub- 
ject is evidently one which admits strong probabilities on 
opposite sides. Doubt, therefore, is the proper sentiment 
for the occasion : it is the result of the best exercise of 
the faculties ; and either positively to believe, or positive- 
ly to disbelieve, would imply an erroneous appreciation of 
evidence. 



236 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

In the minds of some people, a strong prejudice appears 
to exist against that state of the understanding which is 
termed doubt. A little reflection, however, will convince 
any one, that on certain subjects doubt is as appropriate a 
state of mind as belief, or disbelief on others. There are 
doctrines, propositions, facts, supported and opposed by 
every degree of evidence, and many amongst them by 
that degree of evidence of which the proper effect is to 
leave the mind in an equipoise between two conclusions. 
In these cases, either to believe or disbelieve would imply 
that the understanding was improperly affected. Doubt 
is the appropriate result, which there can be no reason to 
shrink from or lament.* 

But it is further urged, that inquiry might contaminate 
the mind with false views ; and therefore it is wise and 
laudable to abstain from it. 

We can understand what is meant by contaminating a 
man's habits, or disposition, or even imagination. If a 
man read impure books, or works of extravagant fiction 
and false taste, his imagination will inevitably be colored 
by the ideas presented, and the conceptions which sub- 
sequently rise up in his mind will partake of the impurity 
and extravagance thus made familiar to it. But there is 
no analogy on this point between the understanding and 
the imagination. There is contamination, there is evil, in 
preposterous and obscene images crowding before the 
intellectual vision, notwithstanding a full and distinct per- 

* * One who has an aversion to doubt, and is anxious to make up 
his mind and to come to some conclusion on every question that is dis- 
cussed, must be content to rest many of his opinions on very slight 
grounds, since no one individual is competent to investigate fully all 
disputable points. Such a one, therefore, is no lover of truth ; nor 
is in the right way to attain it on any point.' — Archbishop Yvhate- 
lt on the Writings of St. Paul, p. 25. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 237 

ception of their character ; but there is no contamination, 
no evil in a thousand false arguments coming before the 
mind, if their quality is clearly discerned. The only 
possible evil in this case is mistaking false for true ; but 
the man who shrinks from investigation, lest he should 
mistake false for true, can have no reason for supposing 
himself free from that delusion in his actual opinions. 
To maintain that he would be more likely to escape from 
error without investigation than with it, is a species of ab- 
surdity which requires no exposure.* 

On no plea, therefore, can investigation, in the circum- 
stances already stated, be declined. That it should unset- 
tle a man's established convictions, or that it should lead 
to ultimate doubt, may be a good : the one is the neces- 
sary preliminary to passing from error to truth ; the other, 
if ultimately produced, is most likely to be the proper 
state of his intellect in relation to the particular subject 
examined. That inquiry should contaminate his mind is 
also a vain allegation. The only meaning which can be 
attached to the phrase, implies a misconception of false- 
hood for truth — a delusion which inquiry is not only the 
direct means of preventing, but of dissipating if he is 
already involved in it. 

Whoever' fears to examine the foundation of his opin- 
ions, and enter on the consideration of any train of 
counter-argument, may rest assured, that he has some 
latent apprehension of their unsoundness and incapacity 
of standing investigation. And as a fear of this sort, 
while it is totally discordant with that spirit of candor and 
fairness which every one must acknowledge to be the 
proper disposition for the attainment of truth, is at vari- 
ance with the positive duty of the occasion, no man 

* The way not to be led into error (remarks Hooker) is to be 
thoroughly instructed. — Ecclesiastical Polity , book iii. 



238 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

should suffer it to prevent him from boldly engaging in 
the requisite inquiry. A great deal of invective has been 
levelled at free-thinking. Taking the expression literaljy 
as applying to the process of thought, the only distinction 
worth attending to on this point is that between accurate 
and inaccurate, true and false. Thinking can never be 
too free, provided it is just. But construing the phrase 
as synonymous with free inquiry, it follows from the 
clearest principles of morality, that the freest inquiry not 
only is an innocent act, but under certain circumstances 
becomes an imperative duty. 

SECTION III. 

CONTINUATION OF THE SUBJECT. 

Besides the objections to inquiry examined in the last 
section, there are some other prejudices of a similar char- 
acter, which, as long as they prevail, must form serious 
impediments to the attainment of truth. 

One of these is a fear that we may search too far, and 
become chargeable with presumption in prying into things 
we ought not to know : another prejudice is, that we may 
contract guilt should we arrive at erroneous conclusions, 
or conclusions at variance with such as are established ; 
and another, that it is a sort of praiseworthy humility to 
acquiesce in received opinions, on the authority of others, 
and refrain from thinking for ourselves. 

A brief space will not be ill bestowed in setting these 
prejudices in their true light. 

As to the first a few words will suffice to prove that 
nothing can be more irrational and unfounded. It has 
been shown in another place * that truth is conducive to 

* Essay on the Publication of Opinions, and also the Introductory 
Chapter to the present Essay. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 239 

human happiness; the attainment of it, one of the highest 
objects of human enterprise ; and the free exercise of our 
faculties on all subjects, the means of securing this invalu- 
able blessing.* If this is a correct representation, the 
prosecution of inquiry in any possible direction is a pro- 
cess from which there is everything to hope and nothing 
to fear, and to which there is no limits but such as the 
nature of our own faculties prescribes. 

It is not easy to conceive with exactness what can possi- 
bly be apprehended from investigation; what is the pre- 
cise danger or difficulty it is expected to involve us in ; 
what is implied in the fear that we may search too far; 
what are those things which it may be presumptuous to 
ascertain. Such persons as have imagined that inquiry 
might conduct us to forbidden truths in the fields of know- 
ledge, seem to have had no determinate notions as to the 
sort of discoveries we should make, but have been in- 
fluenced by some loose analogy with human affairs. 

As there are secret transactions in society, amongst 
bodies or individuals, which we should be culpable in pry- 
ing into ; sealed documents circulating in the world, sacred 
to those whose names they bear, and not to be scrutinized 
with honor by any of the intermediate agents through 
whose hands they* pass ; records of private affairs, kept 
solely for the use of the parties concerned in them, and 
which we are not to come upon by stealth, and rifle of 
their information ; and as to infringe the privacy of these 
matters would be stigmatised as indelicate, meddling, 
presumptuous, so it seems to be supposed that there are 
closed documents in nature into which we are forbidden to 

* * When I see,' said Sir George Savile, in a speech seventy years 
ago, * when I see a rivulet flow to the top of a high rock, and re- 
quiring a strong engine to force it back again, then shall I think 
that freedom of inquiry will be prejudicial to truth.' 



240 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

look, private processes going on into which we have no 
right to intrude, truths existing which are not to be pro- 
faned by our scrutiny, and to attempt to make ourselves 
acquainted with these is unjustifiable audacity and pre- 
sumption. If this prejudice does not often assume the 
definite form here ascribed to it, it may frequently be 
found exerting an influence without a distinct conscious- 
ness in the mind over which it prevails.* 

* When the writer penned this passage some twenty years ago, he 
little thought of the future re-appearance of the prejudice amongst 
men of education, even in a more palpable form. A clergyman has 
in a recent publication denounced geological investigations as not 
8 subjects of lawful inquiry,' ' shrouded from us by a higher power,' 
to be reckoned ' a dark art dangerous and disreputable.' This state- 
ment (for I have not seen the book) is given on the authority of Dr. 
Pye Smith, in his able and valuable work, ■ On the Relation between 
the Holy Scriptures and some Parts of Geological Science,' p. 193. 
The cry of danger, it appears, is not confined to interrogating 
nature, but extends even to researches into historical documents, 
* Scarcely,' says Dr. Wiseman, speaking of the discovery of the key 
to the hieroglyphical proper names, ' scarcely was it announced to 
Europe, when timid minds took the alarm and reprobated it as tend- 
ing to lead men to dangerous investigations.' — Lectures on the Con- 
nection between Science and Revealed Religion, vol ii. p. 76. How 
Btrikiogly contrasted with the bigotry here noticed is the noble decla- 
ration of the present Archbishop of Dublin : — ■ As we must not dare 
to withhold or disguise revealed religions truth, so we must dread 
the progress of no other truth. We must not imitate the bigotted 
Papists who imprisoned Galileo ; and step forward, Bible in hand 
(like the profane Israelites carrying the ark of God into the field of 
battle), to check the inquiries of the geologist, the astronomer, or 
the political economist, from an apprehension that the cause of 
religion can be endangered by them. Any theory, on whatever sub- 
ject that is really sound, can never be inimical to a religion founded 
on truth ; and any that is unsound may be refuted by arguments 
drawn from observation and experiment, without calling in the aid 
of revelation.'— Essa ys on St. Paul, p. 36. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 241 

A more striking instance of a completely false analogy 
could not be adduced. There is not a single point of 
resemblance throughout the whole field of knowledge to 
these little secrets, the offspring of human weakness, or the 
indispensable resources of human imperfection. There is 
no secret in the natural or the moral world, sacred from the 
investigation of man. Here there can be no presumption, 
no undue boldness, no counterpart at all* to the audacious- 
ness of one person intruding upon the privacy of another. 
All that man has to guard against, and that simply for his 
own sake, is error ; his vigilance is required only to insure 
that his facts are properly ascertained, and his inferences 
correctly deduced. The presumption he has to repress, is 
not any presumption in relation to other beings in possession 
of secrets, which he is trying clandestinely to wrest from 
them, but merely the presumption of drawing positive and 
ample conclusions from doubtful and slender premises, of 
supposing that he has discovered what he has not, that he 
has succeeded where he has only failed, that he has done 
what still remains to be accomplished \ in a word, the 
presumption of overrating his own achievements. Here 
indeed a man may err in self-confidence, but an evil can- 
not obviously arise from searching too far, which is best 
remedied by searching farther, by closer reasoning and 
more rigorous investigation. 

The strangest absurdities indeed would be involved in 
the supposition that we could possibly reach to knowledge, 
"which we ought not to attain. We are placed in this 
world by the Creator of the universe, surrounded with 
certain objects and endowed with certain faculties. From 
these objects, with these faculties, it is implied by the 
hypothesis under consideration, we may extort secrets 
which he never designed to be known, extract information 
which Omnipotence wished to withhold. 
16 



242 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

The second of the prejudices above enumerated, that 
we may contract guilt if in the course of our researches 
we miss the right conclusion, and had therefore better let 
inquiry alone, is still more prevalent and influential in 
preventing those investigations which it is our duty to 
make. On a former occasion * it has been shown, that 
nothing can be more at variance with reason, than an 
apprehension of this nature. As our opinions on any 
subject are not voluntary acts but involuntary effects, in 
whatever conclusions our researches terminate, they can 
involve us in no culpability. All that we have to take 
care of, as will be more largely shown hereafter, is to 
bestow on every subject an adequate and impartial atten- 
tion. Having done this we have discharged our duty, 
and it would be irrational and unmanly to entertain any 
apprehension for the result. 

In fact, there is the grossest inconsistency in the preju- 
dice now under consideration. If we may contract guilt 
by searching after truth, we may equally do it by re- 
maining in our present state. The reason alleged in the 
prejudice itself, and the only reason which can be as- 
signed with any plausibility why we may commit an 
offence by embarking in any inquiry, is that we may by so 
doing miss the right conclusion, or in other words, fall into 
error ; for no one would seriously contend that we could 
incur any moral culpability by an investigation which 
conducted us to the truth. But it is obvious that we may 
equally miss the right conclusion by remaining in our 
actual opinions. It is then incumbent on us to ascertain 
whether we are committing an offence by remaining in 
them. In other words, it is necessary to examine whether 
those opinions are true. Thus the reason assigned for not 

* Essay on the Formation of Opinions. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 243 

inquiring, leads to the' conclusion that it is necessary to 
inquire. 

Let those, then, who fear lest investigation should lead 
them astray, reflect that they have no security from de- 
ception in their present state ; and that if mere error 
could be a ground of offence, remaining in error, through 
supineness or needless apprehension, must be a much 
heavier transgression than falling into error by the dis- 
charge of their duty in diligent and faithful inquiry. 

A man, indeed, after the best and most dispassionate , 
investigation of an important subject, may naturally feel 
a degree of anxiety lest he should, after all, have missed 
the truth ; but in this anxiety there is not or ought not to 
be, the slightest admixture of moral uneasiness. It is an 
anxiety, lest his conclusions, when they come to form the 
grounds of his actions or of his instructions to others, 
should lead to consequences which he did not anticipate. 
His conclusions may be wrong, and the consequences 
disastrous ; but if he has a proper view of the matter, he 
will feel none of the stings of remorse, not the faintest 
accusation of conscience. Having inquired to the best of 
his power, he has done all that depended on himself, and 
would exhibit little wisdom were he to torment himself 
with reproaches for an unfortunate issue. 

The third prejudice we have to consider is, that acqui- 
escence in received opinions, or forbearing (according to 
the common phrase) to think for ourselves, evinces a 
degree of humility highly proper and commendable. 

If we examine the matter closely, nevertheless, we shall 
find that it usually evinces nothing but a great degree of 
indolent presumption or intellectual cowardice. There is 
often, in truth, as great a measure of presumption in this 
species of acquiescence as in the boldest hypothesis which 
the human invention can start. That received or estab- 



244 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

lished opinions are true, is one of those sweeping conclu- 
sions, which would require very strong reasons and often 
elaborate research to justify it. On what grounds are 
they considered to be true by one who declines investiga- 
tion ? Because (on the most favorable supposition) they 
have been handed down to us by our predecessors, and 
have been held with unhesitating faith by a multitude of 
illustrious men. But what comprehensive reasons are 
these ? What investigation it would require to show they 
were valid ! As the whole history of mankind teems with 
instances of the transmission of the grossest errors from 
one generation to another, and of their having been coun- 
tenanced by the concurrence of the most eminent of the 
race ; what a large acquaintance with the peculiarities of 
the generations preceding us, and with the circumstances 
of the great men to whom we appeal, it would require to 
show that this particular instance was an exemption from 
the general lot ! 

It is then no humility to refrain from inquiry, on the 
contrary, it is the proper kind of humility (or if it is not 
humility, it is the proper feeling for the occasion) to be 
determined to do all in our power to make ourselves ac- 
quainted with every subject on which it is necessary for 
us to pronounce, or profess, or act upon an opinion. 

From the necessity of using our own judgment, or, in 
other words, of forming a conclusion for ourselves, we 
cannot be absolved. We must form our opinions either 
of the doctrine itself, or of the comparative degrees of 
confidence to which those men who have studied the 
subject are entitled ; and it is evident that in the case of 
disputed doctrines, the latter may be as difficult, - and 
demand as much investigation, as much knowledge and 
acuteness of judgment, as to come to a decision on the 
original question. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 245 

Let no one, then, deceive himself by supposing that he 
is exercising the virtue of humility, or modesty, or diffi- 
dence, when he is in fact resting in a conclusion, which to 
reach legitimately would require so much knowledge and 
ability. Nor let any one suppose that such a plea will 
exonerate him, in certain circumstances, from the imper- 
ative duty of entering upon a rigorous examination of all 
the evidence within his reach. Far from being a virtue, 
this kind of acquiescence is in most cases a positive vice, 
tending to stop all advancement in knowledge and all 
improvement in practice. 

From the preceding review it appears that all these 
prejudices are equally unfounded ; that there are no 
forbidden truths, to which inquiry may conduct us, no 
secret fields of knowledge on which we can possibly 
trespass ; that the result of inquiry, whatever it may be, 
can involve us in no criminality ; and, lastly, that it is no 
true humility to refrain from investigation in deference to 
the authority of others. 

Let the inquirer, then, enter on his task with full con- 
fidence that he is embarking in no criminal, or forbidden, 
or presumptuous enterprise, but is, on the contrary, en- 
gaging in the discharge of a duty. Let him be as cir- 
cumspect as he pleases in collecting his facts and deducing 
his conclusions, cautious in the process, but fearless in the 
result. Let him be fully aware of his liability to error, of 
the thousand sources of illusion, of the limited powers of 
the individual, of the paramount importance of truth ; but 
let him dismiss all conscientious apprehensions of the 
issue of an investigation, conducted with due application 
of mind and rectitude of purpose. 

As there are some prejudices which are hostile to inquiry, 
so there are some principles of an opposite character, the 
full and adequate conviction of which essentially conduces 



246 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

to promote it. Amongst these is the truth that knowledge 
is progressive, and that in this progress every age is 
placed in a more advantageous position for the compre- 
hension of any subject of science than the last. Every 
inquirer, therefore, finds himself on higher ground than 
his predecessors ; he can avail himself of their latest 
acquisitions without the labor of original discovery, and 
thus, with unbroken spirits and unsubdued vigor, he can 
commence his career at the ultimate boundary of theirs. 
Hence, without any presumption in the superiority of his 
faculties, he may hope to attain views more compre- 
hensive and correct, than were enjoyed by men who 
immeasurably transcended him in capacity.* All the ad- 
vantage, nevertheless, which he has over his precursors, 
his successors will have over him. All his exertions will 
tend to place them above him ; and the very truths which 
he discovers, should he be fortunate enough to discover 
any, will give them the power of detecting the errors with 
which all truths on their first manifestation in any mind 
are inevitably conjoined. 

In such considerations as these there might be some- 
thing to deter a man of narrow views and selfish feelings. 
That his opinions should be thus scrutinized and exam- 
ined, and their imperfections detected ; that in process of 
time he should lose his rank as an oracle on the subject 
of his exertions, and be superseded by after-sages, might 



* ' We can adopt at the present day,' remarks Pascal, ' different 
sentiments and new opinions, without despising the ancients, or 
treating them with ingratitude, since the elementary knowledge they 
left us served as steps for our own. We are indebted to them for 
our superiority ; and, standing on an elevation to which they have 
conducted us, the least effort raises us still higher ; and with less 
toil and less glory too, we find ourselves above them.' — Thoughts, 
chap, xx vi. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 247 

have any other effect than that of stimulating him to ex- 
ertion. To a man of real genius, however, a man of 
large and liberal understanding, and as large and liberal 
feelings, these considerations are at once replete with 
satisfaction and encouragement, and destructive of undue 
self-importance and complacency. 

When he looks back on his predecessors, he appreciates 
the advantages of his position, and can thus, without 
undue self-estimation, indulge a fair hope that by strenu- 
ous exertions his own works may form one of the steps 
in the intellectual progress of the race, and constitute him 
the author of benefits to be indefinitely perpetuated. 
When he looks forward, while he exults in the coming 
glories of progressive knowledge, and anticipates with 
delight the development of truths which he is never to 
know, he feels a perfect confidence that any real service 
which he may render to literature or science will be duly 
appreciated, and rejoices that any errors into which he 
may unconsciously wander will do little injury, because 
they will be speedily corrected. 

Knowing that were he even the Newton of his age, he 
must be eventually outstripped, he considers such an in- 
cident as nowise derogatory to his talents or reputation : 
agitated by none of the jealousy which is too common a 
disgrace to men who ought to rise superior to the weak- 
ness of such a passion, he even feels a desire that he may 
be outstripped in his own lifetime, a curiosity to know by 
what modifications his own doctrines will be corrected : 
he is on the watch for new discoveries, because he knows 
that there are minds which, having mastered preceding 
knowledge, are in a condition to make them. 

It has been frequently stigmatized as presumptuous and 
overweening vanity in a man of the present day to fancy 
himself superior to men of past times ; but the view of 



248 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OP TRUTH. 

the subject here exhibited annihilates all such imputations. 
It takes away all color of disrespect from the closest 
scrutiny of the efforts of his predecessors. He is con- 
scious that in the most successful controversy, if contro- 
versy it may be called, which he may institute with them, 
the greatest success cannot be considered as any personal 
superiority on his part over the object of his remarks; he 
knows that it is the superiority of the station to which his 
own times have carried him ; and thus the profoundest 
respect is compatible with the freest examination. What 
does he admire in the great philosophers of past ages ? 
Not surely their errors, perhaps not one of their unquali- 
fied opinions ; but he admires the reach of thought which, 
from the then level of knowledge, could touch on truths 
the full and perfect mastery of which was to be the work 
of future ages, the slow result of the successive efforts of 
persevering and vigorous minds. 

Such a view of the progressive character of human 
knowledge as this, would wonderfully facilitate the pursuit 
of truth. No single principle with which we are ac- 
quainted would have so salutary an influence in promoting 
candor, liberality, openness to conviction, self-knowledge, 
proper caution, and proper fearlessness. 



CHAPTER III. 

DUTIES IN THE PROCESS OF INQUIRY. 

Whether the preceding chapter has succeeded or not, 
in describing the circumstances which reader it obligatory 
upon mankind to undertake the investigation of any sub- 
ject, it will be allowed by all, that when it is the duty of 
men to enter upon inquiry, it is also their duty to adopt 
the best means in their power for bringing it to a success- 
ful issue ; or, in other words, for arriving at the truth. 
And even when inquiry is optional and voluntary, no other 
course can be wisely or consistently pursued. 

Now the success of investigation, as far as the inquirer 
can influence it, depends on two circumstances, the state 
of mind on which he enters upon the inquiry, and the 
conduct which he pursues in relation to the evidence 
accessible to him. 

Let us examine what are the duties of the inquirer in 
reference to each. 

SECTION I. 

DUTIES OF THE INQUIRER IN RELATION TO THE STATE OF HIS 
OWN MIND. 

No one who has been accustomed to discriminate the 
phenomena of the world within him can doubt that there 
are certain states of mind favorable to success in the 
pursuit of truth, while there are others of an opposite 



250 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

character. These, it is necessary for our present pur-" 
pose to investigate, for unless we clearly understand their 
nature, we can fully comprehend neither how far they are 
within our control nor to what extent they are matters of 
duty. These mental conditions may be classed for con- 
venience under the heads of moral and intellectual, the 
former comprehending our desires and emotions, the 
latter, our opinions or modes of thinking. 

In entering upon any inquiry, it is obvious that we may 
be possessed with desires and affections relating to the 
subject, or to the issue of the investigation, and also with 
preconceived opinions respecting it, both of which may 
have a material influence on the result. We may feel, 
for instance, a lively affection for a doctrine, an irrepres- 
sible desire to find it confirmed by examination, and a 
conviction of its truth, not the less strong for having no 
dependence on any process of reasoning ; or, on the other 
hand, we may proceed to the investigation with an utter 
indifference to the issue, and without any decided opinion 
at all on the subject, or even under the emotions of dis- 
taste and antipathy. 

So varied, indeed, are the combinations of intellect and 
feeling under the influence of which we may commence 
any investigation, that they must be consigned to the re- 
collection or imagination of the reader ; but amidst all 
this variety it is not difficult to point out, with sufficient 
precision, both the moral and the intellectual states most 
favorable to the attainment of truth. 

The most favorable moral condition in which the in- 
quirer can be, is, unquestionably, when he is possessed 
with a simple and fervent desire to arrive at the truth 
without any predilection in behalf of any opinion what- 
ever, and without any other disturbing emotion of hope 
or fear, affection or dislike. ' To be indifferent,' says 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 



251 



Locke, 'which of two opinions is true, is the right temper 
of mind that preserves it from being imposed on, and \ 
disposes it to examine with that indifferency, till it has \ 
done its best to find the truth — and this is the only direct 
and safe way to it. But to be indifferent whether we 
embrace falsehood or truth is the great road to error.' * 

If a man is possessed with a desire to find a given 
opinion true, or to confirm himself in a doctrine which he 
already entertains, he will, in all probability, bestow an 
undue attention on the arguments and evidence in its 
favor, to the partial or total neglect of opposite consider- 
ations ; but if he is free from all wishes of this kind, if he 
has no predilection to gratify, if his desires are directed 
solely to the attainment of correct views, he will naturally 
search for information wherever it is likely to present 
itself; he will be without motive for partiality, and sus- 
ceptible of the full force of evidence, 

However unaccountable it may at first sight appear, it 
is a fact, that few human beings, in their moral, religious, 
and political inquiries, are possessed with this simple 
desire of attaining truth ; their strongest wishes are di- 
rected to the discovery of new grounds for adhering to 
opinions already formed ; and they are as deaf to argu- 
ments on the opposite side, as they are alive to evidence 
in favor of their own views. The pure wish to arrive at 
truth is indeed as rare as the integrity which strictly 
observes the golden rule to act towards others as we 
would wish others to act towards us.f For this several 
reasons may be assigned. A principal one is, that men's 
interests are often indissolubly connected with the preva- 

* Conduct of the Understanding, § 12. 

t * The impartial lovers and searchers of truth,' says Locke, ' are 
a great deal fewer than one could wish or imagine.' — Letter to Mr, 
Samuel Bold. Works ; vol. ix. p. 316. 



252 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

lence of a certain opinion ; they are, therefore, naturally 
anxious to find out every possible ground why this 
opinion should be held ; their personal consequence, too, 
is often implicated in its support; they are pledged by 
their rank or office, or previous declarations, to the main- 
tenance of a determinate line of argument, and they feel 
that it would be a disparagement to their intellectual 
powers and to their reputation in the world were it proved 
to be unsound. 

Another reason is, that such opinions are sometimes 
really objects of affection, and things of habit. We are 
accustomed to regard them as true ; we love them as 
the rallying points of pleasant ideas and cherished feelings, 
and we are troubled and even pained when they are pre- 
sented to us in a different light. 

In addition to all this, men are glad to find in their 
opinions some excuse for their practices. They naturally, 
therefore, wish to meet with a confirmation of those doc- 
trines which are conducive to their self-complacency. 

These, and other similar circumstances, create in the 
mind a desire to find some given opinion true ; and, of 
course, as far as their influence reaches, extinguish all 
aspirations and efforts to arrive at the truth. 

Even when any one entertains a sincere desire to form 
correct opinions on any subject, the feelings or emotions 
associated with it in his own mind may interfere to disturb 
his intellectual views. It is, perhaps, possible to conceive 
a man possessed with a genuine wish to arrive at the 
truth, notwithstanding a feeling of affection or compla- 
cency for some particular doctrine ; and endued with 
such self-control as not to allow a feeling of that kind to 
influence his mode of conducting the investigation ; but 
he cannot prevent it from shedding an influence on his 
thoughts. Strive as he may, all the considerations favor- 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 253 

able to the doctrine in question will spontaneously rise to 
his view with more frequency and vividness, and remain 
longer above the intellectual horizon than those of an op- 
posite character. 

The same effect will frequently take place from an 
apparently contrary cause. A man may feel a dislike for 
a certain conclusion ; he may dread to find it true ; and 
this very sentiment may direct his thoughts upon it so 
exclusively as to assist in bringing about the conviction 
which he wishes to shun.* 

In both these cases — in that of affection for a doctrine 
as well as that of dislike — the consequent judgment will 
probably be wrong, since whatever fixes the whole atten- 
tion on part of the evidence tends to vitiate the conclusions 
drawn by the understanding. A signal instance of the 
power of fear to cause erroneous judgments in this way, 
occurred in the middle of the last century. It happened 
that in the year 1750, on the 8th of February, the shock 
of an earthquake was felt in London. Precisely four 
weeks afterwards, on the 8th of March, a similar shock 
occurred. The people became alarmed, and their fears 
jumped to the conclusion (absurdly enough) that a third 
shock would take place after the lapse of a similar period. 
Meanwhile an insane life-guardsman, excited no doubt bv 
the prevalent apprehension, went about predicting that 
the cities of London and Westminster would be utterly 
destroyed on the 5th of April. If the matter had not 

* Locke thus vividly describes the despotism of passion : — 

* Matters that are recommended to our thoughts by any of- our pas- 
sions take possession of our minds with a kind of authority, and will 
not be kept out or dislodged; but as if the passion that rules were 
for the time the sheriff of the place, and came with all the posse, 
the understanding is seized and taken with the object it introduces 
as if it had a legal right to be alone considered there.' — Conduct of 
the Understanding, § 45. 



254 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

appealed to their fears, a prediction from such a person 
would have been ridiculed, as there could be no grounds for 
ascribing to him any supernatural powers. As it was, a 
ready credence was yielded to his prophecy. Before the 
dreaded hour arrived, thousands fled from the apprehended 
catastrophe into the country. Some passed the night in 
their carriages, not being able to procure accommodations 
in the neighboring towns; others betook themselves to the 
river, and lay all night in boats, while crowds waited for 
the dawn of the eventful day in the open fields.* The 
shame and mortification which these parties felt when the 
day had passed without the expected convulsion proved 
how egregiously their fears had misled their judgment. 
Being able now to view, dispassionately, the very same 
evidence which they had previously had before them, but 
which they could not perceive, all the absurdity of their 
anticipations flashed upon their minds. 

The influence of strong feelings in circumscribing the 
intellectual vision is not the least remarkable when they 
are habitually associated with a subject, so that whenever 
the subject enters the mind, the feeling accompanies it. 
Take, for example, the case of awe. If a man is habitu- 
ally laboring under this affection, in regard to the subject 
to be examined, or to the issue of the investigation, it is 
astonishing how limited will be the scope of his thoughts, 
how few and how monotonous the conceptions to which 
the subject will give rise. The accompanying downcast 

* The affair is thus mentioned by Horace Walpole, in one of his 
Letters, dated Wednesday, April 4, 1750. * I return to the earth- 
quake, which I had mistaken ; it is to be to-day. This frantic 
terror prevails so much, that within these three days seven hundred 
and thirty coaches have been counted passing Hyde Park Corner, 
with whole parties removing into the country.* — Letters, vol. ii. p. 
328, ed. 1840. 



• ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 255 

look fixed on a few inches of the ground is an apt emblem 
of the narrow range of ideas which attends the feeling. 

It may be questioned whether this kind of constraint 
ever exists in any intensity in a mind which is occupied 
with a genuine desire after truth ; fear of the result of 
investigation at least can hardly exist there ; but if even a 
fainter tone of the feeling predominate, it will prevent 
that quickness of conception, comparison, inference, which 
would otherwise be brought to bear on the inquiry. How- 
ever this may be, the fact is, that the state of mind in 
question is generally found attended by a desire to receive 
confirmation in our habitual opinions. Men are alarmed 
when, in departments of knowledge over which the solem- 
nity of awe has diffused itself, they aligKt on any new 
ground, or, in other words, on any doctrines at variance 
with received principles ; and their wishes are usually 
pointed to a corroboration of the views already familiar to 
their contemplation, and which neither startle their timidity 
nor task their understandings. 

From this brief review, it appears that the emotions 
described produce two effects : they create desires for 
some result other than the simple attainment of truth ; 
and even when they create no desires of this kind, they 
suggest ideas which would not have otherwise entered the 
mind ; or what is equally effectual, they prevent ideas 
from entering which would have otherwise been sug- 
gested. 

Important as are the favorable and unfavorable states of 
mind to trre inquirer in relation to the pursuit of truth, 
they are not more so than the intellectual. In any given 
mind, the intellectual state most favorable for the attain- 
ment of truth is obviously freedom from preconceived 
errors. The pre-occupation of the understanding by 
erroneous opinions is one of the greatest impediments 



256 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

which offer themselves in the pursuit of accurate know- 
ledge. The mere pre-occupancy itself is an obstacle 
scarcely to be overcome ; but as the opinions thus lodged 
are generally the objects of fondness or veneration, the 
task of removing them becomes almost hopeless. No 
language can describe with sufficient force the tenacity 
with which early received notions are retained : they 
seem to enter into the very essence of the soul, to weave 
themselves into the tissue of the understanding, till it 
transcends the power of conception to imagine them erro- 
neous. In those notions especially, which are coeval with 
our earliest recollections, and the origin of which we can- 
not trace, we seem incapable of suspecting the slightest 
error.* 

When such notions are combined with that kind of rev- 
erential fear which we have already described, there is no 
degree of absurdity to which they may not rise. A mod- 
ern writer, in his travels through Mesopotamia, relates that 
at Orfah (the ancient Ur of the Chaldees), the river and 
the fish in it are regarded as sacred to Abraham, and the 
inhabitants firmly believe that if any of the fish were 
caught, no process of cooking could make any impression 
on their bodies. Here is a notion which the people might 
at once put to the test by direct trial ; a fact which they 
have only to stretch out their hands to verify or disprove ; 
yet so thoroughly pre-occupied are their minds by the 
prejudice instilled in early infancy, and such awe do they 

* ■ If the minds of men,* says Hobbe3, c were all of white paper, 
they would all most equally be disposed to acknowledge whatsoever 
should be in right method, and by right ratiocination delivered to 
them : but when men have once acquiesced in untrue opinions, and 
registered them as authentical records in their minds, it is no less 
impossible to speak intelligibly to such men, than to write legibly 
upon a paper already scribbled over.' — Human Nature, chap. x. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 257 

feel in relation to it, that they have not, according to the 
account, the slightest suspicion of its absurdity, and would 
think it profane to attempt to submit it to the ordeal of 
actual experiment. Whether the superstition is really so 
gross as here represented or not, it hardly surpasses in 
that respect instances nearer home. 

Combining the states which we have attempted to de- 
scribe, we have a union of qualifications which every 
lover of knowledge, every inquirer into the facts of his- 
tory and the laws of nature should aim at attaining ; a , 
simple desire to arrive at the truth, a freedom from dis- 
turbing passion, and a freedom from preconceived errone- 
ous opinions. 

Of these qualifications, the genuine desire for truth 
may be considered the most valuable, while it is not the 
least rare. If it is not the mark, it is at least the indis- 
pensable attribute of a great mind. United with a large 
and comprehensive understanding, it places a man amongst 
the most efficient benefactors of his species. ' The love 
of truth,' says a writer whom we take a pleasure in 
quoting, c a deep thirst for it, a deliberate purpose to seek 
and hold it fast, may be considered as the very foundation 
of human culture and dignity.' * 

Were mankind in general possessed with this desire in 
any great degree of purity and intenseness, many errors 
might undoubtedly still prevail in the world from , the 
limited powers of the human intellect ; but it is easy, to 
see how much the progress of knowledge would be accel- 
erated, and how soon the traces of illiberality and intol- 
erance would be swept from social intercourse and civil 
institutions. 

Men, in fact, are usually in the appropriate condition of 
mind here described when they enter on the study of phys- 

* Dr. Charming on the Elevation of the Laboring Classes. 
17 



258 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

ical and mathematical science : their sole object is to know 
all that is to be known, they seldom have any passions 
connected with the truths before them, and in general 
they are perfectly aware of their own ignorance. 

If the states of mind favorable and unfavorable to the 
pursuit of truth, of which we have now taken a survey, 
were the result of volition, if, in other words, we had but 
to exert our will at any time, in order to produce or to put 
an end to them, the course of our duty in relation to our 
own mental condition would be plain and simple. We 
should then be bound by the clearest obligations of moral- 
ity to dismiss from our minds all hope and fear, affection 
and hatred, preconceived opinions and habitual associa- 
tions, and approach the consideration of the subject with 
that perfect indifference for the issue of the investigation 
and that single love of truth which form the most effectual 
security against error. All this has accordingly been 
sometimes enjoined on the inquirer by the liberal and the 
enlightened, who, in their anxiety to promote a good 
cause, have overlooked for the moment, the nature of 
their moral and intellectual constitution. They have 
fallen into the mistake of requiring what cannot be 
performed. 

' If,' says a writer of this class, ; we heartily desire the 
purchase of truth, we must shake off the prejudices which 
custom and education have loaded us with.' — 'Make it 
your business, then/ he continues, 8 to extirpate all preju- 
dices, to clear your minds of all sorts of prepossessions, to 
wipe out all tinctures, and thereby to make way for truth 
to enter into your souls, and to take possession of them.' 
— ' If we would be masters of truth, our best course is to 
rid our minds for once of all our preconceived opinions, 
to quit our most beloved representations of things, to 
destroy our old notices, to cast away our former preju- 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH, 259 

dices, and so to prepare our minds for the reception of 
truth.' * 

Such injunctions would be excellent were they practi- 
cable. Every one, however, who will take the trouble of 
reflecting on what passes in his own breast must be sensi- 
ble from his proper experience how impossible it is to 
suppress or discard any preconceptions and feelings of this 
nature by a mere effort of the will. No human being has 
any such power over his understanding and affections. 

6 Though I might find numerous precedents,' says a late, 
eminent writer, ' I shall not desire the reader to strip his 
mind of all prejudices, or to keep all prior systems out of 
view during his examination of the present. For, in 
truth, such requests appear to me not much unlike the 
advice given to hypochondriacal patients in Dr. Buchan's 
Domestic Medicine ; viz. to preserve themselves uniformly 
tranquil and in good spirits.' f 

A man who has been brought up in ardent admiration 
of certain doctrines, imbued with a strong affection for 
them, and impressed with a perfect conviction of their 

* A Free Discourse concerning Truth and Error, by John Edwards, 
D. D., pp. 884, 385. Descartes has a passage much to the same 
effect : — ' Itaque ad serio philosophandum Teritatemque omnium 
rerum cognoscib ilium indagandum, primo omnia prejudicia sunt de- 
ponenda ; sive accurate est cavendum, ne ullis ex opinionibus olim 
a nobis receptis fidem habeamus, nisi prius, iis ad novum examen 
revocatis, veras esse comperiamus.' — Princ. Phil., Pars Prima, 
§ lxxv. 

Bacon seems to have contemplated the possibility of such a ' de- 
position ' of prejudices in an often-quoted passage: — ' No one has yet 
been found of so constant and severe a mind, as to have determined 
and tasked himself utterly to abolish theories and common notions, 
and to apply his intellect altogether smooth and even, to particulars 
anew.' 

t Coleridge's Biographia Literaria, vol. i. p. 238. 



260 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

truth, has no power to lay down these feelings at pleas- 
ure. They have been the slow result of years, the gradual 
product of innumerable circumstances, and we might as 
well ask him to divest himself of the recollections of his 
youth, as of these affections for what he was taught 
in it. 

It is always injurious, always destructive of happiness, 
to require or to aim at more in the code of morality than 
can be possibly accomplished, more than depends on a 
man's self ; and it therefore becomes necessary to ascer- 
tain, what, in this respect, is really practicable. Although 
an individual cannot at pleasure lay down his preconceived 
notions, nor dismiss his hopes and fears by a mere act of 
volition, nor cast off his attachments or antipathies when 
he chooses, and it would consequently be idle in him to 
consider these things as duties on his own part, or to en- 
force them on others ; yet he has in his power one very 
important means of indirectly attaining the end in view, 
or, at least, of neutralizing in a great measure the sinister 
influence of his passions and prejudices : he can at all 
times make himself perfectly acquainted with the state of 
his own mind. If he has a strong conviction on any sub- 
ject, he can examine whether it has been the result of 
regular deduction, or whether the opinion lies in his 
understanding unconnected with any premises, just as it 
was placed there by others ; if he loves or dislikes a 
doctrine, self-introspection will show him the extent and 
the origin of the affection : if he desires or dreads any 
particular issue of the investigation on which he is called 
to enter, the intensity and the foundation of this prospec- 
tive emotion will appear to his c inward eye.' By thus 
making the condition of his own mind the subject of scru- 
tiny, he can scarcely fail to reduce the influence of such 
moral and intellectual prepossessions as are lodged there. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 261 

The more closely he examines himself, the freer he will 
be from the danger of improper bias. 

Whatever effect an examination of this kind may have 
on his habitual feelings, it seems eminently adapted to 
loosen the power of all preconceived notions. To be fully 
aware that the opinions we have hitherto held exist in our 
understandings, simply because they have been put there 
by some external agency, and not as the result of any 
process of reasoning on our own parts ; that they are, in 
fact, as far as we are concerned, mere matters of chance,- 
while it cannot fail to make us eager to rescue ourselves 
from so unenviable a condition, is almost tantamount to 
the power of extirpating them from our minds before we 
commence the proposed investigation. Conceive, for a 
moment, the effect which must ensue from the inquirer 
attaining to a clear perception that the opinions he enter- 
tains on any given subject lie in his mind unsupported by 
the slightest evidence. He believes them ; he is fond of 
them ; but in vain does he cast about for any reasons on 
which they repose. 

Here, then, is the precise and the only duty of the in- 
quirer in relation to the state of his own mind — to exam- 
ine closely what that state is with regard to the subject 
which he is called to investigate. This preliminary task 
is no doubt sufficiently difficult to all those who have not 
been accustomed to reflect on the phenomena of con- 
sciousness ; and to them the duty may not appear very 
perspicuous or very determinate. It is, nevertheless, in- 
cumbent on them as far as their ability reaches ; it is also 
part of that process of inquiry through which they must 
pass in order to attain the benefits of truth ; and even to 
be aware that such a self-examination is requisite, is a 
step in advance to their object. 

To men of thought, to philosophers, to those who pro- 



262 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

fess to teach any subject, and especially to all who are 
avowedly engaged in the pursuit of truth for its own sake, 
such a close investigation into the state of their own minds 
is not more an imperative duty, than one of the most 
beneficial and salutary tasks which they can undertake. 
Always to commence at this point, will be found an im- 
mense advantage, not only in prosecuting the inquiry into 
which they are to enter, but in showing them how exceed- 
ingly few are the subjects on which even the most enlight- 
ened minds have any pretensions to being positive and 
dogmatical. 

What is the intellectual condition in which a man of 
even the most liberal education finds himself on attaining 
a mature age, and being roused to independent reflection ? 
He awakes in the midst of a chaos of heterogeneous opin- 
ions, which have been determined to be what they are by 
a long series of causes, and have been received into his 
mind by unconscious adoption, or fixed by assiduous in- 
culcation, as objects of affection and reverence. He finds 
himself (to use the expressive language of Turgot) in a 
, labyrinth into which he has been conveyed blindfold. 
Upon the grounds of these opinions he has scarcely be- 
stowed a thought, and yet has probably often contended 
for them with a warmth, a resentment at opposition, and 
positiveness of language, which rational conviction shrinks 
from assuming. 

Placed in this disadvantageous condition, let him inva- 
riably make it his first business, when he is required by 
duty, or led by inclination, to investigate a subject, to ex- 
amine the origin and grounds of the affections and preju- 
dices of his own mind relating to it. Nothing will more 
powerfully tend to disenchant him of his delusions, or to 
save him from that arrogant presumption in himself and 
condemnation of others, which is one of the commonest 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 263 

failings both of the vulgar and the refined. A dogmatical 
assertion of opinions will scarcely be the fault of one who 
continually falls back on his own understanding, to ask 
whether he holds the positions he is maintaining, from 
having mastered the evidence in their favor, or from their 
having been fixed in his belief without any evidence at all. 

SECTION II. 

DUTIES IN RELATION TO THE EVIDENCE. 

However difficult or impracticable it may be for a man 
to bring himself into the most favorable state of mind for 
the attainment of truth, before he commences any inquiry 
to which his duty may summon him ; the next thing is 
largely, if not entirely, in his power, and that is the mode 
of conducting the examination. Here his path is plain, 
and his duty, although far from easy, is manifest. The 
only legitimate end of inquiry is to arrive at the truth ; 
and the most likely means of attaining that end is to pur- 
sue it with adequate diligence and rigorous impartiality. 
This, then, is his simple duty, to examine fully and fairly. 
The same reasons which require him to enter upon any 
investigation, demand that it shall be properly and effi- 
ciently conducted. As without examination he can have 
no valid assurance that he is teaching truth, or acting on 
just principles, so he can have no valid assurance on these 
points, unless the examination be prosecuted in the like- 
liest way to bring it to a successful issue. The duty of 
inquiring at all involves the duty of inquiring in the best 
practicable manner, and this comprehends the union of 
adequate application with strict impartiality. 

The value of that diligence of examination, which leaves 
no accessible part of a subject unexplored, is scarcely to 



264 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

be overrated. When we reflect on the various knowledge 
required to determine any important question, the number 
of considerations bearing upon it, the subtilty and com- 
plexity of the reasonings to which it may give rise, the 
apparent contradictions and anomalies which the whole 
inquiry may present, we shall be sensible how indispensa- 
bly necessary to the attainment of truth is a sedulous ap- 
plication to the task. To perform it effectually, we must 
not only merely adopt but think out for ourselves every 
proposition contained in the chain of argument, as well as 
satisfy our minds in regard to every alleged fact in the 
chain of evidence. 

No difficult subject (and most subjects likely to call for 
express investigation are either naturally or factitiously 
difficult) can be mastered with a cursory attention. It 
has been well remarked, in reference to the necessity of 
every one really thinking on these cases for himself, that 
no complex or very important truth can be transplanted 
in full maturity from one mind to another ; it must be 
sown, strike root, and go through the whole process of 
vegetation before it can have a living connection with the 
new soil, and flourish in complete vigor and develop- 
ment. * 

* The exact words of the passage here referred to are as follows : 
1 No complex or very important truth was ever yet transferred in full 
development from one mind to another : truth of that kind is not a 
piece of furniture to be shifted ; it is a seed which must be sown and 
pass through the several stages of growth.' — Letters to a Young 
Man whose Education had been neglected. 

Bacon, Locke, and Wollaston, had all, long before, made a similar 
remark, ( An opinion,' says the latter, • though ever so true and 
certain to one man, cannot be transfused into another as true and 
certain, by any other way but by opening his understanding, and 
assisting him so to order his conceptions, that he may find the rea- 
sonableness of it within himself.' — Religion of Nature, p. 91. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 265 

We are especially apt to be deceived in this respect on 
subjects relating to morals. The terms employed are such 
as are dailv used in the common intercourse of life, and 
we imagine we at once comprehend any doctrines which 
they are the medium of expressing. In physical science, 
where at every step we are encountered by the difficulties 
of a technical phraseology, as well as of practical observa- 
tions and experiments, we immediately feel the necessity 
of a regular application and progression, of mastering one 
principle before we proceed to the next, of carrying our 
object by detail, working our way by vigorous and reitera- 
ted efforts. In moral and political questions, on the con- 
trary, we are too apt to be content with mere cursory 
reading and hasty examination : no difficulties are pre- 
sented by the language, no unusual terms arrest our pro- 
gress, no particular experiments demand a pause to verify 
them, and we glide smoothly along the pages of the pro- 
foundest treatise, with an apparently clear apprehension of 
the various propositions we meet with, but in reality with 
a vague conception of their full drift and precise meaning. 
Hence, people are often deluded into fancying themselves 
competent, after a superficial survey, to pronounce a deci- 
sion on questions requiring severe study, great nicety of 
discrimination, and close logical deduction.* These re- 
sults are partly occasioned also by love of ease, and 
reluctance to intellectual exertion. On difficult subjects, 
inquiry, it is not to be concealed, is laborious; and the 
natural indolence of most men induces them to stop short 

* 8 The habit,' says a distinguished writer, c of dwelling upon the 
verbal expressions of the views of other persons, and of being con- 
tent with such an apprehension of doctrines as a transient notice can 
give us, is fatal to firm and clear thought, it indicates wavering and 
feeble conceptions which are inconsistent with sound physical specula- 
tion.' — Whewell's History of the Inductive Sciences, vol. i. p. 240. 



266 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

of that vigorous application which difficulties require for 
their solution. 

But the man who stops short of full research, although 
he may be fair and impartial as far as he goes, although 
he may entertain no desires adverse to truth, and may 
draw correct inferences from the imperfect collection of 
facts he has made, will probably arrive after all at an un- 
sound conclusion. It is obvious, that if he has not before 
him all those grounds for decision which adequate dili- 
gence might have brought together, he cannot possess the 
utmost attainable certainty that his judgment is right. In 
proportion to the deficiency of his investigation in fulness 
will be, ceteris paribus, his liability to error, and his fail- 
ure to fulfil the obligation resting upon him. An incom- 
plete inquiry must be an incomplete discharge of his duty. 

To those inquirers in particular who are engaged in 
researches, which, if successful, will correct or enlarge 
existing knowledge, diligent and patient attention to every 
part of their subject is invaluable. Not a single proposi- 
tion in the doctrines of others, or in their own deductions, 
should be suffered to pass without the closest scrutiny. 

By long-continued meditation, the most obscure and 
perplexed points will insensibly become clear. Difficul- 
ties will every day crumble before resolute and reiterated 
assaults. 

Persevering diligence in the prosecution of the subject 
is of such powerful efficacy, that it is scarcely a matter of 
wonder to find Newton overlooking his own genius, and 
ascribing his most brilliant discoveries to sheer industry 
and patient thought. ' I keep,' he said, c the subject of my 
inquiry constantly before me, and wait till the first dawn- 
ing opens gradually, by little and little, into a full and 
clear light.' 

Impartiality of examination is, if possible, of still higher 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 267 

value than care and diligence. It is of little importance 
what industry we exert on any subject, if we make all our 
exertions in one direction, if we sedulously close our 
minds against all considerations which we dislike, and 
seek with eagerness for any evidence or argument which 
will confirm our established or favorite views. A life-long 
investigation may, in this way, only carry us farther from 
the truth. What duty and common sense require of us is, 
that our attention be equally given to both sides of every 
question, that we make ourselves thoroughly acquainted 
with all the conflicting arguments, that we be severely 
impartial in weighing the evidence for each, and suffer no 
bias to seduce us into supine omission on the one hand, or 
inordinate rapacity for proof on the other. 

This, too, is any thing but a light and easy task. It can 
be performed to a certain extent by every honest and 
sincere inquirer ; but perhaps to achieve it in perfection, 
would require a mind at once enlarged, sagacious, candid, 
disinterested, and upright. A man who perfectly accom- 
plishes it, however, cannot fail to command the esteem of 
his fellow-men by the worth and dignity of his conduct. 
It is painful to think that such an example is rare ; that 
instead of it we usually find the mere partisan, one evi- 
dently engaged, not in the pursuit of truth, but in search- 
ing for every possible argument to support and confirm a 
conclusion, predetermined by his interest, his prejudices, 
or his position in society. 

What a contrast do these two present! — one candid, 
upright, fearless of the issue of the investigation because 
solely intent on truth, searching on all sides, refusing no 
evidence, anxious only that every circumstance should be 
brought out in its true colors and dimensions, and free 
from anger against opposition ; the other directing ail his 
acuteness to one side, prying into those sources of infor- 



268 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

mation alone where he imagines he shall find what is 
agreeable to his wishes, stating every thing both to him- 
self and to others with the art and exaggeration of a hired 
pleader, sounding forth the immaculate merits of his cause, 
and filled with rancor against all who do not range them- 
selves under the same banners. Or, perhaps, instead of 
this angry partisan, we see (what is equally a humiliating 
spectacle) the timid inquirer moving cautiously along, as 
if alarmed at the sound of his own footsteps, shunning 
every track not palpably well-trodden, and looking at any 
evidence that may chance to cross his path foreign to his 
ordinary train of thought, with as much trepidation as he 
would experience were he to see an apparition rising out 
of the earth. 

The annals of the world abound with instances of the 
most determined obstinacy, in turning away from sources 
of information which it was apprehended might subvert 
established opinions. After the telescope had been invent- 
ed, some of the followers of Aristotle positively refused 
to look through the new instrument, because it threatened 
the overthrow of their master's doctrines and authority, 
or rather of their own dogmas ; and when by means of 
this great invention Galileo had discovered the satellites of 
Jupiter, they were infatuated enough to attempt to write 
down these unwelcome additions to the solar system. 

From the lenient manner in which the faults of negli- 
gent and unfair investigation are generally treated, it 
might seem that they were of small consequence and 
light turpitude. To pronounce them so, however, under 
the circumstances described in a former chapter, would 
be little better than an express contradiction. When any 
one is called to the duty of examination at all, whether 
the subject concerns the relation in which he stands to 
God, or has an important bearing on his conduct to his 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 269 

fellow-creatures, or is a matter on which he has to give 
instruction to others, the vices of partial and inadequate 
examination must by the force of the terms be of serious 
moment. The consequences of bad inquiry will be bad 
practice. Misery will tread on the heels of ignorance ; 
the conduct of the man will be infected with his errors of 
thought, and society will suffer from a course which it has 
not sufficient knowledge or virtue to condemn. 

If, quitting single cases and partial inquiries, we raise 
our views to the effects of these vices in all those great 
investigations which concern the human race at large, we 
shall perceive that far from being of trivial consequence 
they are sources of extensive evil, and that this evil must 
be prolonged and aggravated by considering them in any 
other light. They are nothing less, in fact, than impedi- 
ments to the natural progress of mankind in becoming 
acquainted with what is for their real happiness, and con- 
sequently they are impediments to that happiness itself. 

The only improvement in the condition of mankind, 
that can be rationally expected, is from their gradually 
emancipating themselves from the various errors and mul- 
tiform ignorance in which they are involved. Society 
commences in barbarism, it becomes very slowly enlight- 
ened : every step of the progress implies the discovery of 
new truths, or a departure from errors to which it has 
been accustomed, from notions established, and practices 
consecrated by years. To accomplish this, to discover 
truth and to detect error, investigation is the direct means : 
the more free, diligent, and impartial the inquiry, the 
surer the progress, and the faster the improvement.* 

* * When the question,' says an eminent German philosopher, fi is 
about the greatest evils that urge the human race, we always return 
to the truth of truths: mankind cannot be helped unless they become 
better; they can never become better unless they become wiser; but 



270 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

It follows, that to deny the importance of investigation, 
and the importance of conducting it with diligence and 
fairness, is to deny the value of the means of improve- 
ment, and of using those means in the best manner. If 
then we are under any obligation to consult the general 
welfare, diligence and fairness in our inquiries are not 
only recommendable qualities, which it would be well for 
us to exercise, but they are positive duties, which we 
cannot neglect without actual culpability. 

And further it is of great importance to our moral prin- 
ciples in general, that we should cultivate the spirit of 
fairness in research and controversy. While there is so 
much laxity and want of discrimination in regard to can- 
dor and uprightness in the prosecution of our inquiries, 
while research on the most momentous subjects may be 
neglected or perverted with impunity, we cannot expect 
to find the spirit of integrity carried to its highest perfec- 
tion in the commerce of life. From one who exhibits a 
want of proper diligence and scrupulous impartiality in 
his treatment of evidence on religious, moral, or political 
questions, it would be vain to look for uncompromising 
integrity when he is called to adjust the contending claims 
of his fellow-men, or to decide between his own rights 
and those of others. In both cases the same qualities are 
demanded, and if they are neglected in the one, they will 
be weakened in the other. Nothing, on the other hand, 
can more exalt the moral character than a fervent and 
faithful pursuit of truth. 

they can never become wiser unless they think rightly of every thing 
on which their weal or woe depends ; and they will never learn to 
think rightly, so long as they do not think freely. 5 — Wieland on 
Liberty of Reasoning. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE ISSUE OF INQUIRY. 

The important questions regarding the obligation to 
enter upon the pursuit of truth, and the duties to be ful- 
filled in the pursuit itself, having been treated of, it 
remains to consider the final issue. 

When an inquiry respecting any particular point has 
been completed, an impression of some sort or other will 
have been left on the mind of the inquirer ; he will either 
have attained a clear and definite conviction, or he will 
be more or less in doubt and perplexity. The nature of 
this final impression will have been determined by the 
considerations presented to his mind during the process, 
and these considerations will have been themselves ante- 
cedently determined by various circumstances besides his 
conduct in the inquiry, such as the extent of his previous 
knowledge, the accessibility of evidence, the natural pow- 
ers of his understanding, and other causes. Many of 
these are altogether beyond his control ; what is alone 
within his power is the full and fair research already de- 
scribed ; and although this is the direct and most effectual 
means of reaching a just conclusion, it is not always suf- 
ficient to counteract the adverse influences in operation at 
the same time. The most faithful devotion to inquiry 
will sometimes fail in arriving at the truth. 

It manifestly follows from all this, that the issue of any 



272 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

investigation cannot be the proper ground of moral ap- 
probation or censure. It is the manner of conducting the 
process to which alone these sentiments are applicable. 
But it is also manifest that, if the inquirer should be 
ultimately left in error, although without any fault of his 
own, he cannot reap the benefits of truth. He may be in 
this, as in many other affairs, at once virtuous in his con- 
duct and unfortunate in the result of his exertions. 

After all that has been already urged, these positions 
seem almost too plain to require elucidation ; yet so pre- 
vailing and inveterate is the error of supposing a man's 
opinions to constitute proper grounds of moral commenda- 
tion or reprehension, that it is necessary to expose it at 
some length. Nor will a few words be afterwards inap- 
propriately bestowed in elucidating the distinction, not 
always adverted to, between exemption from merit and 
demerit on account of our opinions, and exemption from 
the natural consequences to which our opinions lead. A 
clear comprehension of this distinction seems requisite for 
a complete view of the morality of investigation. 

SECTION I. 

THE ISSUE OF INQUIRY NOT A MATTER OF DUTY. 

The preceding discussions, if they have at all succeeded 
in their object, clearly show that the whole of our duty in 
relation to the process of inquiry is comprehended in ade- 
quate and impartial examination, in the first place, of the 
state of our own minds in reference to the subject of inqui- 
ry ; and, secondly, examination of the subject itself and the 
evidence appertaining to it. It necessarily follows from 
this, as already stated, that our duty is not implicated in 
the result, whatever it may be ; that when we are under 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 273 

obligation to investigate any subject, it is incumbent upon 
us to do it with diligence and fairness, but not to arrive at 
any one conclusion rather than another. 

This latter truth, or rather this negative aspect of the 
one great truth which it has been the object of the preced- 
ing arguments to establish, claims attention even more 
perhaps than the other. To understand at all times what 
our duty requires from us is universally acknowledged to 
be important ; but it is sometimes overlooked that it is no 
less important to know what our duty does not require. 
It may be questioned, indeed, whether more evil has not 
arisen to the human race from their regarding useless and 
pernicious actions and events not within their power, as 
exacted by moral obligation, than from their leaving out 
of the code of morality such as are of a contrary charac- 
ter. The mischievousness of these imaginary duties ought 
to be clearly apprehended in connection with the subject 
before us, and, as a general truth, demands a passing ex- 
position. 

With regard to pernicious actions, a syllable would be 
superfluous to show that it must be fraught with mischief 
to consider them as duties, and consequently both to en- 
courage and to commit them. And with regard to useless 
actions, to erect them into so many imperative obligations, 
besides creating confusion in our moral sentiments, where 
perfect distinctness and precision are of the highest value, 
and inflicting injury (as the prevalence of error cannot 
fail to do) on our reasoning powers, brings upon mankind 
all the evils of needless restraint and profitless com- 
punction. 

It is equally, if not more, pernicious to regard ourselves 

and others as responsible for circumstances or events over 

which we have no control, which we can neither produce 

nor prevent. The unhappiness reciprocally sustained and 

18 



274 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

inflicted in consequence of the omission of imaginary 
duties not in any body's power, the irksome constraint, 
the doubts and fears and misgivings, the disputes and dis- 
sensions proceeding from such erroneous feelings of moral 
obligation, are attested by the melancholy history of hu- 
man superstitions.* 

Men are peculiarly liable to erroneous sentiments of 
this kind, when the scene of the events in question is 
partly or wholly in the mind — when they are events of a 
sensitive or intellectual nature, or external actions so 
mixed up with mental processes, as to baffle the efforts of 
ordinary discrimination to separate them. 

It is no wonder, therefore, that the mistake has been* 
committed, which regards men as lying under an obliga- 
tion to arrive in their researches at a predetermined con- 
clusion. In the prosecution of any inquiry there are 
certain acts instrumental in attaining the object in view, 
which are wholly in our power, while closely connected 
with such acts there are intellectual processes going on 
and states of mind produced not within our control; and 
so long as these distinct things are confounded together, 
approbation and censure cannot fail to be misapplied, and 
erroneous feelings of duty engendered. It is, accordingly, 
the want of a clear and accurate discrimination of volunta- 
ry acts and involuntary mental phenomena, which appears 
to have given rise to the doctrine that it is incumbent on 
every inquirer to arrive at certain pre-appointed conclu- 

* c The greatest burden in the world,' says the author of Paradise 
Lost, ' is superstition, not only of ceremonies in the church, but of 
imaginary and scare-crow sins at home. What greater weakening, 
what more subtle stratagem against our Christian warfare, when 
besides the gross body of real transgressions to encounter, we shall 
be terrified by a vain and shadowy menacing of faults that are 
no t f ' — The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 275 

sions; or, in other words, that a man's duty does not consist 
in diligence and fairness of examination, but in his re- 
garding certain doctrines as true or false. What these 
doctrines are, is indeed by no means settled; but that 
there are some which it is a duty to be convinced of, and 
others which it is incumbent upon us to disbelieve, almost 
all men unite in pronouncing. When this remarkable 
and mischievous notion is fathomed, it amounts to no 
more in each instance than a theory on the part of any 
one who holds it, that it is the duty of other human beings 
to regard a certain proposition as true or false, because he 
himself regards it in that light; that they are not only 
logically wrong, but morally criminal, in drawing any 
inference different from his own. 

The self-conceit implied in this theory might induce any 
one to pass it by with a smile, had it not become a dogma 
which lies at the bottom of much human misery, and 
therefore deserving of serious confutation. It will not be 
difficult to show how utterly inconsistent it is with the 
conclusions already established in the present treatise. 

If there is any correctness in those conclusions, it is 
our duty, when doctrines or propositions are in certain 
cases presented to our minds, to inquire into their truth. 
Whether these are new propositions, or such as we have 
held without investigation from the first dawn of con- 
sciousness, is not material. Circumstances present them 
to our minds as demanding inquiry into their truth, and 
our duty is to examine. It is obvious that in this stage of 
the business, at all events, it is not our duty either to re- 
ceive or to reject them. To examine them is to investi- 
gate whether they have a title to belief or not : and if we 
are bound to ascertain whether they have claims on our 
credence, it would be absurd to argue that it is incumbent 
on us to begin the investigation by admitting or denying 



276 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

the claims into the validity of which we are inquiring. If 
there is any such admission or denial obligatory upon us, 
it must be at a subsequent stage. We proceed, we will 
suppose, in the examination with adequate diligence and 
strict impartiality. In this process there is evidently still 
no duty of belief or disbelief to perform. All that we 
have to do is to be fair, candid, and diligent. We finally 
close the investigation, and the state of our understand- 
ings in relation to the subject examined (on the supposi- 
tion that the process has been conducted in the manner 
described) is obviously the unavoidable and involuntary 
result ; that is, it is the necessary issue of an investigation 
entered into because it was our duty to enter into it, and 
conducted throughout in the manner which our duty pre- 
scribed. That this result should be a given, a pre-ordained 
result, cannot therefore be justly or consistently required. 

It would be an extrordinary thing indeed for any one to 
say to us, 'It is your duty to inquire into this doctrine, and 
to conduct the examination with strict fairness and integri- 
ty ; but although you do all this, unless your examination 
terminate in a belief (or disbelief) of the doctrine, you 
will be morally culpable.' 

It will probably be objected, 'Your culpability arises 
from this, that you did not do all in your power to believe 
(or disbelieve) the doctrine.' Do all in our power to be- 
lieve or disbelieve ? Why should we? On what grounds 
of duty ? Previous to the examination the doctrine is not* 
to us a truth or a falsehood, it is merely a proposition 
offered to our scrutiny: why then should we wish to 
believe it, and do all in our power to believe it, or the 
contrary ? The proper wish on such an occasion, as we 
have seen, is not to find any proposition true or false, but 
to find the truth ; and in regard to doing all in our power 
to believe or disbelieve, if this implies, as it obviously does, 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 277 

paying more attention to the considerations on one side of 
the question than to those on the other, it would be a posi- 
tive violation of duty, an infraction of that rigid impar- 
tiality which has already been established as an imperative 
obligation.* 

But the objector replies, 'You have suffered your pas- 
sions to interfere ; it is perversity of heart and malignity 
of disposition, which have rendered propositions credible 
or incredible to you, that have been rejected or admitted 
by others.' If this accusation is meant to apply to the 
manner in which we have designedly treated the evidence, 
then as by the supposition we have conducted the examin- 
ation with fairness and diligence, it is manifestly out of 
place. But if the intention of it is to charge us with 
being possessed by passions, which have involuntarily on 
our part exaggerated some portions of the evidence and 
weakened others, and thus led to erroneous conclusions, 
we reply: 1. This is a mere gratuitous assumption. 2. It 
is at all events an involuntary error which is charged 
upon us. 3. Since by the supposition we have conducted 
the examination with perfect fairness, notwithstanding our 
suffering under these passions, the greater is our merit; 
we have shown an extraordinary degree of moral self- 
control. 4. The circumstance of having conducted it 
fairly ought to be received in the absence of all other 
evidence, as conclusive proof that no such passions have 
prevailed. 5. As we have just the same grounds for 
throwing such an imputation on our opponent, we may 

* * An inclination to favor, in any degree, however small, one side 
in any question, is evidently not an inclination to do strict and im- 
partial justice upon it ; but the contrary. And a disposition to put 
a favorable construction on facts or arguments, is a disposition to 

put an erro?ieous construction upon them.' dn Introduction to the 

Study of Moral Evide?ice, by Rev. James E.Gambier, 3d ed. p. 74. 



278 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

with equal fairness suppose, that in forming an opinion 
different from ours, he has been influenced by some of 
these reprehensible passions. 

At this point the objector will probably say, ' You have 
made suppositions which I cannot allow ; you have sup- 
posed that an investigation may be conducted with full- 
ness, fairness, and impartiality, and not end in the pre- 
ordained result, in the prescribed opinion : now this I 
deny. If the investigation had been diligently and fairly 
prosecuted, there is only one opinion in which it could 
have ended. That it has terminated differently is a full 
proof of some vice in the process. ' 

This we believe is a correct representation of what 
passes in the minds of many- of those individuals who 
condemn others as morally culpable for their opinions. 
Tacitly assuming themselves to be unerringly in the right, 
they conclude that others could not have differed from 
them had they adequately and impartially examined. 

To an objector of this class it is easy to answer : c We 
might with equal fairness and propriety charge the same 
vice upon you. What reason can you have for maintain- 
ing that all fair and diligent examination must end in the 
establishment of your opinion, which we may not have for 
asserting the same thing in favor of our own? ' 

He may possibly reply: c The reasons for my opinion 
are superlatively strong. It is impossible to conceive that 
any one who candidly examines can resist them; they 
have convinced the best and greatest minds; they have 
never been refuted.' 

We answer ; s All these phrases are only expressions of 
the strength of your own conviction. As to the reasons for 
your opinion, we have examined them, and they appear to 
us either intrinsically unsound or outweighed by opposite 
considerations. Your conviction of their force is not 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 279 

greater than that which we entertain of the strength of the 
arguments on our side of the question. Our opinion, too, 
has been held by men of powerful minds; and if it had 
not, there is nothing in the circumstance of powerful 
minds having held an opinion which can possibly strength- 
en the direct evidence in its favor to one who examines it. 
To one who does not examine, authority may be a valid 
argument ; to one who does, authority in opposition to his 
own views is nothing but an inducement to examine more 
closely, to suspect unperceived fallacies, to seek for addi- 
tional evidence, to review all his own inferences, and try ' 
every part of the chain which connects them with ac- 
knowledged premises. You will perceive, therefore, that 
we have as great a right to adopt the language of infalli- 
bility as you have.' 

Such an objector as we have here supposed is thus 
evidently driven to the untenable position of making the 
coincidence or discrepancy of the opinion of any inquirer 
with his own opinion, the criterion whether the inquiry 
has been properly conducted. 

This it is obvious can never be admissible. It is both 
logically and morally unfair and arrogant. In all argu- 
ments the disputants are to be placed on equal terms ; 
nothing must be granted to one that is not to another. 
If this sort of procedure were conceded to any, it must 
be conceded to all, and it is easy to see that all argument 
would be at an end. But the good sense of mankind, with 
a happy inconsistency, often saves them when their per- 
sonal interests are not implicated, from the legitimate con- 
sequences of their own principles of action, when those 
interests are at stake. While every one might arrogate 
such a privilege to himself, yet when fairly brought be- 
fore him, he would see the folly of a claim to it on the 
part of another, and compel the unreasonable usurper to 
desist from the palpable absurdity of his pretensions. 



280 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

In general, however, people who regard others as guilty 
of an offence in holding a different opinion from their own, 
do not consider the heretical opinion as a proof of inade- 
quate or unfair investigation, and therefore to be con- 
demned, but as directly criminal in itself. Theirs is a 
blind unreflecting prejudice which is quite innocent of the 
suspicion that such a thing as the duty of investigation 
exists either for themselves or their neighbors. 

It will commonly be found that those who are most 
virulent against others for their opinions, so far from hav- 
ing personally discharged this great duty, are too ignorant 
even to have attained to the conception of it 

The consequences of the false theory here exposed — of 
considering that the duty of mankind consists in the belief 
of certain prescribed doctrines, instead of placing that duty 
in the diligence and honesty of their inquiries — have been 
lamentable beyond description, and form perhaps the most 
forcible illustration of the evils of error that can be found 
in the annals of the world. Besides lying like an incubus 
on the intellect of the race and paralyzing its powers, this 
pernicious error has been at the bottom of that bigoted 
intolerance which has so long embittered life and disgraced 
humanity, and which will continue to do both, till man- 
kind awake to a knowledge of their own nature, and to a 
perception of the value of truth. 

It cannot be too freely proclaimed, that whenever and on 
whatever subject inquiry becomes necessary or obligatory 
on human beings, the only duty to be performed consists in 
full and impartial investigation, and has no dependence on 
the result. When a man has accomplished this, he may 
have failed in attaining the truth; but he will not only 
have satisfied the requirements of his own conscience, 
but have deserved the approbation of every wise and just 
judge. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 281 

This conclusion cannot be better enforced than in the 
remarkable declaration of the c ever-memorable ' John 
Hales, in his letter to Archbishop Laud. The passage has 
been often quoted, but it will yet bear many repetitions. 

' The pursuit of truth,' says this single-minded writer, 
4 hath been my only care, ever since I first understood the 
meaning of the word. For this I have forsaken all hopes, 
all friends, all desires, which might bias me, and hinder 
me from driving right at what I aimed. For this I have 
spent my money, my means, my youth, my age, and all 1 
have, that I might remove from myself that censure of 
Tertullian, — Suo vitio quis quid ignorat ? If with all 
this cost and pains, my purchase is but error, I may safely 
say, to err has cost me more than it has many to find the 
truth : and truth itself shall give me this testimony at last, 
that if I have missed of her, it is not my fault, but my 
misfortune.' 

SECTION II. 

THE ISSUE OF INQUIRY ATTENDED BY ITS NATURAL CONSEQUENCES. 

Every view of the subject combines to show that an 
inquirer, having accomplished a full and impartial investi- 
gation, has performed his entire duty, and cannot be justly 
either praised or blamed for the conclusion to which he 
has been brought. 

In performing his duty he has also been employing the 
most likely or rather the only rational means in his power 
to attain the truth ; but since the attainment of truth is 
merely the probable, not the necessary consequence of the 
wise and virtuous course he has pursued, he may after all 
have fallen into error, and in this event, although he will 
be perfectly free from culpability, he will not be exempt 



282 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

from the natural consequences of being mistaken. We 
have already largely insisted on the blessings of truth, and 
it is here scarcely needful to say that the belief of a truth 
is generally speaking a necessary condition for enjoying 
certain benefits connected with it ; while the belief of an 
error usually draws down a number of evils upon him who 
entertains it. If any one for example distrusts the efficacy 
of a medicine in a disease which it can really cure, he 
may suffer under the loss of health, while an efficient 
remedy is within his reach. If he believes in the harm- 
lessness of t a poison, he may lose his life from an errone- 
ous conception of the properties of the noxious substance. 

Thus accurate opinions or just conclusions, are, in some 
case, the indispensable conditions, and in others the prob- 
able means for obtaining certain benefits and avoiding 
certain evils ; and he who after the most faithful investi- 
gation is not fortunate enough to have arrived at the true 
result, will lose the advantages which would have flowed 
from a more accurate comprehension of the subject. 

If this law seems in some degree harsh, it is the same 
which prevails in all pursuits in which mankind can em- 
bark,'and it serves to show in a strong light the importance 
of truth. Moreover the conscientious, although (in the 
issue) unfortunate inquirer is not without his reward. 
Besides the approbation of his own conscience for the 
course he has pursued, both his moral and intellectual 
powers will have been invigorated by the meritorious 
effort, and rendered more efficient for other investigations; 
nor is it to be overlooked that although unsuccessful in his 
principal object, his views will have inevitably become 
more comprehensive and accurate on many subordinate 
points. No right-minded effort to gain knowledge is alto- 
gether fruitless. 

In the circumstances here described, we have before us 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 283 

a man who has pursued a meritorious line of conduct, but 
who notwithstanding his merit has been unsuccessful and 
unfortunate. Generally speaking in those cases where 
this combination is witnessed, the feelings excited in the 
spectator are admiration, sympathy, and a desire to con- 
sole the sufferer. A virtuous man struggling with adver- 
sity has been said by an ancient writer to be a sight 
worthy even of the gods. 

But when the union of merit and misfortune happens to 
take place, or is supposed to have taken place, in the pur- 
suit of truth, distaste and odium most commonly usurp the 
seat of these favorable sentiments. The mistake appa- 
rently more than obliterates the merit, and we resent it as 
an unpardonable offence, or more correctly speaking, per- 
haps, we are insensible to the merit and look only to the 
mistake. Strange that because a man is innocently in- 
volved in the evils of error (a calamity in itself sufficiently 
severe), his fellow-creatures should feel a strong disposi- 
tion and often make the most strenuous efforts to increase 
the bitterness of his fate ! 

There can be no question that such a sentiment is bar- 
barous and misplaced, and that the proper, the enlightened, 
the noble feelings for the occasion, when it really hap- 
pens, are compassion for the misfortune and admiration 
for the virtue which has not been able to avert it. A 
barbarous sentiment of this kind could not be maintained, 
except by profound ignorance of the nature of morality 
and of the constitution of the human mind. 

c It is as absurd,' says a distinguished moralist, fc to enter- 
tain an abhorrence of intellectual inferiority or error, how- 
ever extensive or mischievous, as it would be to cherish 
a warm indignation against earthquakes and hurricanes ;' * 

* Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy, by Sir James Mackintosh, 
§6. 



284 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. \ 

but the absurdity becomes more exquisite when, as it 
generally happens, the imputation of error or inferiority is 
the work of self-conceit, or sheer delusion. 

In the next chapter the course of the discussion will 
lead us to consider with more minuteness the proper con- 
duct to be pursued and the proper sentiments to be cher- 
ished by human beings towards each other in all that relates 
to the search after truth, as well as to point out more pre- 
cisely the errors and violations of morality which in this 
great department of action they are apt to commit. 



CHAPTER V. 

DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS IN RELATION TO THE PURSUIT 
OF TRUTH. 

While it is our duty to enter upon the investigation of 
certain subjects, and conduct the inquiry with diligence 
and impartiality, we may be called upon by various cir- 
cumstances to exercise an influence over our fellow-men 
who lie under the same obligations, or who have volunta- 
rily undertaken the pursuit of truth in some department of 
knowledge. 

There appear to be two principal methods in which this 
may be rightly done. The first is by advising and en- 
couraging others to undertake and prosecute inquiry in 
the proper spirit and manner, and manifesting our senti- 
ments of their conduct in these respects ; the second is by 
communicating to them the information we possess, the 
facts and inferences which have presented themselves to 
our own minds, and thus helping them to their ultimate 
object — the attainment of truth. The first may be briefly 
designated as Moral Influence ; the second as Intellectual 
Assistance : the one supplying motives to search for truth, 
the other means for succeeding in the pursuit. These 
kinds of influence may obviously be exercised singly or 
together. Perhaps they are most frequently conjoined, 
but it will conduce to the perspicuity of the discussion to 
treat them separately as far as things often intermingled 
can be considered apart. 



286 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

In this survey the improper as well as the proper exer- 
cise of our influence and control over the minds and 
actions of others will also come into view, and lead to a 
passing notice of that brute violence which is sometimes 
called in to its aid or substituted in its place. 

From their very nature the questions here proposed 
relate chiefly, although not exclusively, to the conduct of 
people of intelligence, who are presumed to have gone 
through the process of inquiry ; but the treatment of the 
subject would be incomplete, if we did not likewise ex- 
pressly advert to the peculiar obligations incumbent on 
that much larger class who may be denominated non- 
inquirers : and we shall accordingly point out the distin- 
guishing features of their case in the concluding section. 

SECTION I. 

MORAL INFLUENCE. 

In various cases it may be an act of laudable kindness, 
and in some even our absolute duty, to offer advice and 
direction to others, or to express our sentiments in regard 
to their mode of treating important subjects, or in other 
words in regard to their entering on inquiry and their 
conduct in the investigation. We may be called upon in 
such instances to encourage or discourage, to recommend, 
to warn, to approve, or to condemn. 

The influence we may thus exercise over the minds of 
our fellow-creatures is frequently very extensive and 
lasting in its consequences upon their happiness, and 
hence it becomes of great moment that it should be prop- 
erly used; that our counsel and moral sentiments should 
be applied to promote the practice of virtues suitable to 
the occasion and thence the attainment of truth. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 287 

The path of wisdom and morality in this matter is so 
plain that it is truly wonderful how it should ever be 
missed. Whatever assistance we here render to any one, 
whatever counsel or encouragement we give, should mani- 
festly be with the view of inducing and enabling him to 
discharge his duty by entering upon any required inves- 
tigation, and pursuing it with diligence and fairness. We 
should endeavor to infuse into his mind the ennobling love 
of truth. And if we have at any time occasion to ex- 
press our moral sentiments in regard to this part of his 
conduct, it is equally plain thcit our approbation or the' 
reverse should be given according to the degree in which 
these virtues have been exercised or neglected. 

If it is our own duty, as we think has by this time been 
pretty clearly established, to enter upon express investi- 
gation in certain circumstances, and to do all in our 
power by an impartial and rigorous examination to arrive 
at the truth, it must be incumbent upon us to counsel and 
assist others to do the same where we are at all called 
upon to interfere ; and if direct advice and positive assist- 
ance are not in our power, or not demanded by the occa- 
sion, we should be especially on our guard how we throw 
any discouragement or obstacle in their way, or any 
temptation to neglect or pervert the discharge of the obli- 
gation under which they lie. Any act done by us to 
seduce, or deter or prevent them from performing that 
duty of inquiry which is equally incumbent on them as it 
is on ourselves, and from thus securing the enjoyment of 
those advantages which only truth attained by inquiry can 
bring, must* obviously be immoral and reprehensible. 

Nothing, however, is more common than virtual if not 
direct recommendations to shun the duties of inquiry ; 
nothing less extraordinary than marks of disapproval and 
dislike when those duties have been faithfully discharged. 



288 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

What is the conduct of many of those who take upon 
themselves the office of public instruction, who assume to 
be the guides and counsellors of their fellow-creatures ? 
Do they recommend that on any important question you 
should pay equal attention to both sides of the contro- 
versy ? that you should read the books which militate 
against their own opinions as well as such as have been 
produced in their favor ? that you should scrupulously 
weigh the conflicting evidence ? that you should endeavor 
to be strictly impartial and scrutinize their own arguments 
with as much severity as you employ on those of their 
opponents ? Do they urge, do they even mention, the 
duty of perfect fairness of investigation ? Do they insist 
upon the duty of inquiry at all ? Is their language, 
6 Read, examine for yourselves, draw your own infer- 
ences, diligently and impartially investigate ; we present 
^you with our conclusions and the reasons on which they 
are founded; we believe them to be valid and irrefutable, 
but scrutinize them closely, put them to the test; dis- 
charge your own duty, and assist us by pointing out any 
fallacies you may descry ; let us be coadjutors in the 
grand cause of truth ? ' Is it not, on the contrary, ' The 
doctrine we announce is the only one which can be free 
from error ; avoid all those writings which are opposed 
to it as you would avoid the contamination of the plague ; 
do every thing in your power to banish any adverse sug- 
gestions from your own minds ; turn from all discordant 
evidence ; fly from the danger of impartial inquiry; shun 
the moral turpitude of doubting what we teach ; fear and 
confide ? ' 

If, however, the positions we have laid down are true, 
if it is a man's duty to examine, and to examine with 
diligence and impartiality, it is also his duty to recom- 
mend the same course to others. If it would be morally 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 289 

wrong in himself to neglect inquiry, to abstain from the 
investigation of both sides of a question, to bestow all his 
attention on arguments of one tendency, to banish as far 
as he could all opposite suggestions instead of giving them 
a fair and candid examination, then he must stand con- 
victed of a moral offence for urging upon others the same 
conduct. On this point there can be no compromise. It 
is either right or wrong to be partial in our investigations. 
If it is wrong to be partial, it is wrong to recommend and 
enforce partiality ; it is a departure from the distinct line 
of duty, a deviation from candid, upright, and honorable 
conduct. Let every man, on proper occasions, urge his 
opinions with all the force of argument in his power ; let 
him explain them with all the skill of which he is master; 
let him expose the weakness of contrary allegations with- 
out scruple ; but the moment he begins to teach the 
sacred necessity of thinking as he does, to set forth the 
guilt of dissenting from his doctrine, and to insist on the 
avoidance of all opposite considerations, that moment he 
commits an offence against the moral law of truth. 

No further elucidation seems requisite of that direct 
assistance one human being ought to give to another by 
counsel and encouragement in the task of inquiry ; but a 
few more words may be separately bestowed on those 
moral sentiments, the expression of which, while it con- 
stitutes in itself a species of advice, is generally mixed 
with it, and powerfully operates to encourage or discour- 
age any conduct to which it is applied. 

If, in regard to inquiry, the moral approbation and dis- 
approbation of mankind were rightly distributed, they 
would fall exclusively on the conduct exhibited in under- 
taking and prosecuting inquiry, and not on the results ; 
or, still worse, on the opinions lodged in the mind without 
any inquiry at all. Whenever they are thus justly distri- 
19 



290 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

buted, the highest encouragement is given to diligence and 
honesty of investigation. But if men award their praise 
or their censure to mere opinions, without reference to 
the mode of acquiring them, the effect is that such opin- 
ions are ostensibly adopted or repudiated by numbers of 
people whether really held or not; and the pursuit of 
truth, instead of being regarded as a duty, is abandoned 
as a fruitless, a blameworthy, and even a highly criminal 
enterprise. 

Hence nothing can be of higher importance to the 
cause of truth and virtue than distinct views on this point, 
and a rigid adherence to the rule of approving and cen- 
suring men for their conduct in regard to inquiry, and 
not for their opinions. No greater injury can be inflicted 
on morality than stigmatizing the proper discharge of the 
duty of investigation as an offence, on account of its 
results not being in accordance with prevailing notions. 
It is no doubt difficult in many cases to judge whether a 
man's conduct has been honest or not in the examination 
of any question ; and it may therefore be alleged, that 
the rule here recommended is too nice for use ; but the 
reply is obvious, 'that where evidence is wanting we are 
under no obligation, or rather it is positively unjust, to 
proceed to judgment. We are not to apply a wrong rule, 
because it is difficult to apply the right one. In the great 
majority of cases, it is not the province of human beings 
to pronounce sentence on each other's conduct in the 
business of inquiry. The requisite evidence is generally 
beyond their reach, or too subtle for their grasp ; and the 
happiness of the world would be incalculably increased, 
if they strictly confined their approbation and disapproba- 
tion to useful and pernicious actions directly and visibly 
affecting each others welfare, without attempting to in- 
trude their moral sentiments where they cannot be applied 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 291 

with any certainty. ; It is impossible,' says Locke, ' for 
you or me or any man to know whether another has done 
his duty in examining the evidence on both sides, when 
he embraces that side of the question, which we, perhaps 
upon other views, judge false ; and therefore we can have 
no right to punish or persecute him for it. In this, 
whether or how far any one is faulty, must be left to the 
Searcher of hearts, the great and righteous Judge of all 
men, who knows all their circumstances, all the powers 
and workings of their minds, where it is they sincerely 
follow, and by what default they at any time miss truth ; 
and he, we are sure, will judge uprightly.' * 

In those cases where we are able to form a judgment 
of the conduct exhibited in the examination of a question, 
it is not, at all events, by the bare opinions of the inquirer 
at the close, that we can be furnished with the requisite 
light. Whatever other criteria may assist us, these can 
never perform that office ; we must resort, in truth, to a 
very different method. Except a man's own express 
declarations or confessions, or the palpable existence of 
external motives of interest or passion, there appear to be 
only two sets of circumstances by which we may guide 
our judgment of his conduct in inquiry. 

First, we may form a general presumption from a 
man's known personal qualities and habits. We may, 
for example, fairly presume, that by a man of strict in- 
tegrity in other matters, no wilful partiality has been 
exercised in the examination of any question which he 
has been called to investigate. In the absence of express 
evidence to the contrary, this would be the only just 
inference. A man's personal qualities and habits, how- 
ever, are known only to a few, and even when known 

* Third Letter for Toleration, Works, vol. v. p. 290. 



292 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

they cannot be considered as specific evidence of particu- 
lar facts. We have much more exact grounds for de- 
ciding on the fairness or unfairness of his investigations 
in the second set of circumstances referred to when they 
occur, namely, the qualities which he actually exhibits in 
communicating his opinions to others. Diligence, candor, 
uprightness, impartiality on the one hand, and indolence, 
disingenuousness, unfairness on the other, are qualities 
which belong as well to the mode of stating to others the 
evidence and arguments on any subject, as to the mode 
of conducting the inquiry, and reveal the character of 
those efforts which have been made in the secrecy and 
silence of the closet. From the opinion of any one 
barely expressed, we can learn absolutely nothing of the 
process by which it has been formed ; but let him pro- 
duce his explanations, his arguments, his authorities, his 
moral sentiments, and he will probably furnish us with 
sufficient data to decide on his diligence, fairness, and 
integrity ; at least we have no concern with the course of 
application in which his opinion has originated, except so 
far as these data, and the external evidence already 
referred to, betray it. 

The qualities we have enumerated are often as dis- 
tinctly displayed in a man's writings or conversation, as 
they are in any part of his conduct. Who can mistake 
the language of sincerity and singleness of purpose, for 
that of interestedness and duplicity ? who the colorings 
and exaggerations of party pleading for the honest expo- 
sition of the inquirer after truth ? 

An eminent French statesman once sarcastically said, 
that language was given to man to conceal his thoughts. 
If so, it must be commonly a difficult task to use it for the 
intended purpose; but he would have still greater diffi- 
culty in employing it to conceal his moral qualities. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 293 

In any long tissue of sentiment and reasoning, the real 
properties of the mind can scarcely fail to manifest them- 
selves. It is as impossible for the mean, hypocritical, 
servile spirit to assume, through any long investigation, 
the moral carriage of the liberal, the candid, the upright, 
the noble, as to produce in itself the feelings by which 
they are animated. The greatest art will not suffice 
to suppress certain infallible symptoms of what lurks 
beneath the surface, while it will be totally incapable of 
counterfeiting, because utterly unconscious of, many other 
indications, universally attending the qualities which com- 
mand our esteem and admiration. He who gives utter- 
ance to language for the gratification of any unworthy 
passion, spleen, hatred, revenge, or whatever it may be, 
may rest assured that the chances are ten thousand to one 
against a successful concealment of his actuating princi- 
ple. 

Here, then, we have proper grounds for judgment if 
judgment is necessary, and when we have not these, we 
have only to refrain from the superfluous officiousness and 
positive injustice of passing sentence. 

The practice of' pronouncing on a man's fairness, good 
feeling, and integrity, not from external evidence, or the 
usual indications of those qualities, but from the nature of 
the conclusions at which he has arrived, is the same in 
spirit as that of sending him to the scaffold for differing 
from his executioner. Neglecting all the various causes 
which inevitably generate differences of opinion, and 
which, in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, 
ought in each case to be considered as sufficient to ac- 
count for any discrepancy between one man and another, 
these mischievous censors can find nothing to which they 
can ascribe a deviation from their own tenets but per- 
versity of heart or malignity of purpose, and the sole 



294 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

evidence they look for of these reprehensible dispositions, 
is that difference of opinion itself. 

This is the very essence of intolerance, the very spirit 
of Smithfield and the Inquisition. But of the coarser 
forms of persecution exhibited in the exercise of brute 
force or in penal inflictions, a more appropriate place will 
be found to speak when we come to the consideration of 
the duties of governments in relation to the pursuit of 
truth. Here it will be sufficient to say, what will readily 
occur to every reader, that if it is wrong to endeavor to 
hinder or deter any inquirer from a diligent and impartial 
examination of a question by advice and discouragement, 
it is a fortiori wrong to do it by forcible restraint and by 
the infliction of penalties ; and that if moral reprehension 
and censure ought never to be applied by one individual 
to another for his simple opinions, the application of brute 
coercion or physical suffering to prevent or punish the 
formation of such opinions is still more vicious. Every 
argument in the one case applies with tenfold force in the 
other. 

c No one,' says an eminent writer, ' but the religious 
persecutor,* a mischievous and overgrown child wreaks 
his vengeance on involuntary, inevitable, compulsory acts 
or states of the understanding, which are no more effected 
by blame than the stone which the foolish child beats for 
hurting him. Reasonable men apply to every thing which 
they wish to move, the agent which is capable of moving 
it — force to outward substances, arguments to the under- 
standing, and blame, together with all other motives, 
whether moral or personal, to the will alone.' t 

* This is too unqualified : there are moral, political, literary, and 
social persecutors, not to mention others, who long to destroy the 
happiness of such as differ with them in opinion, and often succeed. 

t Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy, by Sir James Mackintosh, § 6. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 295 

A writer of a very different school from that of the 
philosopher just quoted, may be cited to show how nearly 
all enlightened men of the present day agree in the view 
of the subject here taken, whatever other doctrines they 
may hold which are really inconsistent with it. 

4 The principle,' says Dr. Wardlaw, ' which leads men 
to judge and treat each other, not according to the intrinsic 
merit of their actions, but according to the accidental 
and involuntary coincidence of their opinions, is a vile 
principle.' * 

SECTION II. 

INTELLECTUAL ASSISTANCE. 

The second way of influencing others in the pursuit of 
truth is by the communication of knowledge — by instruc- 
tion. 

It must frequently happen that a man who has satisfied 
his own mind on some particular subject, shall be imper- 
atively called upon to assist others whose duty it is to 
make a similar investigation, by imparting such information 
as he has himself acquired respecting it. The proper 
course to be pursued on occasions of this nature, it is not 
difficult to discover. The great end of that intellectual 
assistance which he thus renders to others, in the supposed 
circumstances, is to enable them to arrive at the truth, 
through the medium of a full and fair investigation. Such 
an investigation is evidently their duty, as it was originally 
his own, and what aid he gives should be with the view of 
promoting it. The most direct and efficient mode of 
doing so, is simply to lay before them his own view of the' 
question, with the evidence for and against it, without 

* Quoted in the Westminster Review, July, 1826. 



296 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

exaggeration, disguise, or concealment, and thus to suffei 
the same considerations to operate on their minds which 
have influenced his own. Put an inquirer in possession of 
all these, concealing no doubt and no difficulty, no fact 
and no inference on either side, and you have done all in 
your power to guide him to the truth, and should any 
error lurk in the propositions laid before him, you have 
supplied him with the means of detecting it, by exhibiting 
the grounds of your opinion and the process through 
which you connect the conclusion with the premises. 

Simple as this proceeding appears, precisely adapted as 
it must be allowed to be for the attainment of the object 
in view, and generally followed as it is in all departments 
of knowledge where the passions and interests of men do 
not directly interfere, it is systematically superseded in 
moral and political subjects by two modes of instruction, 
or rather of intellectual treatment, one consisting in pre- 
senting to the mind of the person who is the subject of it 
the evidence only on one side of a question, and carefully 
precluding all cognizance of that on the opposite side ; the 
other in teaching conclusions or doctrines without the 
evidence on which they rest. The first may be called 
the system of concealment and suppression ; the second, 
that of authoritative inculcation. 

Both these modes of proceeding are alike in departing 
from the line of duty, in debilitating the mind, and inter- 
posing obstacles in the way to truth. Although usually 
joined or jumbled in practice, it will be expedient to treat 
them separately. 

If when one human being is assisting others in their 
inquiries, his great aim ought to be, as already stated, to 
enable them to attain truth by the exercise of their facul- 
ties in a full and impartial investigation of the question in 
hand, then to exclude or suppress any part of the evidence 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 297 

on either side, is directly at variance with the duty of the 
occasion. It is attempting to make the examination an 
imperfect one without the cognizance of the parties whom 
he professes to assist. It is consequently nothing less 
than a species of imposition at once inconsistent and im- 
moral. The result to their understandings, even when by 
such means they chance to be guided to the truth, is a 
view of only one side of the question (which must neces- 
sarily be incomplete even as a view of that side), and a 
conviction insecure, because founded on a narrow and im- 
perfect basis ; and when (as is most likely to happen) they 
are led into error, there is nothing in what has been pre- 
sented to their minds, or in the method of exercising their 
faculties, which can at all serve to extricate them from it. 
The practice tends to preclude the most salutary of all 
intellectual exercises — turning a question on all sides, 
and looking at it in all lights. To deprive a mind of this 
healthful play of its powers is to chain it down to stupidi- 
ty. Not that this can be effectually accomplished. No 
mind can be forcibly limited to what is set before it. In 
disputable questions there are certain doubts and difficul- 
ties naturally presenting themselves to the understanding 
with greater or less distinctness, whatever concealment or 
suppression may be practised, nor is there any other sure 
way of putting them to flight, and preventing them from 
recurring to perplex the inquirer, than unreservedly set- 
ting them before him, and enabling him to see their real 
character. Any other course is ineffectual, disingenuous 
in itself, and deeply injurious to him. 

But even this system, reprehensible as it is, must be 
considered superior to the practice of authoritative instil- 
lation, which consists in teaching mere dogmas, conclu- 
sions without the evidence on which they rest, opinions 
without the reasons on which they are founded ; and 



298 ESSAY ON THE "PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

which is usually accompanied by directing the utmost 
fervor of moral approbation to the mere circumstance of 
these conclusions or opinions lying in the mind unques- 
tioned and unscrutinized. 

Besides being open to the objections brought against the 
practice of concealment and suppression, this course of 
instruction (if indeed instruction it can in any sense be 
called), inflicts a still greater injury on the understanding, 
and when attended by the described discipline of the feel- 
ings, perverts the moral sentiments to an extent not gene- 
rally appreciated. Whenever it is adopted, the reasoning 
power is obviously altogether unexercised, the habit is 
generated of receiving propositions without examination 
or even annexing to them precise ideas, and healthful 
curiosity and ardor after knowledge are extinguished. No 
system of stultification can be more completely effectual.* 
Whether the doctrines so implanted are true or false, is a 
matter of mere chance as far as the individual is concern- 
ed who is subject to the process, and yet he is taught to 
consider this matter of mere chance as a peculiar merit 
on his own part, and he finds it draw down upon him the 
approbation of the world. His understanding is thus be- 
numbed, and his moral sense debased. With opinions so 
acquired, should he encounter any facts or arguments of 
a hostile character, he is probably at first filled with 
senseless resentment, and becomes ultimately perplexed, 
although incapable of being convinced ; or if he happens 
to possess a more than usual portion of natural acuteness 

* Locke, -when speaking of ' those whom the ill habit of never 
exerting their thoughts has disabled,' very aptly describes the effect 
pointed out in the text: ' the powers of their minds/ he says, « are 
starved by disuse, and have lost that reach and strength which 
nature fitted them to receive from exercise.' — Conduct of the Tin- 
der standing, § 12. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 299 

his prejudices give way, because they have not that intel- 
lectual support on which the conclusions of a properly 
disciplined mind can always stand against attack. No 
man can adequately comprehend a doctrine until he 
comprehends what can be said against it ; but under this 
system of inculcation the unfortunate disciple does not 
comprehend even what can be said in its favor. 

In both systems one thing is clear ; they are founded at 
once on a distrust of the capacity of the human mind 
generally to discern truth from error, and on a confidence 
in one particular exception — the teacher's own infallibili- 
ty. If you have no distrust of this nature, why not leave 
the evidence and the whole evidence to make its due 
impression? If you do not assume infallibility, how are 
you justified in trying to fix your own opinions on the 
minds of your fellow-creatures by a process which, in 
proportion to its effectiveness, precludes all means of their 
detecting any errors which those opinions may contain ? 
Without infallibility dogmatical inculcation would be at 
once arrogant and mischievous, but even with infallibility 
it would not be justifiable, because although on this sup- 
position the conclusions piled up in the understanding 
would be true, the faculties would be injured by the pro- 
cess,* the truths would lie lifeless in the memory, and 
there would be no security against the future intrusion of 
falsehood. The only real security against the invasion of 
error on those subjects where difference of opinion exists, 

* e An education (if it be so called) in -which the memory only 
retains the Terbal expression of results, while the mind does not 
apprehend the principles of the subject, and therefore cannot even 
understand the words in which its doctrines are expressed, is of no 
value whatever to the intellect, but rather, is highly hurtful to the 
habits of thinking and reasoning.' — Philosophy of the Inductive 
Sciences, by the Rev. ^Y. Whewell, vol. ii. p. 514. 



300 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

is a full knowledge of the truth, of the premises from 
which it is deduced, of the process of deduction, and of 
the fallacy of the arguments opposed to it ; and he whose 
system of instruction should in any way prevent those to 
whom he imports his knowledge from arriving at this 
intellectual condition, even though he were gifted with 
infallibility, would be inflicting upon them an irreparable 
injury. How much greater, then, must be the injury, 
when he has no pretensions to the infallibility he virtually 
assumes, when he is a mere erring creature like them- 
selves, and in addition to stupefying their faculties, most 
probably imposes upon them error for truth ! 

c Is not thought ' (it has been eloquently asked) ' the 
right and duty of all ? Is not truth alike precious to all ? 
Is not truth the natural aliment of the mind, as plainly as 
the wholesome grain is of the body ? Is not the mind 
adapted to thought as plainly as the eye to light, the ear 
to sound ? Who dares to withhold it from its natural 
action, its natural element and joy ? Undoubtedly some 
men are more gifted than others, and are marked out for 
more studious lives. But the work of such men is not to 
do others'* thinking for them, out to help them to think 
more vigorously and effectually. Great minds are to 
make others great. Their superiority is to be used, not 
to break the multitude to intellectual vassalage, not to 
establish over them a spiritual tyranny, but to rouse them 
from lethargy and to aid them to judge for themselves. 
The light and life which spring up in one soul are to be 
spread far and wide. Of all treasons against humanity, 
there is no one worse than his, who employs great intel- 
lectual force to keep down the intellect of his less favored 
brother.' * 

* On the Elevation of the Laboring Classes, by Dr. Channing. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 301 



SECTION III. 

TREATMENT OF THE YOUNG. 

The duty of exercising our influence, moral ana\ intel- 
lectual, over the minds of others in the fair and straight- 
forward manner pointed out in the preceding sections is 
of especial force, when the subjects of our influence are 
the young. Here, if in any case, a conscientious man 
will be scrupulous in his proceedings. In this, as in other 
affairs, maxima deleter pueris reverentia. c A mind,' 
says Channing, ; inspired with reason and conscience, and 
capable through these endowments of progress in truth 
and duty, is a sacred thing.' * 

Under the designation of principling the minds of chil- 
dren, Locke long ago denounced the practice of instilling 
certain doctrines into their minds without exhibiting the 
evidence, or teaching them the duty of examination, and 
even of connecting the idea of guilt with any doubt or 
departure from the principles prescribed. 

1 There is,' says Locke, ' I know, a great fault among 
all sorts of people of principling their children and schol- 
ars ; which at last, when looked into, amounts to no more, 
but making them imbibe their teacher's notions and tenets 
by an implicit faith, and firmly to adhere to them whether 
true or false. What colors may be given to this, or of 
what use it may be when practised upon the vulgar des- 
tined to labor, and given up to the service of their bellies, 
I will not here inquire. But as to the ingenuous part of 
mankind, whose condition allows them leisure, and letters, 
and inquiry after truth, I can see no other right way of 
principling them, but to take heed, as much as may be, 

* Character of Napoleon, part ii. 



302 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

that in their tender years, ideas, that have no natural 
cohesion, come not to be united in their heads, and that 
this rule be often inculcated to them to be their guide in 
the whole course of their lives and studies, viz. that they 
never suffer any ideas to be joined in their understandings, 
in any other or stronger combination than what their own 
nature and correspondence give them ; and that they often 
examine those that they find linked together in their minds; 
whether this association of ideas be from the visible agree- 
ment that is in the ideas themselves, or from the habitual 
and prevailing custom of the mind joining them thus to- 
gether in thinking.'* 

This practice of dogmatical inculcation in the case of 
children, coupled with the moral treatment usually con- 
nected with it, is open to all the general objections already 
stated. It is, especially, any thing but assisting them to 
discharge the duties and attain the ends of inquiry: it is in 
reality the reverse ; for no one will surely deny, that if 
their minds are strongly imbued with particular doctrines, 
if they are taught to believe that to doubt such doctrines 
is a crime, if they are commanded to receive them as 
positive and incontrovertible truths of which no question 
is to be entertained, if they grow up therefore unaccus- 
tomed to the effort and unacquainted with the duty of 
examination, the effect must be a state of mind as remote 
as possible from a fearless and ardent desire after truth, . 

* Conduct of the Understanding, § 41. The same sentiments are 
expressed in one of Locke's letters to his friend Molyneux. ' Pray 
let this be your chief care, to fill your son's head with clear and 
distinct ideas, and teach him on all occasions, both by practice and 
rule, how to get them, and the necessity of it. This, together with 
a mind active and set upon the attaining of reputation and truth, 
is the true principling of a young man. But to give him a rever- 
ence for our opinions, because we tanght them, is not to make know- 
ing men, but prattling parrots. 5 — Works, vol. viii. p. 378. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 303 

and a conduct in regard to investigation in which we shall 
vainly look for diligence and impartiality. 

It may be urged, indeed, that instilling doctrines into 
the minds of children is to a certain extent unavoidable ; 
that at least they must necessarily learn many things the 
reasons of which they cannot understand, and take many 
conclusions on trust because incapable of appreciating the 
evidence on which they rest. Ail this is readily allowed. 
In the course of tuition it may be requisite to lay before 
them many propositions for which they can for a while 
have no other warrant than the authority of the teacher ; 
but if we really wish to produce in them a love of truth, 
a desire after knowledge, a spirit of candor, and that in- 
tegrity of mind which will best preserve them from error, 
nothing must be taught them as a doctrine which it is 
incumbent upon them to believe, and of which it is a 
crime to doubt. On the contrary, they should be im- 
pressed, as early as practicable, with the duty of fair 
inquiry. All the instruction given them should be accom- 
panied with inducements to exert their own faculties, to 
seek after reasons for what is asserted. They should be 
rescued from the mere passive adoption of what is pro- 
posed to them by authority, and trained to the habit of 
drawing their own inferences. Even when the proof is 
beyond their comprehension, they should be made to un- 
derstand that it is only postponed. All the reverence 
winch they are commonly educated to entertain for par- 
ticular doctrines and names, they should be taught to feel 
for truth itself, and for honesty of investigation. It is 
under such a discipline that we should expect to see 
minds of wisdom and integrity arise which would be 
blessings to the world. , 

The sentiments here expressed might be enforced by 
citations from the works of several distinguished writers of 



304 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

very opposite schools, but I must content myself with a 
passage from the pages of a late elegant author : — c I 
would not,' he says, ' have it be thought that because I 
plead for freedom of inquiry, I would, therefore, leave 
youth without the guide of reason and experience. Poly- 
bius has defined man to be an animal that forms opinions : 
as soon, then, as a man begins to show that he possesses 
the characterizing quality of his species, the formation of 
his opinions ought to be considered as the most essential 
part of his education. Now, this should not be attempted 
by dogmatical precepts and positive laws ; but by persua- 
sion, argument, and example; by assiduously inculcating 
the principle which ought to prevail ; and by endeavoring 
to render the reason clear why it should be adopted. 
Opinions which are communicated upon one side without 
the authority of reason, and which are received upon the 
other without the labor of investigation, are seldom honor- 
able either to him who teaches or to him who learns.' * 

From the numerous examples of the systematic instilla- 
tion of prejudice furnished by the history of mankind, two 
may be here cited by way of illustration. 

The late Emperor of France pushed the authoritative 
inculcation of doctrines to an extreme, which by its ab- 
surdity, exposed the real nature of the proceeding to the 
dullest observation. 

By means of the national catechism ordered by him to 
be taught in the schools of France, the lesson was care- 
fully instilled into the minds of the young, that all those 
who failed in their duty to himself, resisted the order of 
things established by God, and rendered themselves de- 
serving of eternal damnation.t 

* Academical Questions, by Sir W. Drummond, preface, p. xi. 
t Considerations on the French Revolution, by Madame de Stael, 
part iv. chap. 6. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 305 

The other illustration is furnished by the practice of 
Mahometans. Their children are sedulously impressed 
with dogmatical confidence in the tenets of the Koran, 
without the slightest attempt on the part of their teachers 
to exhibit any evidence or argument, and they are taught 
to hate with rancor all who differ from their theological 
creed ; the consequences of which are, a total repug- 
nance to improvement, a stultification of intellect, a de- 
privation of morals, and a spirit of fanaticism and 
intolerance towards all infidels, especially Christians. 
; The parents,' says Lane, speaking of the Egyptians, 
c seldom devote much of their time or attention to the 
education of their children, generally contenting them- 
selves with instilling into their young minds a few princi- 
ples of religion, and then submitting them, if they can 
afford to do so, to the instruction of a schoolmaster. As 
early as possible, the child is taught to say, ; I testify that 
there is no deity but God, and I testify that Mahomet is 
God's Apostle.' He receives also lessons of religious 
pride, and learns to hate the Christians and all other sects 
but his own, as thoroughly as does the Mooslim in ad- 
vanced age.' * 

From these two examples even the most prejudiced 
minds may be led to suspect that there is something fun- 
damentally wrong in the practice of one-sided instruction 
and authoritative instillation. When the dogmas incul- 
cated are different from their own, they will scarcely deny 
the evil effects of a system which, if consistently pur- 
sued, would do much to arrest the progress of mankind in 
knowledge, noble-mindedness, and civilization. 

* Account of the Modern Egyptians, vol. i. p. 63. 
20 



306 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

SECTION IV. 

PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS* 

There still remains for consideration one important 
mode in which a man can exercise an influence over the 
minds of others in relation to the pursuit of truth, in which 
he can render them essential assistance in the attainment 
of the great object of inquiry. By the publication of his 
opinions and of the reasons on which they are founded, 
he acts at once on the understandings of a multitude. 
Private communication and personal explanations, such as 
we have hitherto had principally in view, have compara- 
tively a narrow sphere for their evil or their good ; but 
the instruction which is offered to mankind at large, has 
only the limits of the world for the ultimate boundary of 
its influence. 

In the present day, amongst all the various means of 
diffusing information, publication through the press is in- 
comparably the most effective in assisting the cause of 
truth, and for the purposes of the present discussion may 
be taken as the representative of the rest. ; Through 
the diffusion of education and printing (to borrow the 
words of an eloquent writer), a private man may now 
speak to multitudes, incomparably more numerous than 
ancient or modern eloquence ever electrified in the pop- 
ular assembly, or the hall of legislation. By these in- 
struments truth is asserting her sovereignty over nations 
without the help of rank, office, or sword ; and her faith- 
ful ministers will become more and more the lawgivers of 
the world.' * 

What are the circumstances which imperatively call 
upon a man to assist the cause of truth in this way, it 

* Character of Napoleon, by Dr. Charming, part ii. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 307 

may not always be easy to determine. All nevertheless 
will acknowledge, that the welfare of mankind would be 
wofully injured, if every individual, however gifted by 
nature, or accomplished by study, were to confine his in- 
structions to the circle of his family and his friends, or 
restrict his efforts to mere personal communication. The 
progress of society in every thing good and great depends 
on the promulgation and public interchange of knowledge, 
and the more thoroughly this is effected the better. 

Here, then, is an obligation upon all who are capable of 
benefiting society in this manner. On whom the duty is 
incumbent is indeed a point unavoidably left to be deter- 
mined by the conscience and self-appreciation, and, it 
may be added, at the peril of the individual. 

It may be said in general terms, that every one who 
has taken due pains to master a subject, who feels per- 
suaded that he can present it in a new light, and who is 
not destitute of the obvious qualifications for the task, lies 
under an obligation to communicate his knowledge to his 
fellow-creatures, provided they are in a sufficiently civil- 
ized and virtuous condition to receive it without destroy- 
ing the happiness or the existence of their instructor. 
Not to do it, if the matter were of importance, would be 
reprehensible selfishness ; it could be only to avoid trouble, 
or shrink from responsibility, or maintain a solitary supe- 
riority over the rest of the world. 

It is true, he may be deceived in his estimate of his 
own achievements ; an exaggerated opinion of the value 
of what we ourselves accomplish, is perhaps inseparable 
from human nature ; but if he -has taken due pains, and 
is actuated by a proper spirit, his conduct is on every 
principle entitled to unmixed approbation. It may happen 
too, that, by communicating the result of his inquiries, he 
may be instrumental in promulgating error ; his views 



308 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

may wander widely from the truth, and he may lead 
many astray by the same misconceived facts or illusive 
reasonings which have deceived his own mind. These 
are things which, according to the constitution of man and 
the present state of society, cannot be avoided. Even in 
this case, nevertheless, he is doing good. His errors are 
in all probability such as have, with more or less distinct- 
ness, presented themselves to other minds as well as his, 
in the character of truths. To bring them openly for- 
ward, witW'the premises from which they are deduced and 
the train of reasoning by which they have established 
themselves as truths in his own understanding, is giving 
them the best chance of being refuted, and refuted in so 
full and luminous a manner, that their real character will 
be conspicuous to every future inquirer. 

Had they been kept back by indolence or timidity, had 
they and the arguments in their support not been openly 
produced and examined, they would have continued to 
haunt other minds as well as his, to delude other thinkers 
besides himself, and create those casual and vague dis- 
putes, which are perpetually arising when a question has 
not been thoroughly canvassed. * 

When the circumstances here described have made it a 
man's duty to communicate his opinions to the public, the 
manner of doing it can admit of little controversy. He 
is quite as much bound in this case to honesty of state- 
ment and fairness of proceeding, as when he is giving 
private instruction. The object to be kept in view is to 
assist the progress and prevalence of truth, which it is 
almost tautology to say cannot be promoted by either con- 
cealment or exaggeration of evidence, by the coloring of 
facts or the sophistication of reasoning, While he who 

* See Appendix, note B. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 309 

with upright intentions and after adequate examination is 
unfortunate enough to be the instrument of disseminating 
error, merits our esteem, no reprehension can be too se- 
vere for the conscious promulgator of false assertions and 
fallacious arguments.* 

From the fallibility of which even the most sedulous 
and honest inquirer partakes, it also behooves every one 
who publishes his opinions to the world to suspect the pos- 
sibility at least of his being in the wrong, and to refrain 
from arrogantly assuming on his own part that exemption 
from error which he will not grant to another. Above all, 
he should avoid the offensive practice of affecting superior 
moral excellence in virtue of the doctrines he maintains, 
and casting odium upon others because they differ from 
him. He should keep aloof from what has been well 
designated as c that dogmatical assumption of the upper 
ground in controversy, which entrenches itself in supposed 
rights and prerogatives ; treats as a violation of decorum 
the free use of language in its opponents ; and even while 
it condescends to employ arguments, seasons them with 
arrogant and ; , uncharitable reflections on the motives and 
intentions of the adversary.' t 

The substantial duty, in a word, of the man who makes 
known his researches or speculations to the world, is to take 

* ' Is it,' asks Mr. Stewart, c more criminal to misrepresent a fact 
than to impose on the world by what we know to be an unsound or a 
fallacious argument ? * ' Is it in a moral view more criminal, or is 
it more inconsistent with the dignity of a man of true honor, to 
defraud men in a private transaction by an incorrect or erroneous 
statement of circumstances, than to mislead the public to their own 
ruin by those wilful deviations from truth into which we see men 
daily led by views of interest or ambition, or by the spirit of politi- 
cal faction ? ■ — Philosophy ofijie Active and Moral Powers, vol. ii. 
p. 338. 

t Aikin's Letters to his Sod 9 vol. ii. p. 95. 



310 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

the trouble of due preparation, to be honest in his com- 
munications, and to arrogate nothing to himself as an 
inquirer which he will not grant to others exercising the 
same function. Instead of demanding from them the 
deference due to an indisputable oracle from whose decla- 
rations it is criminal to dissent, he should point out, when- 
ever the occasion requires it, the urgent duty, and animate 
them with the manly spirit of impartial investigation ; and 
warn them against receiving on authority any conclusions 
the evidence for which is open to their own scrutiny. 

SECTION V. 

THE RECEPTION OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS. 

In the department of morality now under consideration, 
as in others, duties are reciprocal. If in certain circum- 
stances an inquirer is called upon to communicate his 
views of any question to the public, the public, or those 
who are to derive the benefit of the communication, have 
also their part to perform, and by the right or wrong per- 
formance of it the cause of truth and human* happiness is 
materially promoted or injured. On the principles already 
maintained, these views ought to receive from every one 
who makes them objects of attention, and especially from 
every one who takes upon himself to pass judgment upon 
their merits, that full and fair examination of which we 
have so often spoken. 

We have seen in a former chapter that every individ- 
ual is bound to make a diligent and impartial inquiry into 
those questions the determination of which is necessary to 
his conduct in life, private or public, professional or unof- 
ficial ; inasmuch as the fortune, reputation, health, and 
existence of his fellow-creatures are often dependent on 
the discharge of the duty. 



EiSSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 311 

Under this law every one places himself, who assumes 
the function of publicly pronouncing on the merits and 
demerits of works in literature, philosophy, and science. 
The peace of mind, the reputation, the social position, and 
even the property of the author, as well as the good of 
the public, may all be materially affected by the judgment 
delivered. The self-constituted judge, then, can be in a 
fit condition to pronounce sentence only when he has 
made himself master of the cause. 

This sentence, it is almost needless to say, should be as 
just an appreciation of the work as a proper examination 
can arrive at. While some degree of good-will and ap- 
probation is due, as already shown, to every communica- 
tion made to the public with upright intentions and diligent 
preparation, this can form no reason for withholding a 
strict appreciation of merits and defects. 

A man who presents his views to the world is attempt- 
ing to influence the minds of myriads of human beings, 
and it becomes of importance that these views should be 
put to the severest test which human ingenuity can devise. 
Since it is for the benefit of all that truth should prevail, 
the merits and defects, the strength and weakness of a 
work; whatever they really are, should be rendered dis- 
tinctly manifest. As no upright man would wish error to 
exist for his own private advantage in opposition to the 
general good, so he ought not to refrain from the exposure 
of it in the writings of others, merely from a principle of 
humanity. If the error is important, the duty of the occa- 
sion is to point it out. True benevolence here consists in 
counteracting a general evil, although at the expense of 
impairing individual happiness. 

The whole duty on the subject, indeed, may be com- 
prised in one word — justice. This is what every one 
who takes upon himself to pronounce sentence ought to 



312 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

give, and more than this no man ought even to wish to 
receive. The general presumption in favor of an author's 
intentions, in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, 
should obtain for him the courtesy due to a laudable 
attempt, should secure him from all imputations of bad 
motives, but not shield his speculations from scrutiny. 
Mistaken in some respects as the wisest and best men of 
every age have been, there is nothing incompatible be- 
tween thorough esteem for the moral and even intellectual 
qualities of his mind, and a full conviction of the inaccu- 
racy of his views and the unsoundness of his arguments — 
nothing inconsistent between respect for the one and a 
free exposure of the other. 

It w r ill frequently happen, that not only errors will be 
committed, which it will be requisite to expose, but various 
mental qualities will be exhibited in the communication of 
opinions — vanity, conceit, affectation, prejudice, presump- 
tion, and other offensive and ludicrous characteristics. 
There is no reason, when any good is to be accomplished 
by it, why these should not be set in their true light. At 
the same time it deserves to be remembered, that some 
errors carry along with them their own refutation, and 
some weaknesses furnish their own exposure, so that neg- 
lect may be a not less efficacious, although a less painful 
remedy than censure. * 

The same justice which requires these errors and weak- 
nesses to be shown in their true character, imposes on us 
the pleasanter duty of pointing out excellences whenever 
they occur. To commend just reasoning, felicitous illus- 
tration, candor, fairness, modesty, and magnanimity, is 
equally demanded of us, as to expose and condemn quali- 
ties of an opposite nature. Critics do not always feel that 
it is not sufficient to pass over these meritorious qualities 
in silence — to intermit their vituperation when they meet 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 313 

with them : something more than this is required by the 
general good : just commendation is as useful as just cen- 
sure, and to withhold it is a fraud at once on the individual 
and the public. 

This is the more necessary to be insisted on, as we fre- 
quently meet with men, rigid in the application of princi- 
ples, professing to bring every thing to the standard of 
utility, and severe in their condemnation of all deviations 
from this rule, who appear to think they have done every 
thing required of them when they have performed the task 
of reprehension. With a strong sense of vice and error, 
they have no ardor for excellence ; prone to censure, they 
are without inclination to praise ; alive to deformity, they 
are insensible to beauty and elegance. If they attempt to 
commend, it seems an effort against their nature, which 
dies away in imperfect accents of abortive eulogy. 

Conduct of this kind is reprehensible on their own prin- 
ciples. It is equally important that excellences should be 
duly appreciated, as that defects should be placed in a true 
light. In this, as in other cases, we can have no better 
guide than the law of truth. Let every thing be regarded 
and represented exactly as it is ; let vices be seen as 
vices, and let virtues appear in their true character. If 
men see clearly, they can scarcely fail, sooner or later, to 
feel correctly. 

True merit requires no exaggerated praise. The sim- 
plest statement of what has been accomplished is all to 
which it needs to aspire, although it is not all which a 
generous spirit is impatient to bestow. Nobleness of mind 
springs forward with ardor to meet every indication of a 
similar nature wherever it appears. There is no surer 
mark of the absence of the highest moral and intellectual 
qualities, than a cold and captious reception of excellence. 

Further, it will not escape the candid mind, that being 



314 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

ourselves liable to mistake, we may err both in censure 
and applause. Were we infallible, we might with equal 
fearlessness commit ourselves to a description of both the 
merits and the defects of any production offered to our 
scrutiny ; but prone to err, we should recollect that errors 
of censure are not only more certainly destructive of hap- 
piness than errors of praise, but tend to repress the most 
valuable exertions, and we therefore ought to be especially 
vigilant in investigating the grounds of our decision before 
we pronounce an unfavorable sentence. 

It is interesting to glance at the consequences which 
have sometimes ensued from an illiberal and unjust re- 
ception of the communications made to the world from 
some of its master spirits. If we look into the history of 
science and civilization, we shall find that such treatment 
has had a strong depressing influence on the most distin- 
guished philosophers. Copernicus was long withheld from 
communicating his discoveries by an apprehension of the 
reception they would meet with. Harvey was deterred 
from giving more of his writings to the world by the hos- 
tility manifested against those which he had already pub- 
lished. The second part of ' Cudworth's Intellectual 
System ' was never brought forward (according to War- 
burton), on account of the world's malignity in judging of 
the first. Jenner was haunted by the fear that his great 
discovery would fee made the subject of ridicule ; and 
long after it had been divulged, the animadversions cast 
upon it led him to declare that he would think no more for 
the public good, since nothing but abuse was got for it.* 

Even Sir Isaac Newton himself was the subject of 
severe attacks, which at one time seem almost to have 
disgusted him with his favorite pursuits. In a letter to 

* Life of Jenner, by Dr. Barron. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 315 

Oldenburgh (1672) he writes, 6 1 intend to be no further 
solicitous about matters of philosophy ; and, therefore, I 
hope you will not take it ill, if you find me never doing 
any thing more in that kind.' In another letter (1675) he 
states that he had had some thoughts of writing a further 
discourse about colors, but found it yet against the grain to 
put pen to paper any more on that subject. And in a letter 
to Leibnitz the same year he observes, ' I was so perse- 
cuted with discussions, arising from the publication of my 
theory of light, that I blamed my own imprudence for 
parting with so substantial a blessing as my quiet to run 
after a shadow.' * 

These few instances, which might be easily multiplied, 
suffice to show that a real discouragement is offered to the 
finest minds by an unjust and ungenerous reception of 
their labors ; and it cannot be doubted that the experience 
or the apprehension of such treatment, by stifling many 
brilliant thoughts, comprehensive speculations, and useful 
discoveries, has kept down the dignity and happiness of 
mankind below the point to which they might have at- 
tained. But although genius had never yielded a step to 
such injustice ; although by such means no profound train 
of thinking had been suppressed, no happy conception im- 
prisoned in its birth-place, no discovery nipped in the bud, 
yet assuredly every right feeling demands that the happi- 
ness of these benefactors of society should at least be 
protected from wanton injury. If we cannot find in our 
hearts to reward their merit, let us at all events abstain 
from thoughtlessly robbing them of their peace. This is, 
indeed, no more than our own palpable interest dictates. 
Even in the present day, it is impossible to tell how much 
we all daily lose by the reserve of wise and thoughtful 

* Life of Sir Isaac Newton, by Sir David Brewster, p. 56. 



316 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

men, in keeping back the fruits of long-continued research 
and meditation, from an apprehension that the prejudices 
of society and the rancour of criticism might invade that 
tranquillity of mind, for the loss of which no reputation 
could compensate. 

But it is not only tranquillity of mind of which they 
have to apprehend the loss. Criticism frequently tells 
with forcible effect on a man's position in society, and 
even on his property. We are informed that the deserv- 
edly eminent Dr. Thomas Young had the offer of 1000Z. 
for the copyright of his lectures, but on account of the 
ridicule thrown by the Edinburgh Review on some of his 
papers in the Philosophical Transactions, the publisher 
requested to be released from his bargain.* 

A late author f of no mean abilities relates that, after 
the appearance of a hostile criticism in the Quarterly 
Review on his Characters of Shakspeare's Plays, his pub- 
lishers scarcely sold another copy, although before that 
time the sale had been considerable. J 

It is not necessary to examine for the purpose in hand 
whether, in these instances, the criticism was just. They 
abundantly prove that public censure can affect the prop- 
erty and social prospects of authors ; and that, therefore, 
on the common principles of the coarsest honesty — of 
that which respects no injury not reducible into pounds, 
shillings and pence — censure ought never to be cast upon 
any one unless it has been maturely considered, and is 
fully believed to be just. And even such censure may 
have the effect of injustice if it is not accompanied by a 
candid statement of all that is worthy of praise. 

On the other hand, it must be admittted to be similarly 

*Lockliart's Life of Sir Walter Scott, vol. ii. p. 18. 

t Hazlitt. 

$ Hazlitt's Table Talk, p. 229. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 317 

inconsistent with integrity to pronounce extravagant enco- 
miums, bestowed insincerely, or hazarded without proper 
examination. When hazarded in this way, they are 
frequently the instruments of fraud and disappointment, 
leading the reader to throw away his money and his time 
on worthless books, such as he would have rejected had 
their real character been known to him. They thus vir- 
tually rob one man for the benefit of another, while they 
assist in depraving the public taste, and misdirecting the 
public judgment. 

The laxity which prevails on these points in the present 
day would raise our wonder if it were not in keeping with 
the moral tone pervading society. A remarkable instance 
of it may be found in no less a person than Sir Walter 
Scott, a noble-hearted man in general, but who in his 
capacity of reviewer, performed acts not to be vindicated 
unless the principles here maintained can be disproved. 

Writing to a correspondent, he says, ; I have run up an 
attempt on the Curse of Kehamst for the Quarterly.' ■ • • 

'What I could, I did — which was to throw*as much 
weight as possible upon the beautiful passages, of which 
there are many, and to slur over the absurdities, of which 
there are not a few.' 

6 I would have made a very different hand of it, indeed, 
had the order of the day oeen pour declarer.' * 

Here is a plain avowal, that, acting as umpire be- 
tween the author and the public, he was influenced by 
private motives, unconnected with the merits of the book, 
to pronounce an award which would have been very dif- 
ferent in its character had those private motives been 
different, while the merits of the book remained precisely 
the same. And this is the declaration of a man of highly 

* Lockliart's Life of Scott, vol. ii. p. 302. 



318 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

honorable principles, who was fully alive to many of the 
transgressions of public criticism. What would he have 
thought of similar conduct in a judge on the bench ? 
and yet there is no real difference between one case and 
the other. 

The view which has now been taken of the proper 
mode of receiving public communications would be in- 
complete, if it were closed without adverting to the impor- 
tance, in such cases, of the right application of moral 
approbation and censure. Although this has already been 
insisted upon in respect to private intercourse, and what 
was then said will apply mutatis mutandis here, yet it will 
not be superfluous to repeat, in connection with our pres- 
ent subject, that these sentiments should be directed, not 
to doctrines, but to actions, not to the results of inquiry, 
but to the conduct exhibited in the prosecution of it ; that 
error should not be treated as crime ; that all attempts on 
the part of any one to excite odium against others for 
differences of thought should be unsparingly reprobated ; 
that the assumption of intellectual, and especially of moral 
superiority by a writer, over all who disagree with him in 
opinion, on the mere ground of that disagreement, should 
be uniformly scouted ; that honesty of investigation and 
fairness of statement should be greeted with eager and 
hearty commendation, and that the love of truth should be 
hailed as the brightest distinction of the inquirer. 

Were the principles maintained in this cursory glance 
at the subject consistently acted upon, every man would 
have the proper inducement to keep back or to bring for- 
ward the fruits of his researches, and to bring them 
forward in a proper manner. Knowing that if he pro- 
duced what was immature, ridiculous, unsound, or falla- 
cious, he must undergo the ordeal of free exposure, he 
would be cautious of obtruding what would do him no 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. • 319 

honor : confident, on the other hand, that his merits would 
be fairly appreciated, he would feel all that alertness in 
his labors which naturally arises from the conviction that 
we are making advances to a determinate point : and as- 
sured that the decision of his judges would in all probabil- 
ity be right, he would acquiesce in it, even if unfavorable, 
without irritation, and without complaint, and with the 
satisfaction, at least, that he had made some progress in a 
knowledge of his own capabilities. Above all, he would 
be encouraged in the pursuit of truth by the prospect that 
his efforts would be of service ; that any communication 
he might make to his fellow-creatures in a right spirit 
could do them no harm, and might confer lasting benefit ; 
and that he might venture on attempting to enlighten them 
without any risk of being overwhelmed with obloquy or 
violence because he had succeeded. 

SECTION VI. 

DUTIES OF NOX-INQUIRERS, 

In the preceding sections the argument in its general 
scope assumes that the parties whose conduct is in ques- 
tion are themselves inquirers, and having performed the 
task of investigation incumbent upon them, are in a con- 
dition to advise or assist others in doing the same. But as 
we have before stated, there is another class of persons to 
be taken into view, who not having gone through the pro- 
cess of inquiry, or having gone through it in an extremely 
superficial and inadequate manner, may for brevity be 
denominated non-inquirers. 

If men of this class did not interfere with their fellow- 
creatures in regard to matters of research and opinion, 
their social conduct would not properly come under our 
present notice ; but inasmuch as they do very commonly 



320 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

interfere in regard to such matters, the discussion of the 
subject would be incomplete if no attempt were made to 
point out the line of conduct which they ought to pursue, 
as well as that which they ought to avoid, in so far as their 
circumstances are peculiar, and do not fall under the 
rules already prescribed. 

It is not material in this view whether individuals are 
non-inquirers by their own fault or from the necessity of 
their condition. The point now to consider, is their con- 
duct not in relation to the pursuit of truth, but in relation 
to other human beings who are or may be engaged in it. 
The social duties in question, of persons who from what- 
ever cause belong to the class of non-inquirers are, prin- 
cipally, in the nature of the case, of a negative character. 
Not having possessed themselves of the knowledge which 
investigation only can supply, such individuals are in no 
condition to furnish intellectual assistance to others, and 
have little power even to give effectual counsel and 
encouragement to their fellow-creatures who are or ought 
to be occupied in the pursuit of truth. As far as they can 
do either, they ought to be guided by the principles 
already explained. An ignorant but right-minded person 
may be instrumental at least in promoting inquiries which 
he himself from various causes is debarred from prosecu- 
ting. 

But the main obligation of the non-inquirer is to refrain 
from that mischievous interference to which he is almost 
instinctively prone. As he will not or cannot assist the 
great cause of truth in his own person, he should carefully 
abstain from doing it the least injury. In this and many 
other affairs of vital moment, the officious meddling of 
those who are perfectly powerless to do good has been an 
immense source of human misery. 

The sort of mischievous interference into which the 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 321 

non-inquirer is prompt to fall, is the indulgence of hatred 
and malignity against other people because they hold 
different opinions from his own, sometimes by acts of 
personal injury and annoyance, and sometimes by open 
invective or secret calumny. Where the former cannot 
be ventured upon, the latter is the easy and invariable 
resort. The practice of what has been expressively term- 
ed ' casting odium' upon others for differences of opinion, 
lamentably prevails in all the self-styled civilized countries 
of the world, and generally in proportion to the ignorance 
of the people amongst whom it is found. 

Now, without insisting on what has been advanced in a 
previous section respecting the proper limitation of praise 
and blame to the conduct exhibited in the pursuit of truth ; 
without even expecting the non-inquirer to comprehend 
accurately the requisite distinctions, we think his own 
position is sufficient to* show him the gross erroneousness 
and absurdity of the conduct in question, especially when 
exercised towards those who have really devoted their 
attention to a doctrine which he confessedly has not in- 
vestigated. He differs from them in opinion on a subject 
which they have examined and he has not : they have 
taken pains to understand it, he has taken none : they 
have gained information, of which, as it can be attained 
only by examination, he is necessarily devoid. Yet in 
this situation, upon the mere ground of holding an opinion 
taught him by others, and of the truth of which he is 
incapable of judging for himself, without ability to weigh 
the reasons, nay, without even knowing the reasons in 
support either of his own or the opposite opinion, he 
suffers his heart to be filled with rancor, and lifts up his 
voice or his arm against the men who have taken the only 
rational course for arriving at the truth. 

Such is the real conduct of the majority of human 
21 



322 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

beings, prejudiced non-inquirers, to those who have sedu 
lously discharged the duty of examination, whenever the 
result of such examination happens to be an opinion dif- 
ferent from that which generally prevails. And that it 
must in the far larger number of cases be different, is 
sufficiently plain. It would be absurd to suppose, that an 
inquirer who had devoted all the powers of his mind to 
the investigation of a subject should have the same views 
regarding it as the uninquiring crowd. Even if their 
respective opinions should teach in some points, and be on 
these points susceptible of being clothed in the same 
expressions, yet the real conceptions, and especially the 
related and collateral ideas excited by the words, would 
be different in the extreme. The intelligent and the 
ignorant cannot be said (except in a gross and inaccurate 
sense) to hold the same opinion on any complicated and 
difficult subject. 

After this explanation, the non-inquirer who has attend- 
ed to it, cannot fail to see, that when he reproaches or 
persecutes others who have inquired, on account of any 
differences of opinion, he is in reality inflicting punish- 
ment upon them for the necessary result of discharging an 
important obligation, or, when the inquiry is not obligato- 
ry, for the issue of a beneficial or laudable undertaking. 
He is consequently committing a great and disgraceful 
wrong. His imperative duty is to abstain from intermed- 
dling in a matter in which he is disqualified from taking 
any useful part. As he can do no good, let him scrupu- 
lously avoid the absurdity and injustice of casting the 
slightest shade of odium on his fellow-creatures on account 
of any such intellectual differences. 

Although the preceding remarks apply expressly to the 
great majority of mankind, who are, for the most part, 
precluded from regular and methodical inquiry by their 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 323 

position, yet they are by no means limitable to that class. 
It is not to be denied that, in relation to a great number of 
subjects, the polished and the educated are nearly, if not 
altogether, on a level with the multitude. They regard 
themselves as intelligent and enlightened, and, to a cer- 
tain extent, they are truly so ; but general intelligence 
gives them little or no insight into questions which they 
have not expressly and minutely examined ; and in respect 
of all such questions they can be ranked only in the class 
of non-inquirers. Upon them, therefore, is incumbent all 
the self-restraint, all the reserve in passing judgment, all 
the abstinence from interference which has been inculca- 
ted on the class generally. Yet we every day see them 
erecting themselves into judges of the most complicated 
questions, on which their opinions can be nothing more 
than mere prejudices, and lavishing condemnation and 
odium upon all who dissent from their dogmas. It cannot 
be dissembled, and ought not to be suppressed, that this 
remark is largely applicable to the gentler and more 
amiable sex, who, seldom calculated by position and edu- 
cation to enter into difficult subjects, and at the same time 
peculiarly susceptible of strong prepossessions, too often 
indulge in acrimonious feelings and language against 
opinions which they cannot possibly have examined with 
such rigorous attention as could alone justify any one in 
pronouncing judgment. Even an intellectual condemna- 
tion is, under these circumstances, beyond their jurisdic- 
tion : but when they proceed also to deal out their moral 
censure, they exhibit a spectacle at which their best friends 
must be pained — a spectacle of vain presumption and 
substantial injustice. 

No doubt every human being, man or woman may in- 
nocently entertain, nay, must unavoidably entertain, many 
unexamined opinions, and so long as they are expressed 



324 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

without the manifestation of any spirit towards other people 
which would be felt as unjust and intolerable in return, no 
social wrong is committed ; but a great social wrong is 
committed when, in these cases, the uninformed assume 
the right of moral condemnation, which, on any supposi- 
tion, can belong only to the thoroughly instructed, but 
which, in fact, belongs to none. 

Were we even to suppose for a moment that differences 
of opinion could possibly, in any circumstances, constitute 
proper grounds for praise and blame, rewards and punish- 
ments, yet it is obvious that no one would, in this case, be 
entitled to pronounce sentence who had not himself faith- 
fully discharged the great duty of inquiry. Before any 
one can be in a position to condemn his fellow-creatures 
for any tenets they may hold, the least which can be 
required is, that he himself should have fully and impar- 
tially investigated, not only every part of the subject on 
which he differs from them, but also the morality of 
interference with the opinions of others. 

It may be added, that any one who had really done this 
would have lost all disposition for persecution, or even 
censure. At the end of his investigation he could not fail 
to discern that, while the mere circumstance of holding 
any opinion is an object of neither praise nor blame, and 
while a high degree of either may be merited by per- 
forming or neglecting, or perverting, the great duty of 
searching for truth, the highest degree of criminality 
attaches to him who interferes by injurious action or con- 
tumelious language with the discharge of that duty on the 
part of another. 

Again, then, let it be urged upon all who feel tempted 
to elevate themselves into moral judges of intellectual 
differences, to pause before they assume so dangerous a 
function ; to scrutinize their own attainments ; to examine 



V 

ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 325 

whether they are competent from education and study, 
and express investigation of the doctrine before them, to 
pronounce upon its validity ; and even when they are 
competent to do this, whether they are justified in the 
moral condemnation of any human being for differing in 
opinion from fellow-creatures as fallible as himself. 



CHAPTER VI. 

DUTIES OF GOVERNMENTS IN RELATION TO THE PURSUIT 
OF TRUTH. 

Having examined what are the duties of human beings 
individually in entering upon and prosecuting inquiry, and 
assisting each other in the pursuit of truth, we shall be at 
no loss to determine the duties of governments, and to 
appreciate the influence of those political institutions, and 
practices of mankind in their collective capacity, which 
have relation to the same department of morals. 

In respect to the subject before us, governments are 
obviously to be considered under the same aspects as indi- 
viduals. They may be regarded, in the first place, as 
inquirers themselves ; and, in the second place, as having 
to conduct themselves with uprightness and propriety 
towards other inquirers, — as having to exercise over the 
people subject to their control that moral and intellectual 
influence of which a former chapter has treated. 

SECTION I. 

DUTIES OP GOVERNMENTS CONSIDERED AS INQUIRERS THEMSELVES. 

As an inquirer itself, a government has manifestly a 
most important part to perform. In the discharge of the 
judicial office, for which all the business of legislation is 
merely preparatory, and in legislation itself, the most dili- 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 327 

gent and faithful investigations are continually demanded.* 
But besides inquiries of this and analogous kinds, which 
constitute the very essence of governing, other legitimate 
fields of research are open to the state, and cannot be 
neglected with due attention to the public welfare. By the 
application of its resources it may bring to light much use- 
ful knowledge that would be otherwise inaccessible. It 
may institute inquiries and researches for which the means 
of individuals are utterly inadequate. In this way we have 
seen expeditions sent out for astronomical and geograph- 
ical observation, for surveying regions, coasts and harbors, 
thus rendering our knowledge of the globe more extensive 
and accurate, and navigation safe and certain. We have 
also seen commissions of inquiry appointed to investigate 
public institutions, social customs, moral and physical in- 
fluences, and modes of life, which no private exertions 
would have been competent to examine and appreciate 
with sufficient fulness ana" accuracy.f 

* This has been well put by the present distinguished head of the 
French ministry. * La societe existe : il y a quelque chose a faire, 
n'importe quoi, dans son interet, en son nom ; il y a une loi a 
rendre, une mesure a prendre, un jugeraent a prononcer. A coup 
sur, il y a aussi une bonne maniere de suffire a ces besoins sociaux; 
il y a une bonne loi a faire, un bon parti a prendre, un bon jugement 
a prononcer. De quelque chose qu'il s'agisse, quelque soit l'interet 
mis en question, il y a en toute occasion une verite qu'il faut con- 
naitre, et qui doit decider de la conduite. La premiere affaire du 
gouvernement, c'est de chercher cette verite, de decouvrir ce qui est 
juste, raisonnable, ce qui convient a la societe.' — Cours d'Histoire 
Moderne, par M. Guizot, 5e Le^on. 

t ' Still the agency of government in regard to knowledge is ne- 
cessarily superficial and narrow. The great sources of intellectual 
power and progress to a people are its strong and original thinkers, 
be they found where they may. Government cannot and does not 
extend the bounds of knowledge; cannot make experiments in the 
laboratory, explore the laws of animal or vegetable nature, or estab- 



328 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

Hence it is plain that in certain circumstances a gov- 
ernment may be morally bound to enter upon inquiries in 
the same way as an individual ; and it is equally plain that 
in pursuing its investigations, it is under the same obliga- 
tion as any other inquirer to fulness and fairness of re- 
search. All that has been said as to the duties of the 
individual is applicable, with little modification, to the case 
of government ; and to repeat it here would consequently 
be a needless fatigue to the reader. 

SECTION II. 

DUTIES OP GOVERNMENTS TOWARDS THEIR SUBJECTS CONSIDERED AS 
INQUIRERS. — ENCOURAGEMENT OF INQUIRY. 

A government is, secondly, to be viewed in its relations 
and conduct to other inquirers : it is to be considered as to 
its power of exercising over its subjects a moral and intel- 
lectual influence in reference to the pursuit of truth ; of 
supplying both motives and means for inquiry to the 
people ; of rendering them counsel and assistance in the 
business of investigation. Here, too, the same principles 
are applicable as in the case of individuals, although the 
duties may not be exactly correspondent or co-extensive, 
and the attending circumstanoes may be more compli- 
cated. 

If the state interfere at all in this matter, it should 
plainly exert its moral and intellectual influence for pro- 

lish the principles of criticism, morals, and religion. The energy 
which is to carry forward the intellect of a people belongs chiefly to 
private individuals, who devote themselves to lonely thought, who 
worship truth, who originate the views demanded by their age, who 
help us to throw off the yoke of established prejudices, who improve 
on old modes of education, or invent better.' — Character of Napo- 
leon, by Dr. Channing, part ii. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 329 

moting the ends already described : that is to say, for the 
twofold purpose of inducing and assisting its subjects to 
discharge the duty of inquiry, and of enabling them to 
attain the only legitimate object of inquiry — truth. In 
strict adherence to these objects, it should create no par- 
tialities and antipathies to any particular doctrines ; it 
should hold out no inducements to imperfect and unfair 
examination ; it should have recourse to nothing like au- 
thoritative inculcation; it should attempt no suppression or 
concealment of evidence ; it should leave conclusions or 
opinions unpatronized and unpunished, and extend its en- 
couragement to nothing but enterprise in undertaking, and 
diligence and fairness in conducting, investigation. 

These are the right and appropriate principles on which 
it should act, the legitimate boundaries in which it should 
confine itself. In so far as any act, or law, or institution, 
intrudes beyond these limits, its effects on the cause of 
truth and virtue are injurious. If complete and accurate 
knowledge is important to mankind, if full and unfettered 
research is the way to gain possession of it, if exemption 
from prejudice and a simple wish to attain correct conclu- 
sions form the proper state of mind for entering upon any 
subject, and diligent and impartial attention to the conflict- 
ing evidence the proper conduct to be pursued during the 
examination, then every political regulation or institution 
which circumscribes inquiry, which creates other wishes, 
and offers inducements to pursue a different conduct, car- 
ries with it its own condemnation. Reprehensible in an 
individual, this course is at least equally so in the state. 
By such proceedings, society in fact depraves and injures 
its own members. 

Let us then examine the power and the policy of gov- 
ernments by this test. Let us see how far they are able 
to promote the great objects to be kept in view, and how 



330 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

far the course of interference generally adopted in modern 
communities assists and encourages the people in attaining 
the desirable ends here set forth, or on the other hand 
impedes and perverts their efforts. 

Of the two objects to be regarded, as already pointed 
out, when one party interferes by moral influence and in- 
tellectual assistance with another in the business of inves- 
tigation, the first can scarcely be contemplated by any one 
as coming within the province of the supreme authority. 

There seems to be no practicable way of encouraging 
and fostering by authority the virtue of diligent faithful- 
ness in undertaking and prosecuting such inquiries as are 
personally incumbent on the individual members of the 
community, either by rewards on the one hand, or by pun- 
ishment for neglect of the duty on the other. The requi- 
site evidence in these cases is altogether of too subtle and 
impalpable a nature to be reached or appreciated by the 
state. The duty in question, like many others, is one in 
the discharge of which a government can give no direct 
assistance, and the attempt to do it could only lead to 
waste of means and misapplication of time. The virtue 
to be exercised is too delicate for the coarse hand of power 
to touch. 

If this is a correct representation, if the promotion of 
this virtue, like many other desirable ends, lies without 
the province of authority, the whole duty of government in 
the matter is to take especial care not to injure the cause 
which it is powerless to assist. As it can lend no positive 
aid, the important point left for it to attend to is scrupu- 
lously to refrain from discouraging or repelling or se- 
ducing its subjects from the discharge of those duties of 
inquiry, which as individuals they are bound to perform. 
Incapable of interfering so as to promote, it must not in- 
terfere to pervert the motives and efforts of the inquirer. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 331 

Although this is one of the great principles by which 
public measures and institutions are to be tried, it seems 
never to have been distinctly recognized or understood. 
The just and indispensable abstinence from intermeddling 
inculcated by it, has consequently never been uniformly 
and consistently practised ; and it is a singular feature in 
the case, that the methods to be immediately examined 
which governments have frequently adopted with the pro- 
fessed view of aiding the people in the second object, — 
the attainment of truth, — have had a direct tendency to 
counteract the accomplishment of the first object, — a 
faithful discharge of the duty of inquiry. Governments 
have often, in fact, sought to guide the people to the truth 
(professedly at least) in some of the most important de- 
partments of knowledge, by offering inducements not to 
inquire, or not to inquire in the manner which duty and 
wisdom alike prescribe. 

This will clearly appear in the course of the examina- 
tion of such methods to which we now proceed. 

SECTION III. 

CONTINUATION OF THE SUBJECT. — METHODS OP PROMOTING THE 
ATTAINMENT OF TRUTH. 

There are several methods which governments may 
adopt with the view of enlarging the existing stock of 
knowledge and diffusing it amongst the people, or, what 
is the same thing, of assisting them in the attainment of 
truth. 

One method is to engage learned and skilful men to 
study and to teach certain branches of knowledge, with- 
out any attempt to prescribe the particular doctrines or 
conclusions which shall be inculcated. 



332 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

A second method is to engage such men to teach, but 
at the same time to define beforehand, the specific doc- 
trines which shall be taught. 

A third method, frequently but not necessarily combin- 
ed with the second, is to repress by force all doctrines at 
variance with such as are authoritatively prescribed. 

The remaining business of the present chapter is to try 
these several methods by the principles already laid down. 



SUBSECTION I. 

EMPLOYING PUBLIC INSTRUCTORS. 

With regard to the first of the methods enumerated, it 
is unnecessary here to discuss its absolute policy ; — 
whether it is better for governments to establish schools 
and professorships, and to put forth treatises in any de- 
partment of science, or on the contrary to leave such 
matters entirely to the play of interests and feelings in 
the community. Our present business is to examine 
solely the consistency of the method with the principles 
which ought to govern the conduct of human beings to 
each other. 

This examination will not detain us long. When the 
state engages a competent teacher to instruct the people 
upon a given branch of knowledge without any restriction 
as to particular conclusions, any imposition of pre-appoint- 
ed doctrines, it obviously pursues the same just and simple 
course as the man who candidly lays before his friend 
whatever he himself knows in relation to any contempla- 
ted inquiry. 

Such a proceeding may be superfluous and officious, 
but it can do no harm to the cause of truth ; whether 
politic or impolitic in itself, it does not infringe the princi- 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 333 

pies here maintained. Endowing professorships of Natu- 
ral Philosophy may be taken as an example of appointing 
instructors to teach a subject without prescribing what 
particular doctrines shall be taught. By such means the 
people are doubtless assisted to attain important knowl- 
edge. 

The second method which governments may take for 
the professed purpose of guiding the people to sound and 
accurate opinions, is to select certain conclusions or doc- 
trines, and to bestow emolument on individuals for teach- 
ing them. It is obvious that here the character of the 
proceeding is entirely changed. Let us examine it under 
the two points of view already intimated — 1st, as to its 
effects on the people as responsible beings having person- 
ally to discharge the duty of inquiry; and, 2diy, as to its 
effects on their success in attaining truth. 

As to the first, no one can be at a loss to perceive what 
must inevitably ensue both to the teacher and to the 
taught. The functionary who enters the service of a 
government on such a condition has no choice, during the 
whole of his career, as to what he shall teach. From the 
first day to the last of a life which, as it is a life of tuition, 
ought to be a life of inquiry, he can ostensibly make no 
deviation from the opinions to which he originally bound 
himself. He must, throughout, either conform to the 
prescribed doctrines, or quit his station and give up the 
emolument arising from it. At the outset he either be- 
lieves or disbelieves the doctrines. If he believes them, 
he has cogent motives for abstaining from all examination 
of their validity ; at least from any fair and candid exami- 
nation of the objections brought against them. The in- 
dolence of mind engendered by the perfect coincidence 
of his opinions and his interest disposes him to shun an 
intellectual effort, which could not have a happier issue 



334 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

than the conclusion in which he is already at his ease ; 
and the apprehension of the bare possibility of a different 
result operates equally to dissuade him from the enter- 
prise. Every consideration presented by the circumstan- 
ces in which he is placed suggests, that his exertions 
should be restricted to an inquiry after more striking and 
ingenious arguments in support of the opinions which he 
is at present fortunate enough to hold. 

If, on the other hand, he does not believe the doctrines 
which he has undertaken to profess and expound, he will 
have equally strong reasons to keep him from a full and 
impartial inquiry into their truth. To escape the degra- 
dation of inculcating on others doctrines which he dis- 
believes himself, he will apply all his attention to the 
evidence in their favor : all his diligence, his talent, his 
ingenuity, will be exerted to magnify the arguments that 
he wishes to find conclusive ; all his care will be employ- 
ed to keep his mind from the operation of antagonist 
considerations. 

A man in either of the situations described can hardly 
be expected to be possessed with a wish to arrive at the 
truth, whatever it may be. It is the natural tendency of 
his position to destroy this wish in the most candid and 
impartial mind, and to substitute in its place the desire to 
attain or strengthen a conviction of the prescribed doc- 
trines. The consequences of arriving at results inconsis- 
tent with them are too fearful for him to contemplate, and 
he will therefore venture on no course of study or exer- 
tion in which he does not see a probable termination in 
their favor. 

Thus shackled and biassed in his own inquiries, it is 
easy to perceive what sort of influence he will exert over 
those persons whom it is his province to instruct. A man 
who shrinks from full and fair investigation himself, is not 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 335 

likely to recommend that duty to others, while he is 
necessarily incapacitated from presenting to them an im- 
partial statement of evidence. Instead then of rendering 
assistance to his fellow-creatures, in the way pointed out 
in the last chapter, he will probably resort to dogmatical 
declamation, and endeavor to deter others by raising con- 
scientious alarms or dealing out moral opprobrium from 
that fearless pursuit of truth which the temptations and re- 
straints of his position have made impossible to him. In 
how many other ways soever he may be doing good, he 
will, in this respect, be employed, perhaps unconsciously 
and unintentionally, in perverting the minds of his fellow- 
men ; and unless he rise far superior to the noxious influ- 
ences of the situation in which he has been placed by 
the state, he will become (with equal unconsciousness) an 
oppressor and persecutor. Thus, by this system of pre- 
appointed doctrines, not only the national instructors, but 
through them the community at large, will be prevented 
or deterred from fulfilling the duty of fair and adequate 
investigation ; diligence and honesty in the pursuit of truth 
will be discouraged, and a spirit of intolerance engender- 
ed and maintained. 

It may be remarked in passing that the effects here 
described do not, manifestly, arise from the circumstance 
of the benefit being held out by the state, nor from its 
being mainly of a pecuniary nature, nor from the particu- 
lar department of knowledge to which the doctrines be- 
long. The annexation of any advantage of whatever 
character, whether by positive institution or by the habits 
of the community to any particular opinions, be the sub- 
ject what it may, has the same consequences. Eligibility 
to honors, professional employment, the esteem of friends, 
reputation in society, popularity with the crowd, and other 
benefits accruing from the profession of certain opinions 



336 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

may equally present inducements to negligent and impar- 
tial treatment of evidence. The temptation of the advan- 
tages beforehand and the apprehension of losing them 
afterwards, are essentially the same under all these modi- 
fications, and operate in a similar way.* 

Such institutions and practises have also a further effect 
besides their direct influence over the minds of the par- 
ties as already described. Men, seeing the advantages 
of holding these doctrines, and some of them feeling per- 
haps the evils of disbelieving them, are particularly care- 
ful to implant them in the minds of their children, that 
their descendants may fully possess the firm conviction 
which removes so many obstacles from the career of 
fame and fortune, and thus the pernicious practice of 
dogmatical instillation is perpetuated, while the duty of 
inquiry remains neglected and untaught. 

Thus as to the first of the objects which the people 
have to regard, and which the state, if it interfere at ail, 
ought to encourage and assist them to accomplish ; gov- 
ernments, whenever they pursue this method, do nothing 
to promote but a great deal to counteract it. 

Instead of either refraining from interference or adopt- 
ing a system calculated to impress upon the people the 
duty of inquiry, to cherish in the community a conscien- 
tious regard to impartial investigation, to inspire all classes 
and especially the national instructors with a love of truth, 
they otfer inducements to unfairness of examination and 
insincerity of profession. 

* The powerful influence of public opinion, independently of posi- 
tive institution, in seducing and deterring individuals from the fear- 
less and manly pursuit of* truth, may be seen plainly enough in our 
own country, but perhaps on a still larger scale in America, as 
vividly described by De Tocqueville. Vide Note E. in Appendix, 
referred to in its proper place under the next Section. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 337 

We turn then next to inquire how far this method 
accomplishes what it professes to undertake — with what 
success it guides the people to the truth. 

In the first place, it must occur to every one, after the 
discussions already gone through, that the most effectual 
way of assisting men to attain truth, is to remove all 
obstacles to inquiry, all seductions to indolent acquies- 
cence or partial attention to evidence, and to lead them to 
examine thoroughly the grounds of any doctrine which 
they may be called upon to investigate. Error univer- 
sally arises from narrow and incomplete views, and is 
le£st likely to be found amongst men trained to exercise 
their faculties without restraint, and to look at a question 
on all sides. But when governments employ function- 
aries to teach certain fixed doctrines, they directly and 
at once circumscribe inquiry as far as in them lies, 
and thus lessen the probability of attaining truth. The 
teachers are, as we have already seen, doomed to remain 
in one unchangeable intellectual condition, to look from 
only one point of view, to pace within a circle that cannot 
be enlarged, and as far as their influence extends, they 
will keep the people in a similar unprogressive state, with 
an equally bounded power of vision. 

Full, rigid, impartial, unfettered examination must ever 
be the way to advance the progress and dissemination of 
knowledge of every kind, moral or physical, sacred or 
profane. Imagine for a moment what would ensue if in 
all the great departments of knowledge, governments 
should endeavor to protect and further the interests of 
truth by laying down a string of propositions on each sub- 
ject, and hiring professors to inculcate and enforce them. 
Where under such a system, had it been adopted two or 
three centuries ago, would have been the brilliant results 
of chemical experiment ? or the wonderful treasures of 
22 



338 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

knowledge extracted from the earth by geological re- 
search ? or the sublime discoveries won by the astrono- 
mer from the depths of the heavens ? 

The absurdity of such a course would be more appa- 
rent, although not more real, in proportion as the depart- 
ments of knowledge in which it was adopted, admitted 
of certainty in their conclusions, and it assuredly would 
be more harmless. What sentiments would be excited by 
any government which should positively enjoin on the 
mathematical professors in its pay, that they should not 
teach any propositions at variance with those of Euclid? 
But the real absurdity would be quite as great although 
not so innocent, if this provident care on the part of gov- 
ernment were to extend itself to the patronage of any 
doctrines which might have been fixed upon by any body 
of men, however able and eminent, in the disputable and 
varying sciences of medicine, chemistry, and geology. 
In the first case, the protection would be idly superfluous ; 
in the second, by raising up a strong interest against 
further inquiry, it would be pernicious in proportion as 
it proved effectual, because every science the investiga- 
tion of which by those who apply themselves to it, has 
not yet produced unanimity, is either erroneous in its con- 
clusions or imperfect in its development, and a comparison 
of the discordant opinions arising in different minds from 
the study of it, is essentially necessary to remove those 
errors of fact, of reasoning, or of exposition by which 
unanimity is precluded. 

It will scarcely be urged against this representation that 
the few individuals who are at any time entrusted with the 
powers of government, have peculiar facilities for arriv- 
ing at truth. In no department of knowledge except that 
connected with their office, can this be pretended with the 
slightest verisimilitude. On the contrary, from the cir- 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 339 

cumstance of their attention being engrossed by the im- 
portant and appropriate objects of protecting person and 
property, and the thousand incidents thence arising, they 
are in a great measure disqualified for determining truth 
in other matters. The absorption of the feelings and 
faculties by one class of interesting subjects, necessarily 
precludes the highest degree of fitness for judging of 
others. Such a degree of aptitude for forming a sound 
judgment on any set of questions, can be the fruit of 
nothing but particular devotion to them under the indis-, 
pensable conditions of perfect freedom of examination 
and exemption from extrinsic bias. But suppose the most 
favorable case ; suppose that the few persons wielding the 
authority of the state, have not ventured to fix on any 
doctrines as true, without the aid of the most learned men. 
These men have been assembled for the purpose, have 
investigated, have deliberated, have determined, and 
finally presented the government with a set of conclusions 
in their judgment indubitably true. These are adopted 
by the state, and professors are paid for teaching them. 
Now then, it may be said, the objection that the govern- 
ment itself cannot determine truth, is got quit of: it calls 
in proper assistance, it brings together the ablest men, and 
obtains a result if not absolutely without error, yet more 
accurate than could be obtained in any other way. 

It may, indeed, be at once admitted, that at any given 
moment in any department of knowledge, the conclusions 
of the ablest men who have made it their peculiar study 
under perfect freedom of inquiry, and totally uninflu- 
enced by either hopes or fears, are far more likely to be 
correct than the opinions of the multitude ; and that if the 
doctrines agreed upon by an assembly of such eminent 
men, perfectly unshackled in their deliberations and un- 
biassed by professional interests, could be substituted for 



340 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

the prevalent notions in the minds of the people, the 
cause of truth would be advanced. But this admission 
will not avail the defenders of fixed doctrines. Such an 
assembly has never yet been seen, and to be of the 
required use must be in perpetual session. Amongst a 
race of inquisitive but fallible beings, knowledge is neces- 
sarily progressive. The opinions of the ablest men, if 
such men could be assembled in the way described, might 
be nearer approximations to truth at the moment than 
those of the people at large, but might possibly be shown 
to be erroneous or defective in the succeeding age, or 
even the succeeding year. By fixing, therefore, once 
for all on such opinions to be taught without deviation, by 
professors salaried for the purpose, a government not 
gifted with infallibility, or unable to call in the assistance 
of men who are, would be unavoidably expending its 
resources in the maintenance and propagation of error. 

As the only way, then, to obviate these consequences, 
the assembly must, as already intimated, continue in 
perpetual session, or be reconstructed at short intervals. 
It must be constantly inquiring ; keeping up with the 
advances of knowledge in other quarters ; receiving freely 
the light directed by other sciences upon that to which its 
supervision is limited ; and modifying accordingly the 
propositions to be publicly taught. 

On this plan, undoubtedly, a great part of the objections 
applying to the actual system would vanish : but it would 
only change the character of the difficulties in which a 
government would be plunged by undertaking to deter- 
mine and to propagate truth : and as such a project has 
never been seriously proposed, it is not necessary to dwell 
on the obvious reasons which render it impracticable. 

Nor is any such providential care and contrivance on 
the part of a government at all necessary or useful. With- 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OP TRUTH. 341 

out this cumbrous and costly machinery, under the simple 
system of non-interference as to results, the ablest men of 
the age are in perpetual session, as truly as they can ever 
be, canvassing the most difficult questions, devoting them- 
selves to the most arduous researches, and sedulously 
working their way to truth. 

Against this view of the subject, it may perhaps be 
alleged ; that it proceeds on the supposition that know- 
ledge of all kinds is necessarily progressive, whereas it 
is plain that true propositions cannot alter : they may have , 
other propositions, true or false, added to them, but they 
remain unaffected themselves. Now, if such true propo- 
sitions are adopted by the state, they may be more cer- 
tainly established in the minds of men, and more exten- 
sively disseminated than if they were left to make their 
own way without protection or patronage.' This argu- 
ment, however, takes for granted that the whole difficulty 
— the difficulty of determining truth — has been overcome. 
No doubt there are propositions, which being perfectly 
true, are unsusceptible of alteration ; but it is obvious, 
that before they can be adopted by the state, they must be 
found out and discriminated from such as are false. Be- 
sides, they may be true, but fall short of the whole truth ; 
they may form only part of a series of propositions, and 
convey even a false impression, till the complete series 
has been brought to light : or they may be true only 
under certain conditions, liable to alter. Hence the know- 
ledge of the subject to which they relate is progressive 
from the very nature of the human mind, or of the ob- 
jects of its cognizance ; and the question is, whether or 
not the discovery of new truths, and the disentangling of 
known truths from the errors with which they are compli- 
cated, are best effected by unfettered investigation, or by 
the state stepping in at some point in the progress, pro- 



342 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

nouncing authoritatively that the ultimate goal has been 
reached, and employing functionaries to teach the doc- 
trines thus decisively fixed, as by an enchanter's wand, 
in the particular form and attitude which they may 
have happened to assume at the moment the decree was 
uttered. 

This seems to have been actually attempted in jurispru- 
dence by Justinian, after the promulgation of his celebra- 
ted collection. ' He entirely forbade,' says Savigny, ' the 
rise of a new jurisprudential literature for the future. 
Only Greek translations of the Latin text, and (by way of 
mechanical aid) short sketches of the contents of the title, 
were to be allowed ; if any book, properly so called, any 
commentary on these laws, were written, it was to be 
destroyed, and the author subjected to the punishment 
inflicted on forgery.' c One thought,' he continues, c lay 
at the bottom of all these edicts ; viz., that this selection 
from the legal science and wisdom of former ages was 
adequate to all the wants of society, and could only be 
impaired by any new work.' * 

In the whole of Justinian's proceeding, we may observe 
the identical course pursued which we have been here con- 
tending against. He employed the ablest jurists he could 
find to extract the necessary and useful matter from the 
whole mass of existing documents on the subject ; he 
then stereotyped it as the perfection of wisdom, from 
which all deviation would be an evil ; he appears to have 
provided the schools of law with a new plan of instruc- 
tion, by which to teach these immutable precepts; and he 
visited all commentary, all discussion of the justice or 
policy of his code, with criminal punishment. ' The fun- 

* See Fragments from German Authors, translated by Mrs. Aus- 
ten, r p. 169. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 343 

damental idea,' adds the writer already quoted, ; which 
prompted it, is in fact the same self-delusion which, deeply- 
rooted in human nature, is continually recurring in every 
part of the domain of opinion, and especially in the relig- 
ious part : i. e., we believe ourselves permitted to impose 
on others, as exclusively right and authoritative, that par- 
ticular formula of thought which we have constructed by 
the honest and conscientious exertion of our own powers, 
thus, as we think, for ever banishing error.' * 

All such attempts to banish error can serve but to 
retain it. The only useful office which the prescribed 
dogmas can perform, will be to stand like so many immov- 
able landmarks indicating to the eyes of future genera- 
tions how far the tide of human progress has swept beyond 
the limits imposed by human presumption. 

The objections here stated to the system of pre- 
appointed conclusions have now in most cases their full 
weight. In no departments of knowledge (with few ex- 
ceptions) do governments in the present day, having any 
pretensions to be called free, ever attempt to bind down 
those persons whom they employ in the capacity of teach- 
ers to certain fixed doctrines, whether the latest results of 
inquiry, or such as were propounded and settled in an age 
of comparative ignorance. 

Such a course could not conduce to the general attain- 
ment of truth by the people, but in whatever department 

* l It is the first care of a reformer,' says Gibbon with grave sar- 
casm, ' to prevent any future reformation. To maintain the text of 
the Pandects, the Institutes, and the Code, the use of cyphers and 
abbreviations was rigorously proscribed, and as Justinian recol- 
lected that the perpetual edict had been buried under the weight of 
commentators, he denounced the punishment of forgery against the 
rash civilians who should presume to interpret or pervert the will of 
their sovereign.' — Decline and Fall, chap. xliv. 



344 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

of knowledge it were adopted, would unavoidably dissem- 
inate and perpetuate error.* 

But were it even admitted that the doctrines so selected 
would in all likelihood be true, this system of maintaining 
and propagating them would still (we must not forget) be 
open to the insurmountable objection already urged, that it 
interfered with that personal duty of inquiry, obligatory 
on individuals, which the state is at all times bound to 
respect. 

It must be recollected that the duty which presents 
itself to be performed by any one whose situation calls 
him to inquiry is simply honest and diligent examination, 
and that to draw him from this course by an offer of ad- 
vantages even on the side of what the offerer conceives 
to be truth, is to seduce him from the proper discharge of 
a task of the highest moral obligation, as well as to place 
him in an imperfect intellectual condition in relation to 
the subject. It is impossible to maintain loth that it is 
incumbent on a man to conduct an examination impar- 
tially, and that it is right in other men, singly or associ- 
ated, to present inducements which shall influence him to 
do it partially. Such inducements, it is almost needless 
to remark, operate precisely in the same way, whether 
offered by individuals or by the state ; and the same prin- 
ciples of morality apply to both alike, and with equal 
force. 

When we reflect, too, that the duty of inquiry is in 
many cases, and especially in those cases in which gov- 
ernments are apt to interfere, a direct obligation to the 
Almighty Author of our being, the attempt of any human 
creature, armed with what authority soever, to discourage 
or prevent or pervert the performance of that duty, be- 
comes a procedure of even awful presumption, f 

* See Appendix, Note C. t See Appendix, Note D. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 345 

SUBSECTION II. 

EMPLOYING FORCE. 

We have next to examine the third method which may 
be adopted by governments with a view to assist the peo- 
ple in attaining truth; namely, repressing by force all 
doctrines at variance with such as have been prescribed 
by authority ; in a word, persecution for opinions, that 
eternal blot on the reputation of humanity, which it is 
difficult to mention without an indignation inconsistent 
with a dispassionate survey of its effects.* This must, in 
a greater or smaller degree, always prevail where emolu- 
ment or distinction is held out for teaching or attends the 
profession of prescribed doctrines, inasmuch as the loss of 
advantages in possession has all the effect of a positive 
penalty on the parties subject to it. 

When we were pointing out in a former part of this 
treatise the violations of duty in connection with the pur- 
suit of truth observable amongst individuals, the consid- 
eration of the particular transgression now before us was 
postponed (with the view of avoiding repetitions) to the 
present chapter, as its more appropriate place. As all 
that can be said of persecution when it is the work of 
government will apply with little modification to such 
forms as it commonly assumes in private life, the separate 
consideration of the latter became needless. Penalties 
applied to opinions do not, any more than rewards, de- 
pend for their effects on the agency through which they 
are administered ; nor is their rigor uniformly greater 
when imposed by the state. The persecution inflicted by 
society itself, or by its individual members, is sometimes 

* See Appendix, Note D. 



346 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

equal in atrocity to any which proceeds from the hand of 
power.* 

It may also be here recalled to the reader's attention, 
that although persecution has been the most frequently 
and extensively employed in the support of theological 
doctrines, the same brute violence has been extended to 
other departments of knowledge. Thus to take an exam- 
ple, which happens to be at hand, from the history of 
France. In 1624, at the request of the University of 
Paris, and especially of the Sorbonne, persons were for- 
bidden by an arret of parliament, ' on pain of death, to 
hold or teach any maxim contrary to ancient and approved 
authors, or to enter into any debate but such as should be 
approved by the doctors of the faculty of theology.' By 
the same arret several persons who had composed and 
published theses against the doctrine of Aristotle, were 
either reprimanded or banished. f 

The fate of the celebrated Ramus, too, in the preceding 
century, is a well known instance of the virulence of per- 
secution against all who called in question the infallibility 
of Aristotle. His writings were prohibited and ordered 
to be burnt, and he himself forbidden to teach. 

In examining this method of forcible suppression by the 
same tests as have been applied to the method of pro- 
moting the cause of truth by the employment of teachers, 
it seems almost ludicrous to enter upon a formal proof 
that repressing opinions by violence, so far from assisting 
inquiry, must prevent the people from discharging the 
duty of a full and impartial investigation into the subject 
to which such opinions relate. It is, nevertheless, worth 
while to trace the way in which in relation to the pursuit 



* For proofs of this, see Note E. in Appendix. 

t See D'Alembert on the Abuse of Criticism in Religion. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 347 

of truth, it operates on the mind, conduct, and condition, 
of a people who are unfortunate enough to be placed in 
such a state of intellectual slavery. 

Forcible suppression not only takes away the oppor- 
tunity and means of inquiry from the community at large, 
but destroys or vitiates the natural motives to inquire. 
There can be no doubt that as rewards encourage a par- 
tial attention to evidence in favor of those doctrines for 
the profession of which they are bestowed, so the opposite 
treatment — persecution — has, to a large extent, the 
effect of inducing mankind to shun the persecuted doc- 
trines, and the arguments in their support. The lovers of 
sympathy who shrink from disapprobation — the worldly 
who are alive to profit or pleasure but indifferent to truth 
— the indolent and supine who do not greatly concern 
themselves about any opinions so long as their ordinary 
course of life is suffered to run smoothly, are all deterred 
by a fear of consequences from attending to doctrines 
which can bring nothing but discredit and danger on their 
votaries. They are frightened from what is really their 
imperative duty. With bolder dispositions it is otherwise. 
When persecution is let loose upon society without being 
pushed to absolute extermination, the effect upon the 
strong-minded and energetic is to rouse the spirit of re- 
sistance ; and this is especially the effect on every one 
who suffers in his own person. His passions are stimu- 
lated against his oppressors, his mind is thrown into the 
attitude of defiance and contention, and instead of simply 
seeking for what is true, his whole soul is bent on detect- 
ing the errors of his antagonists, and providing himself 
with every possible argument on his own side. He grasps 
not at truth, but at the means, whatever they may be, of 
self-defence, and at the power of annoyance. Provoked 
to a keen scrutiny, he enters upon it without any adequate 



348 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

sense of the real obligation under which he lies, and in a 
state of mind far from being favorable to stern impar- 
tiality of investigation. 

This is true, even of that minor species of persecu- 
tion which consists in debarring dissentients from certain 
rights and privileges, or exacting declarations of faith, or 
requiring conformity to repulsive ceremonies. Many find 
themselves, from rank or birth or station, in this vexatious 
position in society ; and the consequent irritation and 
sense of injustice sharpen their perspicacity to all the 
valid arguments of their own party, and to the weak 
points of the system which degrades itself by annoying 
them with needless disabilities and fruitless exactions. 

Thus, in deterring from inquiry, on the one hand, and 
perverting the spirit of it, on the other, persecution is 
inimical alike to the means and to the motives for per- 
forming the great duty under our consideration. It is 
superfluous to enter at greater length on the consequences 
flowing in this particular direction from the forcible sup- 
pression of opinions ; but a remark before suggested, 
presses again irresistibly on the mind. In most cases 
where this kind of interference takes place, the duty of 
investigation is a direct obligation to the Supreme Being ; 
and if it is awfully presumptuous in any fallible mortal to 
prevent or pervert the fulfilment of so sacred a duty, by 
holding out to his fellow-creatures the temptation of ben- 
efit, what must be the insane arrogance of him who seeks 
to accomplish the same mischievous purpose by the in- 
fliction of misery ? 

c It is unconsciousness alone ' (to borrow the language 
of a work before referred to) ' or an imperfect sense of 
the real character of his conduct, which redeems it from 
the blackest guilt. We should otherwise sink confounded 
at the audacious wickedness of that man who dared to 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 349 

intermeddle, by pains and penalties of whatever degree or 
whatever kind, with the solemn duty of human beings to 
their Maker, and with the jurisdiction of their Omniscient 
Judge.' * 

Let us next examine how far the forcible suppression 
of opinions will stand the test of the second principle. 

Persecutors, it is certain, how exempt soever they may 
have been from any such notion as that of promoting the 
duty of inquiry, have often labored under the delusion, 
that they were assisting the people in the other object, the 
attainment of truth ; they have actually believed that they 
were promoting the prevalence of sound and accurate 
opinions by preventing the free utterance of thought and 
communication of intelligence. The infatuation seems a 
strange one ; but it has undoubtedly prevailed, and still 
continues amongst many who would not willingly be 
classed among the weak and the ignorant. It is scarcely 
necessary to enter here upon the proof — a proof already 
anticipated in the course of the preceding discussions — 
how effectually these deluded men were doing the con- 
trary ; how certainly, as far as their efforts were not de- 
feated, they were engaged in fixing mankind in darkness 
and error. At this stage of our dissertation, it must be 
abundantly plain that in proportion as persecution for 
opinions is successful, it retards the progress of truth by 
precluding the interchange of knowledge, the emulous 
scrutiny of error, the quick comparison of results, and the 
thorough investigation of the processes by which they are 
attained. It is a brute obstacle, replunging the human 
race, as far as its power extends, into the disadvantages 
of that condition in which the physical means of general 
mental intercourse were unknown. 

* Letters of an Egyptian Kafir, p. 120. 



350 ' ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 

6 Every species of intolerance,' says an eminent writer, 
c which enjoins suppression and silence, and every species 
of persecution which enforces such injunctions, is adverse 
to the progress of truth ; forasmuch as it causes that to be 
fixed by one set of men, at one time, which is much better 
and with much more probability of success, left to the 
independent and progressive inquiries of separate indivi- 
duals. Truth results from discussion and controversy ; is 
investigated by the labors and researches of private per- 
sons. Whatever, therefore, prohibits these, obstructs that 
industry and that liberty which it is the common interest 
of mankind to promote.' # 

But happily such intolerance carries with it, in that re- 
action which, as already shown, it usually calls forth, some 
compensation for the injuries inflicted by it on the cause 
of truth. When this monstrous practice is not pushed to 
extremity, — where its merciless designs cannot be carried 
into complete effect, — where it is mitigated by the ex- 
istence of large bodies who resist it, — where it is there- 
fore only partial and intermittent, and is constantly 
denounced and defied, it is apt, as we have seen, not only 
to sharpen the sight and strengthen the convictions of its 
victims, but to shake existing prejudices in the community 
by the examination it provokes, and to extend the influence 
of the doctrines against which it is levelled. 

Seldom, indeed, is the exciting effort of such intolerance 
confined to those on whom it personally falls. The re- 
cords of the world sufficiently attest that persecution 
awakens the attention of parties who are not immediately 
interested, to questions otherwise not likely to attract their 
notice, and leads to such trains of reflection as silently 
sap, if they do not forcible subvert, the foundations of 

* Moral Philosophy, Book vi. chap. 10. 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 351 

prejudice. Both sympathy and curiosity are roused; the 
fate of the victim is commiserated ; the opinions which 
have drawn down vengeance upon him are scrutinized, 
and the issue frequently is, that they establish themselves 
'in the heart and in the understanding of the inquirer. 

Such results, although they constitute no merit on the 
part of the persecutor, must be allowed, in whatever 
degree they take place, to lessen the effectiveness of 
intolerance in checking the progress of knowledge. After 
every possible alleviation, however, from energies roused, 
opposition provoked, and curiosity awakened, there is still 
a large residuum of evil. It is the very essence of perse- 
cution, in proportion as it prevails, to injure the cause of 
truth, and therefore of human happiness, by preventing 
the utterance of opinions; thus circumscribing the number 
of inquirers, insulating their thoughts, and as far as its 
power reaches, condemning man, with indefinite capabili- 
ties of improvement by intercourse with his species, to 
that incapacity of communicating and transmitting his 
impressions, which is the natural doom of the brute. 



CHAPTEE VII. 



CONCLUSION. 



The views which have now been presented of the duty 
of inquiry essentially differ, it must be confessed, from the 
opinions and practices of mankind in general. 

The state of society at present on this great subject, it 
is not too harsh to say, is a state of barbarism. Whoever 
looks abroad must admit, that in the most enlightened 
countries existing in the world, gross ignorance of the 
duties of man to God, and of man to man, in relation to 
the pursuit of truth, abounds. In this vital matter, no 
where is that conduct which is really virtuous regarded 
with approbation, — no where is that which is really 
vicious condemned : there is no well-directed sensibility ; 
no nice discernment ; no correct appreciation of merit ; 
no consistent adherence even to admitted principles ; hon- 
esty of inquiry is subverted by temptation, or overwhelmed 
with disgrace and persecution ; while unenlightened or 
criminal acquiescence is fostered and recompensed. 

The best wish that can arise in the heart of any lover 
of his species is, that this deplorable condition of humani- 
ty may be relieved ; the best mental change that can hap- 
pen to mankind is an enhancement of their intellectual 
discriminations, and a revolution in their moral sentiments, 
in regard to the pursuit of truth. 

If any one should ask how such a change is to be 



ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 353 

brought about, there appears to be only one answer. It 
can be accomplished by no magic. It must be effected 
by repeated discussions, by bringing the necessary distinc- 
tions frequently into view, by an earnest endeavor to shake 
off error, clear up obscurity and disentangle confusion, and 
by holding up our well-considered conclusions on the sub- 
ject before the eyes of our fellow-creatures. These are 
the appointed and appropriate means by which only we 
can purposely hasten a revolution from error to truth in the 
opinions of mankind, and in the practices founded upon 
them. 

With such views the present work has been written. 
To contribute in some measure, however small, to the 
accomplishment of these noble ends, it is now sent forth 
to the world. The rigid consistency with which it aims to 
apply in every direction the great principles of morality 
connected with the pursuit of truth, may be expected to 
draw down on its doctrines all the ill-will which ignorance 
and bigotry will dare to manifest; but, on the other hand, 
it is not too much to hope that the same feature will insure 
it a candid, if not a cordial, reception from the real lovers 
of truth and the best friends of humanity. In bringing it 
to a close, the writer cannot but feel the conscious satis- 
faction of having (however inefficiently) labored in single- 
ness of spirit for an object of inestimable value. 

23 



ESSAY 



PROGRESS OE KNOWLEDGE. 



E SSAY 



ON THE 



PROGRESS OE KNOWLEDGE. 



PART I. 



A. I am glad that we have disengaged ourselves from 
the company, as I am not altogether satisfied with the 
opinions you have been expressing on the character and 
condition of mankind. They are too disheartening. 

N. Are they true ? That is the only inquiry worthy 
of a rational being. 

A. When I say they are too disheartening, I mean that 
they go beyond the truth in the low estimate which they 
exhibit of .human nature. In the present day, I should 
hardly contest any opinions on any other ground. 

N. After all, what have I said? I have said, and I 
repeat, that when we look back into the history of the 
human race we can scarcely help feeling ashamed that 
we belong to it. Man is an animal in a very slight degree 
rational by nature. It seems to require ages upon ages 
to bring the race to any thing like a state of reason — a 
state where prejudice and passion are subordinate to the 
understanding, where man controls the blind impulse of 
the present by a view of the future, and distinctly per- 
ceives his relative position in the universe. It is certain 
that mankind have hitherto never reached such a state. 



358 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

Let any one look around him, and what does he observe ? 
A few minds perhaps capable of raising themselves into 
the pure atmosphere of truth, of emancipating themselves 
from the domination of mere instinct, of expatiating through 
the moral and material world with full liberty of intel- 
lect, and of appreciating the exact relation in which they 
stand to the existences around them ; but the majority — 
nine hundred and ninety-nine in a thousand — the slaves 
of prejudice and the dupes of passion, inflicting misery 
upon themselves and others from gross ignorance of the 
real tendencies of action and the rational object of exist- 
ence ; shrinking from truth as from a spectre ; frightened 
by imaginary terrors ; incapable of pursuing more than 
one step of argument, yet pertinacious in their own infal- 
libility ; humbling themselves in the dust as unworthy to 
approach the God whom they tremble to think of, while 
they confess his unbounded benevolence, yet assuming 
their actions to be of such immense importance to him as 
to require the discipline of eternity at his hands. The 
meanness of men's reasoning powers in general is almost 
incredible. Locke, if I mistake not, terms a man who can 
advance two steps in reasoning a man of two syllogisms. 
There are few such to be found. The majority of man- 
kind are men of one syllogism, or of less. The faculty of 
taking two steps in reasoning without assistance — lead- 
ing strings — is rare ; that of taking three belongs to one 
in an age. It stamps a man as the wonder of his day. 
A. Yet with these mean understandings, these limited 
faculties, how much has the human race accomplished ? 
You must admit, that men in the present day are superior, 
wonderfully superior, in knowledge and wisdom to their 
progenitors three thousand or even three hundred years 
ago ; that they have discarded some methods of rendering 
themselves miserable, and opened a few fresh springs of 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 359 

happiness. In a word, there has been an advance in the 
discrimination of good and evil. You will not contend 
that men are incapable of progressive improvement, 
chained for ever like the brutes to the circle of individual 
attainment, doomed generation after generation to com- 
mence at one point and to tread the same round. No ! 
human improvement, thank God, admits of successive 
advances, each generation starts from the ground at which 
the last had expended its strength in arriving ; and I will 
venture to say, that this single circumstance is sufficient 
to carry the race to a degree of knowledge which it is 
impossible for us to conceive. Oh ! that I could live to 
see the resujts of another century of progression. 

N. The principle of the progressive improvement of 
mankind, and the consequences resulting from it, I ac- 
knowledge as well as yourself. It was implied indeed in 
my assertion, that it required ages upon ages to bring the 
race to any thing like a state of rationality ; an assertion, 
which, while it admits the tendency to improvement, 
certainly encourages no very sanguinary expectations of 
the rapidity of the progress. In our anticipations on this 
point we differ. When I look back on the past, or around 
me on the present, I cannot help feeling convinced, that if 
men are to advance, as I think they inevitably must, it 
will be by a very slow march. There are a thousand 
obstacles in the way. It is but a poor eulogy on human 
capabilities, that mankind have been four or five thousand 
years in attaining to their present partial and imperfect 
civilization, which extolled as it generally has been, is 
scarcely entitled to the appellation of semi-barbarism. If 
we are to be guided by experience, if we are to expect 
hereafter only what we have found in the past, our antici- 
pations of the rapidity of future improvement will not be 
very extravagant. 



360 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

A. Consider the wars and disorders which have hereto- 
fore constantly checked the career of civilization. But 
for the madness of ambition, how far it would have 
already advanced ! 

N. These wars and disorders were the necessary con- 
sequences of those narrow faculties, that incapacity of 
reasoning, that blindness to their real interests, which I 
charge on the human race. To say in defence of human 
nature, that it would have improved faster had not these 
things happened, is only to affirm, that if it had been 
endowed with superior sense, it would not have exhibited 
so much folly. 

A. There is one thing, however, which you must allow 
to be much in favor of those anticipations which look for 
a more rapid advance in future than has hitherto been 
experienced — the invention of printing. 

N. That indeed is the noblest acquisition of science ; it 
is the impregnable fortress of civilization ; no political 
changes, no physical vicissitudes, no mutation short of the 
complete extinction of mankind, can henceforth ever 
restore the empire of the world to ignorance. But admit- 
ting all the benefits of this invention, it is not in the nature 
of the human mind to advance with rapidity. The 
onward strides of improvement may be sure, but they will 
be slow. Genius may burst away from the steady march 
of the race, and penetrate into regions which it will be 
the work of future generations completely to explore ; but 
all its energy will not suffice to drag on the main body 
faster than the regular pace to which the nature of its 
powers inevitably confine it. 

A. You appear to forget, that as by the press the cul- 
tivation of knowledge extends itself over greater numbers, 
a greater portion of talent will be brought out ; prejudices 
will give way in a shorter time, and improvements be 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 361 

adopted with less reluctance. Consider how rapid has 
been the progress of science within the last fifty years, 
compared with an equal term during the middle ages. 

N. Of physical science it is true. It labors under a 
part only of those obstructions which impede the science 
of human nature. Yet even here we may mark several 
of those impediments which doom the species to a tardy 
progression ; — the dulness and inertness of the faculties 
to discover truth, the interests arrayed against its recep- 
tion, the difficulty of sundering the established bonds of 
mental association. Besides, there is a puny sort of self- 
love in every department of knowledge, which desires the 
prevalence and stability of opinions because they are its 
opinions. It cannot find in its heart to fancy itself at all 
in error. Instead of wishing for the progress and spread 
of truth, however subversive of established doctrines, and 
that mankind should be continually detecting their errors 
and adding to their acquirements, instead of exulting at 
the prospect which the future presents of receding dark- 
ness and advancing light, this contemptible selfishness 
would have the world to stand still for ever at the point 
which itself has attained, and poises its own gratification 
against the comprehensive interests of mankind, its own 
shallow pretensions against the growing science of the 
age, and the intellect of myriads of unborn generations. 
It would bind down all the great spirits which are yet to 
advance the happiness and elevate the dignity of man to 
its own blind dogmas and narrow spheres of vision, and 
permit no other intellectual movement in the world 
than an approximation to those opinions which itself has 
chanced to adopt. 

A. You are severe. 

N. Severe ! Would it not exhaust the patience of the 
meekest philosopher — a designation to which I have no 



362 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

pretensions — to see men who have possessed themselves 
of the established quantum of information constantly par- 
ading it as the ne plus ultra of knowledge, and stifling or 
attempting to stifle every symptom of improvement lest 
their own personal consequence should be scratched ? 

A. I am perfectly aware of the extensive prevalence 
of the feelings you describe, which, joined to the disin- 
clination, perhaps disability, that every man has to enter 
into trains of ideas totally at variance with his habitual 
modes of thinking, protract the reign of error even where 
' interest is not engaged in its support. The conduct of 
the medical men in relation to Harvey's discovery is a 
notorious instance in point.* But these obstacles give way. 

N. True. Men die off; and they are succeeded by 
others, whose minds are imbued with truer principles, and 
who do not feel their reputation pledged against improve- 
ment. This, however, is a slow process. By your own 
showing, a prejudice exposed as false can perish only 
with the generation to which it adheres. A rapid advance 
truly, when every step of improvement requires at least 
an age ! 

A. We have instances, nevertheless, in which discove- 
ries have met with a pretty general reception in their own 
times ; those of modern chemistry, for instance. 

N. Yet Priestley could not part with the doctrine of 
phlogiston. As he was a man who held his opinions with 
less than common pertinacity, an inquirer open to convic- 
tion to the day of his death — not one of those who early 
in life packet up their miserable stock of knowledge and 
label it complete — his is a striking instance how tena- 
ciously a theory once received adheres to the under- 
standing. I grant, however, that physical science ad- 

* See Appendix, Note F. 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 363 

varices more rapidly, and disseminates its improvements 
with more ease, than moral and political knowledge. It 
would seem that just in proportion as knowledge is unim- 
portant it meets with a readier reception. 

A. Do you really intend to insinuate that chemistry, 
and the other physical sciences, are unimportant ? Call 
to mind the power which they have given to man over 
nature- — how well they have answered Lord Bacon's 
description of the rational end of knowledge. 

N. I do not call these pursuits unimportant, except 
comparatively ; but I maintain that they are incalculably 
inferior in their effects upon human happiness to those 
sciences which explore the nature of man and the tenden- 
cies of action, and which in the present day, notwith- 
standing the circumstances which force them in some 
degree on general reflection, are disgracefully neglected. 

A. Not all. The science of Political Economy has 
surely received its due share of attention. Some of the 
first intellects of modern times have fixed their grasp 
upon it. 

N. True. This is an exception, a glorious exception ; 
and if anything could render me more sanguine in my 
anticipations of political melioration, it would be the prog- 
ress of this science, the irresistible manner in which it 
has insinuated itself into our councils and moulded our 
policy. Twenty or thirty years ago the doctrines of 
Adam Smith were apparently a dead letter ; his book was 
considered by that sapient race, the practical men, as full 
of Utopian dreams. Pitt did not fully comprehend it, and 
Fox declared it past understanding.* A first-rate states- 

* Mr. Butler m his Reminiscences tells us, that Mr. Fos confessed 
he had never read the Wealth of Nations ; adding : ' There is some- 
thing in alt these subjects v»hich passes my compiehension ; some- 



364 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

man in the present day would be scouted for equal igno- 
rance. The prevalence of this science will do good. Its 
severe logic, its rigorous requisitions to keep in view the 
meaning of terms, the beautiful dependence of its long 
series of propositions, will accustom men to think with 
more accuracy and precision, while they render it even 
a delightful exercise for a masculine understanding. It is 
a lever which will move the world.* 

A. We have here, then, an instance in which a science, 
and that not a physical science, has advanced with con- 
siderable rapidity. 

N. Pardon me. Political Economy is itself a proof 
that the dissemination of new truths is restricted by the 
nature of the human mind to what I may venture to term 
a very moderate rate. It was necessary that the contem- 
poraries of Adam Smith should be succeeded by another 
generation before his doctrines could prevail, t 



thing so wide, that I could never embrace them myself, or find 
any one who did.' — Vol. i. p. 187. 

* It would be out of place here to do more than protest against 
the disparaging estimate of this ' pretended science ' by M. Comte in 
his Course of Positive Philosophy, a work abounding in unques- 
tionable ability and disputable doctrines. It is to be regretted that 
previous to being committed to the press it was not stripped of the 
prolixity (in this case most remarkable) incident to the form of 
lectures. An analysis and review of the whole by a master-hand 
would be invaluable to the English reader. 

f 'At. the interval of half a century, the speculations of this 
great author have been incorporated in the practices of government. 
This is the time which truth and wisdom have taken to travel from 
the philosopher's studxj to the senate-house ; and at length, after hav- 
ing struggled its way through many obstructions* the system of free 
trade is not only recognized, but is begun to be %cted upon in the 
regulation of commercial affairs.' — Dr. Chalmers on Endowments, 
Preface, p. xi. 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 365 

A. What will you say, however, to the improvements 
of Malthus, Say, Ricardo, and others ? These have been 
generally, if not universally, admitted by their contem- 
poraries. 

N. Where is your proof? Not to enter into the ques- 
tion, whether the writings of these authors contain any 
valuable discoveries, I will venture to assert, that the 
number of people, who fully understand the true nature 
of any improvements which have been introduced into the 
science since the days of Adam Smith, scarcely amounts 
to a few hundreds. No ! we must all die before these 
things can be generally understood. To comprehend 
them belongs not to our age. 

A. It is my turn to ask for proof. 

N. I refer you to the Reviews. How few of the Re- 
viewers of Mr. Malthus, M. Say, or Mr. Ricardo* have 
ventured to grapple with their doctrines. To enter into 
reasonings of this kind is a tasking of the intellect to 
which few writers can submit, and which would scarcely 
promote the popularity of a periodical work. I refer you 
to the House of Commons. Of the number of those who 
are nightly employed in the discussion of economical 
topics, how many are there fully in possession of even 
the acknowledged principles of the subject? 

A. Neither the Reviews nor the House of Commons 
can be reasonably expected to be in the very van of a 
difficult science, although doubtless splendid exceptions 
might be named. But to return to your assertion re- 
specting the slow advance of the science of man, I am 
disposed to think it more rapid than you are willing to 
allow, and that the contrary opinion on your part arises 
from the few changes which have appeared in our civil 

* See Note G, in Appendix. 



365 * ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

and political institutions. Now it is very possible that 
knowledge on a particular subject may have been making 
a great progress for years, and yet not have manifested 
itself in the modification of existing establishments. Nay, 
this seems absolutely necessary : for, before any effects 
can appear in practice, it is requisite, in the first place, 
that the discoveries should have been made ; and, sec- 
ondly, that they should have been familiarized by dissem- 
ination. Hence it is not fair to measure the progress of 
a science at any given period by its practical results. 

N. I concede some weight to your remarks. But what 
examples would you select of improvements in moral and 
political science apart from practice ? 

A. After Political Economy, which we have already 
considered, I should adduce Legislation, Moral and In- 
tellectual Philosophy generally, and the Philosophy of 
Physical Inquiry in particular, and also the Theory of 
Language. 

N. I see whom you are aiming at. You doubtless have 
in your eye Bentham, Dr. Thomas Brown, Home Tooke, 
and a few others. 

A. You might have guessed more widely of the truth. 
I hesitate not to express my conviction, that these writers 
have made important advances in their several pursuits. 
I know the reluctance with which their claims are ad- 
mitted, but I suspect that few have taken the trouble to 
understand their works. 

N. So ! You are coming round I perceive to my 
opinion ; for you must acknowledge, that if few have 
taken the trouble to understand writers of this class and 
character, the rate at which their discoveries are propa- 
gated must be very tardy. Believe me, my dear Sir, 
these men belong to the next age. The truths, which 
they have promulgated, must be familiarized in elementary 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 367 

treatises, taught in the schools, wrought into our lighter 
literature, and instilled into the minds of another genera- 
tion before they can be generally received. It is a com- 
mon error to consider the achievements of a few great 
minds as indicative of the state of civilization to which 
the community at large has attained. Men of genius 
leave their contemporaries a century behind. There is 
an eloquent passage in a writer of some celebrity so much 
to the point, that I must beg to quote it in illustration of 
my views. ' We cannot help remarking,' says he, ' what 
a deception we suffer to pass on us from history. It cele- 
brates some period in a nation's career as pre-eminently 
illustrious for magnanimity, lofty enterprise, literature, 
and original genius. There was perhaps a learned and 
vigorous monarch, and there were Cecils and Walsing- 
hams, and Shakspeares and Spensers, and Sidneys and 
Raleighs, with many other powerful thinkers and actors, 
to render it the proudest age of our national glory. And 
we thoughtlessly admit on our imagination this splendid 
exhibition as representing, in some indistinct manner, the 
collective state of the people in that age. The ethereal 
summits of a tract of the moral world are conspicuous 
and fair in the lustre of heaven, and we take no thought 
of the immensely greater proportion of it which is sunk 
in gloom and covered with fogs. The general mass of 
the population, whose physical vigor, indeed, and cour- 
age, and fidelity to the interests of the country, were of 
such admirable avail to the purposes, and under the direc- 
tion of the mighty spirits that wielded their rough agency ; 
this great mass was sunk in such mental barbarism, as to 
be placed about the same distance from their illustrious 
intellectual chiefs, as the hordes of Scythia from the most 
elevated minds of Athens.' * 

* Essay on Popular Ignorance, by John Foster, p. 71. 



368 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

A. A noble passage, eloquent in language and felicit- 
ous in illustration : but you surely do not regard it as 
applicable to modern times ? 

N. I look upon it as a pretty faithful picture of the 
state of things in the present day. He who, not content 
with imposing reports and statistical results, comes into 
actual contact with the real body of the people, will find 
an immeasurable difference between the average of their 
intelligence and the luminous and comprehensive views 
which fill the eye of a Bentham or a Brown, or any other 
man of genius whose name may be employed to mark 
the farthest point of intellectual progression. 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 369 



PART II. 

N. It appears to me, that in our last conversation on 
the progressive improvement of mankind, we differed only 
in regard to its rapidity, you contending for a much 
quicker progress than I am disposed to anticipate. The 
difference between us, however, scarcely affects any of 
the important consequences flowing from the general prin- 
ciple. 

A. Your arguments, although forcibly urged, by no 
means shook the previous conviction of my mind ; but 
what are the consequences to which you particularly 
allude ? 

N. The most cursory glance at the subject is sufficient 
to suggest a thousand valuable inferences, some of them 
widely at variance with prevalent opinions. For instance, 
if all kinds of knowledge necessarily improve, it is vain 
to look for the soundest principles, the deepest insight into 
nature, in our older writers. 

A. That is a conclusion which is certainly little accord- 
ant with the theories of the day. Even I, sanguine as I 
am of the future, should hesitate to accede to it. 

N. The ground of this prepossession in favor of old 
writers is evidently a false analogy, which Lord Bacon 
has well exposed. In every subject which admits of an 
accession of knowledge, the best writers must be in time 
superseded. To a later age they must often appear 
tedious, wasting their powers on trifles, attempting for- 
mally to establish what is obviously absurd or what no one 
24 



370 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

disputes, or tasking their strength in the prolix exposure 
of fallacies, the true character of which may now be 
shown in a few sentences. Such works after a certain 
period are consulted only on account of their reputation, 
for their style, or for the pleasure of tracking the steps of 
a great mind. The works of Bacon and Locke are 
already becoming instances in point. They are more 
talked of than read ; and if you will pardon a homely 
expression, oftener dipped into than waded through. 

A. We have works, nevertheless, and those not works 
of art, but what in contradistinction may be called works 
of knowledge, which will not be readily superseded. 

N. It would be difficult to name them. I will not 
deny, however, the possibility of a doctrine being so con- 
cisely and clearly established, that the demonstration may 
never be displaced by a better. Even in such cases, the 
doctrine in process of time appears so intuitive as not to 
require proof. 

A. It seems to be an unavoidable inference from your 
. remarks, that the study of old authors is a waste of labor. 

N. Much of it is an exhaustion of the strength to no 
purpose. This obsolete learning is well enough for minds 
of a secondary cast, but it only serves to hamper the man 
of original genius. It is unwise in such a one to enter 
very minutely into the history of the science to which he 
devotes himself — more especially at the outset. Let him 
perfectly master the present state of the science, and he 
will be prepared to push it farther while the vigor of his 
intellect remains unbroken ; but if he previously attempt 
to embrace all that has been written on the subject, to make 
himself acquainted with all its exploded theories and obso- 
lete doctrines, his mind will probably be too much entangled 
in their intricacies to make any original efforts ; too wea- 
ried with tracing past achievements to carry the science 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 371 

to a farther degree of excellence.* When a man has to 
take a leap he is materially assisted by stepping backward 
a few paces, and giving his body an impulse by a short 
run to the starting place ; but if his precursory range is 
too extensive, he exhausts his forces before he comes to 
the principal effort. 

A. The general voice is against your doctrine. Old 
authors are universally considered as treasures of deep 
thought, mines of wisdom, from which the young aspirant 
after distinction is recommended to extract the ore, which 
he is to beat out and embellish for the public use. I thiuk 
you underrate them. 

N. Do not mistake me. I reverence as much as any 
man the great intellects which have been employed in 
raising the structure of science. It is no disparagement to 
the illustrious men of past times, that their errors are 
pointed out, and that shorter and easier methods are found 
of accomplishing that which it required all their efforts to 
effect. With intellects far greater perhaps than any sub- 

* In harmony with the general scope of the observations here 
made, a French writer, before cited, M. Comte, has well character- 
ized two modes of exposition (and the same distinction holds good in 
the study as well as in the explanation of science), one the historic, 
the other the dogmatic; the former presenting a science in the order 
in which it has been brought to its present state, the latter present- 
ing it as it would be formed by a mind whose intelligence sufficed to 
take at once a view of the whole. In proportion as a science ad- 
vances, the first method becomes more and more impracticable by 
the long series of intermediate steps through which the mind would 
be dragged ; while on the other hand, the second method increases 
in facility in the same proportion. Ordinary men (he proceeds to 
say) could never be placed on a level with the actual state of sci- 
ence, brought about by the labors of a long line of master-spirits, if 
every individual had to pass through the successive steps which 
have been necessarily trod by the collective genius of the human 
race. See Cours de Philosophic Positive, tome i. p. 77. 



372 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

sequent laborers in the same cause, they may be surpassed 
in extent and accuracy of knowledge at a later period by 
men of the most limited capacity. Such is the necessary 
condition of human improvement. All that an individual 
can effect is comparatively trivial. His powers of original 
inference are bounded to a few steps. The works of one 
must be elevated on those of another. Meanwhile beauty 
of style, elegance of illustration, perspicuity of arrange- 
ment, and ingenuity of inference — all that constitutes a 
book a work of art — may be imperishable. 

A. Your view of the subject seems to militate against 
all claims to originality. If one man is to build on the 
discoveries of another, his best works can only be like 
stones in the edifice, while it is surely the ambition of 
every man of genius to erect a structure of his own. 

N. This notion, that a man should produce something 
exclusively his own, unconnected with any thing pre- 
viously accomplished, in order to entitle him to the praise 
of originality, has given rise to a good deal of vain con- 
tention about the claims of individuals to particular dis- 
coveries and inventions. A casual expression, a barren 
assertion, an imperfect and unsteady approximation to an 
important truth, has been singled out to invalidate the just 
pretensions of the man of original genius, who has planted 
a firm foot on ground of which it is possible indeed that a 
glimpse had been previously caught, but which had never 
been actually reached ; and who has opened to our de- 
lighted minds a vista of consequences which seems more 
like a creation than a discovery. Thus the originality of 
Newton in his doctrine of Gravitation has been disputed on 
the ground of some approaches to this principle by Hook ; 
that of Hume, in his views of the relation of Cause and 
Effect, on the strength of expressions in sundry writers; 
that of Malthus, in his principles of Population, on account 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 373 

of some passages in Wallace, Stuart, and Smith ; and that 
of Dalton, in his chemical theory of Definite Proportions, 
in consequence of an imperfect anticipation of it by Hig- 
gins. The truth is, that the originality demanded by such 
critics is an originality which cannot exist ; it is purely 
chimerical, and the ambition of attaining it can lead only 
to extravagant paradoxes and baseless theories. Whoever 
wishes to be original in the only practicable way, must 
rise from the improvements of others. A living writer* 
has well characterized this originality in the case of the 
doctrine of population, when he remarks that Mr. Maithus 
took an obvious and familiar truth, which till his time had 
been a barren truism, and showed that it teemed with 
consequences. 

A. I acknowledge that he who can do this may well 
be content with himself. 

N. Yet the critics will quote the familiar truth to prove 
that the consequences were not original. But this is 
absurd on any theory but that which requires in every in- 
vention or discovery a perfect insulation from preceding 
achievements, before it is entitled to that praise. The 
slightest connection with what has been previously accom- 
plished, seems in the eyes of these dreamers to divest it of 
this character. To trace the way in which it was effected, 
or the steps of the process, is with them the same thing as 
destroying its claims to admiration. In contradiction to 
all this, I will venture to affirm that it is invariably owing 
to the state of a science at the time when a man takes it 
Up, that he is able to make his peculiar discoveries. 
Hence those fugitive glimpses, those scattered lights, those 
casual touches in writings of the same date. The minds 
of a number of individuals seem to be contemporaneously 

* Mr. De Quincey. 



374 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

laboring with obscure intimations of the same truth, till in 
the most vigorous amongst them it struggles from its ob- 
scurity and bursts into day. ' The greatest inventor in 
science,' says an eminent philosopher, c was never able to 
do more than to accelerate the progress of discovery.' * 

A. But surely your representation of the matter has a 
tendency to lessen the merit of invention, or at least our 
admiration of it. 

N. On the contrary, it shows us where admiration is 
due, and what are the grounds on which we should grant 
it, as well as explodes the flimsy pretences on which it is 
sometimes professed to be withheld. What is still better, 
it exhibits the real process of invention and discovery, and 
proves that they must necessarily go on, however slowly, 
so long as there is any thing to invent or discover. 

A. In this point we perfectly agree. Hence the folly of 
shutting the mind to further improvement, — of conceiving, 
as many people are apt to do, that they have mastered the 
sciences once and for ever. 

N. Mastered the sciences! A man in the present day 
with regard to the sciences is something like Virgil's boat- 
man, si brachia forte remisit, he loses his place — he is 
in effect carried backward. There is a perpetual necessity 
for exertion if he would maintain his relative position in 
the world of intellect; and from this necessity arises much 
of that hostility to improvement which characterizes the 
dull and the indolent. Thus what should yield delight 
proves a source of mortification ; for what in reality can 
be more exhilarating than the thought, that thousands of 
minds are constantly at work upon new improvements and 
discoveries, that every year may bring some correction to 
our errors and solve some of our difficulties, and that as 

* Playfair's Works, vol. ii. p. 52. 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 375 

long as we live, new lights will pour upon our understand- 
ings ? A right view of the subject would show us, that 
every man of genius, of enterprise, and of research, is 
laboring for our gratification, smoothing the path for our 
steps, and illuminating objects to delight our vision. When 
the warm glow of youthful feeling has passed away, I 
know of nothing so worthy to replace it, nothing so w r ell 
calculated to relieve the insipidity of middle life, as the 
prospect of continual advances in knowledge, inspiring 
hopes which are perpetually gratified and perpetually re- 
newed. An adequate view — a deep impression of the 
progressive character of science is utterly inconsistent 
with that overweening confidence which causes a man to 
place his own opinions as the limit of improvement. 

A. If this is preposterous in an individual, it is surely 
equally so in a body of men. What then shall we say of 
a set of immutable propositions on any subject whatever ? 
— a series of doctrines laid down as absolute truths never 
to be altered ? 

N. I should certainly pronounce it a grand mistake in 
the science of the human mind. There is not a single 
subject which exercises the faculties of man that may not 
be improved — nay, that will not be improved — by the 
efforts of successive generations. It would be an unpar- 
donable degree of arrogance in an assemblage of the 
wisest men that ever lived, supposing that they could be 
brought together, to circumscribe any subject whatever 
within the narrow boundaries of their own opinions. It 
would betray a total misconception of the relations of the 
human mind to the objects around it. I have contended, 
that men in the present day are superior in knowledge to 
their predecessors ; but on the same grounds those who 
come after us will be superior to the existing generation. 
It is highly probable indeed, how mortifying soever the 



376 ran rai f knowledge. 

reflection may be to our personal consequence, that we in 
this age are mere barbarians compared with the race who 
shall hereafter fill the earth ; and surely for us to erect a 
standard of opinion for beings likely to be so inrm: 
superior to <: - is too absurd to need exposure, and 

can scarcely fail to provoke many a compassiona' 
in the future ages of the world. 

A. Absurd enough in all conscience. We are too apt, 
I cc consider our own age as enlightened almost 

to the utmost extent of human capacity. When we reflect 
upon the wonderful discoveries of modern astronomy, on 
the brilliant operations of chemical analysis, on the new 
s darted into the gloom of past ages by geology, on 
the comprehensive truths of political economy, — when we 
survey our ships and our commerce, our steam-engines 
and our gas-lights and balloons, our canals and piers and 
bridges,* — in the exultation of having taken a g 
stric fancy ourselves already arrived at the goal. 

truth is, however, that all these considerations are but 
so many arguments for modesty and diffidence. If the 
present age has excelled those which have preceded it, 
this result is owing to circumstances still in full acti 
and which will inevitably carry the next generation far 
bevond us. It is often said that we are presumptuous in 
thinking ourselves more knowing than our ancestors, but 
we forget the presumption of arrogating a superiority 
over our sue 

N. It is curious to speculate on the consequences of 
this in ev m. The multiplication of books, 

* 7 ::en about twenty years ago) may now 

i- rriages, railrials. the dag" I the 

electrotype : the two former likely to effect an extensive revolution 

in the m&nneHB, habits :wo latter) the 

iL.ii be* :y. 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 377 

for instance, will give rise to some singular phenomena. 
What a vast accumulation of literature, should the world 
continue a thousand or twenty thousand years longer with- 
out a geological submersion ! What a weight of materials 
every vear is adding to the stock of the historian ! In 
process of time it will require the whole life of a man to 
become acquainted with the transactions of former ages, 
and the longest life will be insufficient to master the litera- 
ture of a single country. 

A. It will be the reign of Retrospective Reviews. A 
thousand years hence the literature of our own age may 
possibly furnish half a dozen 'nibbles to these fishers in 
the waters of oblivion. The splendor of intellect which 
envelops us will have dwindled into a mere luminous 
point, scarcely making its way athwart the intervening 
space — a star faintly visible in the night of ages. How 
mortifying to the personal vanity which makes itself the 
very sun of a system ! But if we indulge in speculations 
of this nature we shall inevitably draw on ourselves the 
imputation of being visionary advocates of the perfectibil- 
ity of man. 

N. Such an imputation will scarcely be fixed on me, 
after what I have said in a former conversation on the 
slow progress of the human race. That there will be a 
progress, however, and an incessant one, is so far from 
being a visionary speculation, that I scarcely know a 
proposition which rests on a firmer basis. And the par- 
ticular speculation on the future phenomena of literature 
is equally well founded. It is obvious that the art of 
printing has produced a complete revolution in the world 
of letters during the few centuries which have elapsed since 
its invention ; the movement will continue — will be 
accelerated ; the causes are still in activity, and acquiring 
new force. We have merely to represent to ourselves 



378 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

therefore a repetition of what has already happened, only 
on a larger scale and with a somewhat more rapid career. 
Our conclusions on this subject must be drawn, not from 
the history of antiquity, but from that of modern times. 
Had Greece possessed the art of printing, the story of the 
human race would have been different beyond all concep- 
tion from what it is. 

A. If it had saved the world only from those ages of 
disputation in which the human mind seemed to spin 
round a circle without a single step of advancement, the 
benefit would have been invaluable. It is useless, how- 
ever, to imagine what might have happened ; a more 
interesting inquiry is, What will the future bring ? Lite- 
rature, Science, Political Institutions, Religion — all must 
pass through various changes, if there is any correctness 
in the principle of progressive improvement. 

N. Literature and science we have already adverted to, 
A progress in these must be accompanied by progressive 
changes in our social and political institutions.* That 
they have not arrived at perfection, the slightest glance at 
the misery around us is all that is requisite to prove. The 
supposition that they will not be subject to changes would 
imply, either that while other kinds of knowledge were 
daily advancing, the science of social happiness was as 
complete as the nature of the subject allowed, and there- 
fore susceptible of no improvement ; or that the happiness 
of communities admitted of no addition, their misery of 

* ' II serait evidemment contradictoire,' observes M. Comte in the 
work already quoted, « de supposer que l'esprit humain, si dispose; 
a l'unite de methode, conservat indefiniment pour une seule classa 
de phenomenes sa maniere primitive de philosopher lorsqu'une fois 
il est arrive a adopter pour tout le reste une nouvelle marche phi- 
losophique, d'un caractere absolument oppose.' — Cours, torn. i. 
p. 20. See also Note H, in Appendix. 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 379 

no diminution, from the most thorough insight into the 
various causes which produced them. The history of 
every country proves that a knowledge of these causes is 
one of the most difficult of acquisitions ; that on no 
subject is man more easily deluded, less capable of 
extensive views, guilty of grosser mistakes, and yet more 
inveterately pertinacious in thinking himself infallible. 
Nor is there any subject on which the correction of an 
apparently small error has teemed with such important 
benefits to the world. 

A. From all which, it most indubitably follows, that 
political knowledge and political institutions are predes- 
tined to improvement. What a source of sad anticipation 
to a multitude of politicians ! 

N. Already great changes have taken place, as any 
one will own who is at all conversant with the history of 
the past. Greater are in embryo. The blind veneration 
for rank, the feudal feeling, is obviously on the decline, 
and it is probable that it will be nearly extirpated in the 
course of ages. The tendency of political change is now 
evidently to republicanism ; and it is not unlikely that 
the existing governments of Europe will gradually ap- 
proximate to the form adopted in the United States of 
America. That form is at present unsuitable to the feel- 
ings and habits of Europeans, which still retain a strong 
tinge of the spirit of the middle ages. There are certain 
principles, however, which are making daily advances, 
and which in proportion as they subvert the ancient spirit 
of hereditary attachment, will render it unnecessary and 
substitute a better in its place. Such are the principles — 
that government is for the benefit of the whole com- 
munity ; that to ensure the attainment of this end, the will 
of the majority ought to prevail; that to secure the bene- 
fits of government, the people must strictly conform to 



380 ESSAY ON THE PROGKESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

the regulations which they themselves have imposed ; and 
the corollaries flowing from these propositions. Changes 
of this kind must not be expected too soon. We may- 
alter on a sudden the forms of polity, but we cannot 
suddenly transform the spirits of men. This is the effect 
of time, or what is meant by that phrase, of innumerable 
successive circumstances, and it cannot be either much 
accelerated or much retarded. The slow progress of 
mankind is here more apparent than anywhere. 

A. From your opinion respecting the tendency of 
political change to republicanism I must dissent ; in no 
instance have we seen this form of government produc- 
tive of greater advantages than the mixed ; and I am 
strongly inclined to question whether any happier expe- 
dient can be devised than the hereditary descent of 
power.* 

N. I am not anxious at present to discuss the merits of 
any forms of government. All that I mean to contend 
for is, that whichever is really the best must in the natural 
course of improvement establish its claims to preference. 
Men learn these things slowly, but experience must 
ultimately force them upon their understandings. The 
change in men's religious views will also probably be 
great. As mankind learn to reason more justly, they 

* 'It appears to me,' says De Tocqueville, ' beyond a doubt, that 
Sooner or later we shall arrive, like the Americans, at an almost 
complete equality of conditions. But I do not conclude from this, 
that we shall ever be necessarily led to draw the same political con- 
sequences which the Americans have derived from a similar social 
organization. I am far from supposing that they have chosen the 
only form of government which a democracy may adopt ; but the 
identity of the efficient cause of laws and manners in the two 
countries is sufficient to account for the immense interest we have 
in becoming acquainted with its effects in each of them.' — Intro- 
duction to Democracy in Amerka t p. 25. 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 381 

will see the absurdity of many of their tenets. They will 
discover more and more clearly, that instead of the wise 
and benevolent Author of the Universe, they have been 
worshipping an image in their own minds endowed with 
similar imperfect faculties and passions to their own, nay, 
even invested with principles of action drawn from human 
nature in its rudest state. Men's conception of the Deity 
can never go beyond, although it frequently falls short of 
their moral opinions. He who has a narrow, confused, and 
indistinct view of what is really wise and admirable in 
human qualities, cannot have a clear and comprehensive 
idea of God. Hence, as moral knowledge advances, as 
mankind come more and more to fix their approbation on 
actions according to their actual desert, their conception 
of the Deity will become more refined, more elevated, 
and more worthy of its object. The proper way to exalt 
man's veneration of God is to teach him what is really 
just, benevolent, and magnanimous in his own race. It is 
melancholy to reflect on the sort of attributes and actions 
which are daily ascribed to the Supreme Being. 

A. I have frequently been struck with the fact to which 
you have alluded, that men's conception of the Deity 
generally fall short of their moral opinions ; but I have 
never been able to account satisfactorily for so remark- 
able a phenomenon. How is it, that even in the present 
day theological systems continue to invest the Deity, as 
you have expressed it, with principles of action drawn 
from human nature in its rudest state, and long since 
practically exploded in every civilized country ? 

N. The awfulness of the subject combines with the 
interests of men to produce a tardy application of their 
improved knowledge to their conception of the Author of 
the Universe. It is as if they entertained an obscure and 
undefined apprehension that any alteration in their ideas 



382 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

regarding him would not simply be a change in their own 
minds, but would involve a modification of the nature and 
happiness of the Supreme Being himself. The venera- 
tion which they feel towards their Creator diffuses itself 
over their own dogmas. But your question has diverted 
me from the natural course of my remarks. I was going 
to observe, that mankind will not only necessarily per- 
ceive the absurdity of many of their tenets, but they will 
especially become sensible of the folly and wickedness of 
intolerance, that never-dying worm which preys on the 
vitals of human felicity. I am never so inclined to feel 
contempt for my own species as when I look into the 
history of religious persecution. It presents to us a com- 
bination of all that is weak with all that is wicked in our 
nature — the senseless activity of an idiot destroying his 
own happiness, with the malignity of a demon blasting 
that of others. 

A. Language is too feeble to express the deep execra- 
tion which is its just due. But I own I am more struck 
with the extreme folly, the childish weakness, the inca- 
pacity of just reasoning, involved in the slightest act of 
intolerance, than with any other of its features. In point 
of mere logic, such an act is absolutely disgraceful to the 
intellectual character of any one capable of drawing a 
single inference. Were it not for the sufferings of the 
victim, it would be altogether ludicrous. The puny, 
pitiful attempts at intolerance in our own day are miser- 
ably post-dated — absurd from their pretensions and con- 
temptible from their impotence. 

N. With my whole soul I agree with you as to the sen- 
timents which these attempts ought to inspire ; but I am 
of opinion that they are not so ill-timed nor so impotent 
as you imagine : in other words, I consider that there yet 
exists a more extensive spirit of intolerance than you are 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 883 

aware of; subdued indeed from its original savageness, 
but deeply rooted and tenacious. There are also to be 
found more important cases of intolerance than your lan- 
guage implies. From all that I have myself observed of 
the spirit of society, I am decidedly of opinion, that the 
sympathies of the majority of the nation are in almost 
every case against and not in favor of the victim. 

A. I should be pained to believe it. 

N. I am convinced you will find it so ; and this brings 
us again to the point before discussed, the over-estimation 
of the attainments and real civilization of the present age. 
The spirit of society on this subject may be looked upon 
as the thermometer of civilization — at least a high degree 
of what we include in that term cannot possibly exist 
where intolerance prevails. The two things are mutually 
destructive. The same remark may be applied to a still 
more enormous evil, or one at least that presents itself in 
greater and more distinct masses — war. The existence 
of war at all is a tremendous proof that mankind is not 
civilized. Again, then, we must conclude that we over- 
estimate our progress ; that we are really but a little way 
removed from barbarism, in comparison with the possible 
point at which the race may arrive. And this would be a 
most salutary conviction ; for while it would add to our 
alacrity by teaching us how much there was yet to dis- 
cover, it would abate our presumption in the perfection of 
our present attainments. If I do not deceive myself, I 
foresee the time (far distant, alas !) when mankind shall 
awake to a full sense at once of their actual imperfections 
and of their capacity for illimitable improvement ; when 
they shall cease to create their own misery, and to lavish 
their admiration on qualities that thrive on their ruin ; 
* when almost all the great political wonders, the idols of 
history, stripped one after another of the vain splendor 



384 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

thrown around them, will appear nothing more than the 
frivolous and often fatal sports of the infancy of the hu- 



* Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme, par J. G. 
Cabanis, torn. i. p. 340. 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 385 



PART III, 



A. In our previous conversations we have touched on 
the present state of society, but only in a general way ; 
and we were chiefly occupied with the progress of the 
human race, and the principles on which such a progress 
might be looked for. I should like to hear your senti- 
ments on some other features in the intellectual condition 
of our own times. My friend B. here, who differs in his 
general views from both of us, will assist me in the task 
of contesting any questionable propositions. 

N. The field is wide : we have already endeavored to 
estimate the point reached in the scale of civilization ; 
what other part of the subject have you particularly in 
view ? 

A. My views have reference chiefly to the state of 
moral and political intelligence and feeling. I think, for 
my own part, that society is in a curious condition in 
these respects. It seems to be laboring with a thousand 
incongruous principles and opinions. 

N. I perfectly agree with you. When we examine the 
actual condition of society, we find amazing discrepancies 
in moral and political sentiment. We find even great 
contrariety in the same individual. He will be found, 
perhaps, without being aware of it, maintaining two opin- 
ions, mutually repugnant and contradictory ; one opinion 
probably the result of instillation by his preceptors ; 
the other his own acquisition from reading or con- 
versation. Now, not being in the habit of deducing a 
25 



386 ESSAY ON THE PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE. 

series of inferences, not being able to follow out any 
doctrine to its consequences, he is insensible to the 
contrariety existing between them, and perhaps would 
regard you with something like horror if you were to 
attempt to point it out. This is all very well, and cannot 
be avoided where, without much precision of ideas, there 
is any thing like a determination of the general intellect 
to moral and political inquiries ; where men's knowledge 
begins to outstrip their prejudices, and yet is not disentan- 
gled from them. The same causes, however, give rise 
to other moral phenomena, not quite so free from culpa- 
bility. 

A. To what do you allude ? 

N. I allude to the concealment of opinions and feel- 
ings, to the insincerity, to the conventional simulation 
which abound in the present day. Every one must be 
struck w T ith the discordance in tone between the senti- 
ments of our literature, of our public debates, of our 
formal documents on the one hand, and those heard in 
private society and exhibited in the common habits of life 
on the other. The same individual who has been speak- 
ing to the popular prejudices of the day in public, will 
often let you see by a sneer or a jest, or at all events by 
the principles which regulate his daily conduct, that he 
has in reality been playing the actor and duping his 
audience. Hence our literature does not present us with 
the actual sentiments entertained. There is nothing like 
general sincerity in the profession of opinions. The in- 
tellect of the age is cowed. 

B. A great part of what appears to be insincerity may 
perhaps be ascribed to a want of the power to perceive 
logical inconsistencies, and some part to the habit of 
thoughtlessly expressing in private society opinions not 
seriously entertained. It has been renfarked by an able 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 387 

writer, that were we to know what was said of us in our 
absence, we could seldom gather the real opinions of the 
speakers : ; there are so many things said from the mere 
wantonness of the moment, or from a desire to comply 
with the tone of the company ; so many from the impulse 
of passion, or the ambition to be brilliant ; so many idle 
exaggerations, which the heart in a moment of sobriety 
would disavow ; that frequently the person concerned 
would learn anything sooner than the opinions entertained 
of him, and torment himself, as injuries of the deepest 
dye, with things injudicious perhaps and censurable, but 
which were the mere sallies of thoughtless levity.' * A 
similar observation may be made with regard to moral 
and political opinions. Things are said in the social or 
the listless hour, when the mind relaxes from the tension 
of steady thought, which would be disowned when the 
intellect had collected all its forces, and was calmly and 
solemnly looking at the whole bearings of the subject. 
Besides, if it were not so, I think you judge the matter too 
rigidly. Actual simulation of opinions I will not defend ; 
but surely there is a species of dissimulation, or (not to 
use a word with which unfavorable associations are con- 
nected) of reserve or suppression, which far from being 
culpable may be prudent and even meritorious, nay, abso- 
lutely necessary. I think I once heard you assert, that if 
any man were now to promulgate the moral and political 
opinions (could they be known) which will generally pre- 
vail at the end of two hundred years from this time, he 
would be hooted from society.t In this sentiment I do 
not participate, as I see no room for so immense a change 
as it supposes, but on your own grounds a prudent reserve 
is commendable. 

* Godwin's Inquirer, p. 312, ed. 1823. f See Appendix, Note I. 



388 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

N. The sentiment was expressed perhaps too broadly ; 
but without pretending to form a conjecture as to what 
such future opinions may be, I think it substantially cor- 
rect. I will grant you, therefore, that it is prudent in a 
man to suppress any opinions flagrantly hostile to popular 
prejudice ; but it is not, you will allow, high-minded ; if it 
escape our contempt, it is not a species of conduct to raise 
the glow of enthusiastic admiration, to ' dilate our strong 
conception with kindling majesty,' and to elevate us for a 
time at least above the dead level of our nature. The poet 
says — 

* Give me the line that ploughs its stately course, 
Like the proud swan, conquering the stream by force.'* 

and I confess my admiration will always follow him who 
boldly breasts the current of popular prejudice, forcing 
his way by his native energy. Nor can I help thinking 
that such a man, if he combined undeviating coolness, 
moderation, integrity, and simplicity of mind, with great 
intellectual powers, would in the end extort the forbear- 
ance at least of the host of enemies who would rush to 
the encounter from the instinct of fear. 

A. Such conduct would undoubtedly excite the admira- 
tion of a few, but it would be the destruction of the hap- 
piness of the individual unless he were singularly consti- 
tuted. It is a fearful thing for any man to encounter the 
execration, or even the tacit condemnation, of the society 
in which he lives. And, moreover, it is questionable 
whether, supposing even his sentiments to be true, he 
would promote the cause of truth by such a bold and 
reckless course. For any system of thoughts to be re- 
ceived with effect, the minds of the community must be 
in a state of preparation for it. If promulgated too early, 

* * Cowper. 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 389 

it is cast back into obscurity by the offended prejudices of 
society, or becomes a prominent object against which they 
are perpetually exasperating themselves. It is a light- 
house amidst the breakers. The genius of a Smeaton in 
philosophy would be required to erect an intellectual 
structure of this kind, capable at once of giving intense 
light, and withstanding the moral turbulence by which it 
would be assailed. A premature disclosure of any doc- 
trine, you may rest assured, retards its ultimate reception. 
In fact, a forbearance to utter all that a man thinks is a 
species of continence necessary throughout the w T hole 
progress of civilization ; at every step the commanding 
minds of the age being in one state, and the feelings and 
opinions of the majority in another directly hostile to it.* 
B. I cannot exactly see the necessity of a discrepancy 
of this nature ; but admitting that the commanding intel- 
lects of the age must thus differ in their views on many 

* * And here may I be permitted to caution my readers against the 
common error of confounding the double doctrine of Machiavelian 
politicians, with the benevolent reverence for established opinions 
manifested in the noted maxim of Fontenelle — " that a wise man, 
even when his hand was full of truths, would often content himself 
with opening his little finger." Of the advocates for the former, it 
may be justly said, that " they love darkness rather than light, be- 
cause their deeds are evil ; " well knowing, if I may borrow the words 
of Bacon, " that the open daylight doth not show the masks and 
mummeries and triumphs of the world, half so stately as candle- 
light." The philosopher on the other hand, who is duly impressed 
with the latter, may be compared with the oculist, who, after remov- 
ing the cataract of his patient, prepares the still irritable eye, by the 
glimmering dawn of a darkened apartment, for enjoying in safety 
the light of day.' — Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy, 
by Dugald Stewart, p. 23. On this subject a remarkable letter 
addressed by Mirabeau to Sir Samuel Romilly has recently appeared 
in the life of the latter by his sons, vol. i. p. 294. I have given a 
copious extract from it in the Appendix, Note K. 



390 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

points from the bulk of mankind, it by no means follows 
that all who thus differ are to be ranked in that class. On 
the contrary, I should be inclined to say, that to be widely 
at variance with our own age, is in most cases a mark of 
unsound understanding ; and this seems more especially 
to follow (turning to N.) from your principles; for if the 
human mind is so exceedingly slow at the work of inven- 
tion and discovery as I have often heard you represent it 
to be, it is an obvious inference, that we are not to look 
for many of those gigantic strides which place the man of 
genius far in advance of his contemporaries. The chances 
are, therefore, that singular views are erroneous views. 
Hence a proper diffidence in himself, a sense of that lia- 
bility to error which no one ought to feel more deeply 
than the philosopher, should make him hesitate when he 
finds his opinions peculiar to his own mind. 

N. True, it should make him review them, probe them 
to the quick, try them by every possible test ; but having 
done this, it would be absolutely culpable to suppress them 
merely from the consideration that they were singular, and 
therefore likely enough to be tainted with error. The 
latter, indeed, is a condition under which every man must 
promulgate his opinions. 

A. But to return to the numerous diversities of opinion 
in society : my remark on that head was intended to apply 
not to the discrepancies in the opinions of the same mind, 
but to the differences subsisting between individuals and 
classes. It is astonishing, that with access apparently to 
the same sources of knowledge, under the same civil and 
political institutions, with almost perfect freedom of inter- 
communication, operated upon daily by the same current 
of periodical intelligence from one end of the land to the 
other, pursuing similar occupations and similar amuse- 
ments, the people should be divided into so great a variety 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 391 

of sects and parties, many of them of the most dissimilar 
and opposite modes of thinking. The fact is strikingly 
shown by the publications, and particularly the periodical 
publications of the day. Thus, not to mention that there 
is one set of journals for the ministerial party in politics, 
another for the opposition, another for the reformers, with 
advocates for a thousand intermediate shades of opinion, 
we have journals for the evangelical, the orthodox, the 
unitarians, the methodists, the deists, the phrenologists, 
the co-operatives, and others which might be specified ; 
and these advocating, each of them, doctrines essentially 
repugnant and contradictory to those of all the rest. Is 
it not strange, that under the influence of all the common 
circumstances which I have just enumerated, such very 
opposite views should prevail, and be advocated not only 
with considerable knowledge and skill, but with the most 
thorough conviction of their truth ? Does it not prove, 
either that truth is unattainable in moral, religious, and 
political inquiries, or that men have rushed into the midst 
of these subjects without stopping to ascertain the first 
principles on which they all must agree, and thus have 
involved themselves in a chaos of contradictions ? 

N. You recollect, I dare say, the remark of Locke, 
that although we cannot affirm that there are fewer opin- 
ions prevalent in the world than there are, yet fewer per- 
sons entertain them than we are apt to suppose ; most 
people not having any clear ideas on those questions 
about which so much controversy is raised, and on which 
they themselves loudly assert their positive judgment. 

A. But still you must allow, that the leading minds of 
each party do really hold them, especially in cases where 
interest is out of the question, which is sufficient for my 
purpose, it being in fact still more extraordinary that 
minds of this description, minds consequently of con- 



392 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

siderable powers and superior information, with the same 
sources open to them, should exhibit such contradictory- 
appearances, or in other words entertain such opposite 
views. 

N. Such discrepancies show, that the individual circum- 
stances which shape our opinions predominate over the 
general causes to which w r e are all subjected. They can 
exist only in a very imperfect state of knowledge, such as 
I have contended ours to be, where men's modes of think- 
ing have resulted from chances of a thousand kinds, and 
have not originated in a systematic deduction from unde- 
niable premises. You, I think, have well described the 
general course of even thoughtful men, rushing into the 
midst of subjects without an examination of first prin- 
ciples and a regular progress from them ; or rather they 
find themselves from circumstances in the midst of the 
subjects, and never think of remounting to any primary 
truths, or stepping out of the magic circle described 
around them by the age and country and rank in which 
they came into existence. Engrossed with the established 
ideas of their system, they exercise their ingenuity in dis- 
covering the relations of its parts ; and in the pleasure of 
the occupation, they never think of setting themselves at 
a distance from it, viewing its external aspect, marking its 
position in the world of intellect, surveying its relations as 
a whole to truth and to nature. This is frequently exem- 
plified in the laborious trifling of antiquaries and com- 
mentators, who will often display wonderful skill and 
acuteness in the adjustment of some worthless point, 
which their own exertions alone have invested with some- 
thing like importance. The weakest theory, or the most 
fallacious system of philosophy, will, in like manner, hold 
in bondage the strongest minds, who are often so intensely 
occupied with its intrinsic relations as to forget its extrin- 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 393 

sic absurdity. In the limits by which they are thus cir- 
cumscribed, they sometimes exert the highest powers of 
intellect, and leave nothing for us to bewail but the bar- 
riers with which birth and education and other circum- 
stances have surrounded their understandings. A mind 
thus hemmed in is in a situation somewhat similar to that 
of a man who has been sbut up in a strong castle from 
his birth, and has therefore had no means of viewing the 
outward appearance and relative position of the building. 
His conception too of external objects, as it has been ac- 
quired merely by glimpses through the window, is narrow 
and imperfect; and his comparative estimate of such 
external objects, and those within his reach, must be dis- 
proportionate to their real difference. Let him once es- 
cape from the castle, and his ideas undergo a complete 
revolution. He gets into the pure breezes of heaven, the 
open daylight, and the free exercise of vision. A similar 
happy transition is experienced by the mind which has 
once disengaged itself from the prejudices of any system 
in which it has been cooped up. With regard to the 
diversities of views and doctrines which have led to these 
remarks, I rejoice to see them. I am glad to see the co- 
operative erecting his parallelograms, and the phrenologist 
mapping out the skull. I cannot comprehend that delicate 
sensitiveness which is alarmed at novel and extraordinary 
opinions, as if the structure of society would be demol- 
ished, and the globe itself shattered by their promulga- 
tion. 

B. How then are we to deal with doctrines which ap- 
pear to be dangerous ? Are we to stand idle and allow 
them free course ? 

N. Examine them : look them in the face : if they are 
false, they will vanish before the gaze of scrutiny : if they 
are true, I dare any man to say that they ought to vanish. 



394 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

B. Your reply is what I expected, but I have another 
question to ask in which you may find more difficulty. 
Truth is one, error is pernicious ; how then can you re- 
joice in the existence of diversities by which the uniform- 
ity of truth is excluded? 

N. When I say I rejoice, I speak of course in refer- 
ence, not to what is absolutely good, but to our actual 
state. The world is full of ignorance and error, and I 
am glad to see a zealous pursuit of even singular and 
eccentric views, as the means of ultimately lessening the 
evil. Tentative processes of this kind are indeed indis* 
pensable steps. The grand experiment which Mr. Owen 
is making in America, even if it miscarry, is sure to 
throw light on the principles of human nature.* Even 
the modern phrenology, should it prove utterly unfounded, 
will be of use. The prosecution of its inquiries will furnish 
a body of curious facts to the philosophical speculator ; 
and if ultimately exploded, it will be to the philosophy 
of mind what alchemy was to chemistry, and astrology to 
the true science of the heavens. f The same benefit I 



* Mr. Owen's scheme has failed, and has thrown light on the 
principles of human nature. 

t * Without the attractive chimeras of astrology, without the ener- 
getic delusions of alchemy, whence (asks M. Comte) should we have 
derived the constancy and ardor necessary for the long series of 
observations and experiments which have served in after times for a 
foundation to the first positive theories respecting both classes of 
phenomena ? ' With regard to phrenology, it has certainly made 
way amongst men of science, and besides other testimonies to tae 
validity of its fundamental principles from high quarters, has the 
voice of the eminent philosopher just named in its favor. It may 
be added, that the curious phrenological phenomena (real or illu- 
sory) which everybody has of late years had an opportunity of 
witnessing, demand the impartial and rigorous scrutiny of all lovers 
of truth. It has been lamented as a misfortune in these cases, that 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 395 

own does not spring from a diversity of religious sects, 
because theology is considered as a matter not open to pro- 
gressive improvement. Each sect has its fixed doctrines, 
and the object is not to discover new truths, but to pre- 
vent any lapse from the principles prescribed. All inquiry 
with them is after new arguments to support old opinions. 
Yet here, although intellectual enterprise is discounte- 
nanced, contention and collision are brought into play ; 
the contention of rival sects and the collision of hostile 
opinions, forcing an examination of points which men 
would fain shield from inquiry, extorting concessions 
which can no longer be decently withheld ; and thus pro- 
ducing some of the good effects of that spirit of research 
and discovery which in less important sciences meets 
with such lavish encouragement. Although each sect 
may consider its own system as perfect, it has charity 
enough to assist in stripping other systems of their errors. 

B. Then you regard all these diversities of thinking 
with great complacency ? 

N. They are really exhilarating in an enlarged view of 
the subject. At any given point of the progress, in any 
given state of knowledge or of ignorance, it is much 
better that the ignorance and the error should be of a 



interesting investigations are taken up by incompetent hands and 
almost abandoned to them, partly in consequence of a sort of dainti- 
ness, or a fear on the part of scientific inquirers of compromising 
their reputation, and partly from that force of prejudice from which 
few human beings are exempt. Yet to look at the matter more com- 
prehensively, such incompetent handling is perhaps no misfortune 
at all. Subjects are in this way forced into discussion when they 
would otherwise remain neglected for long periods, awaiting the 
thaw of philosophic pride or prejudice ; valuable materials are accu- 
mulated, and the fastidious or scornful philosopher is at length 
compelled to attend to the investigation in self-defence. 



396 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

multiform than a uniform character. With mjr views, 
therefore, it is somewhat ludicrous to see the anger, the 
vexation, the resentment, with which the generality of 
men regard those who differ from them in opinion. Such 
difference seems to be felt as a sort of personal offence, 
as an intolerable grievance which must be repressed. 
Wounded self-love looks around it, and can find nothing 
short of an act of parliament or a judicial sentence ade- 
quate to the task of avenging its wrongs. What is the 
simple light, however, in which philosophy and common 
sense would see these differences ? They would see, 
first, that the subject in question required examination ; 
and, secondly, that it was likely to obtain the examination 
which it required. The permanent existence of any dif- 
ferences of opinion on any subject shows of itself, either 
that truth has nat been fully attained by any of the dissen- 
tient parties, or that it has not been deduced in the most 
perspicuous method ; and, therefore, that there is still a 
necessity for animadversion and discussion. 

B. It is implied then in your view of the subject, that 
truth in these matters is attainable ; that there are certain 
determinate principles which may be discovered, and from 
which indisputable deductions might be made. 

N. Certainly. I see no reason to doubt it, and our 
friend A, who is so sanguine as to the progress of know- 
ledge, must inevitably accord with me. 

A. True : but others may ask how are such principles 
to be ascertained ? 

N. By a very slow but a tolerably sure process ; by 
generation after generation thinking, and speaking, and 
writing ; by proposing doubts and hypotheses ; by criti- 
cism, by argument, by ridicule ; by all the play and 
contention of wit and folly, scepticism and pertinacity, 
sophistry and good sense. From these discordant ele- 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 397 

merits let loose on every possible subject of inquiry, we 
may ultimately expect that enlightened and lasting una- 
nimity which always attends the clear and simple exhi- 
bition of truth. 

B. But still you will allow, that there are some subjects 
which will probably ever remain dubious, difficult, and 
obscure ; and which, as long as the world lasts, must 
inevitably engender differences of opinion. 

N. I will not undertake to say that there is no subject 
which is doomed to be encumbered with eternal difficul- 
ties ; bat this I will venture to affirm, that of whatever 
kind they are, they will be accurately estimated and set 
in their proper light. The nature and the degree of the 
evidence on each point will be appreciated ; the valid 
inferences, few or many, which the subject affords, will 
be clearly shown ; the absurd conclusions previously 
drawn from it will be exploded ; what it will and what it 
will not furnish will be rendered equally manifest; and 
although the obstacles to a perfect comprehension of it 
may never be surmounted, there may be complete una- 
nimity as to the character of the difficulties which it 
presents. No reason can be assigned why all this should 
not be accomplished, however slowly and gradually it may 
be done, and this is in fact for us, for human beings, the 
attainment of truth. 

B. Although I am not, for my own part, very sanguine 
as to any great progress in the human race, I would not 
deny that there might be a considerable one amongst a 
few superior minds, who are to be found in every age, 
and who, forming an unbroken series, might carry on 
indefinitely the work of perfecting the sciences : but I 
much doubt the possibility of any corresponding, or rather 
any commensurate progress in the multitude. It is one 
thing for the sciences to go on improving, and another for 



398 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

the mass of mankind to become progressively partakers 
of such improvements. 

N. The progress will be slow ; nor will I undertake to 
maintain that it will be altogether commensurate with the 
advances of those superior minds to whom you refer ; but 
nothing I think can prevent it. The same principles of 
human nature which render a science progressive among 
learned and studious men, will make knowledge pro- 
gressive in every class. There is a certain measure of I 
intelligence, or rather there is a certain set of notions, 
which every one inevitably imbibes, even the lowest of 
society ; a certain atmosphere of knowledge breathed in 
common by all ; and these notions depend upon the state 
of knowledge amongst those whose particular business it 
is to apply themselves to its cultivation. Now the cor- 
rectness or incorrectness of the notions thus imbibed, 
makes no difference in the ease with which they are 
acquired. The mind of a child receives with as little 
difficulty the enlightened opinions prevalent in the best 
English society as the ruder notions of the Hindoo or 
Hottentot. Unless, therefore, the communication between 
the high and the low, the learned and the unlearned, is 
cut off, the latter cannot help partaking of the progress of 
their superiors. But it requires no evidence to show, that 
the tendency of modern improvement, far from threat- 
ening to interrupt or embarrass this communication, is 
decidedly to render it easy and complete. In fact, the 
sources of intelligence are open to all ranks indiscrim- 
inately. External obstacles to the general spread of 
sound knowledge are fast giving way. It is in the nature 
of the human mind itself, that we shall detect the most 
formidable impediment. We shall find it generally true, 
that discoveries are both slowly made, and slowly received 
and adopted. After a man has arrived at maturity, trained 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 399 

in certain fixed principles, prejudices, and habits, it is 
impossible to change them essentially; and, even if his 
opinions could be changed, his associations and feelings 
would prove rebels to his intellect. Hence, as I have 
before observed, it is the young on whom any improve- 
ment is to be impressed ; and hence it is an age at least 
which must be granted for its perfect establishment. 
Thus the wisdom of the pre-eminent few of one generation 
cannot become the common property, the familiar instru- 
ment of the crowd, till the next or a still later age ; and it 
appears to me, that this process is one which compara- 
tively little can be done to hasten, but which much may 
be done to perfect and extend. 

A. Here again we come to our old point of disagree- 
ment. After all you have urged, I see no reason for 
departing from the opinion which I before maintained, 
that the wider and wider diffusion of knowledge amongst 
mankind must inevitably accelerate the progress of the 
race. The scope of your doctrine, which appears to me 
to involve a striking inconsistency, is to show, that a 
greater number of mankind may be made to partake of 
the progress, but that the rate of the progress cannot be 
quickened. You maintain in effect, that the general dis- 
semination of knowledge has little or no tendency to 
render mankind readier to part with their prejudices ; that 
what each man learns in his youth he must retain with a 
pertinacity equal and unalterable ; and that even the most 
enlightened individual of the present day, after he has 
reached a certain age, is as callous to further improve- 
ment, as firmly indurated in his notions, as inaccessible 
to new ideas, as the rude barbarian of the American wild, 
or the benighted chieftain of the middle ages : or if you 
do not go quite so far as this ; if you would reject this 
application of the doctrine to the philosopher, you must 



400 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

at least maintain that the nature of the opinions which an 
ordinary man imbibes in that atmosphere of intelligence 
described by you as surrounding his infancy, can make no 
difference as to the tenacity with which they subsequent- 
ly cling to him. In all this there appears to me to be an 
inconsistency for which I can account only by supposing, 
that it has been concealed from your view by a strong 
prejudice as to the slow progress of the race, resulting from 
a disappointment of your sanguine visions on this subject 
in early life. What ! supposing a man's mind to be im- 
bued in youth with liberal and enlightened sentiments, 
supposing him to gather without any direct effort on his 
own part, but from the actions and conversation of those 
around him, ' that the human mind is necessarily fallible, 
that therefore it should never close itself against new 
light, that it should be constantly accessible to fresh ideas, 
and ever on the watch to correct its errors ; that truth and 
not its own importance should be its sacred object in all 
inquiries and on all subjects/ — supposing a man, I say, 
to be imbued with these views, are we to conclude that 
notwithstanding their influence he would be as inveterate, 
as stubborn in his prejudices, as unsusceptible of meliora- 
tion as the most benighted of his species ; as the deluded 
victim, for example, who casts himself under the chariot 
wheels of an idol, the superstitious devotee who heroically 
lashes himself as he conceives into the favor of God, or 
the furious bigot who exterminates heresy by the rack and 
the scaffold ? 

When the matter is put in this light, I think you must 
allow, that in proportion to the real intelligence of men 
will be their openness to conviction, their disposition to 
receive new ideas, their readiness to review their cherish- 
ed opinions ; and that a step of improvement may come 
in time to require something less than an age. 



ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 401 

B. But you have forgotten another part of our friend's 
remark, in which I am fully disposed to join him, the 
necessary slowness with which the human mind makes 
any improvements, any inventions or discoveries. 

A. To this part of his remarks an equally conclusive 
answer may be given. A great part of the slowness with 
which discoveries have succeeded each other, may be 
ascribed to the tardy and limited diffusion of knowledge. 
N. himself has made the remark, that one discovery must 
spring from another ; that a man of inventive genius must 
rise from the height to which the labors of his predeces- 
sor have carried him. Now for a series of improvements 
and discoveries of this kind, I see no necessity for the 
intervention of long periods of time. If a man of original 
talent has the power of rising from the discoveries of his 
predecessor, he may do it, or begin to do it, from the 
moment they are known to him ; and thus one man taking 
up the achievements of another, there may be a series 
of them even amongst contemporaneous inquirers. The 
only requisite condition seems to be a ready and imme- 
diate promulgation of all that is accomplished. Formerly 
indeed what any one man discovered made its way slowly 
and laboriously to others engaged in the same pursuit. 
Perhaps he would pass from the scene before his labors 
were understood and appreciated, and in such a state of 
imperfect inter-communication a barren interval must un- 
doubtedly elapse between almost every successive discov- 
ery in the same science. This lapse of time, however, 
was required solely to propagate the intelligence amongst 
those who were likely to make use of it. At present, 
when the diffusion may be effected with the instantaneous- 
ness of lightning, when the world has become an immense 
whispering gallery, and the faintest accent of science is 
heard throughout every civilized country as soon as utter- 
26 



402 ESSAY ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

ed, the requisite conditions are changed. Long intervals 
are no longer necessary, and the career of improvement 
may be indefinitely accelerated. Besides, not only are 
discoveries more rapidly communicated to discovering 
minds, and the intervals of the series reduced almost to 
nothing, but with the general diffusion of knowledge, more 
of these original intellects start forth, and thus another 
cause is brought into operation to swell the train and 
hasten the triumph of science. 

N. Your observations are ingenious, and to a certain 
extent perfectly just, nor do I know that they are at all 
inconsistent with my own views, except inasmuch as they 
lead to expectations of too sanguine a character. The 
process of improvement, and the circumstances which 
tend to accelerate what has been significantly and some- 
times sneeringly termed the march of mind, you have 
accurately described. The only real difference between 
us is as to the rapidity of the progress ; and I still think, 
that if you were to examine the condition of society with 
a severe scrutiny, if you were to make yourself practical- 
ly acquainted with the intellectual state of the mass, if 
you were to see, as I have seen, that the glare of modern 
civilization is owing to the superficial illumination which 
the intelligence of a comparatively few has cast over the 
many, — in thus perceiving how little had actually been 
done, you would be inclined to grant more time for the 
evolution of those great and glorious results, which we 
unite in hailing as the ultimate destiny of the human 
race. 



APPENDIX 



OF 



NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 



APPENDIX. 



Note A. Page 202. 

Although the following account referred to in the text may 
appear at first sight to have little connection with the subject of the 
present volume, yet, on reflection, it will be found to illustrate the 
great change in feeling which is consequent on the progress of know- 
ledge and civilization, especially as to the value of human life. 

' On the 26th of January. 1796, when the Indefatigable was lying 
in Hamoaze, after having been docked, the Dutton, a large East 
Indiaman employed in the transport service, on her way to the 
West Indies, with a part of the 2d or Queen's regiment, was driven 
into Plymouth by stress of weather. She had been out seven weeks, 
and had many sick on board. The gale increasing in the afternoon, 
it was determined to run for greater safety to Catwater ; but the 
buoy at the extremity of the reef off Mount Batten having broke 
adrift, of which the pilots were not aware, she touched on the shoal, 
and carried away her rudder. Thus rendered unmanageable, she 
fell off and grounded under the citadel, where, beating round, she 
lay rolling heavily with her broadside to the waves. At the second 
roll she threw all her masts overboard together. 

i Sir <£d ward and Lady Pellew were engaged to dine on that day 
with Dr. Harker, the excellent vicar of Charles, who had become 
acquainted with Mr. Pellew when they were serving together at 
Plymouth as surgeons to the marines, and continued through life the 
intimate and valued friend of all the brothers. Sir Edward noticed 
the crowds running to the Hoe. and having learned the cause, he 
sprang out of the carriage, and ran off with the rest. Arrived at 
the beach, he saw at once that the loss of nearly all on board, be- 
tween five and six hundred, was inevitable, without some one to 



406 APPENDIX. 

direct them. The principal officers of the ship had abandoned their 
charge and got on shore, just as he arrived on the beach. Having 
urged them, but without success, to return to their duty, and vainly 
offered rewards to pilots and others belonging to the port to board 
the wreck, for all thought it too hazardous to be attempted, he 
exclaimed, " Then I will go myself! " 

* A single rope, by which the officers and a few others had landed, 
formed the only communication with the ship ; and by this he was 
hauled on board through the surf. The danger was greatly increased 
by the wreck of the masts, which had fallen towards the shore ; and 
he received an injury on the back, which confined him to his bed for 
a week, in consequence of being dragged under the mainmast. But 
disregarding this at the time, he reached the deck, declared himself, 
and assumed the command. He assured the people that every one 
would be saved, if they quietly obeyed his orders j that he would 
himself be the last to quit the wreck, but that he would run any 
one through that disobeyed him. His well-known name, with the 
calmness and energy he displayed, gave confidence to the despairing 
multitude. He was received with three hearty cheers, which were 
echoed by the multitude on shore; and his promptitude and resource 
soon enabled him to find and apply the means by which all might be 
safely landed. His officers in the meantime, though not knowing 
that he was on board, were exerting themselves to bring assistance 
from the Indefatigable. Mr. Pellew, first lieutenant, left the ship in 
the barge, and Mr. Thompson, acting master, in the launch ; but 
the boats could not be brought alongside the wreck, and were obliged 
to run for the Barbican. A small boat, belonging to a merchant- 
vessel, was more fortunate. Mr. Edsell, signal midshipman to the 
port admiral, and Mr. Coghlan, mate of the vessel, succeeded, at the 
risk of their lives, in bringing her alongside. The ends of two 
additional hawsers were got on shore, and Sir Edward contrived 
cradles to be slung upon them, with travelling ropes to pass forward 
and backward between the ship and the beach. Each hawser was 
held on shore by a number of men, who watched the rolling of the 
wreck, and kept the ropes tight and steady. Meantime a cutter had 
with great difficulty worked out of Plymouth pool, and two large 
boats arrived from the dock-yard, under the directions of Mr. Hem- 
mings, the master-attendant, by whose caution and judgment they 
were enabled to approach the wreck, and receive the more helpless of 
the passengers, who were carried to the cutter. Sir Edward, with 



APPENDIX. 407 

his sword drawn, directed the proceedings, and preserved order, — a 
task the more difficult, as the soldiers had got at the spirits before 
he came on board, and many were drunk. The children, the women, 
and the sick, were the first landed. One of them was only three 
weeks old ; and nothing in the whole transaction impressed Sir 
Edward more strongly than the struggle of the mother's feelings 
before she would entrust her infant to his care, or afforded him 
more pleasure than the success of his attempt to save it. Next the 
soldiers were got on shore ; then the ship's company; and, finally, 
Sir Edward himself, who was one of the last to leave her. Every 
one was saved, and, presently after, the wreck went to pieces.' 

After noticing the modesty of Sir Edward in his. account of the 
affair in which he almost kept himself out of sight, his biographer 
proceeds : * Service performed in the sight of thousands could not 
thus be concealed. Praise was lavished upon him from every quar- 
ter. The corporation of Plymouth voted him the freedom of the 
town. The merchants of Liverpool presented him with a valuable 
service of plate. On the 5th of March following he was created a 
baronet.' — Life of Admiral Viscount Exmouth, by E. Osier, p. 
115, &c. , 

Note B. Page 308. 

The only passage of any length in the first edition of the * Essay 
on the Pursuit of Truth,' that has not been incorporated one way or 
other in this second and enlarged edition, occurred in this part of 
the treatise. The author not being able to find an appropriate 
place for it without encumbering the train of argument, has deemed 
it best to relegate it to the Appendix. 

After speaking of the upright man who is unfortunate enough to 
be the unconscious instrument of disseminating error, the passage 
proceeds as follows : — 

1 To such a misfortune all men are liable, and this liability imposes 
on them the duty of communicating their opinions in a spirit of 
candor and liberality. In danger, with the utmost circumspection, 
of falling into mistakes, it becomes them to evince an entire openness 
to correction, a willingness to listen to opposite suggestions, a readi- 
ness to review their most cautious conclusions, and a perpetual sense 
of their own fallibility. They should endeavor, too, to separate the 
consideration of their own reputation from the cause of truth. 

1 A man who communicates his views to the world is or ought to 



408 APPENDIX. 

be an inquirer after truth ; and it is of little importance to him in 
that capacity, when a mistake has been committed and detected, 
which part of -the process is his. That an error has been cleared up, 
that a truth has been discovered, should occasion too much pleasure 
to his mind to permit it to dwell long on the personal consideration 
of the agency through which it has been accomplished. 

* This openness to conviction, nevertheless, is perfectly consistent 
with a severe examination of all opposite allegations, and a free 
exposure of antagonist sophistry. Let him reply, retort, return the 
scrutiny of his opponents, and especially expose any unfairness or 
malevolence which may characterize their opposition; but let him at 
the same time cheerfully acknowledge any errcr of which he may be 
convicted; let him pay the most scrutinizing attention to hostile 
criticism, not to find out merely how to reply to it, but how far it is 
fairly applicable. 

1 Were we to imagine a being, who while he was free from the 
moral weaknesses of human nature, was still subject to its intellec- 
tual fallibility, the following is the kind of language we should ex- 
pect to hear from him, on his giving to the public the result of any 
investigations in which he had been employed. 

1 In communicating these speculations to the world, I do it under 
a full sense of my liability to error, and of the chances that I hrve 
fallen into many mistakes, notwithstanding the patient thought 
which I have bestowed on the subject, and the various means 1 have 
employed to insure correctness. Future philosophers, I am aware, 
will see in a much clearer light the truths here developed, and will 
present them in a much more lucid and convincing order; divested 
too of the inaccuracies which surround them in my pages. These 
inaccuracies I have not the slightest wish to see spared. So far from 
desiring any one to forbear pointing out errors iu my reasoning, I 
shall feel greatly indebted to him for the correction of a fallacy. One 
of the ends which I seek to accomplish by laying these speculations 
before the public, is to avail myself of the instruction arising out of 
the different views which different minds take of the same subject. 
And not only will any one confer a real benefit on me by dissipating 
my errors, but he will prevent my speculations from spreading erro- 
neous opinions among mankind, and counteracting any advantages 
which might result from such of them as are well founded. Nothing 
can be more abhorrent to the feelings of a man of upright mind, 
than that errors should be perpetuated merely to preserve his repu- 



APPENDIX. 409 

tation for correctness, and save his vanity from mortification ; no- 
thing, therefore, ought to be received with more gratitude than an 
indication where those errors lie. It at once enlightens his own 
mind, and saves him from being the instrument of injury to his fel- 
low-creatures, when he thought of doing them a service. 

' On this point I have only one request to make, that the existence 
of an error may be shown, not merely asserted ; and that any fallacy 
in reasoning may be directly pointed out, rather than met by coun- 
ter-arguments drawn from different premises. When any train of 
reasoning is fairly laid down before us, if it involves an error the 
fallacy may be detected and exposed. For any such detection then 
I shall be grateful. I am willing to review, to discuss, to analyze 
again any principle which I have maintained, and should rejoice to 
emancipate myself from any illusion. 

' Should any one intermix his exposure of my errors with oppro- 
brious language, it will be to his own detriment and disgrace; but it 
shall not prevent me from taking advantage of his perspicacity to 
clear my understanding from inaccurate conceptions. While I shall 
do my best to seize the truth of his arguments, I shall also in the 
same spirit of fairness endeavor to appreciate and exhibit in its true 
colors that unfortunate junction of malignancy of disposition with 
intellectual power of which he has afforded the melancholy spectacle. 

' If on the other hand the objections brought against any of my 
doctrines appear to me, after the fullest and fairest examination, to 
be unsound, I shall not hesitate on my part to expose their character. 
To this task I shall devote the utmost acuteness of which I am mas- 
ter, and undertake as close and severe an examination of their pre- 
tensions as I should desire might be bestowed on my own. 

'In a word, as truth is my object, I shall endeavor to find it by 
every mean3 in my power, and shall freely join in the exposure of 
error, whether found in preceding writings, in my own productions, 
or in those of my antagonists.' 

Note C. Page 344. 

The author has been desirous of treating this question respecting 
prescriptive conclusions, in its broadest application to knowledge of 
all kinds, and not merely in reference to politics or to theology. In 
the latter point of view, the subject has been discussed by one of the 
Bubtilest intellects of the eighteenth century, in a short essay from 
which Mrs. Austin's recent translation of * Fragments from German 



410 APPENDIX. 

Writers,' enables me to present to the English reader an interesting 
extract. 

* But is not an association of clergymen, — a church assembly or 
a venerable classis as they call themselves in Holland, — justified in 
binding itself by oath to certain immutable articles of faith, in order 
to exercise a perpetual supreme guardianship over each of its mem- 
bers, and indirectly through them over the people ? I answer such 
a thing is totally inadmissible. A compact of this kind, which is 
entered into with a view to exclude the human race from all further 
enlightenment, is simply null and void, even though it be confirmed 
by the sovereign power, by diets, and the most solemn treaties. One 
age cannot bind itself ; nor can it conspire to place the following one 
in a condition in which it would be impossible for it to extend its 
knowledge, to purge itself from error, and to advance in the career 
of enlightenment. This were a crime against human nature, whose 
highest destination consists emphatically in intellectual progress ; 
and posterity is, therefore, fully justified in rejecting all such 
attempts to bind it, as invalid and mischievous. 

« A combination to maintain an unalterable religious system, 
which no man should be permitted to call into doubt, would, even 
for the term of one man's life, be wholly intolerable. It would be to 
blot out, as it were, one generation in the progress of the human 
species towards a better condition ; to render it barren, and hence 
noxious to posterity. A man can, indeed, retard his own intellectual 
progress, though even then only for a time, as regards things which 
it is incumbent on him to know ; but utterly to renounce it for him- 
self, and far more for posterity, is an outrage on the most sacred 
rights of humanity. Now, what a people ought not to determine for 
itself, a monarch ought still less to determine for it; for his legisla- 
tive character and dignity rests on his being the depository and organ 
of the collective will of his people. If he does but ascertain that 
every real or supposed spiritual improvement consists with the exist- 
ing order and tranquillity of society, he may safely leave his subjects 
to do what they think necessary for the good of their own souls : in 
that he has no right to interfere; his business is to take care that 
none of them forcibly obstruct their neighbors in their endeavors to 
settle their own opinions, or to promote their own spiritual welfare 
by any means within their reach.' 

' In considering the enlightenment by which men emerge from 



APPENDIX. 411 

their self-imposed pupilage, I have insisted mainly on religion j be- 
cause in science and art rulers have no interest in assuming the part 
of guardians over their subjects ; and because pupilage in this matter 
is not only the most mischievous, but the most degrading of any. 
Bat the views of an enlightened ruler go still farther, and tend to 
this, — that, even as regards his government, there is no danger in 
allowing his subjects to make a public use of their own reason, and 
frankly to lay before the world their opinions as to any practicable 
improvement in it, or their criticisms of its present state and acts ; 
of this we have before us a splendid and hitherto unequalled exam- 
ple.' — Essay by Kant, entitled, 'What is Enlightenment? ' in his 
Kleine Schriften. 

Note D. Pages 344, 345. 

The very important consideration, briefly stated at the conclusion 
of this Section, will be found more fully expanded in the following 
extract from a work referred to in a previous chapter. Every up- 
right and conscientious mind must agree in regarding the question 
started, or rather the position taken, as demanding the most atten- 
tive and dispassionate scrutiny, apart from any particular applica- 
tion. The passage may possibly remind the reader (sometimes in 
the way of contrast) of certain portions of Bishop Hare's celebrated 
Letter on Private Judgment,* or of Dr. Paley's Chapter on Religious 
Establishments and Toleration ; but I am not aware that the pecu- 
liar view of the subject here presented, taken as a whole, is to be 
found in English literature : — 

* The course of my subject has brought me to the consideration of 
the third sort of practices enumerated in a former letter. The real 
character of these has been hitherto little regarded, but can scarcely 
be mistaken by any one who reflects for a moment on the necessary 
consequences of annexing emoluments and honors to the profession 
of a given doctrine, or, in other words, to the ostensible adoption of 
a predetermined conclusion. 

' By this time I hope you will so far agree with my views as to 
admit that the duty of every inquirer into the authenticity and 
meaning of any alleged revelation from God, is nothing more or less 
than complete and impartial investigation ; and hence if any reward 

* The Difficulties and Discouragements which attend the Study of the Scriptures 
in the Way of Private Judgment, in a Letter to a Young Clergyman. By Francis 
Hare, D.D. 



412 APPENDIX. 

but that which springs from the discharge of a duty and from the 
attainment of knowledge, is to be held up to his view, it assuredly 
ought to be contingent on the proper prosecution of the inquiry, 
whatever may be the issue. If he is to be artificially incited at all, 
he should be incited to perform the part of a diligent and honest 
inquirer. But no one can gravely maintain that to annex the 
reward to a prescribed result, to a predetermined verdict, is the way 
to encourage or secure fairness and sufficiency of examination : on 
the contrary, you and every body else must admit that it is nothing 
less than bribing the inquirer into negligence and unfairness : it is 
setting up his worldly interest in opposition to his duty to God. No 
conclusion can be more palpable than this. Those who deny it must 
maintain either that a complete and faithful examination of any 
alleged message from the Deity is not the duty of human beings, or 
that exhibiting certain advantages to accrue from arriving at a pre- 
scribed conclusion has no tendency to impair diligence and im- 
partiality during the process of inquiry. The one position is at 
variance with all our moral sentiments ; the other with all our 
experience of mankind. There can be no doubt, my dear Hassan, 
that the consequences of the doctrine here maintained are irrecon- 
cilable with some current notions and existing establishments j but 
what can be more clearly deducible from the undeniable truth that 
our own duty to God requires from us a complete and unbiassed 
examination of any alleged message from him, than the kindred 
truth that it must be wrong in us to present inducements to any 
other human being which have the tendency to render his examina- 
tion of the same solemn subject incomplete and partial? And what 
inducement can operate more effectually to render his inquiry slight 
and negligent and unfair, and thus to seduce him from the direct 
path of duty, than holding out emoluments and honors as the con- 
sequence of deciding on one side rather than the other ? The im- 
morality of this proceeding, and its consequences upon the conduct 
of the inquirer, are equally incontestable. 

1 Figure to yourself, my friend, a young man, who, while he is 
desirous to discharge every duty, and ardent in the pursuit of truth, 
is at the same time ambitious of power, wealth, and distinction. A 
career is open to him, in which these latter desires may be gratified 
on the single condition of professing and teaching certain established 
tenets, and performing certain offices grounded upon them. Is it to 
be supposed that before he accepts the tempting offer, his candor 



APPENDIX. 413 

and conscientiousness will be sufficiently strong to induce him to 
institute a fair and rigid examination of tenets on which his wealth 
and station are to depend ? and after he has accepted it, will the 
inducements to the performance of that duty be strengthened or 
increased ? The result is not very doubtful ; he shuns inquiry and 
accepts the office, and from that moment all probability of any fair 
investigation is at an end : he becomes an intellectual slave bound 
in golden fetters : he is no more free to pursue truth, than the 
chained eagle is free to soar into the sky ; or, rather, he is quite as 
free to pursue it as the muezzin to throw himself from the minaret, 
or as the traveller to leap from the summit of the great pyramid ; 
that is to say, at the risk of consequences — of utter destruction. 

■ And is it possible not to perceive that, besides putting an end 
to impartial examination, this species of bribery is a bounty on 
hypocritical pretension ? Is there one man in ten thousand, who, 
looking forward to the prospect of living in the enjoyment of worldly 
advantages from the profession of certain opinions, will shrink from 
that profession in the first instance, or subsequently abandon it, 
because he finds it impossible to believe in the opinions professed ? 
Can there be a more effectual method of creating insincerity, as 
well as indifference to truth, and can there be a practice more 
destructive of moral worth and real piety ? 

1 1 cannot close without repeating, that independently of engen- 
dering hypocrisy and persecution, and putting a stop to the progress 
of truth, to bestow rewards on theological opinions, — to make the 
profession of them the condition of honors and emoluments, — is at 
variance with the highest principles of religious and moral obliga- 
tion. If it is our personal duty to the Almighty to examine with 
full attention and rigorous impartiality any revelation attributed to 
him, it is an offence against both God and man to tempt others by 
the offer of any advantages to deviate from the same course.' — 
Letters of an Egyptian Kafir in search of a Religion (printed by 
G. H. Davidson), pp. 109, et seq. 

The extract given in the next Note from De Tocqueville, shows 
very strikingly that such temptations are not limited to theological 
opinions, nor are held out only by state authority. 



414 APPENDIX. 

Note E. Page 346. 

* In America, the majority raises very formidable barriers to the 
liberty of opinion : "within these barriers an author may write what- 
ever he pleases, but he will repent it, if he ever step beyond them.* 
Not that he is exposed to the terrors of an auto-da-fe, but he is 
tormented by the slights and persecutions of daily obloquy. His 
political career is closed forever, since he has offended the only 
authority which is able to promote his success. Every sort of com- 
pensation, even that of celebrity, is refused to him. Before he pub- 
lished his opinions, he imagined that he held them in common with 
many others ; but no sooner has he declared them openly, than he 
is loudly censured by his overbearing opponents, whilst those who 
think, but have not the courage to speak, like him, abandon him in 
silence. He yields at length, oppressed by the daily efforts he has 
been making, and he subsides into silence, as if he were tormented 
by remorse for having spoken the truth. 

* Fetters and headsmen were the coarse instruments which tyranny 
formerly employed; but the civilization of our age has refined the 
arts of despotism, which seemed, however, to have been sufficiently 
perfected before. The excesses of monarchical power has devised a 
variety of physical means of oppression ; the democratic republics of 
the present day have rendered it as entirely an affair of the mind, 
as that will which it is intended to coerce. Under the absolute 
sway of an individual despot, the body was attacked in order to 
subdue the soul; and the soul escaped the blows which were directed 
against it, and rose superior to the attempt ; but such is not the 
course adopted by tyranny in democratic republics : there the body 
is left free and the soul is enslaved. The sovereign can no longer say, 
" You shall think as I do on pain of death ; " but he says, " You are 
free to think differently from me, and to retain your life, your prop- 
erty, and all that you possess; but if such be your determination, you 
are henceforth an alien amongst your people. You may retain your 
civil rights, but they will be useless to you, for you will never be 
chosen by your fellow-citizens if you solicit their suffrages; and they 
will affect to scorn you, if you solicit their esteem. You will remain 
among men, but you will be deprived of the rights of mankind. 

* It was sagaciously remarked by Kant, that * we find a strange and unexpected 
contradiction in human affairs, which, indeed, when regarded as a whole, are full 
of paradoxes. A higher degree of civil freedom would appear favorable to freedom 
of opinion, yet does, in fact, impose insuperable barriers to it.' 



APPENDIX. 415 

Your fellow-creatures will shun you like an impure being ; and those 
who are most persuaded of your innocence will abandon you too, lest 
they should be shunned in their turn. Go in peace ! I have given 
you your life, but it is an existence incomparably worse than death." 

1 Monarchical institutions have thrown an odium upon despotism ; 
let us beware lest democratic republics should restore oppression, and 
should render it less odious and less degrading in the eyes of the 
many, by making it still more onerous to the few.' — Democracy in 
America, by A. de Tocqueville, Reeve's translation, vol. ii. p. 160. 

The sort of social proscription here described is much more pre- 
valent in England, particularly in provincial society, than philoso- 
phers seem to be generally aware of, and is dependent on causes not 
peculiar to republics. M. de Tocqueville's representation of the 
treatment of opinions in America is, however, too favorable. It is 
not, as he states, there rendered ' entirely an affair of the mind.' 
We do not witness, indeed, a priestly auto-da-fe in the streets of 
Boston, or a headsman in Cincinnati, but we see s physical means of 
oppression ' equally horrible. Not many years ago the governor of 
South Carolina recommended the summary execution, without benefit 
of clergy, of all persons caught within the limits of the State hold- 
ing avowed anti-slavery opinions ; and this savage recommendation 
was backed by a select committee of the legislature.* Further, this 
atrocious spirit has not contented itself with mere recommendations; 
houses have been sacked and destroyed, public buildings burnt to the 
ground, human beings seized, flogged, and murdered with the express 
object of punishing and putting down the holders of such opinions. 
Amos Dresser, a student, was arrested, tried before a self-constituted 
tribunal at Nashville, Tennessee, found guilty of being a member of 
an Anti-slavery Society in another State, of having books of an 
anti-slavery tendency in his possession, and of being believed to 
have circulated such in his travels. For these offences (incredible 
as it may appear), in the year 1835 (not 1535), in an ( enlightened 
republic,' he was stripped and flogged with a heavy cow-hide in the 
public market-place amidst the acclamations of the people ! But the 
most affecting instance of martyrdom for opinions in the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century, is the case of a young man named 
Lovejoy — an abolitionist, a clergyman, and editor of a newspaper. 
Four times his types and press were destroyed by mobs, and still he 

* Society in America, by Harriet Martineau, vol. ii. p. 350. 



416 APPENDIX. 

persevered in the resolution of maintaining his ground at all hazards. 
Being required by a committee of the citizens of Alton, in the state 
of Illinois, "where he had taken up his residence, to leave the place, 
he addressed a large assembly before which he was summoned, 

* Pale, but intrepid ; sad, but unsubdued,' 

in an unpremeditated speech, which, for courage, justness of thought, 
pathos, modest but immovable firmness, — in a word, moral sub- 
limity, has seldom been equalled. Such qualities among such a 
people sealed his doom. A few days afterwards, his office was sur- 
rounded by a mob, and he was murdered on his own premises, having 
received five bullets in his body.* Further comment would be 
superfluous. 

Note F. Page 362. 

There is just now an instructive instance going on in the medical 
profession, and amongst scientific men generally, of the reception giv- 
en to new doctrines. I allude to what is usually termed Mesmerism. 
Without entering upon the question respecting its claims to credence, 
which this is not the place to discuss, it is very obvious to all who 
are conversant with the subject, that whatever those claims may be, 
there is a singularly curious field for inquiry which cannot fail to 
produce interesting and important results; and from which no phi- 
losopher who, in the phrase of the day, understands his mission, will 
turn away. Either the great mass of alleged facts in Mesmerism 
are true ; or the power of imposture, and the susceptibility of being 
imposed upon possessed by mankind, transcend any thing previously 
apprehended. If the latter is the conclusion to which philosophers 
shall be ultimately driven, the laws of this power and of this sus- 
ceptibility of deception, will form almost as curious a matter for 
investigation, as the Mesmeric phenomena would themselves do on 
the supposition they were real.f On either issue, therefore, the 
whole subject is extremely worthy of attention to the highest intel- 

* See a deeply interesting article in the Westminster Review, No. LXII., entitled 
'The Martyr Age of the United States.' 

t ' Are not,' asks Dugald Stewart, ' the mischievous consequences which have 
actually been occasioned by the pretenders to animal magnetism, the strongest of 
all encouragements to attempt such an examination of the principles upon which 
the effects really depend, as may give to scientific practitioners the management of 
agents so peculiarly efficacious and overbearing.' — Elements^ vol. iii p. 222. 



APPENDIX. . 417 

lects; and yet ordinary men have turned from it "with angry scorn, 
refusing even to cast their eyes on the appearances before them, 
reminding one of the conduct of those candid lovers of truth, who 
after the invention of the telescope, refused to look through it 
because it would have clearly shown them their own errors. But 
the object of this note is not to stimulate the reader to an investiga- 
tion of Mesmerism, or inspire him with any sentiments in its favor, 
but to direct his attention to what more immediately concerns our 
subject, namely, the mode of its reception ; to incite him to seize the 
present opportunity of watching the way in which men are instigated 
by their prejudices, preconceptions, and personal interests, to con- 
duct themselves towards new doctrines. 

It has been remarked by an eminent philosopher, that we cannot 
now find any language in the process of formation as described by 
theorists, unfolding itself in inflexions and terminations ; but in the 
instance before us we are more fortunate. Nature may be truly 
said to be caught in the fact ; we may watch the whole development 
from first to last of the reception given to the announcement of new 
phenomena and novel inferences. "We may study it in all its stages 
from birth to death, and on a scale on which we shall never have 
an opportunity, perhaps, of studying it again. 

Note G. Page 365. 

The theory of population still remains to be settled by a master- 
hand. Mr. Malthus had a candid and an accomplished mind, well 
calculated to bring out a theory in a striking and popular form, but 
too destitute of precision and depth to do justice to one of the most 
difficult subjects in the whole range of political economy. At the 
very outset he takes an enormous leap to a point which it is doubtful 
whether he could have gained by the legitimate and laborious pro- 
cess of digging his way, and making sure of every step. 

Any one who wishes to study the subject, and therefore to look at 
both sides, will do well not to be repelled by the unwieldy volumes 
of Mr. Sadler, nor should he overlook the comparatively brief work 
of Mr. Doubleday. 

With regard to Mr. Ricardo, who was a good deal over estimated 
in his day, the present writer published a free commentary on some 
of his doctrines in 1825 (when the fame of that eminent economist 
was at the highest), under the title of *A Critical Dissertation on 
the Nature, Measures, and Causes of Value, 5 the main conclusions 
27 



418 APPENDIX, 

of which, although the author was in some quarters much abused 
for them at the time, while equally lauded in others, subsequent 
research and reflection have tended to confirm j and he has ob- 
served many of them to have been since silently adopted by con- 
temporary economists, sometimes to an extent that ought in mere 
justice to have been accompanied by an acknowledgment of the 
source from which they were drawn.* A very striking instance of 
this in a quarter where it was least to be looked for, the author for- 
bears to mention. 

Note H. Page 378. 

The inevitable extension of the methods employed in physical 
science to moral and political investigation is now almost universally 
acknowledged ; the following representation of it may be new to the 
reader : — 

1 While I highly appreciate the ultimate importance of clear and 
forcible exhibitions of moral truth, I am apt to indulge the hope of 
a surer and speedier effect from the progress of that physical phi- 
losophy to which I have adverted, especially since I have become 
better acquainted with its advances in this country. Compared with 
the English, we,t my friend, are in these matters mere children. 
In our part of the world, physical science being either visionary or 
empirical, or both united, could not be expected to have any effect 
in improving morals and politics by the superiority of its methods. 
But here it is pursued on rigorous principles, which must ultimately 
be applied to knowledge of every kind. 

8 The practices of rejecting mere gratuitous hypotheses, of de- 
manding facts, of requiring every step of reasoning to be clearly 
exhibited, of looking for perfect precision in the use of terms, of 
discarding rhetorical illusions and mere phrases, of scouting preten- 
sions to infallibility or exemption from rigorous scrutiny, are all 
prevalent here, all recognized as indispensable in physical research, 
and cannot possibly be confined to the department of material phi- 
losophy. They will necessarily be extended to moral inquiries ; and 

* This cannot be said of Mr. De Quincey, who in his recent work, ' The Logic of 
Political Economy,' has honored the ' Dissertation on Value ' with divers comments. 
Whether these are just or not, the present writer having seen the volume only for 
a few moments while revising this sheet, is not in a condition to say 5 but he feels 
quite sure from Mr. De Quincey's abilities and attainments, that his logical views 
on any subject must be exceedingly valuable. 

t Namely, the Egyptians or Moslems generally. 



APPENDIX. 419 

even supposing that, in consequence of social proscription, or priestly 
or political tyranny, these latter subjects were totally abandoned, 
received no direct examination, were exposed to no discussion for 
even a long period, were withheld (if we can conceive it possible) 
from the very thoughts of men for half a century, yet the influence 
of physical investigation upon them could not in the end be pre- 
vented. All the correct principles of reasoning, all the improved 
methods of research, all the habits of comparison and discrimina- 
tion, all the love of truth which the pursuit of any science has a 
tendency to establish or engender, all the impatience of vagueness 
and obscurity and assumption which the prosecution of inquiry su- 
perinduces upon the spirits of men, would gather round the prohib- 
ited subjects, ready, like hungry lions, to rush on what they had 
been withheld from, by the bars and bolts and chains of social or 
political despotism.' * 

Note I. Page 387. 

This being hooted from society in consequence of professing par- 
ticular opinions has really occurred in the United States of America 
since this was written. The following extract confines itself to 
hooting (at which, however, the people did not stop, as lamentably 
shown in a former note) , and is probably one of the most forcible 
representations of what that term includes ever penned. Speaking 
of the friends of the abolition of slavery, the writer says : ■ They 
met in smaller or larger numbers from time to time ; they met for 
refreshment and for mutual strength : but it was in the intervals of 
these meetings, the weary, lonely intervals, that their trials befel 
them. It was when the husband was abroad about his daily busi- 
ness that he met with his crosses : his brother merchants deprived 
him of his trade ; his servants insulted him ; the magistrate re- 
fused him redress of grievances ; among his letters he found one 
inclosing the ear of a negro ; or a printed handbill offering large 
rewards for his own ears or his head ; or a lithographed representa- 
tion of himself hanging from a gallows or burning in a tar-barrel. 
It was when the wife was plying her needle by the fire-side, that 
messages were brought in from her tradesmen that they could sup- 
ply her no longer, or that letters dropped in with such contents as 
the following : — 

* Letters of an Egyptian Kafir, p. 134. 



420 APPENDIX. 

"< Madam, 
' u I write to inform you that personal violence is intended on you 
and your husband this evening. 

6 " Yours in haste, 

■ " An Abolitionist. 

• " Beware of nine o'clock.' " 

* It was in the course of ordinary life that their children came 
crying from school tormented by their school-fellows for their pa- 
rents' principles ; that youths had the doors of colleges slammed in 
their faces, and that young men were turned back from the pulpit 
and the bar. 5 * 

Note K. Page 389. 

Extract from a letter dated London, March 1, 1785, from the 
Count de Mirabeau to Sir Samuel (then Mr.) Romilly : — 

1 " He was happy," said I, one day in speaking of Fontenelle. 
These words, which ought to find a joyful echo in every good breast, 
alas ! one hardly ventures to utter them. Hatred and envy have 
ever made Fontenelle's happiness a cause of reproach to him. They 
made it a crime in him that he did not draw down upon himself per- 
secution from the prejudices of his age; that he showed to others 
only half of those truths of which he saw the whole; that he drew 
aside one veil from the image of truth, only to throw over it another; 
that he exhibited genius trembling before prejudices which ought to 
have trembled before him. What a passion is Envy ! without re- 
laxation she pursues the man of genius, throwing back upon him all 
the torment which she suffers at his hands. If he utter a complaint, 
she says that he is lowering himself by retaliation; if he be silent, 
his silence is insensibility to insult; if his uncompromising spirit lead 
him to make popular error the object of his undisguised attack, she 
paints him as a factious spirit, with whom nothing is sacred; if his 
prudence soften truth, in order that it may not be exposed to the 
outrage of the multitude, she accuses him of having stifled it in its 
birth, and of having sacrificed the eternal rights of mankind to a few 
days of repose. Doubtless we must admire those vigorous and in- 
trepid spirits who proclaim truth in all the splendor and dignity 
with which their own genius has clothed her ; and who not satisfied 
with the glory of discovering her, aspire to that of suffering, and, if 

* See the article before referred to, entitled * The Martyr Age of the United 
States,' Westminster Review, No. LXII. p. 15. 



APPENDIX. 421 

need be, of dying for her. I shall always respect Fenelon writing 
Telemachus in the court of Louis XIV., and Sir Thomas More pub- 
lishing the Utopia in the palace of Henry VIII. These noble spirits 
hallow the age which dishonored itself by persecuting them. But 
while one sheds tears of pity and admiration at the thought of such 
heroical self-devotion, one regrets that the human mind should not 
have benefited by them as it ought. I come, my friend, to the con- 
clusion, that to sacrifice one's self for truth is not the way to insure 
its triumph. Persecution which spreads the progress of error, arrests 
that of reason ; and philosophers do not, like fanatics, multiply in 
exile, in prison, and under the axe of the executioner. Perhaps 
there have been countries and ages in which the boldest truth, an- 
nounced on a sudden to a sovereign people, forced upon the atten- 
tion of an immense multitude by all the powers of eloquence, might 
have effected a revolution [in opinion] at the very moment of its ut- 
terance ; and it were noble to sacrifice one's self to such a hope as 
this. But in our days time only can give to truth the victory over 
prejudice; with us the reign of truth is not the dazzling sway of 
some new creation of genius, but it is the imperceptible influence ef 
general intelligence, by which error is overthrown without the sound 
of its fall being heard. 

' This is the point of view, my dear !Romilly, in which this Fonte- 
nelle, whom I have so long despised, only perhaps because of all men 
of genius he is the one to whom nature has made me the most unlike, 
appears to me to be so remarkable. Truth seems in his eyes to be 
like that ancient statue of Isis, which was covered with many veils; 
he thinks that every age should remove one veil, and only raise the 
next for the age which is to follow. He knows men and he fears 
them, not only because they are capable of doing much harm, but 
because it is very difficult to do them any good ; and he has found 
the means of doing them good by the practice of an art which would 
doubtless never have been resorted to by a more energetic and im- 
petuous character, but which in him has made even timidity and dis- 
cretion subservient to the progress of the spirit of philosophy. At 
one time he bows down for a moment before an error of his own age, 
and then raising himself from this constrained attitude of respect, in 
its very presence, he aims a blow at a similar error which has de- 
luded all antiquity. At another time he places by the side of error a 
truth which he appears to sacrifice and subject to her, but which is 
sure to be triumphant provided it be allowed to remain there even at 



422 APPENDIX. 

such a cost.* Often he parades prejudices in all their pretensions, 
and even grants them that which from the fear of appearing too ab- 
surd they do not claim. At those times when homage is expected 
from him he is silent, and this silence always occurs at a place where 
it will be best understood, and give least offence. Sometimes, on the 
other hand, he is eager to appear unnecessarily submissive and ob- 
sequious, and by so doing shows that there are unjust and suspicious 
tyrants whom one must distrust. In general, instead of attacking 
errors one by one, he devotes himself to the task of exposing and 
drying up in the human mind the sources whence they spring. He 
aims at giving new light and strength to that power of intelligence 
which is destined to subvert them all, and by so doing raises up 
against them an eternal enemy. Thus he attacks them by respect, 
destroys them by homage, pierces them on all sides with shafts of 
which they have no right to complain ; and although they have al- 
ways an eye upon him as upon their most dangerous enemy, he lives 
and dies in peace in the very midst of them. 

1 Without any disparagement to my own impetuosity, this method 
may very possibly, my dear friend, be the best, and no less entitled 
to respect than mine, and it is certainly far more conducive to per- 
sonal tranquillity; but as it does not and never will suit my charac- 
ter, I begin to feel a great inclination for idleness, even that of mind, 
and above all a very lively regret for inroads on my time, occasioned 
by human observances, the fantastical opinions of other men, and 
the conventions of society.' f 

* We are here reminded of a passage in Playfair. c Error,-' he says, l is never so 
sure of being exposed as when the truth is placed close to it, side by side, without 
any thing to alarm prejudice, or awaken from its lethargy the dread of innovation. ' 
— Works, vol. ii. p. 426. 

t Memoirs of the Life of Sir Samuel Romilly, by his Sons, vol. i. p. 293. The 
translation above given is the same as that in the Memoirs, with a few verbal 
alterations. 



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